carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (03/09/86)
Continuing with the excerpts from "Liberalism" by Ronald Dworkin: ______________ I said that the conservative holds one among a number of possible alternatives to the liberal conception of equality. Each of these alternatives shares the opinion that treating a person with respect requires treating him as the good man would wish to be treated. The conservative supposes that the good man would wish to be treated in accordance with the principles of a special sort of society, which I shall call the virtuous society.... Suppose a conservative is asked to draft a constitution for a society generally like ours, which he believes to be virtuous. Like the liberal, he will see great merit in the familiar institutions of political democracy and an economic market. The appeal of these institutions will be very different for the conservative, however. The economic market, in practice, assigns greater rewards to those who, because they have the virtues of talent and industry, supply more of what is wanted by the other members of the virtuous society; and that is, for the conservative, the paradigm of fairness in distribution. Political democracy distributes opportunities, through the provisions of civil and criminal law, as the citizens of a virtuous society wish [them] to be distributed.... The liberal, as I said, finds the market defective principally because it allows morally irrelevant differences to affect distribution.... But the conservative prizes just the feature of the market that puts a premium on talents prized by the community, because these are, in a virtuous community, virtues. So he will find no genuine merit, but only expediency, in the idea of redistribution. He will allow room, of course, for the virtue of charity, for it is a virtue that is part of the public catalogue; but he will prefer private charity to public, because it is a purer expression of that virtue.... The economic market distributes rewards for talents valued in the virtuous society, but since these talents are unequally distributed, wealth will be concentrated, and the wealthy will be at the mercy of an envious political majority anxious to take by law what it cannot take by talent.... [Instead of restricting the franchise] the conservative will find more appeal in the different, and politically much more feasible, idea of rights to property. These rights have the same force, though of course radically different content, as the liberal's civil rights. The liberal will, for his own purposes, accept some right to property, because he will count some sovereignty over a range of personal possessions essential to dignity. But the conservative will strive for rights to property of a very different order; he will want rights that protect, not some minimum dominion over a range of possessions independently shown to be desirable, but an unlimited dominion over whatever has been acquired through an institution that defines and rewards talent.... The distinction between equality of opportunity and equality of result is crucial to the conservative: the institutions of the economic market and representative democracy cannot achieve what he supposes they do unless each citizen has an equal opportunity to capitalize on his genuine talents and other virtues in the contest these institutions provide. But since the conservative knows that these virtues are unequally distributed, he also knows that equality of opportunity must have been denied if the outcome of the contest is equality of result.... [The conservative] will steadily oppose any form of `affirmative action' that offers special opportunities, like places in medical school or jobs, on criteria other than some proper conception of the virtue appropriate to the reward.... Liberalism cannot be based on scepticism. Its constitutive morality provides that human beings must be treated as equals by their government, not because there is no right and wrong in political morality, but because that is what is right. Liberalism does not rest on any special theory of personality, nor does it deny that most human beings will think that what is good for them is that they be active in society. Liberalism is not self-contradictory: the liberal conception of equality is a principle of political organization that is required by justice, not a way of life for individuals.... [But another objection, that liberalism denies to political society its highest function and ultimate justification, which is that society must help its members to achieve what is in fact good] cannot so easily be set aside. There is no easy way to demonstrate the proper role in institutions that have a monopoly of power over the lives of others; reasonable and moral men will disagree. The issue is at bottom the issue I identified: what is the content of the respect that is necessary to dignity and independence? That raises problems in moral philosophy and in the philosophy of mind that are fundamental for political theory though not discussed here; but this essay does bear on one issue sometime thought to be relevant. It is sometimes said that liberalism must be wrong because it assumes that the opinions people have about the sort of lives they want are self-generated, whereas these opinions are in fact that products of the economic system or other aspects of the society in which they live.... Liberalism responds to the claim, that preferences are caused by systems of distribution, with the sensible answer that in that case it is all the more important that distribution be fair in itself, not as tested by the preferences it produces. --Ronald Dworkin -- Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes
laura@hoptoad.uucp (Laura Creighton) (03/11/86)
In article <364@gargoyle.UUCP> carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) writes: >Continuing with the excerpts from "Liberalism" by Ronald Dworkin: >______________ By and large I think that Dworkin describes what is today called ``conservatism'' well. But is is worth noting that what he is describing used to be called liberalism, and indeed is part of what Milton Freidman still calls liberalism. >I said that the conservative holds one among a number of possible >alternatives to the liberal conception of equality. Each of these >alternatives shares the opinion that treating a person with respect >requires treating him as the good man would wish to be treated. The >conservative supposes that the good man would wish to be treated in >accordance with the principles of a special sort of society, which I >shall call the virtuous society.... Here I think that Dworkin misses it; the statment is right but the perspective is wrong. The conservative does not believe that virtue is defined by the virtuous society, but rather that virtuous men create a virtuous society through the expression of their own virtue. The purpose of society, thus, to the extent that a conservative can say that society has a purpose is to *promote virtue*. And one of the many ways it promotes virtue is by rewarding it. >Suppose a conservative is asked to draft a constitution for a society >generally like ours, which he believes to be virtuous. Phrased that way, the conservative will give up in disgust. However, a conservative can be asked to draft a consitution for a society which is virtuous (or promotes virtue) and will come up with a society generally like ours. >[But another objection, that liberalism denies to political society >its highest function and ultimate justification, which is that >society must help its members to achieve what is in fact good] cannot >so easily be set aside. There is no easy way to demonstrate the >proper role in institutions that have a monopoly of power over the >lives of others; reasonable and moral men will disagree. The issue >is at bottom the issue I identified: what is the content of the >respect that is necessary to dignity and independence? If Dworkin is truly interested in dignity and independence, doesn't he see a strong conflict between monopoly of power and independence? Why does this not lead him to conclude that few if any institutions should have a monopoly of power, simply because that decreases independence? I think that a fundamental distiction which Dworkin misses out on in this essay is the objective or subjective nature of ``the good''. Dworkin keeps on plugging for ``a conservative believes that a virtuous society determines the good'' (which is moral subjectivism) whereas all the conservatives I know are moral objectivists. This trait is shared even though there is strong disagreement between conservatives as to what is the basis of this moral standard -- God, human nature, evolutionary pressure, or a simple ``but that is the way it is''. -- Laura Creighton ihnp4!hoptoad!laura utzoo!hoptoad!laura sun!hoptoad!laura toad@lll-crg.arpa
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (03/15/86)
In article <607@hoptoad.uucp> laura@hoptoad.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: >In article <364@gargoyle.UUCP> carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) writes: >>Continuing with the excerpts from "Liberalism" by Ronald Dworkin: > >By and large I think that Dworkin describes what is today called >``conservatism'' well. But is is worth noting that what he is >describing used to be called liberalism, and indeed is part of what >Milton Freidman still calls liberalism. I think it is more accurate to say that traditional liberalism has become the standard in Western democracies, and that mainstream liberalism and mainstream conservatism are both derived from it. Frank Adams ihnp4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
janw@inmet.UUCP (03/17/86)
[ Adam Reed (ihnp4!npois!adam)] >Of the other two names on the list - Hobbes and Spinoza - neither >qualifies as a Liberal. Right about Hobbes. I must really object on behalf of Spinoza, not to nitpick, but because he is one of my favorites. >Spinoza held that individual will, and thus individual freedom, >was an illusion. A very simplistic view of Spinoza's determinism. Suffice it here to say that his whole teaching was on how to *achieve* individual freedom. >His pantheistic metaphysics led to an ethics based on the premise >that "Whatever exists is God". The political corrolary of this >view is acquiescence in whatever exists. It certainly was not for him. He discussed at length which forms of government are preferable to others. >The Panglossian secularization of the above ("All is for the best in >the best of all possible worlds") was the intellectual foundation of >early conservatism, and was mercilessly ridiculed, from an >uncompromising classical Liberal perspective, by Voltaire. Pangloss was, of course, a caricature of Leibnitz's philosophy, not Spinoza's. (To whom the quote above belongs). Voltaire had a high opinion of Spinoza (without really understanding him). >While Spinoza's refusal of a royal pension from Louis XIV tells >us a great deal about his personal integrity, the fact that the >pension was offered tells us even more about the political uses >and implications of his philosophy. No such uses were, of course, made. Louis's interests in Holland had nothing to do with philosophy. He made, however, a show of encouraging culture. The pension was on condition of Spinoza dedicating a book to the king. It may have also had to do with party politics in Holland, in which Spi- noza was, for a while, involved. In that case - the pension offer was an attempt to neutralize an *opponent*. There is absolutely no doubt that had someone explained to Louis XIV the contents of *any* of Spinoza's books, the ultra-catholic Sun King would forthwith become his enemy. In philosophy, Spinoza was a proponent of free inquiry, of indi- vidualism, of rational self-interest, and of reason as the supreme vurtue. In political theory, he was an advocate of democracy based on freedom of opinion. In practical politics, he was a friend and supporter of De Witt, the leader of the liberal, republican party. (None of the above purports to explain Spinoza's philosophy, just to defend his liberal reputation). Jan Wasilewsky
janw@inmet.UUCP (03/17/86)
Correcting a misleading phrase: >>The Panglossian secularization of the above ("All is for the best in >>the best of all possible worlds") was the intellectual foundation of >>early conservatism, and was mercilessly ridiculed, from an >>uncompromising classical Liberal perspective, by Voltaire. [me] >Pangloss was, of course, a caricature of Leibnitz's philosophy, >not Spinoza's. (To whom the quote above belongs). Voltaire had a >high opinion of Spinoza (without really understanding him). I meant that the quote is of Leibnitz, not Spinoza. Spinoza be- lieved all exists that is possible, not just the "best".