carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (03/15/86)
Adam Reed writes: >Of the other two names on the list - Hobbes and Spinoza - neither >qualifies as a Liberal.... Spinoza held that individual will, and thus >individual freedom, was an illusion. His pantheistic metaphysics led >to an ethics based on the premise that "Whatever exists is God". The >political corrolary of this view is acquiescence in whatever exists. >The Panglossian secularization of the above ("All is for the best in >the best of all possible worlds") was the intellectual foundation of >early conservatism, and was mercilessly ridiculed, from an >uncompromising classical Liberal perspective, by Voltaire. While >Spinoza's refusal of a royal pension from Louis XIV tells us a great >deal about his personal integrity, the fact that the pension was >offered tells us even more about the political uses and implications >of his philosophy. I think it is fair to call Spinoza a liberal; but it depends on where you draw the line, and I don't want to argue about that. Spinoza founded his political philosophy on the natural rights and rational self-interest of individuals; individuals are led by reason to form the state by contract. Spinoza was also a stout defender of freedom of thought and speech. I was not aware that Louis XIV offered Spinoza a pension, but it's questionable how much can be read into this. Spinoza was a champion of democracy, and Louis XIV was hardly a democrat, however much he may have approved of Spinoza's philosophy in other respects. I am sure I would distort Spinoza's political philosophy if I tried to summarize it, so I will let him speak for himself. Perhaps a good point of entry into his political philosophy is Chapter 16 of *A Theologico-Political Treatise*. It's only 12 pages and not difficult. If this arouses your interest or if you disagree with or are puzzled by anything in this chapter, then read the first two or three chapters of *A Political Treatise*, in which Spinoza explains his views in greater detail. The former work contains this passage: ______________ Such being the ends in view for the sovereign power, the duty of subjects is, as I have said, to obey its commands, and to recognize no right save that which it sanctions. It will, perhaps, be thought that we are turning subjects into slaves: for slaves obey commands and free men live as they like; but this idea is based on a misconception, for the true slave is he who is led away by his pleasures and can neither see what is good for him nor act accordingly: he alone is free who lives with free consent under the entire guidance of reason. Action in obedience to orders does take away freedom in a certain sense, but it does not, therefore, make a man a slave, all depends on the object of the action. If the object of the action be the good of the state, and not the good of the agent, the latter is a slave and does himself no good: but in a state or kingdom where the weal of the whole people, and not that of the ruler, is the supreme law, obedience to the sovereign power does not make a man a slave, of no use to himself, but a subject. Therefore, that state is the freest whose laws are founded on sound reason, so that every member of it may, if he will, be free; that is, live with full consent under the entire guidance of reason. [Spinoza inserts a footnote here:] "Every member of it may, if he will, be free." Whatever be the social state a man finds himself in, he may be free. For certainly a man is free, in so far as he is led by reason. Now reason (though Hobbes thinks otherwise) is always on the side of peace, which cannot be attained unless the general laws of the state be respected. Therefore the more a man is led by reason -- in other words, the more he is free, the more constantly will he respect the laws of his country, and obey the commands of the sovereign power to which he is subject. Children, though they are bound to obey all the commands of their parents, are yet not slaves: for the commands of parents look generally to the children's benefit. We must, therefore, acknowledge a great difference between a slave, a son, and a subject; their positions may be thus defined. A slave is one who is bound to obey his master's orders, though they are given solely in the master's interest; a son is one who obeys his father's orders, given in his own interest; a subject obeys the orders of the sovereign power, given for the common interest, wherein he is included. I think I have now shown sufficiently clearly the basis of a democracy: I have especially desired to do so, for I believe it to be of all forms of government the most natural, and the most consonant with individual liberty. In it no one transfers his natural right so absolutely that he has no further voice in affairs, he only hands it over to the majority of a society, whereof he is a unit. Thus all men remain, as they were in the state of nature, equals. This is the only form of government which I have treated of at length, for it is the one most akin to my purpose of showing the benefits of freedom in a state. ________________ -- Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes
carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (03/17/86)
Adam Reed: >Of the other two names on the list - Hobbes and Spinoza - neither >qualifies as a Liberal. >Hobbes, with his "social organismic" theory of >the State, was the intellectual precursor of fascism and of >totalitarian democracy. I don't see how anyone can call Hobbes "the" or even "an" intellectual precursor of fascism. One of Hobbes' fundamental principles is that the only legitimate purpose of the state is to serve the interests of individuals, which is the main reason I call him a liberal. This is diametrically opposed to fascism, in which the individual serves as a means to the ends of the state. As to "totalitarian democracy", I have no idea what that may be. Neither do I know what Hobbes' "social organismic" theory of the state might be. Do you mean that Hobbes compared the state to an individual (the "Leviathan")? It doesn't particularly matter whether you call Hobbes a liberal: what matters is to understand what Hobbes actually said. Hobbes was the first philosopher, to my knowledge, to articulate the following view of political society: Individuals are primary and in some fundamental sense equals. These individuals are moved (literally and figuratively) by egoistic passions. There is nothing inherently immoral about these selfish passions. Individuals have natural rights. Their reason leads them to transfer these rights, i.e., make a compact or contract, and thus form a government. If anything, Hobbes is a precursor of libertarianism. Broadly speaking, this understanding of the basis of government is fundamental to liberalism from *Leviathan* (1651) to Nozick and Rawls. For instance, here is a passage from Rawls' *A Theory of Justice*: My aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. In order to do this we are not to think of the original contract as one to enter a particular society or to set up a particular form of government. Rather, the guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic structure of society are the object of the original agreement. They are the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association.... Here are some brief quotes from *Leviathan* ch. 14 to support what I have said about Hobbes: The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call *Jus Naturale*, is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of externall Impediments: which Impediments, may oft take away part of a mans power to do what hee would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgement, and reason shall dictate to him. A LAW OF NATURE, (*Lex Naturalis*,) is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.... And because the condition of Man, is a condition of Warre of every one against every one; in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body.... And consequently it is a precept, or generall rule of Reason, *That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre*.... From this Fundamentall Law of Nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour Peace, is derived this second Law; *That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of hiimselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe*.... The passage from Rawls reminded me that I forgot to include Rousseau and Kant on my list of liberals. Whether or not you call them liberals, they are undeniably contractarians whose political theory rests solidly on their profound explorations of moral theory. Kant, in fact, who had studied Newton's *Principia*, called Rousseau "the Newton of the moral order." -- Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes