laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (12/17/85)
In article <879@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: > >The problem with this solution for the libertarians is that it requires >a powerful central government, with the ability to collect taxes. I >don't see any solutions which are compatible with libertarian ideas on >government. > >(I do quibble with the details of how our government deals with the problem. >Instead of regulations limiting the permitted pollutants, there should be >taxes on the amount of pollutants emitted, with an effort made to match >the tax to the costs imposed on others thereby -- this is hard to do when >health and life are at stake, but not impossible. This would not diminish >the need for a powerful central government.) > Frank, what you have come up with is one of the standard libertarian solutions to such a problem. There are other ones. But those are not taxes that you are getting your government to collect but fines or fees -- unless you plan on making everybody pay for the damage done by Joe Polluter's factory. -- Laura Creighton sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa
torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (01/27/86)
Do janw et. al. accept my assessment of janw's scheme for dealing with pollution? Or have they not seen my latest reply on the subject (about 2 weeks ago)? By the way, I'll try to get around to my critique of Nozick on this subject soon. Then you'll have to defend Nozick, or come up with something better. --Paul V. Torek torek@umich
janw@inmet.UUCP (01/28/86)
[--Paul V. Torek torek@umich] >Do janw et. al. accept my assessment of janw's scheme for dealing with >pollution? Or have they not seen my latest reply on the subject (about 2 >weeks ago)? There was a hiatus in communication. I am reposting, below, my response to the last items I saw. >By the way, I'll try to get around to my critique of Nozick on this subject >soon. Then you'll have to defend Nozick, or come up with something better. I'm looking forward to it. Arguing with you is a pleasure. Let's disagree, always :-). [flink@umcp-cs] >ONE of those individuals is the (would-be) polluter and the other is the >(would-be) victim, and if a person has a RIGHT -- a "moral trump card", a >la most libertarianisms I know of -- not to be imposed upon without consent, >then the polluter must compensate the victim according to the victim's >opinion of the worth of his own life, PERIOD, and tough toenails for the >would-be polluter. If the right is all on *one* side and if the violation is in the *future* ("would-be polluter") then you are absolutely right. Both conditions are necessary. E.g., if I propose to buy your car and you refuse, no court should be able to appoint a price at which you *have* to sell. Thus, eminent domain is morally unjustifiable. Now suppose I smashed your car in an accident. Compensation will *not* be determined by you unilaterally (e.g., a pound of flesh). I am wrong, but I still have my rights. Now consider two people breathing in a stuffy room. *Both* are polluters, both victims and by the same process. None holds a moral trump card. If, for whatever reason (say, a garlic diet), one pollutes *more*, there is still no trump card - it is a matter of degree; he has a right to breath; finite compensation is appropriate. "A right not to be imposed upon" is ambiguous. You interpret it as "right not to be harmed or inconvenienced". By your definition, if the *existence* of someone gets on my nerves and shortens my life, that person owes me whatever I ask (such as to terminate his existence). And for some reason you consider this bizarre position libertarian. On this net you have a considerable collection of libertarians, no two of which agree on everything. I'll bet you that not one accepts the above position. You have *not* to my knowledge logi- cally deduced it from any clearly formulated principle they *do* recognize. >>>>[T. Dave Hudson:] But in legal matters, it is sometimes necessary >>>>to assign a value to something. (Unfortunately, this is abused, >>>>as in taxation and eminent domain.) >>>Or as in janw's scheme. No? Why is it that libertarians forget their >>>libertarianism at the most convenient moments? No. See above. Pollution is morally superior to confiscation. It is fair for the garlic eater to compensate his roommate; it is not fair for the roommate to throw him out and then compensate him. One uses *his* right and incidentally hurts another. The other has no right behind his action. Jan Wasilewsky
desj@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (David desJardins) (02/25/86)
In article <28200611@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: >.......... >Both conditions are necessary. >E.g., if I propose to buy your car and you refuse, no court >should be able to appoint a price at which you *have* to sell. >Thus, eminent domain is morally unjustifiable. When you use words like "should," it seems you take on the responsibility to justify what you say, and not just present it as a fact. It seems to me that there are many examples where it is in the public interest to do precisely what you refer to above. For example, suppose I patent an invention and then refuse to allow it to be used. Is it not in the public interest to require that I make my invention available to others at a reasonable price? Or suppose I have a natural monopoly on the production of some essential item. Should I be allowed to take advantage of this to wield power over individuals? Note that the problem as stated would never occur for rational individuals, since to a rational being the value of every commodity, even his life, is finite. But (1) not all individuals behave rationally, and (2) an equivalent problem occurs if I seek to form a monopoly and demand unreasonable profits. Government intervention becomes necessary (or at least desirable) in both of these situations. >Now suppose I smashed your car in an accident. Compensation will >*not* be determined by you unilaterally (e.g., a pound of >flesh). I am wrong, but I still have my rights. Why is there a difference? If the cost to you is the same, why should the compensation differ. It seems that it is your position which is logically unjustifiable. >Now consider two people breathing in a stuffy room. *Both* are >polluters, both victims and by the same process. None holds a >moral trump card. If, for whatever reason (say, a garlic diet), >one pollutes *more*, there is still no trump card - it is a >matter of degree; he has a right to breath; finite compensation >is appropriate. No question here. >"A right not to be imposed upon" is ambiguous. >You interpret it as "right not to be harmed or inconvenienced". >By your definition, if the *existence* of someone gets on >my nerves and shortens my life, that person owes me whatever >I ask (such as to terminate his existence). And for some >reason you consider this bizarre position libertarian. It seems that *you* are the one who has said that the individual, not the courts, decides the cost. Agreed the position as stated is absurd, but if we modify it so that the cost is decided by the courts (what I will call the "true cost") then it seems perfectly correct. You have to be careful here. Suppose we postulate the existence of a parasitic life form, which cannot exist without harming another individual. My position would be that its continued existence would be dependent on its willingness and ability to pay the cost (the true cost, not whatever may be asked) to the host of its existence. Is your position that if the parasite has no ability to pay then its right to exist should override the host's rights to avoid inconvenience? This seems to be what you are saying... -- David desJardins [Note: the above can be reread in two ways. First let "parasitic list form" = "vampire," and consider whether it has a right to suck your blood. Then let "parasitic life form" = "human fetus" and consider whether it has a right to be carried to term.] Disclaimer: I am not a libertarian. To some this will be sufficient reason to ignore everything I say...
js2j@mhuxt.UUCP (sonntag) (02/26/86)
> In article <28200611@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: > >.......... > >Both conditions are necessary. > >E.g., if I propose to buy your car and you refuse, no court > >should be able to appoint a price at which you *have* to sell. > >Thus, eminent domain is morally unjustifiable. > > When you use words like "should," it seems you take on the > responsibility to justify what you say, and not just present it > as a fact. It seems to me that there are many examples where it > is in the public interest to do precisely what you refer to above. > For example, suppose I patent an invention and then refuse to > allow it to be used. Is it not in the public interest to require > that I make my invention available to others at a reasonable price? The fact that something would be in the public interest is far from sufficient justification for the government to 'require' anything. Suppose the invention above allowed the inventor to produce, say, steel, at a fraction of the normal production costs of his competitors. I'm sure the competitors would be happy to agree with you, that this unsharing inventor should have to share his invention with them. Would this *really* be in the public interest? It certainly would drive down the cost of steel, and steel using products, as the inventor could otherwise charge only slightly less than his competitors. What other effects could we expect to see? Other inventors emigrating to more reasonable countries, rather than let their inventions be taken from them by force here? A general loss of pride as people realize that the country they live in isn't really 'free'? These hidden costs are not negligible. > It seems that *you* are the one who has said that the individual, > not the courts, decides the cost. Agreed the position as stated is > absurd, but if we modify it so that the cost is decided by the courts > (what I will call the "true cost") then it seems perfectly correct. If you accidentally wreck my car, I'm perfectly willing to let the courts decide on how much compensation you should give me. If you want to contract to wreck my car every week, I want to be able to decide how much to charge you myself, godammit! BTW, using the term 'true cost' for the number the fallible court comes up with is a pretty misleading form of argument. > You have to be careful here. Suppose we postulate the existence > of a parasitic life form, which cannot exist without harming another > individual. My position would be that its continued existence would > be dependent on its willingness and ability to pay the cost (the true > cost, not whatever may be asked) to the host of its existence. Seems consistant with your position. Makes me want to barf. Doesn't matter what the 'host' (more accurately, victim) wants? If the court decides that a meal for Dracula is worth $100,000 to the slightly drained hosts, you'd be willing to help hold them down, huh? Even if they're screaming: 'No! Not for any amount of money!' > > -- David desJardins -- Jeff Sonntag ihnp4!mhuxt!js2j
rab@well.UUCP (Bob Bickford) (03/02/86)
<BUG?!> In article <12032@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>, desj@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (David desJardins) writes: > In article <28200611@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: > >.......... > >Both conditions are necessary. > >E.g., if I propose to buy your car and you refuse, no court > >should be able to appoint a price at which you *have* to sell. > >Thus, eminent domain is morally unjustifiable. > > When you use words like "should," it seems you take on the > responsibility to justify what you say, and not just present it > as a fact. It seems to me that there are many examples where it > is in the public interest to do precisely what you refer to above. > For example, suppose I patent an invention and then refuse to > allow it to be used. Is it not in the public interest to require > that I make my invention available to others at a reasonable price? It may be that others may benefit if you are forced to make it available, but this is not a morally acceptable reason for so forcing you. The loss of a *potential* benefit is no loss at all. > Or suppose I have a natural monopoly on the production of some There is no such thing as a natural monopoly. Monopolies only persist when enforced by government. > (2) an equivalent problem occurs if I seek to form > a monopoly and demand unreasonable profits. Government intervention > becomes necessary (or at least desirable) in both of these situations. If you demand unreasonable profits (aside: define unreasonable. prove the reasonableness of your definition) then I can open up a competing business making smaller profits and thereby serve the public better. The only thing you can do to stop me (in a free market) is to lower your prices. Clearly, this also serves the 'public interest'. -- Robert Bickford (rab@well.uucp) ================================================ | I doubt if these are even my own opinions. | ================================================