esk@wucs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (03/13/85)
kjm@ut-ngp.UUCP (Ken Montgomery), responding to Carlton Hommel, writes: > I perceive a bogus analogy here. Separation of "siamese" twins is > not analogous to abortion of fetuses. And refusal to provide vital organs for transplant is? (Remember, Carlton Hommel's analogy was a rebuttal to someone who drew an analogy between abortion and refusal to provide a kidney to one who needed one.) > Siamese twins form together; they have joint ownership of the organs > they share. Thus for one to force the other to undergo an operation > involving the shared organs involves an infringement of the other's > rights. But fetuses, on the other hand, form after their mothers; they > do not share any joint ownership with their mothers. "I was here first"? Why should the temporal order matter? Your other point, about ownership, is more convincing. But not convincing enough -- how does one determine ownership? After all, ownership is a moral concept; the owner is said to have the right to use what is owned and to exclude others from its use; so statements about ownership would seem to beg the question. There is a better explanation of why most people would judge the kidney transplant case differently from the Siamese-twin-separation case (i.e., why they would favor the "right to life" in the Siamese twin case and the "right to control one's body" in the kidney case). Namely, most people seem to think a person has a right to be left undisturbed from the natural, ordinary situation in which they find themselves. Thus, by this principle, if the fetus counts as a moral-equivalent-of-a-person, then it has the right not to be aborted. I take it that the point you have been trying to make, Ken, is that "*even if* a fetus *were* a person, it still wouldn't have a right not to be aborted." I am saying that as long as you argue on an "intuitive" level (trying to draw analogies to cases that we can agree about), most people are going to disagree with you. In other words, the "pro-lifers" have the better side of this argument (this "even if" argument). Of course, you can always argue that the "intuitive" judgements most people have are wrong. From: kjm@ut-ngp.UUCP (Ken Montgomery) > >The ability to feel pain means that animals deserve some protections, > >like some of the animal welfare protection laws we have now. >Why does the ability to feel pain imply that protection is deserved? >By that standard, if someone were to show that bacteria feel pain, >we'd have to stop using antibiotics! I think it's been pretty well shown that they *don't* feel pain. However I find nothing absurd about the notion that a tiny creature could deserve protection; maybe the point is that bacteria cause us pain?--but then we have a counterbalancing reason to kill them (aside from the fact, mentioned above, that they *don't* feel pain.) But enough of this absurd counterfactual discussion. What about my point, about the animal welfare protection laws we have now; should these be totally disposed of (as pro- choice rhetoric logically implies)? Talk about absurdities ... > >> [ Mr. Sanders contends that "natural right" has no meaningful > >> definition, and that perhaps "permission" or "consent" should > >> be used in place of "natural right", since rights ultimately > >> depend on social agreement. -KJM ] > >A meaningful definition of the concept of a natural right: a person A > >has a (moral, natural) right against person(s) B to do X iff B ought, > >out of respect for A, not interfere with A's doing X. [Torek] >Please define "respect". My dictionary does not give a definition >which makes sense in the above context. [-KJM] I think it's clear enough from context, but anyway: respect ~= some positive regard for. To do something out of respect for someone is (roughly) to do it because you think he deserves it. > >... a person ought to do X in a particular situation iff she would do > >X if she were informed, rational, and free. This is not a definition > >of right action, just an empirical test. But it's a valid test. [me] >It's not a valid test, since two "informed, rational, and free" people >confronted with identical situations may do two different things. >This definition has another hole: one person's rational self-interest >may conflict with that of another. [-KJM] First point: if so (I doubt it), then what's right for them to do in the situation differs between the two of them. Second "hole": if so (I agree here), then EITHER they can conflict by both doing what is right, OR one or both of them would (if informed, rational, free) do something different from acting purely in self-interest, such as taking account of the other's interests in some way. (I think the latter.) -- Paul V. Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047
kjm@ut-ngp.UUCP (Ken Montgomery) (04/03/85)
[] From: esk@wucs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) >kjm@ut-ngp.UUCP (Ken Montgomery), responding to Carlton Hommel, writes: >> I perceive a bogus analogy here. Separation of "siamese" twins is >> not analogous to abortion of fetuses. > >And refusal to provide vital organs for transplant is? (Remember, >Carlton Hommel's analogy was a rebuttal to someone who drew an analogy >between abortion and refusal to provide a kidney to one who needed one.) No... Don't read in things that aren't there. >> Siamese twins form together; they have joint ownership of the organs >> they share. Thus for one to force the other to undergo an operation >> involving the shared organs involves an infringement of the other's >> rights. But fetuses, on the other hand, form after their mothers; they >> do not share any joint ownership with their mothers. > >"I was here first"? Why should the temporal order matter? Because if it doesn't matter, the fetus can have ownership of that which it neither produced, traded for, or was given. If the temporal ordering does not matter, a powerful disambiguating rule is lost. > Your other >point, about ownership, is more convincing. But not convincing enough -- >how does one determine ownership? After all, ownership is a moral concept; >the owner is said to have the right to use what is owned and to exclude >others from its use; so statements about ownership would seem to beg the >question. One determines ownership in the above case by temporal ordering. > There is a better explanation of why most people would judge the >kidney transplant case differently from the Siamese-twin-separation case >(i.e., why they would favor the "right to life" in the Siamese twin case >and the "right to control one's body" in the kidney case). Namely, most >people seem to think a person has a right to be left undisturbed from the >natural, ordinary situation in which they find themselves. But the women I've known who have been accidentally pregnant have not been "undisturbed" by it. > Thus, by this >principle, if the fetus counts as a moral-equivalent-of-a-person, then it >has the right not to be aborted. Really? How does this follow? >I take it that the point you have been trying to make, Ken, is that "*even >if* a fetus *were* a person, it still wouldn't have a right not to be >aborted." Exactly. > I am saying that as long as you argue on an "intuitive" level >(trying to draw analogies to cases that we can agree about), most people >are going to disagree with you. In other words, the "pro-lifers" have the >better side of this argument (this "even if" argument). Of course, you can >always argue that the "intuitive" judgements most people have are wrong. Sorry if I've been unclear, but I espouse the principle that each person has the right to be left alone, *until* he/she initiates violation of the same right of someone else; thus I don't see how your conclusion follows. > ... > What about my point, about the animal welfare >protection laws we have now; should these be totally disposed of (as pro- >choice rhetoric logically implies)? Talk about absurdities ... Animals which come under protection laws don't live inside persons' bodies. Thus it is reasonable to protect them. (I would find it absurd to protect an animal which had to live in a person's body. Would you go for protection of, say, liver flukes, Paul?) > ... >I think it's clear enough from context, but anyway: respect ~= some >positive regard for. To do something out of respect for someone is >(roughly) to do it because you think he deserves it. OK, I think a person deserves respect just if he/she has earned it. But fetuses are not out in the world where they can act so as to earn my respect. >> >... a person ought to do X in a particular situation iff she would do >> >X if she were informed, rational, and free. This is not a definition >> >of right action, just an empirical test. But it's a valid test. [me] >>It's not a valid test, since two "informed, rational, and free" people >>confronted with identical situations may do two different things. >>This definition has another hole: one person's rational self-interest >>may conflict with that of another. [-KJM] > >First point: if so (I doubt it), then what's right for them to do in the >situation differs between the two of them. Interesting. This sounds like a pro-choice argument... > Second "hole": if so (I agree >here), then EITHER they can conflict by both doing what is right, Your definition of "right" here appears to be self-contradictory. > OR one or >both of them would (if informed, rational, free) do something different >from acting purely in self-interest, such as taking account of the other's >interests in some way. (I think the latter.) OK. But the thrust of the anti-abortion movement seems to be to *force* the mother to act in what *they* consider to be the fetus' best interests. Thus the mother, under anti-abortion rules, is not free, and your definition does not apply. -- The above viewpoints are mine. They are unrelated to those of anyone else, including my cats and my employer. Ken Montgomery "Shredder-of-hapless-smurfs" ...!{ihnp4,allegra,seismo!ut-sally}!ut-ngp!kjm [Usenet, when working] kjm@ut-ngp.ARPA [for Arpanauts only]