flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul Torek) (08/22/84)
Scott Anderson, quoting Laura Creighton: >> > if the fetus is a human being then the >> > fetus should have the right to life. if the fetus is not a >> > human being then it never had any rights in the first place. >> You state this as if it were unarguable. I disagree. Why should a >> fetal human being necessarily have a right to life? Exactly. (And conversely, why should a non-human have no rights?) The standard "pro-life" argument says that the fetus is human, and all humans have a right to life, therefore the fetus has a right to life. There is a fallacy of equivocation in the argument, however. In the first premise, the word "human" is taken to be a biological term. In the second premise, however, "human" is taken as a moral term. If the equivocation is avoided by taking the first occurrence of "human" as a moral term, then it is no longer open to the pro-lifer to argue that the humanity of the fetus is a biological fact. If the equivocation is avoided by taking the second occurrence as a biological term, then the second premise can be doubted. For what it then says is "All members of the species Homo Sapiens have a right to life." That statement is essentially question-begging, unless some argument can be given for it. From Brian Peterson: Sperm, ova, and random body parts (if cloning) all have the "potential" to become a human being. Pure "potential" to be a human being is not enough. What is different with a fertilized ovum? I think this represents a common mistake. There is a difference here. A fetus has more than "potential", it has time-dispositional capacities of adult humans. The difference is that the fetus is the same creature as the one who (later, as an adult) writes articles to netnews. It is the same animal. So, assuming that if we let it live it will come to have these properties, we can say that "viewed four-dimensionally" (3-d + time), it has these capacities. This is not true of the ova or body part, because it is something else (the animal that takes over the material) that will have the adult-human properties. Now, how important is this difference? Therein lies the real question. Here are two ways to answer this. One way is to construct numerous analogies and hypothetical cases to test our moral intuitions on the subject. Another way is to work from the fundamentals, asking what kinds of creatures ought we to care about, how much, and in what way. I think that the latter approach leads to a radically different position from either of the two popular sides of the controversy. But that's a matter for another day. "The worth of an idea is inversely proportional to its popularity" --Paul Torek, umcp-cs!flink
pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc) (08/25/84)
[from Paul Torek:] >The standard "pro-life" argument says that the fetus is human, and all humans >have a right to life, therefore the fetus has a right to life. There is a >fallacy of equivocation in the argument, however. In the first premise, the >word "human" is taken to be a biological term. In the second premise, >however, "human" is taken as a moral term. >If the equivocation is avoided by taking the first occurrence of "human" as >a moral term, then it is no longer open to the pro-lifer to argue that the >humanity of the fetus is a biological fact. Why? Why can't it be argued that the fetus is both biologically human and has a moral right to live? It might require an extension of the standard syllogism, but is that not possible? >If the equivocation is avoided >by taking the second occurrence as a biological term, then the second >premise can be doubted. For what it then says is "All members of the >species Homo Sapiens have a right to life." That statement is essentially >question-begging, unless some argument can be given for it. All I think that you have done here is illustrate the difficulty of treating two aspects of humanity (moral and biological) separately. Is it really possible to do this? Isn't our humanity more composite than that? The crux of the matter seems to be in the apparent distinction you are making between "members of the species Homo Sapiens" and a "human being". What is the basis of that distinction? Are we not both at the same time? My point is that when we think of a human being we don't think in just biological terms ... or just moral terms. In considering the abortion issue (or any human rights/life issue) are we justified in considering the parts of what makes up "humanity" to the exclusion of the whole? What happens when we do that with, not just the fetus, but any human being? -- Paul Dubuc {cbosgd,ihnp4}!cbscc!pmd The true light that enlightens every one was coming into the world... (John 1:9)