[net.origins] The Cosmological Argument

hoffman@cheshire.columbia.edu (Edward Hoffman) (08/13/86)

In article <15222@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> gsmith@brahms.UUCP (Gene Ward Smith) writes:

>  We know that something exists. Suppose we grant that things cannot
>exist without a reason (Leibniz called this "the principle of sufficient
>reason"). It then follows that there must be a reason why something exists.

Well, I think this is where the argument collapses.  To state that things exist
for a reason implies that there was an intent to put them there.  This impli-
cation in and of itself assumes the existence of a god.  This existence, of 
course, is then supposed to be "demonstrated" by the argument.  Thus, the
argument is circular.

>   Clearly, with all the postulations and suppositions involved, this is 
>not a proof for the existence of God. It will be interesting to see if anyone
>cares either to fix it or to rip it to shreds and stomp on the pieces.

I wouldn't call this "ripping it to shreds", just pointing out the main flaw
of the argument.



Edward Hoffman

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stirling@fortune.UUCP (Patrick Stirling) (08/15/86)

I'm following up from talk.religion, so apologies if this has already been
discussed in net.origins!
Regarding this discussion, I have two questions:
1. What is 'existence'?
   The best answer I can think of is "some kind of perturbation in some
   kind of energy field" whch sounds rather vague. A more practical answer
   might be "something exists if it is perceived by a normal person" 
   (limiting my argument to humans on purpose). This give rise to the
   question "What's normal", which I can't answer, and also to fact that 
   (in my opinion) it's possible for one person to perceive something
   that most people don't perceive, AND for the thing to exist.
2. Why does anything need a reason to exist?
   This reminds me of a piece in my local sunday paper (the SF Ex-Chron)
   recently, stating that "the house fly is totally useless to humans - 
   there is no known reason for its existence"! The colossal egocentricity
   of this took my breath away!
Any comments on these questions or their relation to the discussion are
looked forward to!

patrick
{ihnp4, hplabs, amdcad, ucbvax!dual}!fortune!stirling
He thought he saw a rattlesnake
That questioned him in greek;
He looked again, and saw it was
The middle of next week.
"The one thing I regret", he said,
"Is that it cannot speak"
Lweis Carrol, Sylvie and Bruno.

crm@duke.UUCP (Charlie Martin) (08/15/86)

This whole arghument is based on the idea of a "reason" for something to
happen -- which seems to be identical to a "cause" for something existing;
then the total/partial-ordering of reasons argument is just the old
first-cause argument for the existence of a creator (often spelled with
a capital letter.)

But the underlying assumption in this is that all events must have a 
"cause" -- and observation does not bear that out, especially on a quantum
level.  Once there are non-causal events, then the ordering breaks down.
As does the argument.

-- 

			Charlie Martin
			(...mcnc!duke!crm)

tim@hoptoad.uucp (Tim Maroney) (08/15/86)

Not at all, Gene.  To say "X exists" is to say "Not-X does not exist."  If
all events are simply mathematical potentials, rather than an ordered series
of causally-connected things; that is, if "the universe" is simply a set of
potentials, with no potential excluded; then Not-X also exists.  Therefore,
the entire criterion of "existence" becomes invalid.

If your little mind is still befuddled, feel free to write again, but please
don't strain yourself thinking about it....
-- 
Tim Maroney, Electronic Village Idiot
{ihnp4,sun,well,ptsfa,lll-crg,frog}!hoptoad!tim (uucp)
hoptoad!tim@lll-crg (arpa)

Give me food, or give me slack (or kill me).

m128abo@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Michael Ellis) (08/15/86)

> Tim Maroney

> Easy to shoot down.  There is no reason to assume that anything
> exists.  All events may simply be mathematical potentials, none more
> real than any other.  Our experiences are simply some of the
> potentials.  Therefore, since there is no objective reason to assume
> that anything exists, the first premise of the argument is flawed or
> at least unneccessary, and the argument becomes suspect.

    In that case, existence as an all-or-none affair is replaced by
    existence as a superposition of potentia. Doesn't weakening
    "strict objective existence" to "intersubjectivity" assert that
    existability, if not existence, exists?

>(No, this is not a joke; yes, I am prepared to doubt that anything exists.)

    But are you prepared to doubt slack?

-michael

    The fact that operant behavior seems "directed toward the future"
    is misleading.

-BF Skinner

gsmith@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Gene Ward Smith) (08/15/86)

In article <998@hoptoad.uucp> tim@hoptoad.UUCP (Tim Maroney) writes:

>Not at all, Gene.  To say "X exists" is to say "Not-X does not exist." 

   This is simply false. If Not-X is everything that is not X, then if X is
not already everything, "X exists" *implies* "Not-X exists". On the other
hand, if you mean "X exists" is to say "Not-Not-('X exists')", then this is
a double negative which helps you not at all.

>If all events are simply mathematical potentials, rather than an ordered series
>of causally-connected things; that is, if "the universe" is simply a set of
>potentials, with no potential excluded; then Not-X also exists.  Therefore,
>the entire criterion of "existence" becomes invalid.

   I translate your statement about potentials into "everything which *can*
exist, *does* exist". Clearly if all potentials exist, something exists; in
fact, a great deal exists.

>If your little mind is still befuddled, feel free to write again, but please
>don't strain yourself thinking about it....

   You neither, Y'hear?

ucbvax!brahms!gsmith    Gene Ward Smith/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
ucbvax!weyl!gsmith            "When Ubizmo talks, people listen."

carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (08/15/86)

>2. Why does anything need a reason to exist?
>
>This reminds me of a piece in my local sunday paper (the SF Ex-Chron)
>recently, stating that "the house fly is totally useless to humans -
>there is no known reason for its existence"! The colossal
>egocentricity of this took my breath away!

Not only is it homocentric, the statement is a very ignorant one.
The writer undoubtedly would have called fruit flies "totally useless
to humans" before Drosophila proved its immense value to genetics.

Flies, while often annoying (they've pushed me to the brink of
insanity on mountain hikes) are of considerable benefit to humanity.
First, they are decomposers: they feed on dead organic matter such as
wastes and animal carcasses, recovering the nutrients in these
materials for the food chain.  Second, flies are food for many types
of animals (and some plants!) which are of more direct benefit to
people.  Third, many flies are pollinators; without pollinators, a
large proportion of plants could not reproduce.  Finally,
notwithstanding horror movies starring mutant arthropods, flies are
beautiful, both in their structure and in their adaptations.

Richard Carnes

gsmith@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Gene Ward Smith) (08/29/86)

In article <112@methods.UUCP> cary@methods.UUCP (Cary Timar (U of W co-op)) writes:
>In article <15222@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> gsmith@brahms.UUCP (Gene Ward Smith) writes:

>>   We can do this a little differently: we can look at everything that exists
>>and the relation "<" of ontological dependence ...
>>Zorn's lemma says that there are maxima under ontological dependence.

>Extrapolating logic and set theory outside our universe is questionable,
>at best.  I see no reason why any theoretical god need be bound by some
>descriptive laws invented by men to describe the behavior of
>mathematical sets that they created to describe the universe around
>them.

   Well, I agree with you, sort of. But I think logic and set theory are 
more universal than you think. In particular, set theory was invented to
talk about mathematical reality (sets of real numbers, etc.) and not 
the universe around us.

>In particular, I cannot see why we should grant Zorn's Lemma.
>Mathematicians generally prefer to have proofs that do not depend on the
>Axiom of Choice or its equivalents.

   Most mathematicians could care less, a few strange ones do. By the way,
there is an old joke to the effect that the existence of God is equivalent
to the Axiom of Choice: since Zorn's lemma => God exists and God exists =>
God can do the choice routine, and hence the Axiom of Choice is true.

>I feel that somehow any theoretical god is belittled by being dependent
>for its very existence on Zorn's Lemma.

   This is not what the argument says, so I wouldn't worry about it. 

ucbvax!brahms!gsmith    Gene Ward Smith/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
    "*That* the world is, is the mystical." -- Ludwig Wittgenstein

jc@cdx39.UUCP (John Chambers) (08/30/86)

>               ... We now have an ordering relation of ontological dependence:
> universe = R0 < R1 < R2 ... where "<" means "explains" or "causes to be".
> We may assume X < Y < Z => X < Y. Let us suppose also that X < Y & Y < X is
> impossible; that is, two *different* things cannot provide mutual explanations
> for the other's existence. 

Leaving aside the rest of this for others to hack apart, I'll
jump into the fray by attacking this point.  At first glance,
this seems like an intuitively reasonable assumption, but that
just goes to show how feeble a think intuition is.  Biologists
quite frequently invoke arguments in which X < Y & Y < X.

How so?  Well, consider the evolution of the ornate reproductive
structures we call "flowers".  It seems quite clear that these
evolved in response to the pollinating behavior of insects (and
possibly a few birds).  On the other hand, the insects' behavior
clearly evolved as to take advantage of the existence of flowers.
Thus we have:
    X = Insects visit flowers, consuming nectar and/or pollen,
    	and incidentally cross-pollinate the flowers.
    Y = Plants produce flowers that announce the presence of
	nectar and pollen.

It seems quite clear that X < Y, and also Y < X.  That is, without
the presence of pollinators, flowers wouldn't have evolved; without
the presence of flowers, insects would do little if any pollination.

This is usually referred to as "co-evolution".  

A similar situation exists with the evolution of edible fruit,
which are devices that plants use to trick large animals (mostly
birds and mammals) into scattering the plants' seeds and fertilizing
them as they sow them.  Fruit evolved because there were animals
around willing to eat them; the animals eat them because the
plants supply them.

Perhaps I should put "because" in quotes.  The concept of "causation"
here is a bit different than what most theologians and philosophers
have dealt with.  Note especially that this interpretation of the
concept doesn't require purpose and/or intelligence on the part of
the agents.

-- 
	John M Chambers 
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