datanguay@watrose.UUCP (datanguay) (04/05/84)
<eat me>
Having been reading this newsgroup for the last few months, I guess it's
time to submit something...
Some people have claimed that the women's standard of living outweighs
the value of the live of the foetus. Some people have claimed that the
value of the life of the foetus outweighs anything. I would like to submit
my measuring stick for the value of things:
The value of a thing is equal to the amount of sorrow its
removal from existence will cause.
The worth of a thing (be it person, foetus, dog, frog, carrot, or rock)
is thus equal to the amount of love generated by that thing. Note that this
is not really a measurable thing, so please don't scream at me about how
love(x) + love(y) > love(x+y) or about some other mathematical game. This
means, of course, that Fido is as valuable as a person (assuming that Fido
is loved by her owners, or by her lover, Rover). The same might hold true
for the Mona Lisa. Get the idea?
Another point I would like to address is the value of death. "Life is
good" (from Laura Creighton) does not imply that "death is bad". It's the
prize that awaits us all. Personally, I would rather be dead than face a
life of misery. My biggest restraint from any thoughts of suicide is a
simple consideration of how much sorrow such a thing would bring to those
that love me (I've no reason to kill myself anyway, but if I had...).
The foetus up for abortion is probably not loved by the pregnant woman
(henceforth I'll use the term mother, simply because it's easier to type).
Nobody else (except maybe the father and grandparents - more on that below)
really knows about the foetus and so there is no love for it there. If nobody
loves the foetus (or, indeed, any person) then the death of the foetus is
no loss.
This philosophy does imply that the father (and grandparents or others
who might be close to the mother and foetus) has some say in whether or
not the mother should carry the foetus to term, since the death of the foetus
would then result in some sorrow on his part. Not being a terribly logical
person, I don't agree with this conclusion (sorry Laura - but I know your
really just an AI program :-). If the guy wants to keep alive any foetus
that results then he should let the woman know in advance - tough titty to
him if he doesn't and then doesn't like her decision.
Flamette: Some people argue in this group along the lines that
"a foetus is/isn't a human until you prove to me otherwise". This is silly.
This is a point of definition, not proof. You can try to convince me one
way or the other (I'm undecided) but nobody is in a position to prove
anything until an accepted, rigid definition of human can be given (which will
likely never happen).
Off the wall: Every so often I see these displays put up by pro-life groups.
They usually include some pictures of foetuses (sp?) all lit up by a
background light so that they seem to glow from within. Whenever I see these
pictures I get a terrible desire to want to taste them, they look so delicious.
Anybody else ever get such an urge? (I also have an incredible urge to stick
out my foot and trip a car, but that's probably attributable to seeing
Monty Python at a very young age.)
The end is the means, but the means always end.
David Tanguay at watrose!datanguaylaura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (04/07/84)
Unfortunately, I have to say that you cannot say "the value of something is proportional to the amount of sorrow that would be generated if it were removed" simply because you cannot measure the amount of sorrow involved, and therefore you cannot really ever set up any rules whatsoever. It is impossible to know whether a fetus values its life more than a woman values getting an abortion, just as it is impossible to know whether I value strawberries and whipped cream more than you value your life. If I believe that I value strawberries more than you value your life, I should be perfectly justified in killing you if you would not give me the strawberries that you were eating to feed me. The problem with this view is that it is not in the slightest way objective, and so can be immediately collapsed into "i value x more than y; therefore everybody who isn't foolish should value x more than y; therefore I want x and he wants y -- I will get x and this will be right." Thus your particular hierarchy of values becomes THE heirarchy of values. For instance, you claim that you would rather be dead than handicapped -- yet if you meet handicapped people you find that they (for the most part) would rather be alive than dead. So you are in conflict with these people over your value structure and there is no way to determine who is right because "sorrow" is a subjective state. Whoever has the biggest club rules. There is no room for reason, because it is your subjective desires which for the basis of your proposed ethical structure, and you are not trying to make any of these rules explicit. If I say that I am happier being alive despite being handicapped, you have no way to reason with me that I should be happier being dead, because all you are actually presenting is your own personal views on how you think that you might feel if you were handicapped, or worse, how you think that handicapped people *ought* to feel -- to suit you -- regardless of how they actually feel. It is arguable that a person should have the right to end his own life, because if his values are so structured that he could not maintain his integrity (and what is valuable to him) while remaining alive but could further his values by his death, he would choose death. (This is the argument of the man who sacrifices himself for his friend. In actuality, under these conditions, it would not be a sacrifice -- if the friend were so valuable that the loss of his life outweighed the loss of one's own life it would be a selfish decision -- it would be to allow one's friend to die, despite that being a higher value to you than your own life which would be the sacrifice.) But the fetus does not volunteer to be aborted; it has its death thrust upon it, so this argument does not apply. -- Laura Creighton utzoo!laura "Not to perpetrate cowardice against one's own acts! Not to leave them in the lurch afterward! The bite of conscience is indecent" -- Nietzsche The Twilight of the Idols (maxim 10)
datanguay@watrose.UUCP (datanguay) (04/09/84)
<> > from Laura Creighton > Unfortunately, I have to say that you cannot say "the value of > something is proportional to the amount of sorrow that would > be generated if it were removed" simply because you cannot > measure the amount of sorrow involved, and therefore you cannot > really ever set up any rules whatsoever. The amount doesn't really matter. See below. > It is impossible to know whether > a fetus values its life more than a woman values getting an abortion, What it thinks doesn't matter, since it won't be around to cry about the decision. > just as it is impossible to know whether I value strawberries and > whipped cream more than you value your life. If I believe that I > value strawberries more than you value your life, I should be > perfectly justified in killing you if you would not give me the > strawberries that you were eating to feed me. A thing's value is not determined (under my scheme) by what I think of it, but by what somebody thinks of it. I may not care about your life (don't take this personally - just an illustration) but so long as somebody does I'm not justified in taking your life since that will cause that other person sorrow. Most of the rest of your objections/responses fall apart from this misunderstanding (sorry) so I'll ignore them here and give you another whack at it. By the way, you might be justified in killing me over the strawberries if they meant so much (to the populace in general). For example, our society generally thinks it's okay to shoot a guy who tries to rob Fort Knox (say). The gold therein is valued more than the robber's life (otherwise we could just let him walk in peacefully and take it). > For instance, you claim that you would rather be dead than handicapped -- I didn't say anything about being handicapped - I mentioned misery (or some such abstract). Being handicapped is fine by me. Misery is having to spend the rest of my life in Waterloo (pining for the forest) ... The biggest hole in my view as I see it is the influence the grandparents have. If they "value" the foetus then it shouldn't be killed, for their sake. Personally, I would not give them much authority (moral, not necessarily legal), but I've no good reason for this opinion (yet) so maybe they should be able to block the abortion if want to. The end is the means, but the means always end. David Tanguay at watrose!datanguay
minas@foxvax1.UUCP (P.C. Minasian ) (04/12/84)
David Tanguay at watrose!datanguay suggests that: > The value of a thing is equal to the amount of sorrow its > removal from existence will cause. Interesting idea. Until you consider the real ramifications of what he's saying. This is really a peripheral topic I'm opening up here, but I'm left with little choice. David, How does your definition relate to the thousands of homeless souls we have wandering the streets of most major urban environments?? I submit that their death or murder would probably cause little or no sorrow; this is precisely why these people often end up on the street in the first place! Are you saying that these lives have no value and should therefore not be saved/rehabilitated? Or, worse yet, that their murder should not be considered morally unjustifiable? -- -phil minasian ...decvax!genrad!wjh12!foxvax1!minas
owens@gatech.UUCP (Gerald R. Owens) (04/14/84)
Something was itching at the back of my mind regarding Mr. Tanguay's definition of the value of a human being, until it clicked a few days ago. He states: The value of a thing is equal to the amount of sorrow its removal from existence will cause. All fine and good, But what is so special about person X if their sorrow for another person Y's death makes Y valuable, but if nobody values X's life, that X has no value? I.e. How can a person give somebody else "value" (it's not intrinsic, by the above definition) if they themselves have no value unless someone else would be sorrowful for them, and they, in turn, would have no value unless that first person valued them. What the heck is so special about "somebody else"? (presumably, a person cannot give value to themselves, mainly because they would be dead, and so obviously cannot sorrow for themselves). Also, there is the convenient clique effect. Given a group of people who value each other, but nobody outside the group likes anybody in the group, it would be bad to kill ONE member of the group (the rest would be sorrowful), but OK if you kill everyone (nobody would be sorrowful, since the ones who would be are conveniently dead). I hasten to add that I do not think that Mr. Tanguay intended the clique effect. He made the definition to fit the case of abortion, and that is just fine when one wants to define a non-observable such as value. It is proper, however, to question the propriety of a definition if it's use leads us to regard as ok things that we have agreed beforehand are not (such as genocide, where the extinction of a hated race not only would not cause sorrow, but cause rejoicing over the plunder that the unmourned-for victims left behind.). The good thing I find about net.abortion is that many minds are brought to bear on a particular idea, bringing different viewpoints to it, so that ideas that look good on the surface are probed for flaws. I echo Mr. Anderson's sentiment: Let's keep the discussion up, I'm learning. Gerald Owens Owens@gatech