carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (03/09/86)
I will make a stab at explaining the basic meaning of "liberalism" past and present. Since Ronald Dworkin can do this much better than I can, I will let him do the talking. The excerpts below are taken from his essay "Liberalism", which appears in both *Public and Private Morality*, ed. Stuart Hampshire, and *Liberalism and Its Critics*, ed. Michael Sandel (the latter is a very useful volume). Liberalism, says Dworkin, is based on the belief that government must treat all its citizens with equal concern and respect: as free, independent, and with equal dignity -- a belief shared by American (US) conservatives. But the liberal also believes that government must be neutral on "the question of the good life," and denies that government must operate on a theory of what human beings ought to be: _____________ The [liberal] theory of equality supposes that political decisions must be, so far as it is possible, independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life. Since the citizens of a society differ in their conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to another, either because the officials believe that one is intrinsically superior, or because one is held by the more numerous or more powerful group. ... Suppose that a liberal is asked to found a new state. He is required to dictate its constitution and fundamental institutions. He must propose a general theory of political distribution, that is, a theory of how whatever the community has to assign, by way of goods or resources or opportunities, should be assigned. He will arrive initially at something like this principle of rough equality: resources and opportunities should be distributed, so far as possible, equally, so that roughly the same share of whatever is available is devoted to satisfying the ambitions of each. Any other general aim of distribution will assume either that the fate of some people should be of greater concern than that of others, or that the ambitions or talents of some are more worthy, and should be supported more generously on that account.... But what does the principle of rough equality of distribution require in practice? If all resources were distributed directly by the government through grants of food, housing, and so forth; if every opportunity citizens have were provided directly by the government through the provisions of civil and criminal law; if every citizen had exactly the same talents; if every citizen started with no more than what any other citizen had at the start; and if every citizen had exactly the same theory of the good life and hence exactly the same scheme of preferences between productive activity of different forms and leisure, then the principle of rough equality of treatment could be satisfied simply by equal distributions of everything to be distributed and by civil and criminal laws of universal application.... Of course, none of these conditions of similarity holds. But the moral relevance of different sorts of diversity are very different, as may be shown by the following exercise. Suppose all the conditions of similarity I mentioned did hold except the last: citizens have different theories of the good and hence different preferences. They therefore disagree about what product the raw materials and labor and savings of the community should be used to produce, and about which activities should be prohibited or regulated so as to make others possible or easier. The liberal, as lawgiver, now needs mechanisms to satisfy the principles of equal treatment in spite of these disagreements. He will decide that there are no better mechanisms available, as general political institutions, than the two main institutions of our own political economy: the economic market, for decisions about what goods shall be produced and how they shall be distributed, and representative democracy, for collective decisions about what conduct shall be prohibited or regulated so that other conduct might be made possible or convenient. Each of these familiar institutions may be expected to provide a more egalitarian division than any other general arrangement.... In a society in which people differed only in preferences, then, a market would be favored for its egalitarian consequences.... But we must now return to the real world. In the actual society for which the liberal must construct political institutions, there are all the other differences [talents, inheritance, handicaps].... These inequalities will have great, often catastrophic, effects on the distribution that a market economy will provide. But, unlike differences in preferences, the differences these inequalities make are indefensible according to the liberal conception of equality. It is obviously obnoxious to the liberal conception, for example, that someone should have more of what the community as a whole has to distribute because he or his father had superior skill or luck. [In other words, the liberal lawgiver must, on his own principles, reject an institution or principle of distribution which has this effect. Dworkin is not claiming that wealth "belongs" to the community before it is distributed, but rather that it gets distributed *somehow*, willy-nilly; so what is the principle by which wealth *should* be distributed?] The liberal lawgiver therefore faces a difficult task.... The liberal must be tempted, therefore, to a reform of the market through a scheme of redistribution that leaves its pricing system relatively intact but sharply limits, at least, the inequalities in welfare that his initial principle prohibits. No solution will seem perfect.... In either case, he chooses a mixed economic system -- either redistributive capitalism or limited socialism -- not in order to compromise antagonistic ideals of efficiency and equality, but to achieve the best practical realization of the demands of equality itself. ... [The liberal] must now consider the second of the two familiar institutions he first selected, which is representative democracy. Democracy is justified because it enforces the right of each person to respect and concern as an individual; but in practice the decisions of a democratic majority may often violate that right, according to the liberal theory of what the right requires. Suppose a legislature elected by a majority decides to make criminal some act not because the act deprives others of opportunities they want, but because the majority disapproves of those [political] views or that sexual morality.... The decision invades rather than enforces the right of citizens to be treated as equals.... How can the liberal protect citizens against that sort of violation of their fundamental right? ... The liberal, therefore, needs a scheme of civil rights, whose effect will be to determine those political decisions that are antecedently likely to reflect strong external preferences, and to remove those decisions from majoritarian political institutions altogether.... The rights encoded in the Bill of Rights of the US Constitution, as interpreted (on the whole) by the Supreme Court, are those that a substantial number of liberals would think reasonably well suited to what the US now requires.... He has available, in the notion of procedural rights, a different device to protect equality in a different way. He will insist that criminal procedure be structured to achieve a margin of safety in decisions, so that the process is biased strongly against the conviction of the innocent.... So the liberal, drawn to the economic market and to political democracy for distinctly egalitarian reasons, finds that these institutions will produce inegalitarian results unless he adds to his scheme different sorts of individual rights. These rights will function as trump cards held by individuals; they will enable individuals to resist particular decisions in spite of the fact that hese decisions are or would be reached through the normal workings of general institutions that are not themselves challenged. The ultimate justification of these rights is that they are necessary to protect equal concern and respect; but they are not to be understood as representing equality in contrast to some other goal or principle served by democracy or the economic market. The familiar idea, for example, that rights of redistribution are justified by an ideal of equality that overrides the efficiency ideals of the market in certain cases, has no place in liberal theory.... --Ronald Dworkin [To be continued] -- Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes
laura@hoptoad.uucp (Laura Creighton) (03/11/86)
In article <363@gargoyle.UUCP> carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) writes: >I will make a stab at explaining the basic meaning of "liberalism" >past and present. Since Ronald Dworkin can do this much better than >I can, I will let him do the talking. The excerpts below are taken >from his essay "Liberalism", which appears in both *Public and >Private Morality*, ed. Stuart Hampshire, and *Liberalism and Its >Critics*, ed. Michael Sandel (the latter is a very useful volume). > >Liberalism, says Dworkin, is based on the belief that government must >treat all its citizens with equal concern and respect: as free, >independent, and with equal dignity -- a belief shared by American >(US) conservatives. But the liberal also believes that government >must be neutral on "the question of the good life," and denies that >government must operate on a theory of what human beings ought to be: Unfortunately, this is impossible. You cannot both promote the belief that a government must treat all its citizens with equal concern and respect and be neutral on the question of what human beings ought to be. As a bare minimum you must have a theory which says ``government officials ought to treat all its citizens with equal concern and respect''. However, there is a deeper problem in Dworkin's conception of conservatism. Conservatives do not believe that a government should treat all its citizens with *equal* respect -- just with *at a bare minimum*, a minimum amount of respect. Thus conservatives and liberals will both agree that all its citizens deserve respect, but conservatives claim that it is possible to get more respect. Respect can be earned. While Dworkin claims that liberals want to treat all citizens with equal respect, I have actually neer met one who demonstrates this belief. Like everyone else, liberals have heroes, and accord them respect -- so people like Mother Theresa, and Martin Luther King are accorded more respect than the average. (Note -- I do this as well. I find nothing wrong with the practice, for indeed I believe that Mather Theresa and Martin Luther King *deserve* more respect. But how one can hold this belief while also believing that a government must be neutral on the question of what human beings ought to be escapes me. I don't think it is possible.) Finally, what is Dworkin's concept of the function of the judicial branch of government? Surely he believes that it is part of government. But it most clearly is *not* neutral on the question of what human beings ought to be. (We can get into a semantic quibble here over whether Dworkin thinks the function of courts is only to determine what human beings ought not to be. Buth when you covert that into ``everything not forbidden is good'' you still have made a statement about what is good.) Actually, I would like to see Dworkin attempt to defend the SEC, but no matter... >_____________ >These inequalities will have great, often catastrophic, effects on >the distribution that a market economy will provide. But, unlike >differences in preferences, the differences these inequalities make >are indefensible according to the liberal conception of equality. It >is obviously obnoxious to the liberal conception, for example, that >someone should have more of what the community as a whole has to >distribute because he or his father had superior skill or luck. It is this concept of equality which is morally obnoxious to a conservative. Consider -- if one really believed this then one would be forced to give an equal amount of music lessons to all, rather than the lions share to those who have superior skill in music. It also ignores that preferences and skills are linked -- those who have a preference for an area of study can usually develop skills in this area through their efforts, and those who have skills in an area usually develop a preference for it. The two are not distinct. -- Laura Creighton ihnp4!hoptoad!laura utzoo!hoptoad!laura sun!hoptoad!laura toad@lll-crg.arpa
desj@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (David desJardins) (03/16/86)
In article <608@hoptoad.uucp> laura@hoptoad.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: >>Liberalism, says Dworkin, is based on the belief that government must >>treat all its citizens with equal concern and respect: as free, >>independent, and with equal dignity -- a belief shared by American >>(US) conservatives. But the liberal also believes that government >>must be neutral on "the question of the good life," and denies that >>government must operate on a theory of what human beings ought to be: > >Unfortunately, this is impossible. You cannot both promote the belief >that a government must treat all its citizens with equal concern and respect >and be neutral on the question of what human beings ought to be. As a bare >minimum you must have a theory which says ``government officials ought >to treat all its citizens with equal concern and respect''. No, "government" is not the same as "government officials" (at least, not always, and certainly not in theory). In practice, this means that those who become government officials are those who are willing to enforce the chosen principles of government. Since no one is forced to be a government official, this is not a problem. >However, there is a deeper problem in Dworkin's conception of conservatism. >Conservatives do not believe that a government should treat all its >citizens with *equal* respect -- just with *at a bare minimum*, a >minimum amount of respect. Thus conservatives and liberals will both >agree that all its citizens deserve respect, but conservatives claim >that it is possible to get more respect. Respect can be earned. >While Dworkin claims that liberals want to treat all citizens with equal >respect, I have actually neer met one who demonstrates this belief. Nobody claims that liberals treat all citizens with equal respect. Individuals of course are free to treat others with as much or as little respect as they desire. But the *government* must treat people with equal respect (equal protection under the laws). >Like everyone else, liberals have heroes, and accord them respect -- so >people like Mother Theresa, and Martin Luther King are accorded more >respect than the average. But you would not want the government to accord them more respect, or to treat them differently under the laws. This is the point. >Finally, what is Dworkin's concept of the function of the judicial branch >of government? Surely he believes that it is part of government. But >it most clearly is *not* neutral on the question of what human beings >ought to be. (We can get into a semantic quibble here over whether >Dworkin thinks the function of courts is only to determine what human >beings ought not to be. Buth when you covert that into ``everything not >forbidden is good'' you still have made a statement about what is good.) There is also a semantic point about "what human beings are" vs. "what human beings do." But this is not truly relevant either. The fact is that here you have a good point. Any sort of law is, by definition, not neutral on what human beings ought to be. Anybody out there want to speak in defense of Dworkin's statement? -- David desJardins
laura@hoptoad.uucp (Laura Creighton) (03/18/86)
In article <12428@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> desj@brahms.UUCP (David desJardins) writes: >In article <608@hoptoad.uucp> laura@hoptoad.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: >> >>Unfortunately, this is impossible. You cannot both promote the belief >>that a government must treat all its citizens with equal concern and respect >>and be neutral on the question of what human beings ought to be. As a bare >>minimum you must have a theory which says ``government officials ought >>to treat all its citizens with equal concern and respect''. > > No, "government" is not the same as "government officials" (at least, >not always, and certainly not in theory). In practice, this means that >those who become government officials are those who are willing to enforce >the chosen principles of government. Since no one is forced to be a >government official, this is not a problem. You have missed it. Dworkin comes right out and says that a government must treat all its citizens with equal concern and respect. But this is a normative statement. It implies that, at a bare minimum, the government officials who create and enforce government policy treat all its citizens with equal concern and respect. Therefore it cannot be neutral on the question of what human beings ought to be. The two aims are incompatible. > > Nobody claims that liberals treat all citizens with equal respect. >Individuals of course are free to treat others with as much or as little >respect as they desire. But the *government* must treat people with >equal respect (equal protection under the laws). But the government, as an abstraction, only exists through the actions of individual government employees. And these employees, being human beings, cannot treat all citizens with equal respect. What they can do is treat human beings with a *minimum* of respect, but that is not the same thing. > >>Like everyone else, liberals have heroes, and accord them respect -- so >>people like Mother Theresa, and Martin Luther King are accorded more >>respect than the average. > > But you would not want the government to accord them more respect, >or to treat them differently under the laws. This is the point. On the contrary, I would expect that the government treat them with more respect. This is inevitable. I would not expect them to be exempt from the laws of the land, by and large, but even this is not totally true. If Martin Luther King were alive today to organise civil disobedience in protest to some law which he found discriminatory, I would expect that more people would investigate the possibility that the law was in the wrong out of respect for Martin Luther King than if somebody else protested the very same law. This sounds unfair, but also sounds like what would happen. And at the end, MLK might not have to pay any penalty for breaking the law. Since I am assuming that the law was unjust to begin with, I would be glad that he did not have to pay the penalty, but the fact would remain that he was treated differently than the last person who had to pay the penalty. -- Laura Creighton ihnp4!hoptoad!laura utzoo!hoptoad!laura sun!hoptoad!laura toad@lll-crg.arpa