sdyer@bbncca.ARPA (Steve Dyer) (11/07/84)
Hello Steve,
Could you please post this anonymously to net.motss?
(What happens to mod.motss?)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I am all against discrimination, of any kind. I believe though
that the legislation in the US does not go very far against it, to
say the least, as exemplified in the recent posting of the Cambridge
ordinances. Their structure is approximately as follows:
It shall be an unlawful practice for [A] to [B] because
of [C] except in [D].
where some of the instances are:
[A] Cambridge School Dept., employers, employment agency,...
[B] discriminate in the provision of services, employment, education...
refuse to hire or employ, discharge from employment...
directly or indirectly to fail or refuse to classify properly or
refer for employment...
[C] the race, color, sex, age, religious creed, disability/physical
handicap, national origin or ancestry, sexual orientation, marital
status, family status, military status, or source of income of such
person
[D] Employment by a religious institution of individuals
performing a service related to a *bona fide* religious purpose...
Employment programs designed to effect affirmative action
by giving special preference to women, racial minorities or veterans
provided that such employment programs shall not discriminate among
women, racial minorities, or veterans on the basis of other
discriminatory criteria as set forth in Section 9E (4) hereof.
etc...
My point is that such laws or regulations, by mentioning *specific* instances
of potential discriminators ([A]), potential forms of discriminations ([B])
and potential targets ([C]), do not rule out discrimination as such except in
*these specific cases*, which, by the virtue (hm...) of their being specific
cannot possibly cover all existing cases of discrimination, and, as a matter
of fact, do encourage less obvious forms of discrimination.
For example:
- Is denial of employment on the basis of IQ tests and
their likes discriminatory or not? (It does not seem to fall in any
category mentioned in [C], unless a lower score is a physical disability...).
On the basis of language abilities (it is mentioned just in one case, and
does not seem related to any category in [C]--even not to race, for
a caucasian child, e.g., could be adopted by a hispanic one and not know
english...
- Is denial of any kind of employment on the basis of age, sex or sexual
preference by a religious institution discriminatory or not? Suppose a
woman applied to a seminary for priests; suppose an old man did; suppose
a gay man did. What if any of them applied for a menial job in a church?
- Why isn't affirmative action mentioned for all other types
of targets of discrimination? E.g., by reductio ad absurdum, require
affirmative action for gays (see Steve Dyer's remark...), elderly,
cripple and jews (to counter you-know-whom).
If this trend continues, the list of specific clauses is bound to
increase without limit (or until it lists by name every human alive and
is updated accordingly...). Then there always will be grounds for
discrimination of some kind.
The solution? More principles, less examples, with all the
implications (more on that some other time).
--
/Steve Dyer
{decvax,linus,ima,ihnp4}!bbncca!sdyer
sdyer@bbncca.ARPAsdyer@bbncca.ARPA (Steve Dyer) (11/07/84)
Unfortunately, "principles" can not always be turned into action, let alone
enforced as law. While I can see our anonymous poster's point about the
almost ludicrous specificity of the Cambridge human rights ordinance, s/he
must realize that all bills are the result of compromise, and that specific
language is necessary if the ordinance is not to be thrown out. One would much
rather assume the Golden Rule in all affairs, but alas, we cannot. Hence
this ordinance. So much for principles.
I am unconvinced of the claim that an ordinance which details may/may nots
to the extent that Cambridge does actively contributes to discrimination.
This is an objection based on aesthetics and not pragmatics. The ordinance
provides a few gaping holes by which individuals may choose to continue to
discriminate, but I sincerely doubt that it will be the cause of any new
discriminatory behavior. What it does provide for the first time in
Cambridge is a formal method of legal redress when people are discriminated
against on the basis of their sexual preference.
--
/Steve Dyer
{decvax,linus,ima,ihnp4}!bbncca!sdyer
sdyer@bbncca.ARPA