ellis@spar.UUCP (04/22/86)
>>>> Mike >> Me > Wayne >>>>Evolution is undirected: ie. it has no long-term goals. >> Survival? Existence? >If survival is the goal of evolution, >then why have so many species failed to survive? > >If existence is the goal, >then why are there so many species that no longer exist? Goals are not necessarily realized. >It turns out that these are not brain-teasers. Since neither survival >nor existence are goals of evolution, the questions are moot. An entity >must have understanding to have goals. Evolution has no understanding, >and hence is a goal-less process. > >(Naturally, this is not to say that evolutionists have no > understanding or goals...) I guess I shouldn't be surprised that so many are quick to assert that Aristotle's `telos' (roughly `purpose, goal, or aim') has no place in scientific explanation. After all, physics and chemistry flourished only after purging all but efficient causes, yes? Viewed game-theoretically, the evolutionary payoff matrix has two results -- extinction or survival. I fail to see how to prevent evolution from becoming tautological unless it is seen as the rationale behind the first scientifically sanctified `goal'; appropriately, this goal is existence. Sure -- we usually view biological teleology behavioristically -- one does not have to attribute conscious goals to genes, organs, species, or whatever, to speak of the `purpose' of that which is under analysis. The purpose of my heart is, after all, to pump blood, is it not? Why are so many species of female dominated social insects haplodiploid? Because females of such species shared more genetically with their sisters than their brothers or even their own offspring. But that's NOT a cause-and-effect explanation. In fact, it is amazingly close to saying why such insects `ought to have' such a `goal', conscious or otherwise. In fact, it IS a teleological explanation. It is not my argument that insects have conscious goals (maybe they do, but that is beside the point). The traditional point of view is that for such insects, with each generation, there is a bias in `survival payoff' strongly favoring any genetic change towards social female societies. To say that such insects forego parenthood and instead help their mothers produce nearly identical sisters `because variants which are more successful at reproducing themselves are more likely to survive' is to explain one goal with another -- survival of genotype -- the goal of evolution. Such teleological explanations are totally different from `real' causes as the gravitational attraction behind falling rocks; evolution, like entropy, operates on the level of information, not the level of raw matter itself. Evolution, or any kind of feedback loop, is likewise unanalyzable viewed by discrete cause=>effect events, whereby causal explanations are reducible to primitive discrete interactions, such as described by Wesley Salmon in "Causal Structure of the World": chain fork junction collision before c1 c1 c1 c2 c1 c2 | / \ \ / X after e1 e1 e2 e1 e1 e2 There is no way to embed anything like feedback loops or evolution within such interactions as the above. Feedback loops require that a later event, such as a next-generation copy of (genetic) information, be identified with an earlier `instantiation' so that we `imagine' that the cause effects itself. As far as I can tell, evolution is the implicit rationale whereby teleological arguments (`the purpose of my heart is to pump blood') are supposedly reduced to `proper scientific causal' explanations (`hearts gradually evolved because pumping blood led to species more fit to survive'). What's so awful about `purpose', anyway? Goals imply that `information' exists which can refer to and cause potential future real world states of existence. Every text I have encountered on modern biological methodolology and epistemology embraces teleology in some form. (Re: Mayr's "Growth of Biological Thought" or Rosenberg's "The Structure of Biological Science"). There seems to be a metaphysical rebellion among biologists these days. I think it is clear that the natural teleology intrinsic in evolution explains WHY consciousness is intentional and goal-directed (rather than strictly rational) in the first place. -michael
sunny@hoptoad.UUCP (04/23/86)
> >From: ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) > >>>Evolution is undirected: ie. it has no long-term goals. > > > It turns out that these are not brain-teasers. Since neither survival > nor existence are goals of evolution, the questions are moot. An entity > must have understanding to have goals. Evolution has no understanding, > and hence is a goal-less process. > (Naturally, this is not to say that evolutionists have no > understanding or goals...) Evolution has evolution as its goal. Evolution of spirit is reflected in the evolution of physical life. By looking only at the physical world, you see only the symptoms of the actual spiritual causative factors in action... If you wish to understand creation or evolution you must eventually look on the planes above the physical. The only known tool for this examination is the human mind itself. All the answers are within. Seek enlightenment and you find these answers. Denial will keep you confined within the walls of your own construction. Evolutionists and Creationists are not in conflict. They both misperceive that they are examining the totality of existance, and therefore come up with equally invalid explanations of a fraction of the universe. Both creation and evolution are valid when understood in the correct context of the physical world being only the lowest form of manifestation, on the plane of effects, of those actions and forces acting from higher planes. -- Sunny Kirsten U.P.S.: 10329 Hilltop Rd. U.S. Mail: P.O.B. 2025 Loch Lomond, CA 95426-2025 Voice Phone: (707) 928-5546, 987-2477 USENET: ...!{sun,ptsfa,well,lll-crg,ihnp4,ucsfcgl,nsc,frog}!hoptoad!sunny
mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) (04/23/86)
This was a difficult note for me to understand: I had to print it to try to get the author's intended sense. I think I disagree with you, Michael: if I've misunderstood, I apologize in advance. In article <211@spar.UUCP> ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes: > >>>>Evolution is undirected: ie. it has no long-term goals. [HUYBENSZ] > > >> Survival? Existence? [ELLIS] > > I guess I shouldn't be surprised that so many are quick to assert that > Aristotle's `telos' (roughly `purpose, goal, or aim') has no place in > scientific explanation. After all, physics and chemistry flourished only > after purging all but efficient causes, yes? Yes. Purpose and goals have no place in scientific theory about (literally) brainless subjects because adding them to an explanation adds no more predictive or descriptive ability. Thus Occam's Razor throws out "purpose" and "goals" in favor of "function". (There are meanings of "function" that do not imply purpose.) > Viewed game-theoretically, the evolutionary payoff matrix has two > results -- extinction or survival. I fail to see how to prevent > evolution from becoming tautological unless it is seen as the rationale > behind the first scientifically sanctified `goal'; appropriately, this > goal is existence. Wait a minute: who chose survival as a goal over extinction? While we may personally prefer one over the otehr and pay more attention to it, there is no reasonable argument that one or the other is a purpose or goal of evolution. Both are phenomina associated with evolution. > Sure -- we usually view biological teleology behavioristically -- one > does not have to attribute conscious goals to genes, organs, species, or > whatever, to speak of the `purpose' of that which is under analysis. > The purpose of my heart is, after all, to pump blood, is it not? Actually, "function" can serve quite as well, and without the burden of excess meaning that "purpose" provides. The only thing I can say in favor of the word "purpose" is that it makes explainations to most people (who are most familiar with teleological explanations) simpler and more direct. ... > Such teleological explanations are totally different from `real' causes > as the gravitational attraction behind falling rocks; evolution, like > entropy, operates on the level of information, not the level of raw > matter itself. I don't perceive any such "level of information". Evolution operates on just plain matter like any other descriptive law. We make descriptive abstractions like matter and species for our own convenience, where it is simplest and most compact for us to describe and predict. > Evolution, or any kind of feedback loop, is likewise unanalyzable viewed > by discrete cause=>effect events, whereby causal explanations are > reducible to primitive discrete interactions, such as described by > Wesley Salmon in "Causal Structure of the World": > > chain fork junction collision > > before c1 c1 c1 c2 c1 c2 > | / \ \ / X > after e1 e1 e2 e1 e1 e2 > > There is no way to embed anything like feedback loops or evolution > within such interactions as the above. Feedback loops require that a > later event, such as a next-generation copy of (genetic) information, > be identified with an earlier `instantiation' so that we `imagine' that > the cause effects itself. I disagree. Any time-based feedback loop can be unwound into chains of the discrete structures you list above. The idea of loops is simply a shorthand for long chains whose elements are extremely similar. > As far as I can tell, evolution is the implicit rationale whereby > teleological arguments (`the purpose of my heart is to > pump blood') are supposedly reduced to `proper scientific causal' > explanations (`hearts gradually evolved because pumping blood > led to species more fit to survive'). I think here you are just noting that it is clumsier to speak in a non- teleological fashion than otherwise. We are raised from infancy with teleology embedded within our language, because human institutions are teleological. The rest of the universe doesn't seem to operate that way. Thus we're at a disadvantage because we are less practiced with non- teleological modes of speech. > What's so awful about `purpose', anyway? Goals imply that `information' > exists which can refer to and cause potential future real world states > of existence. Every text I have encountered on modern biological > methodolology and epistemology embraces teleology in some form. > (Re: Mayr's "Growth of Biological Thought" or Rosenberg's "The > Structure of Biological Science"). There seems to be a metaphysical > rebellion among biologists these days. The answer to "what's so awful..." is the same as the answer to "what's the benefit of Occam's Razor?" "Purpose" is more comfortable for us to use, but less accurate. I don't think you are identifying rebellion so much as convenience. > I think it is clear that the natural teleology intrinsic in evolution > explains WHY consciousness is intentional and goal-directed (rather > than strictly rational) in the first place. I think you are placing the cart before the horse. You are finding "natural teleology" in evolution because that is the way your consciousness works most conveniently. -- Strephon: "Have you the heart to apply the prosaic rules of evidence to a case brimming with such poetical emotion?" Chancellor: "Distinctly." From "Iolanthe", by Gilbert and Sullivan. -- Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
wfi@rti-sel.UUCP (William Ingogly) (04/24/86)
In article <211@spar.UUCP> ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes: >... As far as I can tell, evolution is the implicit rationale whereby > teleological arguments (`the purpose of my heart is to > pump blood') are supposedly reduced to `proper scientific causal' > explanations (`hearts gradually evolved because pumping blood > led to species more fit to survive'). > > What's so awful about `purpose', anyway? Goals imply that `information' > exists which can refer to and cause potential future real world states > of existence. ... Perhaps I'm misreading what you've been saying here, but what most people think about when they hear "goal" is the notion of a force directing a process toward an ideal future state. Saying "I'm going to direct everything in my life toward becoming a lighthouse keeper" is different than saying "everything that's happened in my life makes it possible that I'll be a lighthouse keeper some day." And this seems to be implicit in your concept of information that somehow refers to future real states. Suppose we have a dammed lake at the top of a hill, and a valley below. If the dam is removed, does the lake's flowing to a stable state in which all water resides in the valley involve somehow the system's referring to future real states in which the water either flows or doesn't flow downhill to the valley? And how does information 'refer' to a system's potential future states? This approach strikes me like the 'anthropic principles' certain cosmologists are enamored of: a lot of fun to think about but ultimately not that useful as models that can generate falsifiable hypotheses. -- Cheers, Bill Ingogly
throopw@dg_rtp.UUCP (Wayne Throop) (04/25/86)
>>>>>Evolution is undirected: ie. it has no long-term goals. >>> Survival? Existence? >>[...] An entity >>must have understanding to have goals. Evolution has no understanding, >>and hence is a goal-less process. >> >>(Naturally, this is not to say that evolutionists have no >> understanding or goals...) > > I guess I shouldn't be surprised that so many are quick to assert that > Aristotle's `telos' (roughly `purpose, goal, or aim') has no place in > scientific explanation. After all, physics and chemistry flourished only > after purging all but efficient causes, yes? Goodness gracious, am *I* supposed to be an example of someone who asserts that goals have no place in scientific explanation? You get this from the fact that I assert evolution to be goal-less? Quite an extrapolation... "There exists a case where WT asserts goal-less-ness, therefore WT asserts goals have no place in scientific explanation." Gosh, what would Aristotle say to this sylogism? To say that an anylysis of purpose and goal is inappropriate in science is silly, and I never said it. > Viewed game-theoretically, the evolutionary payoff matrix has two > results -- extinction or survival. I fail to see how to prevent > evolution from becoming tautological unless it is seen as the rationale > behind the first scientifically sanctified `goal'; appropriately, this > goal is existence. Nonsense. To be viewed "game-theoretically", species playing the evolution game must make a "play" and receive a "payoff". You have defined no such plays made by species, and a large part of the idea behind Darwinian evolution is to show how evolutionary change could occur in the absence of such "plays" that species could "make", since there seem, in fact, to be no such plays. The point is that far from requiring a goal to escape tautologicality, evolutionary theory was developed *specifically* to *avoid* goal-ism while still explaining speciation, since goal-based explanations require an ordering and directing mechanism, and such a mechanism was not found. Again, Darwinian evolution was invented precisely because goal-oriented explanations *failed* to explain evolution, because no effective mechanism for the goal-tropic agent was found. > Sure -- we usually view biological teleology behavioristically -- one > does not have to attribute conscious goals to genes, organs, species, or > whatever, to speak of the `purpose' of that which is under analysis. > The purpose of my heart is, after all, to pump blood, is it not? To you, yes. To a cannibal, the purpose of your heart might be to provide courage. To a surgeon, the purpose of your heart might be to display aquired skill. To an internist, the purpose of your heart might be to get a publication of some sort. My point is not to bombard you with disquieting images of unusual purposes for your internal organs. The point is that "purpose" implies some entity with goals. Different entities can see different purposes in the same thing. Objects per se have no purpose. Purpose is attributed to objects by agents which use them. Thus, speaking of the "purpose of evolution" is like speaking of the "purpose of the atlantic ocean". You can justify saying that the purpose of the atlantic ocean is to allow delivery by supertanker of oil to the United States, but that says more about the economy of the US than it does about the AO itself. Similarly, saying that the purpose of evolution is survival says much more about the aspirations of certain members of the human species than it does about the process of evolution. > Why are so many species of female dominated social insects haplodiploid? > Because females of such species shared more genetically with their > sisters than their brothers or even their own offspring. But that's NOT > a cause-and-effect explanation. In fact, it is amazingly close to saying > why such insects `ought to have' such a `goal', conscious or otherwise. > In fact, it IS a teleological explanation. It is *not* teleological. In fact, it is the *opposite* of a teleological argument. Certain insects are not haplodiploid because they are female dominated, they are female-dominated because they are haplodiploid. Or, a clearer case, tigers don't have claws because they hunt, they hunt because they have claws. Now, I will grant that it is easy to confuse evolutionary arguments with similar teleological arguments. But this doesn't make Darwinian evolution teleological, and never has. > [...omitted causation diagrams...] > There is no way to embed anything like feedback loops or evolution > within such interactions as the above. Feedback loops require that a > later event, such as a next-generation copy of (genetic) information, > be identified with an earlier `instantiation' so that we `imagine' that > the cause effects itself. Uh.... what does this have to do with evolution? Natural selection doesn't involve contra-temporal feedback. > As far as I can tell, evolution is the implicit rationale whereby > teleological arguments (`the purpose of my heart is to > pump blood') are supposedly reduced to `proper scientific causal' > explanations (`hearts gradually evolved because pumping blood > led to species more fit to survive'). And what do you want me to conclude? The fact that you apparently can't tell the difference between these two arguments means evolution is teleological? > What's so awful about `purpose', anyway? Goals imply that `information' > exists which can refer to and cause potential future real world states > of existence. Every text I have encountered on modern biological > methodolology and epistemology embraces teleology in some form. > (Re: Mayr's "Growth of Biological Thought" or Rosenberg's "The > Structure of Biological Science"). There seems to be a metaphysical > rebellion among biologists these days. > > I think it is clear that the natural teleology intrinsic in evolution > explains WHY consciousness is intentional and goal-directed (rather > than strictly rational) in the first place. Sigh. There isn't anything awful about purpose. It merely isn't present in Darwinian evolutionary theory. Your assertions about the teleological nature of evolution don't make it so. I haven't read the books you mention, but the ones I have read do *not* use teleological explanations, any more than the insect example you used was teleological. And evolution cannot explain why consciouisness is intentional by virtue of evolution's intrinsic teleology, since teleology is not intrinsic in Darwinian evolution and never was. > -michael -- Wayne Throop <the-known-world>!mcnc!rti-sel!dg_rtp!throopw
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (04/26/86)
Mike Huybensz writes: [replying to Michael Ellis] >> I guess I shouldn't be surprised that so many are quick to assert that >> Aristotle's `telos' (roughly `purpose, goal, or aim') has no place in >> scientific explanation. After all, physics and chemistry flourished only >> after purging all but efficient causes, yes? >Yes. Purpose and goals have no place in scientific theory about (literally) >brainless subjects because adding them to an explanation adds no more >predictive or descriptive ability. Thus Occam's Razor throws out "purpose" >and "goals" in favor of "function". (There are meanings of "function" that >do not imply purpose.) Actually, the reason for the rejection of "purposes" is much simpler: the notion of purpose is inherently subjective. >Wait a minute: who chose survival as a goal over extinction? While we may >personally prefer one over the otehr and pay more attention to it, there is >no reasonable argument that one or the other is a purpose or goal of >evolution. Both are phenomina associated with evolution. Well, I prefer an intermediate position: that evolution enforces survival as a goal of organism systems/genotypes. The goal is there, but by the subjective nature of the thing, it is associated with individuals with respect to themselves. > Evolution operates on >just plain matter like any other descriptive law. We make descriptive >abstractions like matter and species for our own convenience, where it >is simplest and most compact for us to describe and predict. I'm note convinced by this last line anymore. The decriptive abstractions are backed up by real phenomenological differences, after all. The question of whether there is goal-oriented evolution is not moot, and it simply isn't a question of semantics either. The "punctuated evolution" school, in its descriptive explanation, begs the question of why certain morphological changes seem to happen almost instantaneously. I would suggest that it is possible that there is some impetus which actively seeks the completion of the transformation. THis is rather different from an explanation which argues that the dispersive force is simply mutation, and that the favorable changes are simply the ones which persist. The second is a more orthodox explanation, but orthodoxy is no guarantee of truth in science. C. Wingate
mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) (04/29/86)
In article <1188@umcp-cs.UUCP> mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) writes: > Mike Huybensz writes: [replying to Michael Ellis] > >Purpose and goals have no place in scientific theory about (literally) > >brainless subjects because adding them to an explanation adds no more > >predictive or descriptive ability. Thus Occam's Razor throws out "purpose" > >and "goals" in favor of "function". (There are meanings of "function" that > >do not imply purpose.) > > Actually, the reason for the rejection of "purposes" is much simpler: the > notion of purpose is inherently subjective. The only reason I'd disagree is because when studying people the subjective analysis (including purposes) still gives results that are hard to rival in a more scientific manner. But yes, I agree that "purposes" in the inanimate are subjective, as subjective and meaningless as gender in the inanimate (which numerous languages saddle us with.) > >Wait a minute: who chose survival as a goal over extinction? While we may > >personally prefer one over the other and pay more attention to it, there is > >no reasonable argument that one or the other is a purpose or goal of > >evolution. Both are phenomina associated with evolution. > > Well, I prefer an intermediate position: that evolution enforces survival as > a goal of organism systems/genotypes. The goal is there, but by the > subjective nature of the thing, it is associated with individuals with > respect to themselves. Sorry, but an intermediate between two goals is still a goal, and I don't see how non-thinkers and abstractions can be said to have goals. Do gaseous molecules have pressure as their goal? Does quantum mechanics have a goal? Of course, I could (*shudder*) get us started on whether thinkers have purposes, goals, souls, free will, or whatever. But PLEASE, let's not start that again. Let's just work on agreeing about the non-thinking and abstractions such as evolution. > > Evolution operates on > >just plain matter like any other descriptive law. We make descriptive > >abstractions like matter and species for our own convenience, where it > >is simplest and most compact for us to describe and predict. > > I'm not convinced by this last line anymore. The descriptive abstractions > are backed up by real phenomenological differences, after all. Natural phenomina, no matter how real, don't imply any purpose. > The question of whether there is goal-oriented evolution is not moot, and it > simply isn't a question of semantics either. The "punctuated evolution" > school, in its descriptive explanation, begs the question of why certain > morphological changes seem to happen almost instantaneously. I would > suggest that it is possible that there is some impetus which actively seeks > the completion of the transformation. THis is rather different from an > explanation which argues that the dispersive force is simply mutation, and > that the favorable changes are simply the ones which persist. The second is > a more orthodox explanation, but orthodoxy is no guarantee of truth in > science. If you had to explain the tunneling effect of electrons before quantum mechanics was proposed, would you look for an impetus, a purpose of the electrons? Why must you try to find purpose when you don't know something? That's exactly the cause of "god of the gaps" syndromes. Are you a closet supporter of Fr. Teilhard de Chardin? :-) (This last sentence.) -- Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (04/30/86)
>>... As far as I can tell, evolution is the implicit rationale whereby >> teleological arguments (`the purpose of my heart is to >> pump blood') are supposedly reduced to `proper scientific causal' >> explanations (`hearts gradually evolved because pumping blood >> led to species more fit to survive'). >> >> What's so awful about `purpose', anyway? Goals imply that `information' >> exists which can refer to and cause potential future real world states >> of existence. ... > >Perhaps I'm misreading what you've been saying here, but what most >people think about when they hear "goal" is the notion of a force >directing a process toward an ideal future state. Saying "I'm going to >direct everything in my life toward becoming a lighthouse keeper" is >different than saying "everything that's happened in my life makes it >possible that I'll be a lighthouse keeper some day." And this seems to >be implicit in your concept of information that somehow refers to >future real states. Suppose we have a dammed lake at the top of a >hill, and a valley below. If the dam is removed, does the lake's >flowing to a stable state in which all water resides in the valley >involve somehow the system's referring to future real states in which >the water either flows or doesn't flow downhill to the valley? And how >does information 'refer' to a system's potential future states? I do not see how the dam in your example possesses the required internal organization to contain a hypothetical model of the future inside itself, such as possessed by highly goal-oriented computer programs and biological systems. [This] >approach strikes me like the 'anthropic principles' certain cosmologists >are enamored of: a lot of fun to think about but ultimately not that >useful as models that can generate falsifiable hypotheses. >- Cheers, Bill Ingogly Cosmologists? Like who? Most of the ideas I'm concerned with here are from biology, cybernetics, artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and philosophy. I apologize for my stupidity and general inability to make a convincing case for notions that are as new to me as they apparently are to most readers... An example swiped from Dennett's "Brainstorms" is relevant here. If I were to try to understand a how a chess program worked, the first thing I'd assume is that its intention was to win at chess. As I understood it better, I might learn that it was not aware of various goal-oriented concepts in chess, such as the desirability of advancing pawns with the intention of forcing queening situations. Intentional statements differ in verifiability from kosher causal statements in degree only. In both cases, we infer statements that are not logically deducible from observations; in both cases, we need be prepared to alter our hypotheses in the face of new evidence. I agree it is one goal of science to reduce intentional statements to `rigorous' causal statements. What I do not see is why such reduction necessarily invalidates teleological explanation. -michael
mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) (05/01/86)
In article <238@spar.UUCP> ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes: > I agree it is one goal of science to reduce intentional statements to > `rigorous' causal statements. What I do not see is why such reduction > necessarily invalidates teleological explanation. Teleological explanations aren't really invalidated by reductionism: they are still valid in that they still work, still have explanatory power. But by more stringent criteria, such as Occam's Razor, they can be considered invalidated. The reason they are invalidated by Occam's Razor is that essentially teleological explanations involve hidden men to explain function as behavior. And how do we explain the behavior of humans and the hidden men? Obviously they have hidden men in their heads too... ad nauseum. Much like those 17th century drawings of homunculi inside the heads of sperm. -- Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
tos@psc70.UUCP (Dr.Schlesinger) (05/02/86)
Doesn't the very word **purpose** connote a consciousness, most likely but not necessarily human, which wills a particular cause/effect sequence. It seems to me that the discussion of any process, e.g. evolution, which presumably is not so **willed** can be related to **purpose** only in a sense in which that word means nothing more than cause and effect. Whatchathink? Tom Schlesinger, Plymouth State College, Plymouth, N.H. 03264 uucp: decvax!dartvax!psc70!psc90!tos
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (05/03/86)
In article <318@dg_rtp.UUCP> throopw@dg_rtp.UUCP writes: >>>[...] An entity >>>must have understanding to have goals. Evolution has no understanding, >>>and hence is a goal-less process. Let me change the semantics here a bit. "Evolution" per se has no goals; but I think it makes sense to say that the species which are evolving do have a goal: to survive. (And the individuals of the species have the more complex goal of perpetuating their genes.) I am inclined to agree that understanding is necessary in order to have goals; but I think the genetic information in the DNA does constitute a rudimentary kind of understanding. (Very rudimentary, if we compare it to a human's understanding; but perhaps not so bad compared to a cockroach's. I have no problem ascribing goals to a cockroach.) >> Viewed game-theoretically, the evolutionary payoff matrix has two >> results -- extinction or survival. I fail to see how to prevent >> evolution from becoming tautological unless it is seen as the rationale >> behind the first scientifically sanctified `goal'; appropriately, this >> goal is existence. > >Nonsense. To be viewed "game-theoretically", species playing the >evolution game must make a "play" and receive a "payoff". You have >defined no such plays made by species, and a large part of the idea >behind Darwinian evolution is to show how evolutionary change could >occur in the absence of such "plays" that species could "make", since >there seem, in fact, to be no such plays. More accurately, the "plays" that the species makes are individuals, and the "payoff matrix" has a potentially infinite number of results: zero offspring, one offspring, etc. >> Sure -- we usually view biological teleology behavioristically -- one >> does not have to attribute conscious goals to genes, organs, species, or >> whatever, to speak of the `purpose' of that which is under analysis. >> The purpose of my heart is, after all, to pump blood, is it not? > >To you, yes. [...] >The point is that "purpose" implies some entity with goals. Different >entities can see different purposes in the same thing. Objects per se >have no purpose. Purpose is attributed to objects by agents which use >them. There is a real sense in which the evolutionary purpose of your heart is to pump blood. It would not exist if it did not perform that function. >Thus, speaking of the "purpose of evolution" is like speaking of the >"purpose of the atlantic ocean". Here I agree with you. Evolution, as a whole, has no purpose. >Or, a clearer case, tigers don't have claws because they >hunt, they hunt because they have claws. Not so clear. The first ancestors of the modern tiger which hunted probably had claws of some sort. But because they hunted, those claws became adapted to hunting. It certain is true that tigers have claws well adapted to hunting because they hunted. >Uh.... what does this have to do with evolution? Natural selection >doesn't involve contra-temporal feedback. Michael's feedback loops actually are a useful way to think about natural selection, as long as you remember that they don't *really* represent contra-temporal feedback. Each cycle through the feedback loop is another generation. >And evolution cannot explain why consciouisness is >intentional by virtue of evolution's intrinsic teleology, since >teleology is not intrinsic in Darwinian evolution and never was. Agreed. This conclusion depends on evolution itself having purpose, which it does not. >> -michael >-- >Wayne Throop <the-known-world>!mcnc!rti-sel!dg_rtp!throopw Frank Adams ihnp4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
pete@valid.UUCP (Pete Zakel) (05/08/86)
> In article <318@dg_rtp.UUCP> throopw@dg_rtp.UUCP writes: > >>>[...] An entity > >>>must have understanding to have goals. Evolution has no understanding, > >>>and hence is a goal-less process. > > Let me change the semantics here a bit. "Evolution" per se has no goals; > but I think it makes sense to say that the species which are evolving do > have a goal: to survive. (And the individuals of the species have the more > complex goal of perpetuating their genes.) > > Frank Adams I wish to disagree with this statement. Survival is not a goal, it is a process. DNA that survives gives rise to DNA that is good at surviving. Species that survive and perpetuate their genes give rise to species that are good at surviving and perpetuating their genes. Their is no "goal". When conditions change such that a certain survival process does not work, species depending on that process die out. Species that use a survival process that works under both set of conditions survive. This is called "natural selection" and is the basis of evolution. Describing a process as goal oriented makes explanation easier, but the explanation should not be confused with the reality. This type of confusion is what gave rise to Lamarck's (spelling?) theories (you know: if you cut off the tails of enough mice, eventually you will breed tail-less mice). -- -Pete Zakel (..!{hplabs,amd,pyramid,ihnp4}!pesnta!valid!pete)
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (05/10/86)
In article <267@valid.UUCP> pete@valid.UUCP writes: >> In article <318@dg_rtp.UUCP> throopw@dg_rtp.UUCP writes: >> >>>[...] An entity >> >>>must have understanding to have goals. Evolution has no understanding, >> >>>and hence is a goal-less process. >> >> Let me change the semantics here a bit. "Evolution" per se has no goals; >> but I think it makes sense to say that the species which are evolving do >> have a goal: to survive. (And the individuals of the species have the more >> complex goal of perpetuating their genes.) >> >> Frank Adams > >I wish to disagree with this statement. Survival is not a goal, it is a >process. DNA that survives gives rise to DNA that is good at surviving. >Species that survive and perpetuate their genes give rise to species that >are good at surviving and perpetuating their genes. Their is no "goal". >When conditions change such that a certain survival process does not work, >species depending on that process die out. Species that use a survival >process that works under both set of conditions survive. This is called >"natural selection" and is the basis of evolution. Being a goal and being a process are not incompatible. You have presented a fine argument that survival is a process. But no one has disputed this. The question is, is it also a goal? This is as much a semantic question as anything. There are important similarities between ordinary human goals and the evolutionary "goal" to survive; there are also important differences. The question is, are the similarities enough to justify the extension of the terminology to this domain? Or, more or less equivalently, what is the best way of talking about the evolutionary process in contexts where functionality is at issue, rather than details of natural selection? The chief advantage of using this terminology in this context is that it is by far the most concise way of expressing these ideas. The chief disadvantage is that it is subject to misunderstanding by those who do not understand the subject. I tend to feel that the argument in favor is stronger, at least in some contexts. I might feel differently if I spent more time arguing with creationists. Frank Adams ihnp4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108 P.S. I don't want to spend time arguing with creationists. If I had noticed that net.origins was in the newsgroups line on my original follow-up, I would have removed it. My comments were directed primarily to the net.philosophy audience. If you haven't yet agreed about whether evolution happens, a discussion about whether it can be regarded as goal-oriented is pointless and misleading.
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V Torek) (05/14/86)
In article <1382@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: >Let me change the semantics here a bit. "Evolution" per se has no goals; >but I think it makes sense to say that the species which are evolving do >have a goal: to survive. (And the individuals of the species have the more >complex goal of perpetuating their genes.) Not me. Not my cat. Not most animals, I'll wager. > I am inclined to agree that >understanding is necessary in order to have goals; but I think >the genetic information in the DNA does constitute a rudimentary kind >of understanding. (Very rudimentary, if we compare it to a human's >understanding; but perhaps not so bad compared to a cockroach's. I >have no problem ascribing goals to a cockroach.) DNA codes information, in a sense, but that seems to me about all you can say. Cockroaches probably have goals, but then they probably have (rudimentary) minds; DNA doesn't seem to be built the right way to have either. Also, a cockroach can compare its perceptions to its goals and figure out whether things are going the way it wants them to -- can DNA? --Paul Torek umcp-cs!flink
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (05/19/86)
> Paul Torek >> Frank Adams >>Let me change the semantics here a bit. "Evolution" per se has no goals; >>but I think it makes sense to say that the species which are evolving do >>have a goal: to survive. (And the individuals of the species have the more >>complex goal of perpetuating their genes.) > >Not me. Not my cat. Not most animals, I'll wager. Are you seriously trying to tell us that most animals do not possess basic survival instincts? Just how would your cat behave if threatened by an aggressive dog? Would it just sit there and let the dog tear it to pieces? Does your cat fall asleep in the middle of busy traffic? When your cat is hungry, does it not exhibit behavior that is directed towards the goal of finding and consuming food? And so on.. If you were trying to tell us that most animals are not capable of reason, you wouldn't encounter any argument from me. But it is pretty obvious that animal behavior is goal-directed, and that these goals are understandable in terms of their contribution to the animal's fitness to survive. >> I am inclined to agree that >>understanding is necessary in order to have goals; but I think >>the genetic information in the DNA does constitute a rudimentary kind >>of understanding. (Very rudimentary, if we compare it to a human's >>understanding; but perhaps not so bad compared to a cockroach's. I >>have no problem ascribing goals to a cockroach.) > >DNA codes information, in a sense, but that seems to me about all you can >say. Cockroaches probably have goals, but then they probably have >(rudimentary) minds; DNA doesn't seem to be built the right way to have >either. Also, a cockroach can compare its perceptions to its goals and >figure out whether things are going the way it wants them to -- can DNA? You say "DNA codes information, in a sense". Does that grudging concession imply that there is something inferior about the DNA's information content? By my account, human created information systems are vastly inferior to the richness and complexity of DNA-directed biological systems. You say that DNA doesn't seem to be built right to have goals? Whatever does DNA lack? ..a physiological process or behavior.. owes its goal-directeness to the operation of a program... All the processes of individual development (ontogeny) as well as all seemingly goal-directed behaviors of individuals fall into this category, and are characterized by two components: they are guided by a program, and they depend on the existence of some endpoint or goal which is foreseen in the program regulating the behavior. The endpoint might be a structure, a physiological function, or a steady state. - Ernst Mayr (The Growth of Biological Thought, 1982) -michael
bane@parcvax.UUCP (05/20/86)
In article <1494@umcp-cs.UUCP>, flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V Torek) writes: > > ... > >understanding; but perhaps not so bad compared to a cockroach's. I > >have no problem ascribing goals to a cockroach.) > > DNA codes information, in a sense, but that seems to me about all you can > say. Cockroaches probably have goals, but then they probably have > (rudimentary) minds; DNA doesn't seem to be built the right way to have > either. Also, a cockroach can compare its perceptions to its goals and > figure out whether things are going the way it wants them to -- can DNA? Anyone who has worked with insects would never say they had a mind. As far as I can tell, they are nothing more than stimulus-response machines; the response can be complicated, true, but nothing that requires a mind. Cockroaches, for instance, have no "brain" as we know it, but rather SMALL clumps of neurons along their back. If you cut off a cockroach's head (I did, in biology lab), it will live for days, acting very much like a cockroach (crawling around, etc.). It eventually dies of hunger. Same with praying mantis's (same experiment, *sniff*). I can't imagine a cockroach comparing perceptions to goals - the air pressure changes suddenly, it scuttles. Small, enclosed space, it slows down. Head toward stimulus of food and pheromones of opposite sex. Etc, etc. There are a relatively limited number of these. - rene -- Rene P S (nee Steiner) Bane bane@parcvax
ellis@spar.UUCP (05/20/86)
>>>John R. Bane >>Paul V Torek >Rene Steiner/Bane >> >understanding; but perhaps not so bad compared to a cockroach's. I >> >have no problem ascribing goals to a cockroach.) >> >> DNA codes information, in a sense, but that seems to me about all you can >> say. Cockroaches probably have goals, but then they probably have >> (rudimentary) minds; DNA doesn't seem to be built the right way to have >> either. Also, a cockroach can compare its perceptions to its goals and >> figure out whether things are going the way it wants them to -- can DNA? > >Anyone who has worked with insects would never say they had a mind. >As far as I can tell, they are nothing more than stimulus-response >machines; the response can be complicated, true, but nothing that >requires a mind.. Cockroaches, for instance, have no "brain" as we >know it, but rather SMALL clumps of neurons along their back.. >.. >I can't imagine a cockroach comparing perceptions to goals - the air >pressure changes suddenly, it scuttles. Small, enclosed space, it >slows down. Head toward stimulus of food and pheromones of opposite >sex. Etc, etc. There are a relatively limited number of these. The existence of mind with conscious goals is a different question from whether goal-directness a scientifically respectable quality to attribute to biological entities. From what I have read, it appears to be widely accepted within most modern biological methodologies that teleological descriptions are useful, verifiable, and necessary in most descriptions and theories of living things, at least within disciplines where reduction to the "mechanical" explanations of chemistry, physics, and engineering is in the far distant future. By my account, the possession of "mind" is not a requirement of goal-directness; what counts is the possession of an internal program which is able to reference and attain potential real world states through self-monitoring and self-directing mechanisms, such as the teleomechanisms DNA employs to assure the development of an embryo, despite remarkable laboratory-induced disruptions that would never occur in nature. As to whether cockroaches have minds, few would argue that their thoughts, purposes, and feelings, such as they would be if they did indeed exist, could be very similar to or as complex as ours. Can anyone tell us how much complexity is required to feel pain or hunger, or to perceive and respond to those parts of the external world that are meaningful to an insect's survival, anyway? Do most of an insect's responses which we understand make sense in terms of their survival value? Do most people who believe in evolution deny that what some call "mind" must have evolved right along with "body". If mind did not evolve, where did it come from? -michael Blessed be you, mighty matter, irresistable march of evolution, reality ever newborn; by constantly shattering our mental categories, you force us to go ever further in our pursuit of the truth. -Pierre Teilhard de Chardin
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (05/22/86)
In article <1494@umcp-cs.UUCP> flink@maryland.UUCP (Paul V Torek) writes: > >In article <1382@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: >>Let me change the semantics here a bit. "Evolution" per se has no goals; >>but I think it makes sense to say that the species which are evolving do >>have a goal: to survive. (And the individuals of the species have the more >>complex goal of perpetuating their genes.) > >> I am inclined to agree that >>understanding is necessary in order to have goals; but I think >>the genetic information in the DNA does constitute a rudimentary kind >>of understanding. (Very rudimentary, if we compare it to a human's >>understanding; but perhaps not so bad compared to a cockroach's. I >>have no problem ascribing goals to a cockroach.) > >DNA codes information, in a sense, but that seems to me about all you can >say. Cockroaches probably have goals, but then they probably have >(rudimentary) minds; DNA doesn't seem to be built the right way to have >either. Also, a cockroach can compare its perceptions to its goals and >figure out whether things are going the way it wants them to -- can DNA? I'm going to back off here a bit. I do not think that the kind of goals associated with evolution (*not* goals *of* evolution) are quite the same meaning of the word as we use for people and animals. I do think it is a useful extension of that concept in some contexts. It may be confusing and ambiguous, but other modes of expression are frequently very long-winded. Frank Adams ihnp4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
friesen@psivax.UUCP (05/23/86)
In article <265@spar.UUCP> ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes: >> Paul Torek >> Frank Adams > >>> "Evolution" per se has no goals; >>>but I think it makes sense to say that the species which are evolving do >>>have a goal: to survive. (And the individuals of the species have the more >>>complex goal of perpetuating their genes.) >> >>Not me. Not my cat. Not most animals, I'll wager. > > Are you seriously trying to tell us that most animals do not possess > basic survival instincts? > I think you misunderstood him. I rather think he is denying the stuff in the parentheses, namely he is saying that he and his cat do not have the goal of perpetuating thier genes. Of course his cat has the goal of surviving! But it may be doubted that it is attempting to transmit its genes. -- Sarima (Stanley Friesen) UUCP: {ttidca|ihnp4|sdcrdcf|quad1|nrcvax|bellcore|logico}!psivax!friesen ARPA: ??
throopw@dg_rtp.UUCP (Wayne Throop) (05/24/86)
> ellis@spar.UUCP > The existence of mind with conscious goals is a different question from > whether goal-directness a scientifically respectable quality to > attribute to biological entities. Naturally, I agree. Goal-directedness is a good way to talk about things that model the world, and which use these models to reach certain preferred states of being (goals). Obviously, some biological entities are among these things. *However*, the process of evolution itself is *not* one of these things. It has no preferred states, and no model of the world, (it *is* a model, it doesn't *have* a model) and thus has no goal. Note that the existance of commonly observed or even clearly preferred states in a system is *not* enough to conclude that there is a goal-directed mechanism at work. The use of a model of a relevant part of the system to attain the preferred state is also required. > By my account, the possession of "mind" is not a requirement of > goal-directness; what counts is the possession of an internal program > which is able to reference and attain potential real world states > through self-monitoring and self-directing mechanisms, such as the > teleomechanisms DNA employs to assure the development of an embryo, > despite remarkable laboratory-induced disruptions that would never occur > in nature. I agree with this. However, it is *still* easy to mistake complicated static construction mechanisms with goal-directed mechanisms. The DNA example may in fact be such a confusion, since I don't know that it has been shown that the DNA posesses a model of the embryo (It *is* this model, again, it cannot *posess* this model). I go rather further than Jim Balter in attributing purpose and goals to systems. I'd say that when a system understands some aspect of the world (in the Frank Adams sense of understanding), then that system can be said to have goals and purpose. For example, a steam engine with a centrifugal governer *might* accurately be said to have the "goal" of running at a constant speed. But I agree with Jim completely when he says (paraphrased) that in attributing goals to a system, it is crucial to pin down what the preferred states are, and what entity has understanding of these preferred states. I still maintain that Darwinian evolution, as a process, has no goal. The members (or perhaps in some cases, groups of members) of the evolving species have the goal of survival, but the evolutionary process does not. -- Wayne Throop <the-known-world>!mcnc!rti-sel!dg_rtp!throopw
laura@hoptoad.UUCP (05/25/86)
In article <324@parcvax.Xerox.COM> bane@parcvax.Xerox.COM (John R. Bane) writes: >Anyone who has worked with insects would never say they had a mind. >As far as I can tell, they are nothing more than stimulus-response >machines; the response can be complicated, true, but nothing that >requires a mind. > >Cockroaches, for instance, have no "brain" as we know it, but rather >SMALL clumps of neurons along their back. I think what we have here is a disagreement as to what constitutes a mind. I think that you have demonstrated that cockroaches don't have a brain, but I am not sure that all minds are found in brains. A cockroach has a pretty boring mind, 'tis true, but it is better than a rock gets. I am still wondering if it is better than what a complicated plant gets, though. (If you think of a plant as a green rock, go see Stevie Wonder's *The Secret Lives of Plants* someday. Yes, I know that the book was real hokey and bogus -- the movie is beautiful. Slow motion photography of little sprouts growing tiny tendrils and waving them in the wind until they find a post they can creep up. Plants move as gracefully as cats -- but so slowly that we do not see them!) -- Laura Creighton ihnp4!hoptoad!laura utzoo!hoptoad!laura sun!hoptoad!laura toad@lll-crg.arpa