kort@hounx.UUCP (B.KORT) (02/04/86)
Nothwithstanding the rationalist view that the use of force is (generally) an irrational behavior, we are nevertheless left with the reality that some alloplastic agents in our society do habitually embrace force as a means of attaining their goals. The dilemma of the rationalist is how to protect his interests without returning violence for violence. This dilemma vexed even Einstein, an avowed pacifist who later urged (and then regretted) the use of atomic weapons. It is easier to learn war than to learn peace. Until we learn how to teach peace, we will have more knowledge of combative behavior than of cooperative behavior. --Barry Kort
janw@inmet.UUCP (02/07/86)
[--Paul V. Torek torek@umich] >>[Bob Stubblefield] >>To say that in normal circumstances the initiation of force to >>gain values is irrational, is not to say force is irrational in >>all contexts. [examples]. Stealing a loaf of bread in Marie >>Antoinette's day may have been rational. It is certainly possible >>for man to devise political systems that make it difficult to >>distinguish the rational from the irrational. >I have an important question here: is stealing a loaf of bread in Marie >Antoinette's day an example of *initiating* force? If so, you have >already conceded that it is sometimes rational to initiate force. And >in that case, why isn't it rational to support certain laws (say, laws >that authorize taxation to pay for national defense, for example)? Bob makes an important distinction between *normal* and *abnor- mal* circumstances. What you are saying is that the circumstance of a state having external enemies is abnormal enough to *insti- tutionalize* the initiation of force against *own* citizens. This means *giving up* normality (in Bob's sense) for good. The price is clearly too high to be rationally paid because you are giving up what you are trying to save. However, if the taxes are emergency levies and are not likely to become permanent, then I can see how someone rationally opposed to initiation of force in general would make an exception in ex- traodinary circumstances. There is a moral difference between, say, an anti-Nazi resistance fighter sequestering a private weapon *against all law*, and Congress voting that, from now on, any part of a person's income they want to take, is theirs. The difference here is entirely in favor of the law-breaker, and against the lawmaker. It is like all other intolerable moral choices. A starving peasant family might intentionally let one of the children die to save the others and keep the seed grain. Would you proceed from this observation to, say, a constitutional amendment institu- tionalizing children-killing to save on food resources ? The con- clusion from an abnormal situation should rather be, to concen- trate on discovering ways to prevent its recurrence. Jan Wasilewsky
janw@inmet.UUCP (02/10/86)
[kort@hounx --Barry Kort] >Nothwithstanding the rationalist view that the use of force is (generally) >an irrational behavior, we are nevertheless left with the reality that some >alloplastic agents in our society do habitually embrace force as a means >of attaining their goals. IRS and INS are prominent among these agents. >The dilemma of the rationalist is how to >protect his interests without returning violence for violence. In the cases above, one might vote or lobby ... >This dilemma vexed even Einstein, an avowed pacifist who later >urged (and then regretted) the use of atomic weapons. *Later* that, and before, simultaneously with pacifism, the So- viet revolution; and later, simultaneously with pacifism, Zionism and defense of Israel. He was awfully nice but inconsistent, through and through. His political views carry as little authori- ty as Newton's biblical exegesis. But you've switched to alloplastic agents *outside* our society (external enemies). That problem is hard, indeed. >It is easier to learn war than to learn peace. Read: to "learn" *them* peace. Democratic societies *are* peace- ful, it is a proven fact. While the planet is always covered with a rash of wars, there has never been a war between two democratic countries. They don't even arm against each other. The problem of war is solved, in principle: make all nations as free as (e.g.) Costa Rica. In practice, there are obstacles. Jan Wasilewsky
janw@inmet.UUCP (02/10/86)
[hound!rwsh (R.STUBBLEFIELD)] > When I say force is the opposite of reason, I am *not* saying the >victim or the initiator of force necessarily becomes incapable of reason. >(Although it is clear that force could destroy the victim's brain and his >faculty of reason.) To be precise, initiation of force to gain values is >*opposed* to the faculty of reason. I will argue, after some intermediate >steps, that initiating force to gain values is detrimental to the faculty >of reason--both to that of the victim *and* the initiator. We have here 3 successively weakened reformulations. I agree with the last one, in a still weaker form: (1) Force is *the* opposite of reason. --"The" implies the one and only. Surely, force is not the antonym of reason; and lots of things (such as self-delusion) could be said to be opposed to reason as much as force or more. (2) Initiating force to gain values is *opposed* to the faculty of reason. --Well, it is opposed to whatever faculty would be in command if force were not initiated - sometimes, reason. (3) Initiating force to gain values is *detrimental* to the faculty of reason--both to that of the victim and the initiator. Add : "tends to be", and "in the long run", and I agree. This is *still* strong enough to object to *institutionalized* initiation of force in society - *even* if that were the only way to prevent *sporadic* use of force by society's members. However, the alter- native of a total breakdown of civilization, or of imminent con- quest, would be bad enough to justify that. If non-initiation of force is the rule, it would seem to follow that enforcement of *contracts* by physical force - especially by the government - is *not* justified. Breaking a contract is not initiating force. People often say "force or fraud" - as if they were one. But they aren't. Also, breach of a contract does not always imply fraud. Can contracts be maintained, except by the threat of force ? Certainly. There are many examples. Jan Wasilewsky
torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (02/13/86)
In article <28200631@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: >>>To say that in normal circumstances the initiation of force to >>>gain values is irrational, is not to say force is irrational in >>>all contexts. [examples]. Stealing a loaf of bread in Marie >>>Antoinette's day may have been rational. It is certainly possible >>>for man to devise political systems that make it difficult to >>>distinguish the rational from the irrational.[Bob Stubblefield] > >>I have an important question here: is stealing a loaf of bread in Marie >>Antoinette's day an example of *initiating* force? If so, you have >>already conceded that it is sometimes rational to initiate force. And >>in that case, why isn't it rational to support certain laws (say, laws >>that authorize taxation to pay for national defense, for example)? > >Bob makes an important distinction between *normal* and *abnor- >mal* circumstances. What you are saying is that the circumstance >of a state having external enemies is abnormal enough to *insti- >tutionalize* the initiation of force against *own* citizens. No, that's not my point. What I'm wondering is what separates "normal" from "abnormal" circumstances, and whether "abnormal" ones are really abnormal at all. Maybe they aren't -- maybe the very circumstances we live in and can expect to live in for quite a while (those of having external enemies) justify the use of force in taxation? To put it differently, what is the difference between stealing the loaf of bread in Antoinette's day on the one hand, and taxation for defense today on the other, that makes the first OK but the second wrong? --Paul Torek torek@umich
carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (02/13/86)
There has been some discussion recently concerning "initiation of force" (alternatively "initiation of coercion"). Would someone please post a definition of this term so that I can follow the discussion. What conditions are necessary and sufficient for an event to be considered an initiation of force? -- Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes