[net.abortion] Abortions and Aristotle

barry@ames-lm.UUCP (Kenn Barry) (06/21/84)

[Help! Help! Help!]{{ { { { { { { { { { { { { { { { { { {(burp)
> An abortion is either murder or it isn't.  Something can't be murder
> from only one person's point of view.  If abortion is murder then it
> shouldn't be allowed whether or not the child will be wanted.  You can't
> legally murder someone just because no one likes him.  On the other
> hand, if abortion isn't murder, then the father should have no say in
> the matter (legally).  It's not his body.

	Maybe I'm being picky, but I don't think this kind of Aristotelian
logic (is or isn't, no middle ground) is valid. To use your example,
for instance, 'murder': this word is a legal term, and its meaning varies
according to whose laws you're subject to. An abortion which was perfectly
legal in this country might well have been murder if carried out in a
country where abortions are illegal.

	But this is a trivial example. More serious confusion has occurred
from applying this sort of either/or logic to the question of whether
a fetus is a human being. A fetus, like everything else, is what it is;
to ask whether it's 'human' is not to ask a factual question, but to
ask how best to classify it. And the purpose of the classification is
to figure out how it should be treated.

	It seems clear to me that a fetus is different from an adult
human being in a number of significant ways, which have been covered
by the free-choicers here on the net. It is equally clear to me that
a fetus is not the same as a dog or cat, or as a malignant tumor. The
differences have been adequately covered by the right-to-lifers. The
conclusion I draw from this, is that the best way to classify a human
fetus is to give it its own category, somewhere between human and non-
human, and then to decide which human rights are appropriate to this
pre-human. Obviously, this approach in no way guarantees that we will
all reach the same conclusions about how fetuses are to be treated; but
perhaps it would cut down on the amount of tail-chasing and repetition
that occurs in this debate.

                                                Kenn Barry
                                                NASA-Ames Research Center
                                                Moffett Field, CA
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Electric Avenue:              {dual,hao,menlo70,hplabs}!ames-lm!barry

pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc) (06/22/84)

}> An abortion is either murder or it isn't.  Something can't be murder
}> from only one person's point of view.  If abortion is murder then it
}> shouldn't be allowed whether or not the child will be wanted.  You can't
}> legally murder someone just because no one likes him.  On the other
}> hand, if abortion isn't murder, then the father should have no say in
}> the matter (legally).  It's not his body.
}
}	Maybe I'm being picky, but I don't think this kind of Aristotelian
}logic (is or isn't, no middle ground) is valid. To use your example,
}for instance, 'murder': this word is a legal term, and its meaning varies
}according to whose laws you're subject to. An abortion which was perfectly
}legal in this country might well have been murder if carried out in a
}country where abortions are illegal.

Are you saying that murder is only murder if we choose to call it such?
I guess killing all those Jews in Nazi Germany wasn't murder.

}
}	But this is a trivial example. More serious confusion has occurred
}from applying this sort of either/or logic to the question of whether
}a fetus is a human being. A fetus, like everything else, is what it is;
}to ask whether it's 'human' is not to ask a factual question, but to
}ask how best to classify it. And the purpose of the classification is
}to figure out how it should be treated.

The either/or logic still applies.  When you make a new classification
for the fetus to exist in by itself you are saying that a fetus is a
fetus, but it is not human.  So then it is either a fetus or a human,
right?  If the fetus is supposed to be only part human, what is the other
part?  I never did understand the logic of systhesis.

}
}	It seems clear to me that a fetus is different from an adult
}human being in a number of significant ways, which have been covered
}by the free-choicers here on the net. It is equally clear to me that
}a fetus is not the same as a dog or cat, or as a malignant tumor. The
}differences have been adequately covered by the right-to-lifers.

A two-year-old is also different from an adult in significant ways.
It is not a question of significant differences, but whether or not
these differences constitute a differnce *in kind* between the adult
and the child or fetus.  

}								...The
}conclusion I draw from this, is that the best way to classify a human
}fetus is to give it its own category, somewhere between human and non-
}human, and then to decide which human rights are appropriate to this
}pre-human. Obviously, this approach in no way guarantees that we will
}all reach the same conclusions about how fetuses are to be treated; but
}perhaps it would cut down on the amount of tail-chasing and repetition
}that occurs in this debate.

More synthesis.  What is between human and non-human?  What is between
monkey and non-monkey?  Nothing, except what you put there.  The problem
here is that "non-human" doesn't say what it *is*, just what it isn't.
How can you define something as being between one thing and what that 
thing isn't?  So what is the fetus really between?  A monkey and a human?
A dog and a human?  Putting the fetus between human and non-human doesn't
say anything about what it is.

I'll stick with Aristotle.
-- 

Paul Dubuc 		{cbosgd, ihnp4} !cbscc!pmd

  "The true light that enlightens every man was coming
   into the world..."		(John 1:9)

barry@ames-lm.UUCP (Kenn Barry) (06/24/84)

[<+>]
     My thanks to Paul Dubuc for his interesting response to my
posting. I may have bitten off more than I can chew, but let me
try to clarify my original point.

     Man is a symbol-maker. In order to think at all, we abstract
what seem to be the significant features of the reality we observe,
and make from this symbols to stand for the groupings and features
and characteristics we are able to extract from our sense-data. As
Kant pointed out, it is this self-constructed symbolic reality we
really live in, for our contact with 'objective' reality is only
indirect, via our sense-organs.
     Our constructions are of course not random (unless we're insane).
They are constrained by the necessity of being a good map of the
sense impressions we receive. However (here comes the point), the
objective universe is not similarly constrained by our symbolic
maps of it. It is free to throw new phenomena at us which do not
neatly equate to any of the categories we had thus far constructed.
     A case in point: one very fundamental categorization we impose
on the universe is alive/not alive. It long seemed that anything in
the real world would have to fall unambiguously into one of those
two groups. But then viruses came along. They obstinately insisted
on having characteristics that, by the pre-existing classifications,
made them unquestionably alive, and also certainly non-living.
     I don't know if this particular debate still rages among the
biologists, but it makes a good illustration in any case. The first
mental reaction to such a problem is to examine the evidence
carefully, to see if the new phenomenon (virus) is perhaps closer
to one of the two pre-existing categories. If so, one can modify
one's categories to include the new phenomenon, and still leave a
fairly clear dividing line between the two possibilities.
     The other possibility is to discover that no clear division is
possible. Some things occur along a continuum, with no clear
dividing line. In such cases, it is important to understand that
the categories we assign are derived from our observations, and not
the other way around.
     This is the situation I see when we try to categorize the human
fetus as either human/non-human. The process of human ova and sperm
uniting and becoming (eventually) a fully-functional human being is
a very gradual one, with no unambiguous dividing line where
'humanity' begins, provided by the observations. There are two signal
events - fertilization and birth. Indeed, most of the abortion
argument seems to center on which of these two events should be
considered the 'human' starting-point. But neither is a clean
separation-point. At birth a child acquires a truly separate body
of its own, but a well-developed fetus delivered early by surgery
can also often be kept alive outside the mother's womb. Similarly,
even though conception seems like the beginning of the process of
'humanization', parthenogenesis is possible, and even cloning may be
possible one day. Are we to argue therefore for the 'humanity' of
an unfertilized human egg?
     What I was trying to say in my original article, was that by
recognizing that the dividing line we draw between 'human' and
'non-human' *has* to be somewhat arbitrary, we can deal with trying
to find the most *sensible* way to categorize, rather than trying
to force the facts to fit our preconceived notions that the
distinction between human and non-human is a fact to be discovered,
and not a definition to be agreed upon. We can even, as I suggested,
create a third category, call it "pre-human", define it as having
some of the qualities we think of as 'human', but not others, and
accord it some human rights, but not others. Or we can stick to just
two categories if we want to, as long as we remember that the
precise location of the dividing line is bound to be somewhat
arbitrary, and that arguing about whether ambiguous cases are
'really' human is to ascribe to our human definitions an absoluteness
that they do not possess.
     Contrary opinions will be read with interest. Do keep in mind
that I am *not* saying that our classifications of human/non-human
are totally arbitrary. They are constrained by our perceptions of
objective reality, and are quite useful. I am only saying that
objective reality does not provide us with an exact location
where the human/non-human line should be drawn, only an
approximate one.

        [The opinions expressed herein are my own foolishness, and do not
necessarily reflect the views of anyone that matters.]

                                                Kenn Barry
                                                NASA-Ames Research Center
                                                Moffett Field, CA
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Electric Avenue:              {dual,hao,menlo70,hplabs}!ames-lm!barry

pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc) (06/29/84)

A response to Kenn Barry:

>...  This is the situation I see when we try to categorize the human
>fetus as either human/non-human. The process of human ova and sperm
>uniting and becoming (eventually) a fully-functional human being is
>a very gradual one, with no unambiguous dividing line where
>'humanity' begins, provided by the observations. There are two signal
>events - fertilization and birth. Indeed, most of the abortion
>argument seems to center on which of these two events should be
>considered the 'human' starting-point. But neither is a clean
>separation-point. At birth a child acquires a truly separate body
>of its own, but a well-developed fetus delivered early by surgery
>can also often be kept alive outside the mother's womb. Similarly,
>even though conception seems like the beginning of the process of
>'humanization', parthenogenesis is possible, and even cloning may be
>possible one day. Are we to argue therefore for the 'humanity' of
>an unfertilized human egg?

The logic here does not follow.  If parthenogenesis and cloning are
possible, then humanity starts at the point that these events occurr.
They are analogous to fertilization.  This dosen't make the unfertilized
egg a human.  Biologically, fertilization is only non-arbitrary point
that which a human can be said to come into existence.  That is the
only point at which a unique individual comes into being.

>     What I was trying to say in my original article, was that by
>recognizing that the dividing line we draw between 'human' and
>'non-human' *has* to be somewhat arbitrary, we can deal with trying
>to find the most *sensible* way to categorize, rather than trying
>to force the facts to fit our preconceived notions that the
>distinction between human and non-human is a fact to be discovered,
>and not a definition to be agreed upon.

The dividing line does not *have* to be arbitrary.  What facts have been
forced?  Your suggestion seems to promote an acceptance of a certain
lack of knowledge.

>We can even, as I suggested,
>create a third category, call it "pre-human", define it as having
>some of the qualities we think of as 'human', but not others, and
>accord it some human rights, but not others. Or we can stick to just
>two categories if we want to, as long as we remember that the
>precise location of the dividing line is bound to be somewhat
>arbitrary, and that arguing about whether ambiguous cases are
>'really' human is to ascribe to our human definitions an absoluteness
>that they do not possess.

The only human right that has any real application to the fetus is
the right to live. The question is, are you going to afford it this
right?  If it doesn't have that one, what others can it have?  Your
abstract concept sounds plausible on the surface, but when you get
down to applying critera for what is human or pre-human (seems to
me that this is just another way of saying human or non-human.) you
will run into much practical difficulty.

>     Contrary opinions will be read with interest. Do keep in mind
>that I am *not* saying that our classifications of human/non-human
>are totally arbitrary. They are constrained by our perceptions of
>objective reality, and are quite useful. I am only saying that
>objective reality does not provide us with an exact location
>where the human/non-human line should be drawn, only an
>approximate one.

The synthetic reasoning you use has a deadening effect on an
abstract persuit of the truth.  It may seem practical to apply
it to specific cases, but the principle when widely applied leaves
us with nothing to be known for certain.  The restraint you place
on it is artificial and, in itself, arbitrary.  There is no
concrete difference between saying something is "somewhat arbitrary"
and "totally arbitrary".  As soon as you embrace "arbitrariness"
in your persuit of knowledge, you put a certain elastic quality
on the truth.  That may be fine for things that don't matter much
but in drawing the line between killing a non-human and a human,
we had better try to be certain, or else give the fetus the benefit
of our doubts.

-- 

Paul Dubuc 		{cbosgd, ihnp4} !cbscc!pmd

  The true light that enlightens every one was coming
  into the world...		(John 1:9)