zeus@aero.ARPA (Dave Suess) (01/20/86)
In article <413@cisden.UUCP> john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) writes: >... I argued thus: > > 1. Argument A based on logical structure X yields conclusion M. > 2. I construct Argument B also based on logical structure X which > yields conclusion N. > 3. We have reason (from other considerations) to believe that N is > false. > 4. We therefore conclude (and this is a good conclusion) that > logical structure X is flawed. (We *do not* conclude that M > is false -- showing the invalidity of an argument for M is not > to show that M is false. Kinda tricky, huh, Oleg? [Sarcasm.]) HOLD ON! I claim that the form of the argument is valid: the logical structure is NOT flawed. There is a hidden premise to the syllogism offered that makes it a bit tricky (ok, everyone, look up "enthymematics"), and it is that hidden premise that makes the conclusion unjustified. The argument was: laws against abortion are an imposing of one's morality on others (imposing one's morality on others is a "bad thing") THEREFORE: laws against abortion are a bad thing. The logical form of the argument is then All A are B All B are C ----------- All A are C This holds for BOTH arguments, original and attempted refutation. The argument is VALID, but is not SOUND (and the conclusions can't be said to follow, as a result). The problem is the (hidden) premise that imposing one's morality on others is a "bad thing." This hidden premise exists in the refutation, as well, but the conclusion that laws against murder are a bad thing follows because of the flawed second premise, not because the syllogism has faulty logic. > >X here is the structure of Kathy's argument (step 1) concluding that abortion >should not be illegal (conclusion M). Step 2 is my exactly parallel argument >concluding that killing Jews should not be illegal (conclusion N). We all >agree that N is false (step 3) -- that's why it's a handy test case. (No >emotion needed.) I therefore conclude *not* that abortion should be illegal, >but that the argument X is incorrect, and so Kathy hasn't shown that abortion >should be legal. Again, to recap: the structure of the original argument IS valid; it is the second premise that is at fault. Agreed, the argument hasn't shown that abortion should be legal (it hasn't shown what it purported to show, either: that abortion should not be illegal). "We all agree that N is false" is also specious, ad populum, etc., since we can find (elsewhere on the net, if he's still there) neo-nazis today, regrettably. "(No emotion needed)" indeed! We don't need Nazis and Jews to refute the premise that "all impositions of morality are 'bad things'" and to include them is an appeal to emotions or to pity. It is perfectly legitimate to appeal to emotions, but it is not legitimate to do so and claim to be dealing with formal arguments that are valid. Arguing by analogy is a weak course in any debate, since it is usually the differences that highlight the argument truly at hand (especially here, where that difference involves post-birth Jews and pre-birth foetuses). There are many citations of the Nazi analogy in anti-abortion literature, but they are no more legitimate than the analogy made in Fr. Wooley's argument. A well-known anti-abortion advocate, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, has written: "As a Jew, I cannot remain silent at this facile use of the Nazi analogy, though I realize that some anti-abortion Jews use it. If this argument is so compelling, why do Jews remain generally favorable toward abortion?" So, since we don't need the Nazis to refute polite arguments, why don't we leave them out of what is an already cluttered debate? That way, at least, no one can claim, as I do, that the only reason to include them is to appeal to the emotions, and only in misleading or improper arguments. Dave Suess zeus@aero2.arpa