esk@wucs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (02/11/85)
[This is a reply to ariel!norm, alice!ark, and whuxlm!mag (J. V. Sanders)] From: Andrew Koenig (ark@alice) > I define "humanity" as "ability to think". I believe that there is a > great deal of difference between the ability to think and the ability > to feel pain. It is exactly this difference that leads me to the > conclusion that eating animal flesh is OK but murder is not. That difference doesn't lead me to quite the same conclusion. The ability to feel pain means that animals deserve some protections, like some of the animal welfare protection laws we have now. This raises an issue that gives "pro-choicers" a bad case of hoof-in-mouth disease: if someone doesn't believe that cruelty to animals is wrong, should that morality be (horrors!) *imposed* upon him? From: mag@whuxlm.UUCP (Joel V. Sanders, using Gray Michael A's account) > - Similarly, but less obviously, argument from natural "rights" appears > to be arbitrary assertion. If a meaningful definition of the concept > of a natural "right" has been formulated, then it has escaped the > scrutiny of this writer. All the theories from classical liberalism > and libertarianism that I have examined depend ultimately upon social > agreement. If political "rights" have no "natural" basis, then the > very term "right" is both unnecessary and obfuscating, and a species > of "permission" or of "consent" would offer more clarity. A meaningful definition of the concept of a natural right: a person A has a (moral, natural) right against person(s) B to do X iff B ought, out of respect for A, not interfere with A's doing X. Similarly for rights to have something provided for one (if there *are* any such rights -- a matter of considerable dispute, of course). Suppose, as I think most of us believe, that some of the things we ought to do or to refrain from doing, we ought out of respect for another. Then there are rights. "But haven't you just pushed the problem back a step, to 'ought'?" No problem: a person ought to do X in a particular situation iff she would do X if she were informed, rational, and free. This is not a definition of right action, just an empirical test. But it's a valid test. It is not a practical one at this time, given the low state of behavioral sciences; but it's intended to show meaningfulness. From: norm@ariel.UUCP (N.ANDREWS) > Suppose... > 1.) Octopus-like intelligent creatures, masters of interstellar travel > visited earth, coming in peace,... > Supose either one of these creatures was wantonly killed [--] should the > perpetrator of the killing be tried for the murder of a "person"? I think it should be made a crime immediately, but can't say whether "ex post facto" trials would be called for. Now, on to your "more general" points: "Is it ever really in anyone's long-range self-interest to attempt to achieve values through slavery or murder?" The answer depends on how one interprets the ambiguous term "self-interest". It can mean either: what a person thinks is good for him OR what is really beneficial to him OR what he thinks is worth promoting (this may include benefits to others valued independently of the effect on himself) OR what really is worth his promotion (what he ought to seek) And none of these are *obviously* equivalent to any other, though some may be equivalent yet not obviously so. "If some behavior generally considered 'moral' is not in one's long-range self-interest, why should anyone care, in that respect, to be 'moral'?" See the first and third interpretations above -- people can and do sometimes value benefits to others independently of the effect on themselves; examples are love, humanitarianism, etc. And if they are right to act that way (I think so), see the fourth interpretation also. So what I am suggesting is that something can fail to be in one's 'self-interest' in one of the first two senses and still be worth doing. "Are 'pro-lifers' able to answer these questions rationally? Are pro-choicers able to find a rational basis for individual rights and the rule of objective laws?" Probably not -- but then I'm biased toward --The THIRD side, Paul V. Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 Don't hit that 'r' key! Send any mail to this address, not the sender's.
kjm@ut-ngp.UUCP (Ken Montgomery) (03/01/85)
[] From esk@wucs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) >[This is a reply to ariel!norm, alice!ark, and whuxlm!mag (J. V. Sanders)] > >From: Andrew Koenig (ark@alice) >> I define "humanity" as "ability to think". I believe that there is a >> great deal of difference between the ability to think and the ability >> to feel pain. It is exactly this difference that leads me to the >> conclusion that eating animal flesh is OK but murder is not. > >That difference doesn't lead me to quite the same conclusion. The ability >to feel pain means that animals deserve some protections, like some of >the animal welfare protection laws we have now. Why does the ability to feel pain imply that protection is deserved? By that standard, if someone were to show that bacteria feel pain, we'd have to stop using antibiotics! > ... >From: mag@whuxlm.UUCP (Joel V. Sanders, using Gray Michael A's account) >> [ Mr. Sanders contends that "natural right" has no meaningful >> definition, and that perhaps "permission" or "consent" should >> be used in place of "natural right", since rights ultimately >> depend on social agreement. -KJM ] > >A meaningful definition of the concept of a natural right: a person A >has a (moral, natural) right against person(s) B to do X iff B ought, >out of respect for A, not interfere with A's doing X. Please define "respect". My dictionary does not give a definition which makes sense in the above context. > ... >"But haven't you just pushed the problem back a step, to 'ought'?" No >problem: a person ought to do X in a particular situation iff she >would do X if she were informed, rational, and free. This is not a >definition of right action, just an empirical test. But it's a valid >test. It's not a valid test, since two "informed, rational, and free" people confronted with identical situations may do two different things. This definition has another hole: one person's rational self-interest may conflict with that of another. > Paul V. Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 -- The above viewpoints are mine. They are unrelated to those of anyone else, including my cats and my employer. Ken Montgomery "Shredder-of-hapless-smurfs" ...!{ihnp4,allegra,seismo!ut-sally}!ut-ngp!kjm [Usenet, when working] kjm@ut-ngp.ARPA [for Arpanauts only]