nlt@duke.UUCP (N. L. Tinkham) (06/24/85)
In response to my summary of the conservative and "moderate" positions in the Southern Baptist Convention (regarding inerrancy of the Bible) Gary Buchholz posts an article containing 1) the claim that Fundamentalism, in practice, uses its own tradition, rather than the Bible, as the ultimate authority; 2) the claim that the "moderate" position is "latent liberalism" -- that "moderates" would be liberals if they were to work out the implications of their beliefs; and 3) the statement (I think) that the inerrantists' position, while not, strictly speaking, accurate, provides a useful mythology and thus is an intellectually valid position. I will respond to the second point in this article. [">" is G. Buchholz, ">>" is myself] > I would have to say that on the pragmatic level your "moderate > position" is fraught with difficulties as regards its political > success. How could your "moderate" church justify itself (as can > Stanleys) to be "the church of Christ" in any non-ideological way when > you write something like this...... > >>The "moderate" >>position claims a stronger human influence on the writing of the Bible, >>stating that since imperfect human beings, living in an imperfect human >>culture, with incomplete knowledge, wrote the Bible, some of the biases >>and mistaken notions held by these authors and their cultures may have >>found their way into Biblical writings. Nevertheless, the moderates would >>say, the Bible was written by men of God and records, as accurately as >>possible given the limitations of human knowledge, their experiences >>of God. > > To say these things seems to be self-defeating in the sense that if the > task is pursued systematically and rigorously then what you end up with > is what historically came be to known as theological liberalism. In > this sense you are a latent liberal, a liberal waiting to be, if you > were only to work out the implications. > > It is probably the case that you have not worked out the implications > of the view of the bible that you espouse. Stanley has, and that is > why he rejects it (this argument is well rehearsed in fundamentalist > literature), he rejects it as "unsuccessful" (- to the maintenance of > his particular ideology). I have indeed heard conservative writers (Lindsell, for instance) argue that if one rejects the inerrancy of the Bible, one must also reject much of orthodox Christianity. In my judgement, this does not follow. It is true that without an infallible authority to guarantee the truth of propositions, we cannot assert propositions with justified certainty. Nevertheless, the absence of an infallible guarantee of the truth of a belief does not make that belief false. It could easily be true that the events around which our faith is based (the Resurrection, the Virgin Birth, miracles in Israel and in the early Church, etc.) did indeed occur but that no infallible record of them exists (and thus that we are forced to rely upon the good but not inerrant testimony of witnesses to the events). Similarly, I can easily imagine the major doctrines of Christianity (Atonement, the Incarnation, and so forth) being true without the existence of an inerrant writing to assure us of their validity. One would hope that the records we have are accurate enough to give us a reasonably good idea of the acts of God in Israel and in Christ; but I see no need to deny the truth of these events and doctrines just because the records can not give complete certainty. One further comment: In the paragraphs quoted above, there are several references to the political or theological usefulness of beliefs. Although I understand that mythology is a very important part of the human experience, I am extremely hesitant to accept as true a belief merely on the basis of its usefulness. As obvious as this sounds, I prefer to believe things if and only if they are true. It can, of course, be a difficult, perhaps even impossible, task to determine whether a given proposition is true; but the task, I think, is still to determine which things are true and then believe those. The question of usefulness is, at most, an interesting observation made along the way. Yes, it is very useful to have an infallible book, person, tradition, or method of reasoning to give certainty to beliefs. If I ever find such an infallible guide, I will treasure it. But the need for certainty in belief does not justify asserting that an object is infallible if it is not. N. L. Tinkham duke!nlt