zeus@aero.ARPA (Dave Suess) (01/20/86)
In article <420@cisden.UUCP> john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) writes: >The main reason for referring to Nazis in a rational discussion of abortion >is this, that they believed that killing innocent people in some instances >was morally okay, but that all civilized people (and everyone in this >discussion) agree that they were murderers, i.e. that their morality was >*wrong*. (I'll cheerfully use some other example if you suggest a similar >one.) 1. I think Nazis did *not* believe in killing innocent people; rather, their ignoble morality classified Jews as non-innocent, non-people. 2. "all civilized people" sounds suspiciously ad populum, and to say that the Nazis' morality was "wrong" begs the question of right and wrong in the context of moral systems. 3. As I have pointed out elsewhere, the "rational" (say, non-emotional) refutation of the original argument (that since anti-abortion laws impose one's morality on others, so anti-abortion laws are a "bad thing") does NOT require an example with Nazis and Jews, it merely requires a counter- example that refutes the hidden premise (all impositions of one's morality on others are a "bad thing"). So, another example is NOT needed. If a *rational* argument is to be pursued, one can use the *general* case of murder, and leave out an example that has historically been used to evoke emotional responses. > This example is potentially illuminating for two reasons: > ... > > 2. Many (not all) of the arguments that are used in favour of > abortion have logical flaws in them. (This is of course true > of many arguments on our side, too.) Often these logical > flaws can be exposed by showing that the same line of logic > can be used to conclude that the Nazis' killing of Jews was > morally licit. If this can be done (and it often can) it > shows *not* that abortion is always wrong, but that the > particular pro-abortion argument being paralleled was > illogical. (This kind of proof is called _reductio_ad_ > absurdum_.) And the Nazis are a particularly handy group to > use for this purpose not because of any emotions involved, > but simply because the immorality of their doctrine is one of > the few things we can all agree on without much discussion. But, as I claim, the argument was not illogical, it suffered from an incorrect premise. The reductio_ad_absurdum is difficult to see here, if the same form of argument is assumed: p1: all anti-murder laws are impositions of one's morality on others p2: all such impositions are "bad things" C: all anti-murder laws are "bad things" Where is it required that Nazis and Jews appear in this attempt? All that is required is to show that the second premise is faulty, and the conclusion no longer holds. I claim that using Nazis and Jews is an argument by analogy and an appeal to emotions: Nazis and Jews are *not* required to refute the original argument. The attempted refutation uses guilt by association and tacitly includes the assumption that the Nazis' doctrine is *immoral* (at least, that is what is claimed above: not so tacit, I guess). > >So in article <210@aero.ARPA> zeus@aero.UUCP (Dave Suess) has apparently >misunderstood what I was getting at. He writes, at first quoting me: Now we're getting somewhere. THIS looks like argumentum_ad_hominem (abusive). Let me claim that I understood what you were getting at, but that I didn't agree with *how* you got to where you were getting at. > >>>And again, so is murder a moral issue. If some Nazi actually thinks it's >>>okay to go around shooting Jews, I'm not going to argue that he should >>>be allowed to because, after all, you can't force morality on people >>>who don't want it. I don't care whether the Nazi *wants* to be subject >>>to my morality -- I'm going to do the best I can to impose it on him and >>>thereby protect his victims. >> >>Every year, I ask that the Nazis be left out of arguments (since it lends >>an air of emotionalism based on what is often a side issue). Here, even >>though the subject is murder (in a general sense), there is an analogy where >>1) pro-choice-for-abortion equates with "Nazi", and 2) foetus equates with >>"Jew". Murder in general is quite different than a racist variant, and >>using Nazis and Jews would seem, as usual, inappropriate. Nobody mentioned >>aborting just Jewish foetuses, after all. > >What I wrote wasn't meant to be emotional. It's a _reductio_ad_absurdum_ >using precisely the same logic as the argument it refutes, but reaching a >conclusion we all agree is false. > But, as I can claim, the argument is logically valid, it is one premise that needs to be refuted, not the form of the argument. The conclusion cannot be reached with an incorrect premise, so it is *not* proved false. We (I speak of the rational parallel here, that anti-murder laws are "bad") agree that the conclusion is "false", but it is not due to the argument advanced or its refutation. Whether the use of Nazis and Jews was meant to be emotional or not is not at issue here; rather, I claim that, regardless of intent, the use of Nazis and Jews in this argument is superfluous and *does* appeal to the emotions. >>There is a place for Nazis-Jews references here, but the context should be >>ideologies of Nazis and Jews as they pertain to abortion. And recall that >>the Nazis were very much anti-abortion (for German-Aryans), expressing the >>opinion that, for the good of the state, women should be making more and >>more German-Aryans (more soldiers, and more soldier-mothers, presumably). >> >>[See how easy it is? My comments equate anti-abortion with "Nazi" now, >>when really I should have left it at the "good of society" argument, without >>painting it with the emotion of "Nazis!" Hence, my above paragraph is >>specious, and should never be cited as an argument on these issues.] > >Yes, I agree. Your argument is an _argumentum_ad_hominem_, saying (falsely, >by the way) that the Nazis were anti-abortion, and implying a connection >with today's anti-abortion forces. As you point out, this is illogical, >specious even. But it's not what I did. Well, my example was *not* an argument: I didn't advance any conclusions (if I did, they would probably have been guilt by association). I claim that what you did was to use Nazis and Jews for no necessary reason; I claim further that use of Nazis and Jews for no necessary reason is most likely an appeal to the emotions. I dispute your classification of an ad_hominem here: I didn't use an argument, and the example I gave was directed at no one else in the argument (no one at all, really). Almost finally, it is easy for you to assert that my statement about the Nazis' stand on abortion is false, but I have evidence to the contrary. Hitler closed the birth-control clinics, the Nazis were adamantly anti-feminist, anti-abortion, anti-birth-control, anti-homosexual (for German-Aryans only, of course). I might ask you to back up your throw- away comment, but the point is this: rational argument does not need Nazis and Jews the views of Nazis on abortion are irrelevant So, again, I appeal to the net: leave out emotional Nazi-Jews side-issues or any claim to rational argument can be attacked as specious when they are used by analogy to abortion. It shouldn't be so hard: if the Nazis and Jews aren't being used as appeals to emotion, then a sufficient number of legitimate, non-emotional arguments can be substituted. Dave (not falsely, by the way) Suess zeus@aero2.arpa
john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) (01/23/86)
This is in reference to Dave Suess' recent valuable articles arguing against the propriety of referring to Nazis in arguments about abortion, as I did. My feeling is that this discussion is interesting but has gotten a little off the point. I tried with not a lot of success to be brief. In article <218@aero.ARPA> zeus@aero.UUCP (Dave Suess) finds fault with my defence of one of my arguments as a _reductio_ad_absurdum_, arguing correctly that what I was doing was not (as I had written) showing a flaw in the logic of the argument I was criticising, but rather showing a flaw in the premises of that argument. He's right, but it's beside the point -- my argument stands even though my analysis of my argument was flawed. The technique of building a parallel argument and deriving an absurdity will work whether the flaw in the original was in logic or in premise. In either case, it's a _reductio_ad_absurdum_; the _res_absurda_ isn't the same though. As Dave writes (and I agree entirely): > The problem is the (hidden) premise that imposing one's morality >on others is a "bad thing." This hidden premise exists in the refutation, as >well, but the conclusion that laws against murder are a bad thing follows >because of the flawed second premise, not because the syllogism has faulty >logic. My reference to Nazis was meant as an illustration of the falsity of the premise (which wasn't all that hidden, after all) that "imposing our morality on other people is always bad". >> Step 2 is my exactly parallel argument >>concluding that killing Jews should not be illegal (conclusion N). We all >>agree that N is false (step 3) -- that's why it's a handy test case. >[...] > "We all agree that N is false" is >also specious, ad populum, etc., since we can find (elsewhere on the net, if >he's still there) neo-nazis today, regrettably. Here I have to disagree with Dave. 1. I didn't say "Our agreement that N is false proves that N is false" -- as he says, that would have been _ad_populum_; although I'm not sure it even has enough appearance of accuracy to call it specious. 2. If we wait to accept something as true until not only all the participants in the discussion accept it as true, but until all possible hypothetical participants can be anticipated to accept it, we'll absolutely *never* get *anywhere*. None of the people in this discussion question my assertion "that killing Jews should not be illegal" is false. If someone who actually thought Jew-killing was okay were participating, I'd debate the point. But nobody is. So why can't we accept it as true and get on to other things? >We don't need Nazis and Jews to refute the premise that "all impositions of >morality are 'bad things'" and to include them is an appeal to emotions or >to pity. It's true. We don't *need* the example. I could have said, simply, "You don't really believe your own premise that imposing morality is always wrong." But it's a whole lot more satisfying to demonstrate that they don't believe the premise by illustrating with a case in which they in fact don't believe it, and will see that they don't. A counterexample to a general assertion is, bar none, the strongest way to dispute it. >A well-known anti-abortion advocate, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, has written: > "As a Jew, I cannot remain silent at this facile use of the > Nazi analogy, though I realize that some anti-abortion Jews > use it. If this argument is so compelling, why do Jews > remain generally favorable toward abortion?" Did you intend this to illustrate the fallacy of _argumentum_ad_populum_? It's a pretty pure example of it, don't you think? In article <219@aero.ARPA> zeus@aero.UUCP (Dave Suess) writes, quoting me: >>The main reason for referring to Nazis in a rational discussion of abortion >>is this, that they believed that killing innocent people in some instances >>was morally okay, but that all civilized people (and everyone in this >>discussion) agree that they were murderers, i.e. that their morality was >>*wrong*. (I'll cheerfully use some other example if you suggest a similar >>one.) > >1. I think Nazis did *not* believe in killing innocent people; rather, their >ignoble morality classified Jews as non-innocent, non-people. But this makes the parallel even more exact. My opponents in the abortion debate don't believe they're advocating the killing of innocent people either. I think they are, just as we all think the Nazis were. And again, the whole point was that in such a case, *even the opponents* agree that there's nothing inherently wrong with the guy who thinks it *is* murder using force or law to stop the guy who thinks it *isn't*. I ask again, can you think of a better real-life case to use as a parallel, where group A thought that killing a member of group C was okay, and group B thought the same act was murder? >2. "all civilized people" sounds suspiciously ad populum, and to say that >the Nazis' morality was "wrong" begs the question of right and wrong in the >context of moral systems. I answered this earlier. And I have no qualms at all about asserting Nazi morality to be wrong. You called it "ignoble" yourself. What's the point? >3. As I have pointed out elsewhere, the "rational" (say, non-emotional) >refutation of the original argument (that since anti-abortion laws impose >one's morality on others, so anti-abortion laws are a "bad thing") does >NOT require an example with Nazis and Jews, it merely requires a counter- >example that refutes the hidden premise (all impositions of one's morality >on others are a "bad thing"). So, another example is NOT needed. If a >*rational* argument is to be pursued, one can use the *general* case of >murder, and leave out an example that has historically been used to >evoke emotional responses. The "*general* case of murder" doesn't work, because it can be easily, and fairly sensibly, argued that most murderers don't really think what they do is right. The Nazis really seem to have thought they were doing good by slaughtering people, though. You need a specific example where someone thought it was permissible to kill. > I claim that using Nazis and Jews is an argument by >analogy and an appeal to emotions: Nazis and Jews are *not* required to >refute the original argument. An argument by analogy would have said 1. Foetuses and Jews are similar (in some relevant way). 2. It is wrong to kill Jews. 3. Therefore it is wrong to kill foetuses. I didn't do anything like that at all! >>So in article <210@aero.ARPA> zeus@aero.UUCP (Dave Suess) has apparently >>misunderstood what I was getting at. He writes, at first quoting me: > >Now we're getting somewhere. THIS looks like argumentum_ad_hominem (abusive). Look up _ad_hominem_. Saying that *apparently* somebody misunderstood something has *nothing* in common with _argumentum_ad_hominem_, and can only be classed as abusive by grossly indulging your sensitivity to insult. I didn't abuse; I tried to correct what I thought was a failure on your part to grasp what I meant. If I'm wrong, I'm sorry. But _ad_hominem_? >Almost finally, it is easy for you to assert that my statement about the >Nazis' stand on abortion is false, but I have evidence to the contrary. I'll get back to you on this. -- Peace and Good!, Fr. John Woolley "Compared to what I have seen, all that I have written is straw." -- St. Thomas
zeus@aero.ARPA (Dave Suess) (01/28/86)
In article <450@cisden.UUCP> john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) writes: >... As Dave writes (and I agree entirely): >> The problem is the (hidden) premise that imposing one's morality >>on others is a "bad thing." This hidden premise exists in the refutation, as >>well, but the conclusion that laws against murder are a bad thing follows >>because of the flawed second premise, not because the syllogism has faulty >>logic. > >My reference to Nazis was meant as an illustration of the falsity of the >premise (which wasn't all that hidden, after all) that "imposing our >morality on other people is always bad". And my complaint remains: using the Nazis tugs at the emotions in what otherwise purports to be a rational discussion. "Nazis" certainly aren't needed to illustrate that the premise doesn't hold. > ... >>We don't need Nazis and Jews to refute the premise that "all impositions of >>morality are 'bad things'" and to include them is an appeal to emotions or >>to pity. > >It's true. We don't *need* the example. I could have said, simply, "You >don't really believe your own premise that imposing morality is always >wrong." But it's a whole lot more satisfying to demonstrate that they don't >believe the premise by illustrating with a case in which they in fact don't >believe it, and will see that they don't. > >A counterexample to a general assertion is, bar none, the strongest way >to dispute it. Again, my point: since the example you chose wasn't *needed*, why lay an argument open to the claim that since it uses an emotion-charged example rather than bland hypotheticals, the argument has no validity in a rational discussion? Or the claim that the example was chosen to deliberately manipulate the emotions in the way that the presenter of the argument wants them manipulated? I agree that a counterexample is a strong tactic; but why not use words like "A society that holds that some people, because of their genetic backgrounds, are inferior and may be executed at will" instead of "Nazis and Jews"? >>A well-known anti-abortion advocate, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, has written: >>... >Did you intend this to illustrate the fallacy of _argumentum_ad_populum_? >It's a pretty pure example of it, don't you think? > Oops. Mea maxima culpa. (Perhaps I meant it as a snappy yet apropos quote to end that posting, to jazz up my empty signature space. Perhaps I was anxious to show that I'm not the first to point out that references to Nazis in abortion arguments are specious, or that it is not a point made just by anti-anti-abortionists. Probably I screwed up, especially if it distracted from the legitimate points I was trying to make.) >... I ask again, can >you think of a better real-life case to use as a parallel, where group A >thought that killing a member of group C was okay, and group B thought the >same act was murder? > But why is it necessary to use a "real-life" case? To appeal to the emotions? I find it hard to justify any other answer. Anyway, it doesn't take much imagination to come up with more examples that are not the typical "Nazis" analogy. Try Charlie Manson and Family for group A, the Tates and LaBiancas (or any affluent "pigs") for group C, and the state of California for group B. Or try considering group C as the current inhabitants of Death Rows in the US, group A as the citizens of the US, and group B as a shocked group of foreign anti-capital-punishment activists. Or try group C as the people of Jericho (Rahab and her house excepted), group B as their neighbors in Ai and other Canaanites, and group A as Joshua and the tribes of Israel! Emotions abound for manipulation in that bunch of examples, but I thought this was *rational* discussion. > ... >> I claim that using Nazis and Jews is an argument by >>analogy and an appeal to emotions: Nazis and Jews are *not* required to >>refute the original argument. > >An argument by analogy would have said > 1. Foetuses and Jews are similar (in some relevant way). > 2. It is wrong to kill Jews. > 3. Therefore it is wrong to kill foetuses. >I didn't do anything like that at all! True; but what *I* would have put for the aforementioned argument by analogy would be 1. Nazis thought it was okay to kill Jews. 2. Pro-abortion people think it is okay to kill foetuses. 3. Foetuses and Jews are similar (they are both unfairly killed) 4. Nazis and pro-abortion people are similar (they both have philosophies that justify unfair killings). 5. Everybody knows Nazis were damned wrong, so ... 6. Everybody should know the pro-choice position is damned wrong. Please note that this is *not* what you wrote (ever); it is what *can be* inferred from using the "Nazis" example, with little difficulty. Your analogy (please notice) left out the Nazis, and could have *easily* left out the Jews (and substituted "adults" or "birthed people"). Emotions get evoked: one camp can be self-righteously stroked, while another camp can get irritated that their arguments are being dragged through unnecessary mud. My final comment on the subject: if an argument is so weak that it depends on emotional responses, then it is better left out of a purported rational discussion and reserved for rabble-rousing. Otherwise, its inclusion in rational debate appears contrived, inappropriate, and the mark of a losing argument. Dave Suess zeus@aero2.arpa