[net.abortion] Densinger -- still has it wrong

esk@wucs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (11/20/84)

Densinger's errors center on this assertion:
>> We simply CANNOT ever know moral Truth.

First of all, knock off that capital T.  Second, it ain't so.  We can so
know moral truth, using plain old human reason and experience.  Note that
small t.  Moral truth is human truth; if a norm is valid for humans then
it has to be knowable for us.

Densinger goes on:
>> This is why making personal moral decisions is so difficult ...

If Densinger were right it wouldn't be difficult, it would be IMPOSSIBLE.
The very concept of human freedom depends on our ability to know what
norms apply to us.

Tense, painful moral decisions are disvaluable, not valuable.  It would be
nice (though the possibility is purely hypothetical) if tough decisions were
unnecessary.  Tense decisions are also no paradigm of freedom.  The less
certain a decision is (if correct), the less free.  (The more certain the less
free if the decision is incorrect.)

Densinger argues that "legalization is different because it is an arena in
which the ... rules are known ... Laws are human-made ...".  What he fails
to realize is that laws can be criticized from a moral/philosophical point
of view.  Laws can be human-unmade too.  The mere fact that our country
has certain laws or Constitutional principles says nothing about what we
should do.  

Densinger should reflect that the same Kant to whom he refers upheld the
thesis that moral truths are humanly knowable and that universalizable
principles can and must be used.  There are limits to the limits of human
reason.
		--The THIRD side, Paul V Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 
Please send any mail directly to this address, not the sender's.  Thanks.

densinge@stolaf.UUCP (Charles W. Densinger) (11/26/84)

>Densinger's errors center on this assertion:
>>> We simply CANNOT ever know moral Truth.

>First of all, knock off that capital T.  Second, it ain't so.  We can so
>know moral truth, using plain old human reason and experience.  Note that
>small t.  Moral truth is human truth; if a norm is valid for humans then
>it has to be knowable for us.

Paul Torek and I are talking about two different things: subjectivity
and objectivity.  I do not believe that humans can know objective truth,
and I used the capital T above to indicate this.  Knowledge of eternal,
universal, objective truth can be had only by an eternal, omniscienct
being.  Paul misunderstands me if he thinks I am suggesting that there
are no human truths.  We have to have things we believe in in order to
get out of bed in the morning.  My campaign is against those who claim
to have access to eternal knowledge, to Right and Wrong, to Truth.
When we make claims of this nature, we are attempting to grab onto some
measure of objectivity.  We want something sure, tangible.  Why do we
need this?  Because we are terrified of our limitations, that we might
not really know.  We might not know, for instance, the solution to the
abortion question.

I am not a dreary skeptic.  In fact, I feel that the only way to avoid
cynicism and hopeless skepticism if to confront the realities of our
predicament as human beings.  If Paul knows what he is saying when he
says that "moral truth is human truth," fine.  Most people don't.  Human
truth is subjective and limited.  We can only really know our own
picture and what fits within it.  Too many people (all of us, at times,
including myself) mistake subjective certitudes for objectivity.  I KNOW
murder is morally, universally, eternally WRONG.  How?  We can't say
much more than "Because I just do."  What Paul is really talking about
is subjective truth, not objective truth, and what we must remember with
subjective truth is that every subject has a different truth.

>>> This is why making personal moral decisions is so difficult ...
>If Densinger were right it wouldn't be difficult, it would be IMPOSSIBLE.
>The very concept of human freedom depends on our ability to know what
>norms apply to us...
>Tense, painful moral decisions are disvaluable, not valuable.  It would be
>nice (though the possibility is purely hypothetical) if tough decisions were
>unnecessary.  Tense decisions are also no paradigm of freedom.  The less
>certain a decision is (if correct), the less free.  (The more certain the less
>free if the decision is incorrect.)

It seems clear to me that if making moral decisions were not difficult,
no one would be immoral.  I think Paul is deluding himself if he thinks
that it is easy to make decisions like whether to return the extra change
you got from the cashier or not or whether to report the crime you
witnessed or to stay uninvolved, much less a decision like whether or not
to have an abortion.  Difficulty in making a decision is often a sign of
the value that situation has for us; we do not agonize over things we
don't care about.

Other than this, I do not care to say much about Paul's comments.  He
uses the word "tense" where I used the word difficult.  These are not
the same and are not necessarily even related.  Many tasks are difficult
without making us tense.  I think he is making a mistake in aligning
freedom with easy decisions.  Life is not, nor ought it to be easy.  We
generally value those accomplishments we have made which have been
difficult or have demanded much of us.

>Densinger should reflect that the same Kant to whom he refers upheld the
>thesis that moral truths are humanly knowable and that universalizable
>principles can and must be used.  There are limits to the limits of human
>reason.

Kant fails, I think, in his attempt to re-establish morality after he
blasts pure reason.  He feels uncomfortable with his groundlessness.  It
is here that Kierkegaard offers the world a great insight.  Kierkegaard
it quite comfortable with the limits of reason which deny humans eternal
knowledge, and so am I.

         -Chuck Densinger
          {decvax|ihnp4}!stolaf!densinge

steiny@scc.UUCP (Don Steiny) (11/27/84)

> 
> I do not believe that humans can know objective truth.
>
	Yikes!  "Objective truth!"   Whatever this could 
be, contained in the statment above is the assertion
that we cannot know it.  The unknowable is uninteresting
and had no affect on our lives.

	I think Paul Watzlawick said it best, "the only way
to be objective is to not be there." (in *Change* somewhere).

	"What is true is that which it is best for us to believe."

				William James
-- 
scc!steiny
Don Steiny - Personetics @ (408) 425-0382
109 Torrey Pine Terr.
Santa Cruz, Calif. 95060
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