cbostrum (08/02/82)
Ah, this is interesting. I am not sure I believe the claim that "rationality requires determinism" but I am prepared to argue for that *exact* statement, which is not what laura addressed. But as for what she did say: The evidence she gave for "free will" (whatever that is) was our *feeling* that we are able to "make choices" such that the result of our deliberation *seems* to be decided upon by ourselves rather than external circumstances. But first, this may only seem to be so, and second, the fact (if it were one) that our internal decision making process was what caused the choice (and the resultant feeling of "making a choice") does not mean that the choice was still not determined. With the definitions laura gives, I see no problem in having the "free will" and "determinism" compatible. However, convincing her might be harder. For starters, consider this similar problem: Is it possible for a computer to play chess well (something involving making good decisions at the chess board, etc.) and yet still have all its actions determined by the rules of its instruction set? Surely the answer is yes, and it has been done already. Isnt there a strong similarity here, and isnt it maybe just a matter of time before we can comfortably say the same things with humans? I believe the answer is yes,yes. I missed the discussion of Newcombs Paradox here, and dont want to start it again if no one else does, but I think its clear that if you take both boxes youll only get 1000, and if just the one, youll get a million. So, what could be clearer than to take just the one? I also fail to see how taking both boxes and getting 1000 demonstrates "free will" as laura seems to claim. I still would like to see someone challenge the statement "ratiionality requires determinism".