[net.misc] Mind/Brain Identity, etc.

ignatz (01/11/83)

	This isn't really the newsgroup for this; but then, I don't think
a philosophy group exists, so I'll dump this here for now.  Complaints to
/dev/null, if you please.
	David Sher submitted a letter he recieved contemplating a couple of
possible mind/brain relationships.  None of these were in conflict with
current philosophical theories, but, then, none were unique.  I took a most
enjoyable course as an undergraduate, oh so many years ago, entitled "The
Mind-Brain Identity Crisis".  It purported to expound the various theories
which have been proposed, attacked, defended, and still not resolved by
Western philosophers. (Note the latter; representation of Eastern philosophy,
as with Eastern history, is sadly lacking in our educational institutions
unless the student actively seeks such information, and the school is
exceptional in offering such. End digression...)  As I have been away from
this type of thing for some time, I can't purport to remember all of the
theories; but some follow.  If there's interest, mail to me and I'll dig out
the actual reference texts for proper names, terminology, etc.  Enough such
requests, and I'll write a proper little paper for the net.

For the purposes of discussion, the brain is that physical glop of matter we
can see, touch, and perceive through our physical senses.  The mind is that
incorporeal construct which appears to carry on the functions of perception,
thought, and consciousness.  The problem:  The brain and the mind appear to
be inextricably linked; yet they appear to be totally different.  The brain
is a physical construct, detectable by instruments of the physical world.  The
mind is invisible, without physical extent or detectability; yet the condition
of the brain affects the mind, and activities of the mind can affect the brain
(and the attached body)  HOW?

1. Solipsism.  Maintains that the observing ego is all there is; all else is
	constructed by the observing intelligence.  What appears to be other
	intelligences are/may be actually partitioned sections of the same
	intelligence.  Explains God nicely; when the "tiniest sparrow falls",
	God knows it because the sparrow *is* God. Of course, when the mind
	wishes a change in the physical world, it happens, because that world
	exists only as a result of that mind.  As mentioned, this is
	a proposition which is difficult to attack; it also cannot be proven.

2. Materialism.  There is nothing but the material universe; that which we
	perceive as the incorporeal mind doesn't exist.  This is difficult to
	explain without reviewing the arguments, but basically comes down to
	our apparent intelligence, free will, and consciousness being nothing
	of the sort, but rather by-products of the chemical interactions of the
	physical body.  I forget the arguments for defending this point from
	the first question I asked:  If you can't tell the difference between
	a mind that just *is*, and the appearance of a mind (such as self-
	consciousness, etc.) that results from physical interactions of the
	body, what's the difference?

3. Parallelism.  One of the most fascinating, this is personally repugnant
	to me because it violates causality.  Basically claims that there is
	some sort of incorporeal identity that, for some reason, desires to
	be associated with a purely physical entity, but has no control over
	or reaction from the body.  Thus, when you think you want to, say,
	tie your shoelace, it is merely a delusion that you think you made
	the body lean over and tie it.  Such an act was going to happen in
	the physical world, anyway; but the parallelism of the mind-brain
	just made it *appear* that the mind caused the action.
	Yech.

4. "Soul". (I can't remember the proper term.)  Some incorporeal entity
	actually inhabits the physical body, but we just don't have the
	means of detecting it.  Flavors of this hold that the entity is
	inextricably tied to the body and perishes when the body perishes;
	or that it is indestructible by physical means, and thus is a "soul"
	in the religious sense.  Various theories are proposed for exactly
	*how* the mind controls the brain, but all contend that the incorporeal
	mind can and does control the physical brain, and can be affected
	by it.

Enough; before I spout off any more, I'll go read my books again, and probably
pour a pitcher of beer (college atmosphere reconstruction, don't y'know...)
The main thing that comes back to me is the feeling that, with the various
schemes proposed, none can ever be definitively proven or disproven. (indeed,
a couple seem to be proposed with that in mind.  Job security for
philosophers?)  Anyway, sorry for the ramble....

					Dave Ihnat
					ihuxx!ignatz