[net.politics.theory] A Tale of Lenin and the Tsar

carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (12/05/85)

I want to take a break from the controversies currently raging in
this newsgroup and post something which I think will be of general
interest.  The following is an excerpt from an unpublished lecture by
John E. Roemer, an economist at UC Davis.  A mathematically rigorous
version of the argument is published in *Econometrica* 53 (1985).
_______________

1.  INTRODUCTION.  Revolutions have been thought of by social
scientists, for the most part, as inexplicable or irrational events,
events exogenous to the jurisdiction of the models we build to
explain economic and social behavior.  (Historians, being less
enamored of models, have placed revolutions more centrally in the
purview of their discipline.)  The hurdle for economists and
political scientists in explaining revolutions is the collective
action problem:  why should any individual join a revolutionary
movement, when the costs to him of participation are potentially very
high, and the benefits, if the revolution succeeds, will be enjoyed
by him even without his participation?  Rosa Luxembourg was not
unaware of the problem of explaining mass action (she wrote on the
psychology of the mass strike); I suppose, in our modern jargon, she
could be translated as saying that in certain situations, the
preference structure of the Prisoner's Dilemma game does not
characterize how people think about participating or not
participating in the mass movement; they have, instead, what are
called Assurance Game preferences, in which each person derives more
utility from participating if others do than from defecting or
scabbing if others participate.  Saying this doesn't make it so, of
course, and the hyperrationality which characterizes economic theory
today pushes us to ask:  what, then, explains the switch in
preferences from those which characterize the "individualistic"
Prisoner's Dilemma, to those of the "cooperative" Assurance Game,
facilitating possibility of mass action?

In this talk, I sidestep this central question.  Too often, I think,
in economics, we fail to study phenomena because they don't make
sense given our way of thinking about things.  Or, worse, we deny a
phenomenon exists because we can't explain it.  The attitude of many
economists towards mass unemployment is an example of this last
casualty of our scientific method.  And while no one, so far as I
know, denies the existence of revolutions, they tend not to be
studied, not because of their unimportance, but because our present
models of individual behavior do not enable us to get to first base
in explaining them.  It is not a big step to conclude, as a
consequence of this failure of theory, that revolutions are
aberrations, or exogenous like earthquakes.  I have avoided calling
upon the *deus ex machina* of "paradigm myopia" to explain the
non-study of revolutions, because I do not wish to suggest that the
"other" so-called paradigm, Marxism, has all the answers regarding
them.  Certainly for Marxism revolution occupies a central place, but
I do not think Marxists have answered very well questions of
collective action and revolutionary dynamics.  [John Roemer]
[to be continued]
-- 
Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes

laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (12/07/85)

For any given revolution-type action there will always be people who will
understand that *nothing is going to happen unless somebody does it*.  They
are not particularily interested in how fair it will be that some people
will enjoy benefits which they have not earned by joining the revolutionary
movement -- they are interested in the fact that if they don't do something
they will not get the benefits that they want.

-- 
Laura Creighton		
sun!l5!laura		(that is ell-five, not fifteen)
l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa

carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (02/11/86)

While this article is formally a reply to Wasilewsky, it will also
serve as a further reply to Fencsik's question about the nature of
contemporary academic Marxism.  Jan writes, concerning "A Tale of
Lenin and the Tsar":

>I realize these are two fictitious characters. However, the fact that
>they behave completely out of character for their historical
>namesakes *does* reflect, to me, on the value of the analysis. The
>author says: here is how two forces behave, let us understand why.
>The answer: because you invented them this way - leaves his
>conclusions without foundation.
>
>The fictitious "Lenin" has, as his main priority, the overthrow of
>the tsarist regime - which, however, treats him with relative
>leniency, and we are invited to understand that. Having this
>priority, he calls for "progressive income redistribution" to obtain
>the support of the people. All this, for historical Lenin and the
>tsarist government, is complete hogwash.

Jan here misses the point of Roemer's article, which may not have
been very clear although I thought it was.  The name "Lenin" was
chosen for one of the agents in the tale simply because Lenin is the
most famous revolutionary of our time.  "The Tsar" is the obvious
name for "Lenin's" opponent in a two-person game.  Roemer did not
state or imply that the model (or rather models) he proposed had any
particularly close correspondence to the historical reality of the
Russian Revolution, nor do his conclusions depend on a close
correspondence.  

The principal question Roemer is addressing is this:  Is it possible
to understand revolutionary ideology in terms of individual
rationality?  Revolutions need not be black boxes; we can (Roemer
suggests) understand how they work.  As a step towards this
understanding, Roemer constructs a model in the form of a two-person
game.  The purpose of constructing models is to enable us to
substitute precision for handwaving; by starting with a set of
precisely defined assumptions, we may be able to derive interesting
results that shed some light on the real world.  It goes without
saying that the real world is more complex than the model; it also
goes without saying that if the model's assumptions are too wildly
unrealistic (e.g., "people seek to minimize their income"), then the
model is of little use.  Jan appears to believe that the model's
assumptions are unrealistic:

>As for "income redistribution" - the error is even worse here.
>This was not *anywhere* on Lenin's, or the Bolsheviks', list of
>priorities. (Redistributionism and "petty-bourgeois egalitarian-
>ism" are among the swear words of Bolshevik theoretical jargon).
>Their agrarian program was very characteristic: the land of the
>landlords (about half of the land in use) was to be expropriated, but
>*not* parcelled to the peasants.  Rather, it was to be developed
>by the state ("bourgeois-democratic" state) with hired labor, because
>large-scale production units were more progressive.  The Mensheviks'
>program differed in that the land was to be municipal, not central
>government, property. There was a party that wanted all the land to
>go to the peasants - the Socialist-Revolutionaries (SR) and some
>other parties with more moderate redistribution agenda. In 1917,
>after their coup, Bolsheviks suddenly scuttled their own program and
>adopted the SR program - for the good reason that it had the
>overwhelming support of the peasants.  Such lightning changes of
>policy were quite characteristic of Lenin. But of course that had
>nothing to do with defeating the Tsar who had been deposed long
>since.

Jan's historical account is interesting but beside the point.  It
shows that the Russian Revolution did not follow exactly the course
of Roemer's model.  Of course -- no one has claimed that it did.  But
Jan's account also shows that progressive redistribution (from rich
to poor) was very much on the minds of the revolutionaries, even if
they wished to redistribute wealth in the form of collective rather
than private property.  And indeed there is a large class of
historical situations (including e.g., Central America and South
Africa today) in which we may presume that the desire to improve
one's material situation is one of the principal motives for engaging
in revolutionary activity.  So I think it is not grossly unrealistic
for the Lenin of the fable to propose a progressive redistribution of
income.  In fact, one of Roemer's main results is that, given the
other assumptions of the model(s) (which of course I have not yet
specified), Lenin MUST propose a progressive redistribution if he
wishes the revolution to succeed.  This is what Roemer means by
"rationalizing revolutionary ideology"; under the terms of the
model(s), proposing a progressive redistribution can be viewed as a
rational strategy for winning the two-person game with the Tsar.  

If I have time, I will post some more excerpts from the article to
clarify these points.  For now let me post these general
methodological remarks from another article by John Roemer.
Reprinted in defiance of bourgeois copyright laws.
__________________

Marxism's method, it is often claimed, is the dialectical analysis of
social forces; Marx's key insight was to see the individual was
determined by his social milieu, indeed his relation to the means of
production; methodological individualism ignores this insight by
placing the individual in the center of the story.  Classes must be
the atoms of the Marxian system, not strategic individuals [or so it 
is claimed].  The power of the Marxian argument must come, however,
not by postulating that classes are the atoms of the system, but by
proving that as a *theorem*.  One has no choice but to take
individuals as given and separate.  We observe that individuals
frequently act in class units, the problem being to explain this in a
deductive way, based on postulates of individual behavior.  A huge
deficiency of bourgeois history and social science is its inability
to understand class behavior and solidarity:  as well as observing
the importance of such behavior, Marxists are obliged to explain it.
Marxism consists of at least these claims:

(1) that classes act as units in certain historical situations;

(2) that class position is best defined with reference to a person's
relation to the means of production;

(3) that class struggle is the mechanism of historical change;

(4) that historical change has a certain pattern (feudalism,
capitalism, socialism);

(5) that capitalism is ethically bad (exploitation).

To argue these points, Marxism requires at least three types of work
-- history, social science and philosophy.  I think the role of
history is to formulate inductive laws, with reference to (1)-(4)
above.  The role of social science is partly inductive, to formulate
laws on a somewhat more micro level than history does, but also
deductive, to formulate axiomatic theory that can explain the
inductive laws.  For example, I have referred to proving a theorem
that individuals will act as classes in some situations as an example
of how (1) [classes sometimes act as units] can be given such han
axiomatic basis.  An example of (2) [class position being defined by
relation to means of production] is the work of [E.O.] Wright, who
shows by analysis of data that defining class by reference to the
relations to the means of production gives more cogent explanations
of certain phenomena than defining class with reference to income or
status as non-Marxist sociology does.  Game theory can be an
important tool ... for claim (1) at least.  I have argued above it is
also useful in (3) [class struggle as the mechanism of historical
change].  It is the role of Marxist philosophy to argue for (5)
[capitalism is ethically bad], although that argument must depend on
historical work.  It is also interesting to note that game theory can
be useful for (5), in clarifying ethical positions....

On this account, what distinguished Marxist from non-Marxist social
science is not the postulate of methodological individualism, but the
level of aggregation deduced as applicable in social analysis.  In
the non-Marxist view history is determined originally by man's
struggle against nature, and no further level of aggregation is
fruitful.  In the Marxist view history may be determined originally
by man's struggle against nature, but the struggle against nature
leads to the formation of classes that struggle against each other.
Indeed, class interests can then affect the struggle against nature.
It is in this sense that Marxism performs an aggregation that
bourgeois thought does not.  The most efficacious lens for analysis
may not be the one with the highest magnifying power, and by
resolving always to the level of the individual one may lose the
pattern.

....If we had a good axiomatic theory of class formation and
development of class capacity under capitalism, perhaps a
generalization would suggest itself applicable to socialism.  I think
the inadequacy of the Marxist understanding of developments in
twentieth century socialism in large part results from the lack of
formulation of a general deductive theory of class, inspired by the
inductive observations that constitute historical materialism.

There is a secondary purpose for using deductive models in Marxism:
to win over non-Marxists by showing them that Marxism can be
formulated as a consistent system, requiring that the choice for or
against it must be made on the basis of which world-view better
conforms to historical evidence, not on the basis of internal
consistency.  I do not mean to imply these ideological decisions are
taken in the pristine vacuum of the library; but if we believe
academic Marxism has any role, we must acknowledge the power and
importance of rigorous argument in ideological debate.  Both
world-views, it appears, can be made internally consistent by modern
standards of rigor.  But I think this pedagogic purpose is secondary.
The axiomatic method, and methodological individualism in particular,
is useful not mainly as a language to convince skeptics, but as a
tool to teach ourselves.  [John Roemer]
-- 
Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes