ellis@spar.UUCP (05/05/86)
>>> me >> Mike Huybensz > Charles Wingate >>> I guess I shouldn't be surprised that so many are quick to assert that >>> Aristotle's `telos' (roughly `purpose, goal, or aim') has no place in >>> scientific explanation. After all, physics and chemistry flourished only >>> after purging all but efficient causes, yes? > >>Yes. Purpose and goals have no place in scientific theory about (literally) >>brainless subjects because adding them to an explanation adds no more >>predictive or descriptive ability. Thus Occam's Razor throws out "purpose" >>and "goals" in favor of "function". (There are meanings of "function" that >>do not imply purpose.) I'll temporarily pass on the distinction between goal and function, pending a clear definition from anybody on just what a "function" is in this context. To me, this word is tied too strongly to its mathematical and computer science sense. If "function" as you use the word here means "direction towards a desirable future state of affairs", especially where desirable means "serving to maintain or increase fitness", then we are merely arguing over which label to call it. That's no different from Aristotle's "telos", or "purpose" cloaked in the clinically sterile "function". And the determination of such "telea" or "purposes" is most definitely something that is of interest to biology. They OUGHT to be distinguished from the direct material and efficient causes of physics or chemistry because they are totally unlike anything occurring at the push-pull level of immediate physical causality -- their real origins lie not in the immediate past but are have stupendously convoluted roots buried deep in the distant evolutionary past. Concerning your use of Occam's razor, a recent quote from C. Dyke: Occam's razor depends always on a criterion internal to a particular theory. The simplest explanations for the phenomena we like to explain by evolutionary theory are those preferred by some freshmen: God made it that way.. [One sequel of this argument] involves spelling out the metaphysical commitments underlying the two opposing views. No matter how the dialog unfolds, the invocation of Occam's razor must be absolutely question-begging.. [The other sequel] consists of the teacher leveling the charge of unscientificness against the student. But this is a dangerous move, for the student must be sufficiently impressed by the wonders of science if the charge is to have any persuasive power. Only when .. the student's dependence on the fruits of scientifically grounded technology is established.. can Occam's razor be invoked. But the key move is not the razor stroke. The key is the entrapment of the student in an internal commitment to science.. One-dimensional selection models seem simple to selectionists, but dressed up in qualifying caveats until only their own mother could recognize them, their simplicity is far from obvious to the unfaithful.. The real issue is which models, handled with which epistemological strategies, are the better ones.. as explainers and research generators. None of the sides between in a dsipute between theories can insist on the a priori authoritative stance that would be required in order for Occam's razor to have an persuasive force. I notice that you occasionally use mentalisms like "purpose" and "intent" in your articles. In fact, I do not see how it is possible to extricate human understanding, including all scientific epistemologies, from the basic fabric of our mentalisms, teleological or otherwise. Science itself has an internal commitment to anthropocentrism: it explains reality to humans. If teleological explanations have the power to reliably predict or describe, they are as useful as any other kinds of explanations. If they can eventually be reduced to immediate push-pull forces upon atoms in the void, so much the better for everybody, teleologists and reductionists alike. Eliminative reductionism strikes me as saying "We have the binary to a program, consequently, we can throw away the high level code, comments, and documentation". In a sense, you're right -- all those other things can be re-generated from the object given enormous effort. But is a bunch of numbers the same as understanding how the program really works? I'd rather have the high-level code with plenty of teleological comments. >Actually, the reason for the rejection of "purposes" is much simpler: the >notion of purpose is inherently subjective. That's begging the question at hand: What is "objective"? If biological entities truly possess goal-oriented behavior, then is our so-called "anthropomorphic" tendency to see purpose in living things not a reflection of nature as it really is? In the past, we were not able to understand how there could be mechanisms behind purposeful behavior. That is not the case today. I can easily write a computer program that behaves as though it had a purpose, say, to win a game. If you were to analyze its behavior teleologically, your description in intentional terms would be perfectly useful for a hacker to subsequently to reduce this high-level description to an equivalent program, or, alternatively, to synthesize a rigorous functional explanation of its disassembled code into a form usable by humans. Is there such a thing as THE objective description of anything? By my account, "objective" means "sanctified by some scientific methodology". Period. -michael Bohr undid what Copernicus had accomplished: he reinstated Man at the center of his description of the world, wherefrom Copernicus had expelled him. -Bernard d'Espagnat
mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) (05/06/86)
In article <246@spar.UUCP> ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes: > >>Purpose and goals have no place in scientific theory about (literally) > >>brainless subjects because adding them to an explanation adds no more > >>predictive or descriptive ability. Thus Occam's Razor throws out "purpose" > >>and "goals" in favor of "function". (There are meanings of "function" that > >>do not imply purpose.) > > I'll temporarily pass on the distinction between goal and function, > pending a clear definition from anybody on just what a "function" is in > this context. To me, this word is tied too strongly to its mathematical > and computer science sense. Aiiiieee! Did you ever see the Saturday Night Live sketches with Gilda Radner as Emily Litella? Emily: "What's all this about <garbled subject>? [Long, silly monolog.]" Jane Curtin: "Emily, it's <correct subject>, not <garbled subject>." Emily: "Ohhhhh. That's different! Never mind. (Bitch!)" Simply, the definition of "function" I had in mind is "what something does". I am making a distinction between purpose and function where the former is prescriptive and implies an entity wanting a result, and the latter is descriptive and does not imply outside entities. My intended distinction was crucial to my argument. I should have made it more clear. (Sometimes I think that 90% of argument in philosophy, etc. could be eliminated if newly coined terms were used, eliminating the overloading and ambiguity problems of English.) Now let's see what's left for you to complain about. > If "function" as you use the word here means "direction towards a > desirable future state of affairs", especially where desirable means > "serving to maintain or increase fitness", then we are merely arguing > over which label to call it. That's no different from Aristotle's > "telos", or "purpose" cloaked in the clinically sterile "function". Clearly not, because my "function" is descriptive, not prescriptive. > And the determination of such "telea" or "purposes" is most definitely > something that is of interest to biology. They OUGHT to be distinguished > from the direct material and efficient causes of physics or chemistry > because they are totally unlike anything occurring at the push-pull > level of immediate physical causality -- their real origins lie not > in the immediate past but are have stupendously convoluted roots buried > deep in the distant evolutionary past. Determination of "telea" would be of interest in any field, if theer were some evidence of it. But I don't see any such evidence in either physics or biology. Nor do I see any problems with biology being as strictly causal as physics: just more complicated. > Concerning your use of Occam's razor, a recent quote from C. Dyke: > > Occam's razor depends always on a criterion internal to a particular > theory. The simplest explanations for the phenomena we like to > explain by evolutionary theory are those preferred by some freshmen: > God made it that way.. > > [One sequel of this argument] involves spelling out the > metaphysical commitments underlying the two opposing views. No > matter how the dialog unfolds, the invocation of Occam's razor must > be absolutely question-begging.. Yes. Occam's razor does beg the question. It is a standard heuristic for doing so, and thus (hopefully) directing energies into the most directly productive channels. > [The other sequel] consists of the teacher leveling the charge of > unscientificness against the student. But this is a dangerous > move, for the student must be sufficiently impressed by the wonders > of science if the charge is to have any persuasive power. Only when > .. the student's dependence on the fruits of scientifically grounded > technology is established.. can Occam's razor be invoked. But the > key move is not the razor stroke. The key is the entrapment of the > student in an internal commitment to science.. Yes, this is a fallacy of argument unless the student accepts the premises of science already or becomes convinced of them in a valid manner. > One-dimensional selection models seem simple to selectionists, but > dressed up in qualifying caveats until only their own mother could > recognize them, their simplicity is far from obvious to the > unfaithful.. The real issue is which models, handled with which > epistemological strategies, are the better ones.. as explainers and > research generators. None of the sides between in a dsipute between > theories can insist on the a priori authoritative stance that would > be required in order for Occam's razor to have an persuasive force. I can't really make head or tail of the argument in the above paragraph. It looks like several condensed into one. Could you explain it more clearly? > I notice that you occasionally use mentalisms like "purpose" and > "intent" in your articles. In fact, I do not see how it is possible to > extricate human understanding, including all scientific epistemologies, > from the basic fabric of our mentalisms, teleological or otherwise. > Science itself has an internal commitment to anthropocentrism: it > explains reality to humans. Science is no more anthropocentric than human minds, perhaps less so since the humans involved make conscious attempts to divorce themselves from normal anthropocentric viewpoints. Mentalisms are particulary inapt for describing the inanimate and non-sentient world because they generate too many incorrect predictions. Indeed, that's probably one of the reasons why we have the traditional idea of "inanimate" with resulting simpler models. > If teleological explanations have the power to reliably predict or > describe, they are as useful as any other kinds of explanations. If they > can eventually be reduced to immediate push-pull forces upon atoms in > the void, so much the better for everybody, teleologists and > reductionists alike. The problem with teleological explanations is that they make more than just correct or useful predictions: they make a whole bunch of incorrect predictions as well that descriptive and theoretic explanations don't. For example, thinking of animals as people. You immediately start to run into all sorts of questions about why animals don't do this that and the other thing, which requires so many explanatory notes that the search for a non-teleological description becomes worthwhile. (At least in our culture.) > Eliminative reductionism strikes me as saying "We have the binary to a > program, consequently, we can throw away the high level code, comments, > and documentation". In a sense, you're right -- all those other things > can be re-generated from the object given enormous effort. But is a > bunch of numbers the same as understanding how the program really works? > I'd rather have the high-level code with plenty of teleological comments. No, it's saying "We have the binary for the program (reality), let's make the shortest and most accurate manual page we can." There is no high-level code with comments that we know of: all we have are other people's attempts at manual pages. > >Actually, the reason for the rejection of "purposes" is much simpler: the > >notion of purpose is inherently subjective. > > That's begging the question at hand: What is "objective"? No, it's not in the sense I intend. Let's say several people see me driving around the town. An objective description that all might agree to is that I'm driving. Subjective descriptions might be that I'm driving to relax, that I'm driving to get somewhere, that I'm driving to waste fuel. There is likely to be little agreement over a purpose even if I make a statement. > If biological entities truly possess goal-oriented behavior, then is > our so-called "anthropomorphic" tendency to see purpose in living things > not a reflection of nature as it really is? It's a reflection of our nature, and our environment of other human beings. Not necessarily anything else. Much like "The man with a hammer sees all problems as nails." > In the past, we were not able to understand how there could be > mechanisms behind purposeful behavior. That is not the case today. > I can easily write a computer program that behaves as though it had a > purpose, say, to win a game. If you were to analyze its behavior > teleologically, your description in intentional terms would be perfectly > useful for a hacker to subsequently to reduce this high-level > description to an equivalent program, or, alternatively, to synthesize a > rigorous functional explanation of its disassembled code into a form > usable by humans. The program doesn't have a purpose of it's own: you have a purpose for the program. The program is just an automaton. (And my personal feeling is that people are just automatons, and that purpose is a meaningless term recited by some of us automatons to describe function that is too complex for us to manipulate competently. But let's not get into the free-will/determinism debate in this note.) > Is there such a thing as THE objective description of anything? > By my account, "objective" means "sanctified by some scientific > methodology". Period. That's all I'm looking for. A standard upon which people agree. Such as the normal functioning of our senses. -- Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
friesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (05/07/86)
In article <246@spar.UUCP> ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes: > > Is there such a thing as THE objective description of anything? > By my account, "objective" means "sanctified by some scientific > methodology". Period. > No, "objective" means "yielding the same result or conclusion when performed by different people", or to put it another way, it means "the result does *not* depend on *who* is performing the activity, only on *how* it is performed". I do agree, however, that some things may have objective explanations at different levels. -- Sarima (Stanley Friesen) UUCP: {ttidca|ihnp4|sdcrdcf|quad1|nrcvax|bellcore|logico}!psivax!friesen ARPA: ??
friesen@psivax.UUCP (05/15/86)
In article <1051@cybvax0.UUCP> mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) writes: > >The problem with teleological explanations is that they make more than just >correct or useful predictions: they make a whole bunch of incorrect >predictions as well that descriptive and theoretic explanations don't. >For example, thinking of animals as people. You immediately start to run >into all sorts of questions about why animals don't do this that and the >other thing, which requires so many explanatory notes that the search for a >non-teleological description becomes worthwhile. You seem to be assuming that ascribing purpose necessarily implies human-like reasoning falculties. I consider this false. > >> If biological entities truly possess goal-oriented behavior, then is >> our so-called "anthropomorphic" tendency to see purpose in living things >> not a reflection of nature as it really is? > >It's a reflection of our nature, and our environment of other human beings. >Not necessarily anything else. Much like "The man with a hammer sees all >problems as nails." I disagree here also. You seem to be working with a very restrictive definition of the term purpose! And a very anthropocentric one at that. I would say that the definition of purpose would be something like: "The activity/behavior of the system is contingent upon the current state of the world in such a way that the final state tends to approach a *predetermined* state". Or at least some variant on this. That is I *define* purpose as "producing goal-directed behavior". Thus an animal *can* show purpose under this definition, and in a non-anthropocentric way. > >The program doesn't have a purpose of it's own: you have a purpose for the >program. The program is just an automaton. (And my personal feeling is that >people are just automatons, and that purpose is a meaningless term recited by >some of us automatons to describe function that is too complex for us to >manipulate competently. I would say that if the program has sufficient flexibility it may be said to have purpose, where the purpose comes from does not matter! It does not matter in this sense whether people are automatons or not, if they show "goal-directed behavior" they have purpose, by definition. -- Sarima (Stanley Friesen) UUCP: {ttidca|ihnp4|sdcrdcf|quad1|nrcvax|bellcore|logico}!psivax!friesen ARPA: ??