apak@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent) (01/02/86)
I've followed the recent discussions in this group with interest. But I
think it's in danger of degenerating into a head-on clash of world-views.
Probably that's eventually inevitable, but maybe we can get further first.
I'm interested in whether the "pro-life" people out there can make a case
against abortion WITHOUT any religious premises. So your task is to produce an
argument framed in terms acceptable to an aetheist moral philosopher. Scriptural quotations are out, references to God are out, arguments starting
with (say) the Ten Commandments as axiomatic are out. For example, it's
fine for you to say that human beings come into existence at the moment of
conception. It's no good to proceed by saying "Killing human beings is wrong.
Therefore abortion is wrong. QED."
Of course, you may regard this as a hopeless task; in other words you may
believe that there's no reason why someone without a religious point of view
should oppose abortion. That at least ought to explain why we've reached an impasse.
regards,
akstanwyck@druxu.UUCP (StanwyckDA) (01/03/86)
> I've followed the recent discussions in this group with interest. But I > think it's in danger of degenerating into a head-on clash of world-views. > Probably that's eventually inevitable, but maybe we can get further first. > I'm interested in whether the "pro-life" people out there can make a case > against abortion WITHOUT any religious premises. So your task is to produce an > argument framed in terms acceptable to an aetheist moral philosopher. > Scriptural quotations are out, references to God are out, arguments starting > with (say) the Ten Commandments as axiomatic are out. For example, it's > fine for you to say that human beings come into existence at the moment of > conception. It's no good to proceed by saying "Killing human beings is wrong. > Therefore abortion is wrong. QED." > Of course, you may regard this as a hopeless task; in other words you may > believe that there's no reason why someone without a religious point of view > should oppose abortion. That at least ought to explain why we've reached > an impasse. Just an equal challange in response: Can you make an argument against murder (of adult humans) without resorting to a religious premise. Statements such as "it isn't nice" or "it makes me feel bad" are not convincing. If the argument is based on a moral statement, justify that moral statement. -- ________ ( ) Don Stanwyck @( o o )@ 303-538-5004 ( || ) Cornet-374-5004 ( \__/ ) [druxu|drutx]!stanwyck (______) AT&T-IS @ Denver, CO
apak@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent) (01/04/86)
I recently asked whether anyone had arguments against abortion which were not religious in nature. The following quote is in response to that. In article <1730@druxu.UUCP> stanwyck@druxu.UUCP (StanwyckDA) writes: > >Just an equal challange in response: Can you make an argument against murder >(of adult humans) without resorting to a religious premise. Statements such >as "it isn't nice" or "it makes me feel bad" are not convincing. If the >argument is based on a moral statement, justify that moral statement. > > Don Stanwyck This seems a reasonable request. I certainly can't make an argument against killing adult humans IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, because I don't believe that's a tenable moral position. But I'll give you two arguments which suggest that it's generally wrong to kill people. These aren't watertight demonstrations (since, firstly, moral philosophy isn't mathematics and, secondly, I'm not a moral philosopher), but sketches of some sort of moral position. (That's all I'm asking for from anti-abortionists, in case that wasn't clear.) Here goes: (1) I start from a position of utilitarianism, so that an action which is intended to produce the greatest good for the greatest number is a moral action."Good" is a term which reflects my personal values, some of which will become apparent. This is a likely source of controversy. If, for example, you maintain that your values place the life of a member of homo sapiens above all else, you will produce a consistent moral position against abortion. I would criticise your values as arbitrary and speciesist, and would ask whether you really would destroy a planet of intelligent, friendly, talented aliens rather than a single human. But, if you steadfastly maintain your position, I certainly can't prove that it's logically wrong. I expect, by the way, that people will be able to persuade me that the values I profess aren't really quite what I mean, because it's almost impossible to be completely satisfied with any moral system. For the health of the net, perhaps you ought not to bother unless it's going to affect the consequences of my arguments. (2) First argument. Adult human beings tend to possess a variety of qualities which I regard as valuable (for example, kindness, intelligence, creativity). I'll refer to these qualities collectively as "character", emphasising that they combine to produce a whole world-view and behaviour-pattern. Mostly, people have characters which are on balance good. (Here and afterwards, it should be understood that I'm using my values.) Corpses have no discernible character, so people with good characters are better for the world than corpses,all else being equal. I therefore enjoin you not to kill people with good character. This argument does not apply to abortion, since the character of a foetus is little-developed. It is true that abortion removes the potential for an adult to develop, but no more than contraception does. If the human race were close to extinction, I might regard either as wrong, but the situation doesn't presently arise. (3) Second argument. A society in which each member evaluated the character of her sisters and brothers, and felt free to kill those she regarded as bad, would be a less pleasant society than one in which adult human life was generally protected. It is therefore moral for each of us to try to uphold respect for adult life, and immoral to diminish such respect (again, all else being equal). Killing people, of whatever character, tends to diminish the general respect for adult life. Some might (and do) argue that this establishes the immorality of abortion: that the lack of respect for human life shown by society's tolerance of abortion has wider social consequences. This is an empirical rather than a moral question: if I were persuaded of its truth then I would alter my views on abortion. However, I am not presently convinced. I believe that a clearly-established social contract is in effect, under which it is permissible to kill foetuses in certain circumstances, and this is understood to have no implications beyond birth. An absolutely firm dividing line, such as birth, is necessary to avoid the individual decisions about human worth which I argued above were deleterious. So, though I was asked to consider only adults, the same argument suggests that killing children is wrong. regards, ak " Salome, dear, NOT in the fridge."
john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) (01/06/86)
In article <1100@oddjob.UUCP> apak@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent) writes: >I'm interested in whether the "pro-life" people out there can make a case >against abortion WITHOUT any religious premises. So your task is to produce an >argument framed in terms acceptable to an aetheist moral philosopher. >Scriptural quotations are out, references to God are out, arguments starting >with (say) the Ten Commandments as axiomatic are out. For example, it's >fine for you to say that human beings come into existence at the moment of >conception. It's no good to proceed by saying "Killing human beings is wrong. >Therefore abortion is wrong. QED." This is an interesting challenge, and likely to be fun to talk about, but I think it may be a little beside the point, and I'll try to say why. We (that is, most pro-Life people) think abortion is a type of murder, and because all murder is wrong, then abortion in particular is wrong. Now you've asked us to come to the same conclusion without the premise that murder is wrong. Fair question. Well, you could make lots of arguments one way and another about the morality of murder, some based on religious principles and some not. But the ultimate point is this -- can you make a convincing case against murder in general "WITHOUT any religious premises, in terms acceptable to an atheist moral philosopher?" (I don't think it can be done -- I'm not sure.) And yet you are (presumably) opposed to murder. So whatever line of reasoning you've used to get to your anti-murder position, the same line of reasoning leads to an equally strong anti-abortion position. Whatever answers to your challenge we come up with, the case for permitting abortion is no weaker and no stronger than the case permitting the killing of any other innocent person. But I'm willing to give it a try. Perhaps your side could do the same. Do you believe murder is immoral? (If not, I'm not sure we can even discuss questions like this with any remote prospect of success.) And if so, what logic did you use to get to the conclusion, since (according to your rules) you mustn't take as given that "Killing people is wrong"? This might be a very fruitful line of discussion. But a word of caution -- please, everybody, let's try to be mroe careful than we've been in the past to answer what the opponents really say, and not to make silly things up and attribute them to our opponents. It's much more satisfying, and infinitely more illuminating, to joust with real enemies than with ridiculous straw men. -- Peace and Good!, Fr. John Woolley "The heart has its reasons that the mind does not know." -- Blaise Pascal
salazar@cisden.UUCP (Kathy Salazar) (01/07/86)
Non-Religious Discussion... Initially, when I am trying to analyze an ethical dilemma, I try to reverse the situation to see if it still holds true. In reversing the abortion issue... you would have abortion forced on people! This obviously is silly and unreasonable since it would be forcing an operation (like removing a kidney) on people who don't want it. They have something like this in the movie "The Meaning of Life", it is a comedy!!! If abortion is illegal... what do you do with someone who is set on having one...arrest them? My husband is a deputy in a county jail, they put prisoners who are set on 'hurting' themselves in solitary confinement. Not a nice place, You have no light, no clothes, two mattresses and a hole in the floor. Would you have wanted to have a mother live like this until the baby was born...regardless of whether it were put up for adoption? Fact 1; There will be abortions, legal or not, there always have been. There is no possible way to enforce the illegality of abortion. Just make them safer. Fact 2; It is a moral issue and only individuals make that decision. You can't force morality on people who don't want it. Fact 3; The world is not the same place as 2000 years ago, or even 100 years ago. The population is increasing too fast, look at China, learn a lesson. Fact 4; Knowledge is needed to make your own decision, for or against abortion. FINAL WORDS: The morality of a society might best be defined by the way the poor are treated. Let's give more choices to people, encourage everyone to think for themselves and do the 'right' thing. Kathy Salazar
john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) (01/08/86)
In article <380@cisden.UUCP> salazar@cisden.UUCP (Kathy Salazar) writes: >Initially, when I am trying to analyze an ethical dilemma, I try to reverse >the situation to see if it still holds true. > >In reversing the abortion issue... >you would have abortion forced on people! >This obviously is silly and unreasonable since it would be forcing an operation >(like removing a kidney) on people who don't want it. I don't think I understand your point. It would seem that, if anything, you're arguing against abortion here. By the same logic, we could invest- igate whether murder (of adults) should be permitted -- we reverse the question and ask whether people should be forced to commit murders. Clearly not. But I don't think we've proven anything one way or the other. >If abortion is illegal... >what do you do with someone who is set on having one...arrest them? >My husband is a deputy in a county jail, they put prisoners who are >set on 'hurting' themselves in solitary confinement. Not a nice place, >You have no light, no clothes, two mattresses and a hole in the floor. >Would you have wanted to have a mother live like this until the baby was >born...regardless of whether it were put up for adoption? I don't think *anyone*, *ever*, suggested this. I'd prefer penalties against abortionists, who rack up substantial incomes from their killing. As an aside, notice that even pro-choice people refer to the pregnant women as "mothers". If that's not a person in there, just what is it that they're "mothers" of? >Fact 1; >There will be abortions, legal or not, there always have been. There is no >possible way to enforce the illegality of abortion. Just make them safer. The same applies to murder of anyone else -- "There will be murders, legal or not; there always have been." A law does not prevent the evil entirely; nobody ever thought it did. But a law can certainly discourage and reduce the incidence of evil, as can be plainly seen from the *huge* increase in the number of abortions done each year in the U. S. since 1972. >Fact 2; >It is a moral issue and only individuals make that decision. You can't >force morality on people who don't want it. And again, so is murder a moral issue. If some Nazi actually thinks it's okay to go around shooting Jews, I'm not going to argue that he should be allowed to because, after all, you can't force morality on people who don't want it. I don't care whether the Nazi *wants* to be subject to my morality -- I'm going to do the best I can to impose it on him and thereby protect his victims. >Fact 3; >The world is not the same place as 2000 years ago, or even 100 years ago. >The population is increasing too fast, look at China, learn a lesson. Many countries are now reproducing at far below "replacement" rates, the U. S. at just slightly above. And you beg the question. Suppose you're entirely right, suppose there are "too many" people (whatever we mean by that) -- just how is it right to alleviate the problem by killing some of them? ("Comrade, sometimes the individual must be sacrificed for the good of the whole.") >Fact 4; >Knowledge is needed to make your own decision, for or against abortion. No disagreement here at all between us. >FINAL WORDS: >The morality of a society might best be defined by the way the poor >are treated. Let's give more choices to people, encourage everyone to think >for themselves and do the 'right' thing. And these foetuses, these children, who are being killed by abortions -- who are they, the rich? If they don't qualify as poor in the sense of disenfranchised, ignored, voiceless, powerless, just who does? "Let's give more choices to people". Okay. Let the kids get old enough to decide, and then let them decide for themselves whether they want to be killed. That way we wouldn't be *imposing* our choices on them. Now *there's* a pro-Choice position I could endorse. -- Peace and Good!, Fr. John Woolley "The heart has its reasons that the mind does not know." -- Blaise Pascal
john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) (01/08/86)
Adrian Kent has given us a valiant and thoughtful shot at saying how to forbid the killing of adults but allow the killing of foetuses. But I don't think his arguments against murder hold water. In article <1101@oddjob.UUCP> apak@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent) writes: > I certainly can't make an argument >against killing adult humans IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, because I don't believe >that's a tenable moral position. But I'll give you two arguments which suggest >that it's generally wrong to kill people. (Maybe we should limit the question to whether it is allowable ever to kill an adult who is not trying to harm anyone, and is innocent of any crime. This eliminates a couple of potential side-lines, but leaves the analogy to abortion intact -- the child is *at worst* unintentionally harming someone and is certainly guilty of nothing.) >(1) I start from a position of utilitarianism, so that an action which is >intended to produce the greatest good for the greatest number is a moral action."Good" is a term which reflects my personal values, some of which will become >apparent. This is a likely source of controversy. If, for example, you maintain >that your values place the life of a member of homo sapiens above all else, you >will produce a consistent moral position against abortion. I would criticise >your values as arbitrary and speciesist, and would ask whether you really would >destroy a planet of intelligent, friendly, talented aliens rather than a single >human. But, if you steadfastly maintain your position, I certainly can't prove >that it's logically wrong. First, I don't think I've ever heard anyone say that his value system placed the lives of humans "above all else". I object on moral grounds to killing humans, but I would have exactly the same objection to killing any *person*, regardless of species. Angels being immortal and extraterrestrials hypothetical, we're left with _homo_sapiens_. Next, a general problem with utilitarianism. Dostoievski posed the problem: Suppose there is a city, somewhere, whose inhabitants are happy and prosperous and healthy. They have a high culture, universal peace, and so on. The catch is this -- the whole thing depends on the existence of a single child kept in a dungeon somewhere, starved, ignorant, neglected, sick, tortured. And the whole city with its millions of inhabitants will lose its magical peace and prosperity and happiness should this child ever be released. Is it worth it? Can anything worth while be built on deliberate cruelty and injustice? (Dostoievski and I say No.) But utilitarianism -- "the greatest good of the greatest number" -- clearly would say Yes. So are you really a utilitarian? If so, what do you say about the child in the dungeon? (Or the ones under the curette?) >(2) First argument. Adult human beings tend to possess a variety of qualities >which I regard as valuable (for example, kindness, intelligence, creativity). >I'll refer to these qualities collectively as "character", emphasising that >they combine to produce a whole world-view and behaviour-pattern. Mostly, >people have characters which are on balance good. (Here and afterwards, it >should be understood that I'm using my values.) Corpses have no discernible >character, so people with good characters are better for the world than corpses,all else being equal. I therefore enjoin you not to kill people with good >character. This argument does not apply to abortion, since the character of a >foetus is little-developed. The problem with this whole line is that it explains why *you* don't like to kill adults, but it doesn't give you any ground on which to criticize someone who *does* like to. It bases everything on your personal likes. I happen to like and value the character of foetuses -- innocence, vast but yet-untapped potential, smallness, complexity, rapid development. So what? >(3) Second argument. A society in which each member evaluated the character of >her sisters and brothers, and felt free to kill those she regarded as bad, >would be a less pleasant society than one in which adult human life was generally protected. It is therefore moral for each of us to try to uphold >respect for adult life, and immoral to diminish such respect (again, all else >being equal). Killing people, of whatever character, tends to diminish the >general respect for adult life. Notice how you keep having to (arbitrarily) specify "adult" life. What's happened here is that you yourself have already "evaluated the character" of certain of your brothers and sisters (the very young), and "felt free to kill those" you regard as having "character" not up to *your* criteria. And I agree, it makes for an unpleasant society. Killing people, of whatever age, tends to diminish the respect for human life. > Some might (and do) argue that this establishes >the immorality of abortion: that the lack of respect for human life shown by >society's tolerance of abortion has wider social consequences. This is an >empirical rather than a moral question: if I were persuaded of its truth then >I would alter my views on abortion. However, I am not presently convinced. >I believe that a clearly-established social contract is in effect, >under which it is permissible to kill foetuses in certain circumstances, and >this is understood to have no implications beyond birth. An absolutely firm >dividing line, such as birth, is necessary to avoid the individual decisions >about human worth which I argued above were deleterious. So, though I was >asked to consider only adults, the same argument suggests that killing children >is wrong. Remember back in the late sixties, all the pro-Life people were warning that widespread abortion was bound to lead to infanticide and the killing of senile adults, and so on? And all the liberals said pooh-pooh? Well, we sure see it happening, now, don't we? Medical journals discuss "options of non-treatment", not just for comatose, but for the "pleasantly senile". Deformed babies are starved to death in hospitals, while courts uphold the parents' "rights" to starve their babies if they want. Your "absolutely firm dividing line" has been crossed an awful lot the last few years, and the reason is that it's not really that firm. A nine-month foetus, ready to be born, is obviously and clearly alive and human, just as much as she is a month later -- the dividing line of birth is, if anything, just a matter of arbitrary convenience. And, like all such lines, when it becomes more convenient to violate it than to observe it, it gets violated. >" Salome, dear, NOT in the fridge." My nomination for the funniest signature line on the whole net. -- Peace and Good!, Fr. John Woolley "The heart has its reasons that the mind does not know." -- Blaise Pascal
richard@boulder.UUCP (Richard Byrd) (01/11/86)
I think the recently made request for elucidation of the basis of the immorality of murder is a very relevant to the abortion question. Everyone agrees that murder is immoral and should be illegal. People disagree as to whether abortion is murder. Indeed, the question of whether abortion is murder is to a great extent a matter of definition, and peoples' definitions vary. Thus it is quite appropriate to go a level deeper and examine why we believe murder is so wrong and then see if these reasons apply to abortion. Why and when murder is wrong can be a very subtle question, but I would like to note some simple points that I hope are not too controversial. I think that I, and most other people, oppose murder primarily because of the suffering caused to the person killed. When we are shocked and disturbed on hearing of a murder, I think it is because of the thought of what it would be like for us to be killed. A person who once had a life to look forward to now has nothing. Along the same vein, if murder were legal and universally permitted our lives would be full of uncertainty and terror. Thus we make murder illegal. Note that our sympathy for the victim and our horror at the act seem related to the victim's consciousness of his life. For most of us these arguments do not apply to killing animals. It appears that we don't think that animals have enough consciousness of their lives to make the prospect of losing it a source of great anguish. (However, for the higher animals "cruelty to animals" laws do attempt to limit the purely physical suffering and pain involved in killing animals.) In the case of a fetus, it seems clear that in the earliest stages of development there is no pain, much less consciousness, and the above arguments against murder do not apply. As the fetus develops, my understanding is that there is sensation of pain, but how much more consciousness exists is debatable. Therefore it seems that to understand the morality of abortion we must have a deeper understanding of the nature of the fetus. Of course, a different basis for regarding murder as immoral might lead one to different conclusions regarding abortion.
cc@ucla-cs.UUCP (01/13/86)
In article <387@cisden.UUCP> john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) writes: >In article <380@cisden.UUCP> salazar@cisden.UUCP (Kathy Salazar) writes: >>In reversing the abortion issue... >>you would have abortion forced on people! >>This obviously is silly and unreasonable since it would be forcing an operation >>(like removing a kidney) on people who don't want it. > >I don't think I understand your point. I am not surprized... Logical experiment is beyond you. Sarcasm is foreign to you. I wonder about you, Fr..... >>If abortion is illegal... > >I don't think *anyone*, *ever*, suggested this. >I'd prefer penalties against abortionists, who rack up substantial >incomes from their killing. OK. What if the abortions are "free"? There is a new non-hormonal medication currently in research that stirred up a lot of controversy : it is used to regulate menstruation in women -- even if they happen to be pregnant. An induced abortion of sorts happens. Woman might not even KNOW if she is or is not pregnant. The medication has no known side effects. It's effects are painles and quick. And it needs to be taken once a month around the time of the period. So, Fr. Woolley, the incomes the manufacturers of this drug will rack up will derive from REGULATION of the menstrual periods, NOT abortions wich will be a side effect. Is THAT type of abortion OK with you, my good Fr.? >But a law can certainly >discourage and reduce the incidence of evil, as can be plainly seen >from the *huge* increase in the number of abortions done each year >in the U. S. since 1972. You have statistics on the number of ILLEGAL abortions in US BEFORE 1972 and the fatality rate of those abortions? Compare the number of fatalities to the those of the LEGAL abortions! >>Fact 2; >>It is a moral issue and only individuals make that decision. You can't >>force morality on people who don't want it. The good Fr. responce was again based on equating abortion to murder and to Nazi attitude toward Jews. Why, Fr. Woolley? Why do you insist on clouding the issue with evoking an emotional responce to an unrelated subject? Is it because you can't think of any REAL argument? >>Fact 4; >>Knowledge is needed to make your own decision, for or against abortion. > >No disagreement here at all between us. > >>FINAL WORDS: >>The morality of a society might best be defined by the way the poor >>are treated. Let's give more choices to people, encourage everyone to think >>for themselves and do the 'right' thing. > >And these foetuses, these children, who are being killed by abortions -- >who are they, the rich? If they don't qualify as poor in the sense of >disenfranchised, ignored, voiceless, powerless, just who does? > >"Let's give more choices to people". Okay. Let the kids get old enough >to decide, and then let them decide for themselves whether they want to >be killed. That way we wouldn't be *imposing* our choices on them. Now >*there's* a pro-Choice position I could endorse. Mean while let them starve, pull their parents into poverty, grow up in the streets and join the gangs. That way they will choose the option to be killed by themselves ( and take a few of their friend along!). Is that what you are saying, Fr.? Fr., if I find out that any of my friends is pregnant I'll try to stop them from having an abortion - IF YOU, Fr. Woolley, promise to SUPPORT FINANCIALLY and MORALLY that friend of mine for the period of the pregnancy and for the NEXT 18 years. NO???? Well, I gues it's abortions for the lot of them..... ================================================================================ From the steam tunnels of UCLA - Oleg Kiselev (....!ucla-cs!oac6.oleg)
zeus@aero.ARPA (Dave Suess) (01/14/86)
In article <387@cisden.UUCP> john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) writes: >And again, so is murder a moral issue. If some Nazi actually thinks it's >okay to go around shooting Jews, I'm not going to argue that he should >be allowed to because, after all, you can't force morality on people >who don't want it. I don't care whether the Nazi *wants* to be subject >to my morality -- I'm going to do the best I can to impose it on him and >thereby protect his victims. Every year, I ask that the Nazis be left out of arguments (since it lends an air of emotionalism based on what is often a side issue). Here, even though the subject is murder (in a general sense), there is an analogy where 1) pro-choice-for-abortion equates with "Nazi", and 2) foetus equates with "Jew". Murder in general is quite different than a racist variant, and using Nazis and Jews would seem, as usual, inappropriate. Nobody mentioned aborting just Jewish foetuses, after all. There is a place for Nazis-Jews references here, but the context should be ideologies of Nazis and Jews as they pertain to abortion. And recall that the Nazis were very much anti-abortion (for German-Aryans), expressing the opinion that, for the good of the state, women should be making more and more German-Aryans (more soldiers, and more soldier-mothers, presumably). [See how easy it is? My comments equate anti-abortion with "Nazi" now, when really I should have left it at the "good of society" argument, without painting it with the emotion of "Nazis!" Hence, my above paragraph is specious, and should never be cited as an argument on these issues.] Dave Suess
apak@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent) (01/14/86)
There's been a lot of interesting followup to my original question (should
an atheist moral philosopher oppose abortion?) and subsequent arguments (which
suggested that a reasonable, consistent moral position exists that distinguishesbetween the killing of adults and of foetuses). Some of it's come by private mail. At the moment, I'm having (machine) trouble replying to that, so I'll try
to respond here. Quotes are from John Woolley's article: I apologise for any
misquotation or misattribution of other people's points.
(> John Woolley >> Adrian Kent)
In article <388@cisden.UUCP> john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) writes:
>>(1) I start from a position of utilitarianism, so that an action which is
>>intended to produce the greatest good for the greatest number is a moral action."Good" is a term which reflects my personal values, some of which will become
>>apparent. This is a likely source of controversy. If, for example, you maintain
>>that your values place the life of a member of homo sapiens above all else, you
>>will produce a consistent moral position against abortion. I would criticise
>>your values as arbitrary and speciesist, and would ask whether you really would
>>destroy a planet of intelligent, friendly, talented aliens rather than a single
>>human. But, if you steadfastly maintain your position, I certainly can't prove
>>that it's logically wrong.
>
>First, I don't think I've ever heard anyone say that his value system
>placed the lives of humans "above all else". I object on moral grounds
>to killing humans, but I would have exactly the same objection to killing
>any *person*, regardless of species. Angels being immortal and
>extraterrestrials hypothetical, we're left with _homo_sapiens_.
The point I'm tryng to make is that a creature ought to be treated
according to its attributes, not its species. Extraterrestrials may be
hypothetical, but they're very useful in analysing someone's moral position.
I'd like to know how you recognise a "person". What qualities does a race
have to possess in order to qualify? And is it possible for only some members
of a race to qualify, or do you have to judge the question species by species?
I think these are crucial questions of principle, and lie at the root of
our differing conclusions.
>Next, a general problem with utilitarianism. Dostoievski posed the
>problem: Suppose there is a city, somewhere, whose inhabitants are happy
>and prosperous and healthy. They have a high culture, universal peace,
>and so on. The catch is this -- the whole thing depends on the existence
>of a single child kept in a dungeon somewhere, starved, ignorant, neglected,
>sick, tortured. And the whole city with its millions of inhabitants will
>lose its magical peace and prosperity and happiness should this child ever
>be released. Is it worth it? [ .... ] (Dostoievski and I say No.)
>But utilitarianism -- "the greatest good of the greatest number" --
>clearly would say Yes. So are you really a utilitarian? If so, what do
>you say about the child in the dungeon? (Or the ones under the curette?)
Firstly, I don't agree with the unequivocal claim that utilitarianism
would say Yes. I need to know more about the hypothesis. If, when the child
is released, at least one other child within the city will incur equivalent
suffering AND lots of good things will be lost, then you're right about the
utilitarian conclusion. I agree with that conclusion: it seems like common
sense. On the other hand, if the only consequence of releasing the child is
that lots of good things will be lost, then a utilitarian's moral opinion
will depend on her values. So I'll assume the latter hypothesis, which probably
interests you more. I think that, if enough good things are lost, there comes
a point at which I would not release the child. Suppose, for instance, the
alternative is that everyone in the city loses all interest in everything
except basic human needs: that empathy, art, curiosity all vanish. That seems
worse to me than the child's suffering. Take another example (from "Country of
the Kind", author forgotten). Suppose that the human disposition to violence
can completely be removed, but that in the process all artistic ability and
appreciation is lost. Is the suffering saved worth the cost?
So, am I really a utilitarian? As I've said elsewhere, I think
utilitarianism has flaws, but it's a good rule of thumb. What do I say about
the child in the dungeon? That, if I knew that after making my moral choice
I would be randomly assigned a role in society (P(AK=child)=0.000001,
P(AK=city-dweller)=0.999999), I would make the same choice.
I see no analogy with the children/foetuses under the curette, either
in terms of suffering or in terms of personal loss; you can't take away freedom
from someone who doesn't have it.
>
>>(2) First argument. Adult human beings tend to possess a variety of qualities
>>which I regard as valuable (for example, kindness, intelligence, creativity).
>>I'll refer to these qualities collectively as "character", emphasising that
>>they combine to produce a whole world-view and behaviour-pattern. Mostly,
>>people have characters which are on balance good. (Here and afterwards, it
>>should be understood that I'm using my values.) Corpses have no discernible
>>character, so people with good characters are better for the world than
>>corpses. This argument does not apply to abortion, since the character of a
>>foetus is little-developed.
>
>The problem with this whole line is that it explains why *you* don't like
>to kill adults, but it doesn't give you any ground on which to criticize
>someone who *does* like to. It bases everything on your personal likes.
It's certainly true that moral philosophy is value-dependent. Whether
that's a problem is debatable: I think it's simply a recognition of the fact
that there are no absolute moral truths. It's also true that I have no grounds
(other than what are essentially aesthetic ones) for criticizing someone who
likes killing adults, as long as she doesn't actually do it. And ultimately,
if she sincerely believes that killing and being killed are both good things,
I may have to concede that, under her consistent moral system, she is justified
in killing. That doesn't stop me from preventing her from doing so, of course.
So yes, though one can argue over the reasonableness of a set of values,
one can not necessarily prove a set of values to be wrong. But what normally
happens is that people's stated values prove to be incoherent, or inconsistently
applied. That's why moral debates can be useful.
>
>I happen to like and value the character of foetuses -- innocence, vast
>but yet-untapped potential, smallness, complexity, rapid development. So
>what?
Well, if those are seriously meant to be the primary reasons why you value
foetuses (which I doubt), then it seems to follow that you ought to value
a sperm and unfertilised egg (together) at least as much. So the general
pattern is: X states values, Y draws conclusions, X accepts conclusions or
refines values, .... I don't know whether you consider that a good pastime,
but at least it keeps moral philosophers off the street.
[There follows a section in which I give a second argument against killing,
which John Woolley comments on. I've omitted it to save space; see his article.]
>
>Remember back in the late sixties, all the pro-Life people were warning
>that widespread abortion was bound to lead to infanticide and the killing
>of senile adults, and so on? And all the liberals said pooh-pooh? Well,
>we sure see it happening, now, don't we? Medical journals discuss "options
>of non-treatment", not just for comatose, but for the "pleasantly senile".
>Deformed babies are starved to death in hospitals, while courts uphold
>the parents' "rights" to starve their babies if they want.
>
>Your "absolutely firm dividing line" has been crossed an awful lot the
>last few years, and the reason is that it's not really that firm. A
>nine-month foetus, ready to be born, is obviously and clearly alive and
>human, just as much as she is a month later -- the dividing line of
>birth is, if anything, just a matter of arbitrary convenience. And,
>like all such lines, when it becomes more convenient to violate it than
>to observe it, it gets violated.
Similar points were made to me in private mail by Charli Phillips, for
which I'm grateful. I agree that this part of my previous argument doesn't
stand up. I'll come back to this question in a later posting, if and when
I think I have anything sensible to say about it.
>>" Salome, dear, NOT in the fridge."
>My nomination for the funniest signature line on the whole net.
> Fr. John Woolley
Credit to Marion Hill, who supplied this in a 1957 New Statesman competition
for gruesome one-liners.
regards,
akpete@valid.UUCP (Pete Zakel) (01/14/86)
> Just an equal challange in response: Can you make an argument against murder > (of adult humans) without resorting to a religious premise. Statements such > as "it isn't nice" or "it makes me feel bad" are not convincing. If the > argument is based on a moral statement, justify that moral statement. > -- > Don Stanwyck Certainly, if you murder adult humans, you will be seen as a murderer by other adult humans, and subject to being "removed" yourself. (Definition of "removed": Killed, jailed, or otherwise having your freedom to kill other human beings taken away). -Pete Zakel (..!{hplabs,amd,pyramid,ihnp4}!pesnta!valid!pete)
apak@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent) (01/17/86)
killing in general is beginning to bifurcate. It started out as a *moral*
discussion pure and simple. But later postings have (for example) argued
that there should be a law against murder, on the grounds that society is
better off with such a law than without. I just want to point out that this
is an interesting and relevant but separate question. One can argue that there
should be a law against X without believing X to be wrong, and conversely.
(In particular, I think it's much harder to argue that killing is wrong than
to argue that it should be outlawed.)
regards,
ak
"Salome, dear, NOT in the fridge."john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) (01/17/86)
In article <30@valid.UUCP> pete@valid.UUCP (Pete Zakel) writes: >Certainly, if you murder adult humans, you will be seen as a murderer by >other adult humans, and subject to being "removed" yourself. (Definition >of "removed": Killed, jailed, or otherwise having your freedom to kill >other human beings taken away). All this argument shows is that, in general, it's imprudent and unwise to murder adults. But if you were *certain* that nobody would ever find out about some proposed murder, or that some legal loophole would get you off scot free, your argument wouldn't apply. And yet the murder would still be wrong. It's not the possibility of punishment that makes an action wrong. -- Peace and Good!, Fr. John Woolley "Compared to what I have seen, all that I have written is straw." -- St. Thomas
john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) (01/17/86)
For the first time ever I've been chided for insufficient sarcasm. My mother, all my friends, everyone who ever knew me, are *all* amazed. In article <8328@ucla-cs.ARPA> cc@ucla-cs.UUCP (Oleg Kiselev) writes: >In article <387@cisden.UUCP> john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) writes: >>In article <380@cisden.UUCP> salazar@cisden.UUCP (Kathy Salazar) writes: >>>In reversing the abortion issue... >>>you would have abortion forced on people! >>>This obviously is silly and unreasonable since it would be forcing an operation >>>(like removing a kidney) on people who don't want it. >> >>I don't think I understand your point. > >I am not surprized... Logical experiment is beyond you. Sarcasm is foreign to >you. I wonder about you, Fr..... Wow, this is weird. I didn't understand Kathy's point. (She had made an argument -- Oleg leaves it all out of his posting -- which seems to be of the form "It is wrong to force people to do X. Therefore it is wrong to forbid people to do X." This is clearly absurd, as I pointed out. Oleg prudently omitted that, too. [Sarcasm.]) Now I know Kathy a little, and I know she's not a bit dumb, so I assumed I'd misunderstood something, or she'd left something out. I asked for clarification, and Oleg Kiselev accuses me of stupidity and *!*lack of sarcasm*!*. >>>If abortion is illegal... >> >>I don't think *anyone*, *ever*, suggested this. The above three lines are taken verbatim from Oleg's posting. Unless you remember my original, you'd think that I said nobody wanted abortion to be illegal, which is absurd. In fact, he's left out a bunch of stuff, and the juxtaposition of these two lines gives a grossly misleading impression. Careful about included quotes, folks, please. We can't quote everything, but try to be honest. (Or is honesty in debate another of those traditional values I so disingenuously propound? [Sarcasm.]) >So, Fr. Woolley, the incomes the manufacturers of this drug will rack up will >derive from REGULATION of the menstrual periods, NOT abortions wich will be a >side effect. Is THAT type of abortion OK with you, my good Fr.? Of course not, and you know not. If the intention is to abort, and the effect is to abort, it's a little disingenuous (read "dishonest") to pretend you're just "regulating". Killing is killing, even if it's painless and inexpensive. Responding to my paralleling an argument for abortion with a hypothetical Nazi argument for the licity of killing Jews, Oleg writes: >The good Fr. responce was again based on equating abortion to murder and to Nazi >attitude toward Jews. Why, Fr. Woolley? Why do you insist on clouding the issue >with evoking an emotional responce to an unrelated subject? Is it because you >can't think of any REAL argument? (Patiently) No, Oleg. I was, in fact, engaging in "logical experimentation". Didn't you recognize it? [Sarcasm.] Can't you follow a "REAL argument"? [Sarcasm.] I argued thus: 1. Argument A based on logical structure X yields conclusion M. 2. I construct Argument B also based on logical structure X which yields conclusion N. 3. We have reason (from other considerations) to believe that N is false. 4. We therefore conclude (and this is a good conclusion) that logical structure X is flawed. (We *do not* conclude that M is false -- showing the invalidity of an argument for M is not to show that M is false. Kinda tricky, huh, Oleg? [Sarcasm.]) X here is the structure of Kathy's argument (step 1) concluding that abortion should not be illegal (conclusion M). Step 2 is my exactly parallel argument concluding that killing Jews should not be illegal (conclusion N). We all agree that N is false (step 3) -- that's why it's a handy test case. (No emotion needed.) I therefore conclude *not* that abortion should be illegal, but that the argument X is incorrect, and so Kathy hasn't shown that abortion should be legal. That's logic, Oleg. Kind of unfamiliar? [Sarcasm.] -- Peace and Good!, Fr. John Woolley "Compared to what I have seen, all that I have written is straw." -- St. Thomas
john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) (01/17/86)
I'm deadly serious about this, so pay attention, Oleg. In article <8328@ucla-cs.ARPA> cc@ucla-cs.UUCP (Oleg Kiselev) writes: >Fr., if I find out that any of my friends is pregnant I'll try to stop them >from having an abortion - IF YOU, Fr. Woolley, promise to SUPPORT FINANCIALLY >and MORALLY that friend of mine for the period of the pregnancy and for the NEXT >18 years. NO???? Well, I gues it's abortions for the lot of them..... Don't assume a NO answer, bucko. In fact, yes. Anyone who needs financial or moral support in order to avoid an abortion, even if the support involved is likely to have to go on for years, is welcome to stay with me. (Guests of course are expected to act civilized, help with housework, etc. And long- term guests should be willing to do what they can to help with bills and things. But if they can't, that's okay.) If staying in my house doesn't suit you, I've got all sorts of other resources available -- other friends, family, and so on, who are all eager to help (or will be when their arms are twisted :-) ). My address is 6672 S. Pearl St., Littleton, Colo. 80121 (suburb of Denver), or St. Mary's Church, 2290 S. Clayton St., Denver, Colo. 80210. You can reach me at home at 303-797-3237, or often during the day at this office, 303-798-1802. That's a promise, not just to Oleg's friends, but to anybody. And welcome to the ranks of the pro-Lifers, Oleg. -- Peace and Good!, Fr. John Woolley "Compared to what I have seen, all that I have written is straw." -- St. Thomas
john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) (01/18/86)
It seems a little clarification is needed into why I referred to Nazis in recent postings. 1. I did not say (and certainly did not mean to imply) that pro-choice people have the same moral qualities as Nazis. 2. I did not refer to Nazis as some sort of emotional trick, or as part of an _argumentum_ad_hominem_. The main reason for referring to Nazis in a rational discussion of abortion is this, that they believed that killing innocent people in some instances was morally okay, but that all civilized people (and everyone in this discussion) agree that they were murderers, i.e. that their morality was *wrong*. (I'll cheerfully use some other example if you suggest a similar one.) This example is potentially illuminating for two reasons: 1. It might possibly give pro-choice folks some insight into us their opposition to realize that we *really believe* that what they advocate and practice is morally indistinguishable from what the Nazis advocated and practiced. (The people involved are certainly distinguishable -- don't say I called you a Nazi!) We're not just out to interfere with other people, or foist religion on the unwilling, or any such thing. We want to stop people killing other people. Whether you agree or not is one thing, but you'll understand us a lot better if you know and can feel a little of why we're opposed to you. 2. Many (not all) of the arguments that are used in favour of abortion have logical flaws in them. (This is of course true of many arguments on our side, too.) Often these logical flaws can be exposed by showing that the same line of logic can be used to conclude that the Nazis' killing of Jews was morally licit. If this can be done (and it often can) it shows *not* that abortion is always wrong, but that the particular pro-abortion argument being paralleled was illogical. (This kind of proof is called _reductio_ad_ absurdum_.) And the Nazis are a particularly handy group to use for this purpose not because of any emotions involved, but simply because the immorality of their doctrine is one of the few things we can all agree on without much discussion. So in article <210@aero.ARPA> zeus@aero.UUCP (Dave Suess) has apparently misunderstood what I was getting at. He writes, at first quoting me: >>And again, so is murder a moral issue. If some Nazi actually thinks it's >>okay to go around shooting Jews, I'm not going to argue that he should >>be allowed to because, after all, you can't force morality on people >>who don't want it. I don't care whether the Nazi *wants* to be subject >>to my morality -- I'm going to do the best I can to impose it on him and >>thereby protect his victims. > >Every year, I ask that the Nazis be left out of arguments (since it lends >an air of emotionalism based on what is often a side issue). Here, even >though the subject is murder (in a general sense), there is an analogy where >1) pro-choice-for-abortion equates with "Nazi", and 2) foetus equates with >"Jew". Murder in general is quite different than a racist variant, and >using Nazis and Jews would seem, as usual, inappropriate. Nobody mentioned >aborting just Jewish foetuses, after all. What I wrote wasn't meant to be emotional. It's a _reductio_ad_absurdum_ using precisely the same logic as the argument it refutes, but reaching a conclusion we all agree is false. >There is a place for Nazis-Jews references here, but the context should be >ideologies of Nazis and Jews as they pertain to abortion. And recall that >the Nazis were very much anti-abortion (for German-Aryans), expressing the >opinion that, for the good of the state, women should be making more and >more German-Aryans (more soldiers, and more soldier-mothers, presumably). > >[See how easy it is? My comments equate anti-abortion with "Nazi" now, >when really I should have left it at the "good of society" argument, without >painting it with the emotion of "Nazis!" Hence, my above paragraph is >specious, and should never be cited as an argument on these issues.] Yes, I agree. Your argument is an _argumentum_ad_hominem_, saying (falsely, by the way) that the Nazis were anti-abortion, and implying a connection with today's anti-abortion forces. As you point out, this is illogical, specious even. But it's not what I did. -- Peace and Good!, Fr. John Woolley "Compared to what I have seen, all that I have written is straw." -- St. Thomas
cs111olg@ucla-cs.UUCP (01/19/86)
What can I say?! I take off my hat and salute you, Fr.! I guess you must have resources us, mere mortals don't! (18 years of support and no religious nonsence?! You BETTER be serious!) In article <414@cisden.UUCP> john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) writes: > >I'm deadly serious about this, so pay attention, Oleg. > >[Fr. gives a promise of long-term support and financial assistance] >[and his address] Well, Fr. I am not the one to back down on my word and I have saved your address and phone #. It IS long-distance, but I am sure you have some friends in LA as well. >That's a promise, not just to Oleg's friends, but to anybody. And welcome >to the ranks of the pro-Lifers, Oleg. Fr., you are being presumptious! I will suggest to any friend of mine who is considering having an abortion that she give you a call first and consider having you help her iff she decides NOT to have an abortion. THIS, however, in no way points to ME approving that OR joining the ranks of PRO-LIFERS.... May be you just CAN'T UNDERSTAND, Fr.! I'll try (again!!!) explaining it: MY position is irrelevant as far as any INDIVIDUAL woman is concerned. I DON'T insist that ABORTION is the best contraceptive. ON THE CONTRARY, I view ABORTION as a VERY SERIOUS ACT OF INTERVENTION into a woman's body which MAY (and DOES all TOO OFTEN) result in DAMAGE and LASTING PHYSICAL HARM to the woman. I DON'T consider it my right to dictate MY views to any one, much less condemn them for making a decision I might find unwise. There for I call myself a PRO-CHOICER : I support each and every woman's right to CHOOSE what she is going to do with her body and her life. As for your offer vs. my position : NOTHING is changed! I am glad that a woman who would like to give birth to a child and can't afford to (for many reasons!) has some one to turn to for support and assistance. I STILL would advise a woman in such situation to consider all the long term implications of her decision -- and make her CHOICE. CHOICE, Fr.!!! CHOICE!!! NOT an inforcement of some one's moral code on others but a FREEDOM to MAKE OWN DECISIONS! ***Try to understand, Fr.!!!*** VERY FEW WOMEN IN THEIR RIGHT MINDS WOULD WANT TO UNDERGO AN ABORTION. VERY FEW WOMEN IN THEIR RIGHT MIND WOULD WANT TO GET PREGNANT *BY ACCIDENT*, WHEN THEY ***CAN'T*** AFFORD (for whatever reason!) TO GET PREGNANT!!! VERY FEW WOMEN IN THEIR RIGHT MIND WOULD ADVOCATE ABORTION AS A SOLUTION TO EVERY PREGNANCY! So don't hole up in your convenient and comfortable dogma, Fr.! Face it! I am in favor of CHOICE, you are against it. Forget this nonsence with PRO-LIFE lable - there is no such thing! There is PRO-CHOICE and ANTI-CHOICE. And leave moral decisions to the mothers who are the ones to carry the burden...
mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) (01/20/86)
In article <412@cisden.UUCP> john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) writes: > But if you were *certain* that nobody would ever find > out about some proposed murder, or that some legal loophole would get you > off scot free, your argument wouldn't apply. Not necessarily: human "certainty" is subjective. I might be "certain" but wrong. Thus, the possibility of error argues strongly that "don't murder even if you think you can get away with it" is still a good heuristic. > And yet the murder would still be wrong. > It's not the possibility of punishment that makes an action wrong. Is this fallacy "suggestion by repeated affirmation" or "suggestion by use of a confident manner"? I certainly see no other argument here. Why don't you simply tell us why you think murder is wrong? -- Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) (01/21/86)
Adrian Kent and I both tend to be verbose. I'll try to pare things down a lot here. It shouldn't be too opaque if you've been reading the discussion. And may I once again remark how nice it is to have some civilised debate going on around here? In article <1114@oddjob.UUCP> apak@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent) writes: >I'd like to know how you recognise a "person". What qualities does a race >have to possess in order to qualify? And is it possible for only some members >of a race to qualify, or do you have to judge the question species by species? >I think these are crucial questions of principle, and lie at the root of >our differing conclusions. I use the ancient definition of "person": "An individual substance of a rational nature". From there, I answer that a race is "personal" if it is rational, if it can think and reason. (Realizing that these terms aren't strictly defined, we can agree anyway that humans are persons in this sense.) And, no, not "only some members" qualify. The question is whether the "nature" is rational, not the degree of rationality exhibited by the particular individual substance. So if we discover intelligent Martians (or whatever) I would object to killing them just the same as I object to killing humans. In response to my example of the child tortured to provide the good of the community: > Firstly, I don't agree with the unequivocal claim that utilitarianism >would say Yes. I need to know more about the hypothesis. If, when the child >is released, at least one other child within the city will incur equivalent >suffering AND lots of good things will be lost, then you're right about the >utilitarian conclusion. I agree with that conclusion: it seems like common >sense. [...] I think that, if enough good things are lost, there comes >a point at which I would not release the child. That's exactly the point of our disagreement. I and most traditional moralists, including every moralist I know of before about 1800, would say that deliberately inflicted injustice is always wrong, no matter what the perceived benefits might be. It is wrong to steal a dollar from somebody even though by doing so you can somehow give a dollar to each of a hundred other people. It is wrong to inflict suffering on the child in the example in order to benefit the society. So I think we really do disagree on this. But Western (Christian or liberal) legal and moral tradition is pretty much all on my side. > What do I say about >the child in the dungeon? That, if I knew that after making my moral choice >I would be randomly assigned a role in society (P(AK=child)=0.000001, >P(AK=city-dweller)=0.999999), I would make the same choice. Maybe I don't understand you here. I think you're saying that your willingness to take the one-in-a-million chance of being the one to suffer somehow justifies your choice. (Or makes it less unjust?) But I'm sure the average mugger willingly takes a greater chance than .000001 of being hurt or killed when he mugs, but we don't think his willingness to undergo the risk makes his violence any less inexcusable. Am I being dense? > It's certainly true that moral philosophy is value-dependent. Whether >that's a problem is debatable: I think it's simply a recognition of the fact >that there are no absolute moral truths. I don't object to moral philosophy's being value-dependent. But you seem to make it taste-dependent, which is another story. Values can be shared, debated, and so on. De gustibus, on the other hand, non disputandum est. (Ain't no 'countin' fer taste.) So if your big objection to murder is that you don't like it, well, I say you haven't done much philosophy. "FACT that there are no absolute moral truths"??? (Including this one...) All theists and "transcendentalists" say there are absolutes. Referring to my listing of several features of a foetus' character that I like (and I really do, by the way): > Well, if those are seriously meant to be the primary reasons why you value >foetuses (which I doubt), then it seems to follow that you ought to value >a sperm and unfertilised egg (together) at least as much. My point was that my tastes as to people's character don't have a lot to do with whether it should be legal to murder them. > So the general >pattern is: X states values, Y draws conclusions, X accepts conclusions or >refines values, .... I don't know whether you consider that a good pastime, >but at least it keeps moral philosophers off the street. It's fun, cheap, and doesn't rot your teeth. About the hazards of assuming that a firm artificial dividing line between human and non-human (e.g. birth) will hold up under fire: > Similar points were made to me in private mail by Charli Phillips, for >which I'm grateful. I agree that this part of my previous argument doesn't >stand up. I'll come back to this question in a later posting, if and when >I think I have anything sensible to say about it. Do. It's an important point. -- Peace and Good!, Fr. John Woolley "Compared to what I have seen, all that I have written is straw." -- St. Thomas
pete@valid.UUCP (Pete Zakel) (01/21/86)
> In article <30@valid.UUCP> pete@valid.UUCP (Pete Zakel) writes: > >Certainly, if you murder adult humans, you will be seen as a murderer by > >other adult humans, and subject to being "removed" yourself. (Definition > >of "removed": Killed, jailed, or otherwise having your freedom to kill > >other human beings taken away). > > All this argument shows is that, in general, it's imprudent and unwise > to murder adults. But if you were *certain* that nobody would ever find > out about some proposed murder, or that some legal loophole would get you > off scot free, your argument wouldn't apply. And yet the murder would > still be wrong. > > It's not the possibility of punishment that makes an action wrong. > -- > Peace and Good!, > Fr. John Woolley I believe the question was to give a reason for not murdering that doesn't rely on a moral stand (I'm sorry, but I don't have a copy of the original task request). My response basically was showing why the Golden Rule is a good rule to follow. If you help other people, and don't show yourself to be a threat, you are likely to be well-treated and protected by people around you. I, personally, believe murder to be wrong - partly for moral and religious reasons - but the request was for a non-religious and non-moral stance. I believe I gave a valid stance. I also believe it is possible for a moral person to murder someone else and STILL be moral, it would require much thinking, reasoning, and planning and the person would have to live with himself afterward. Also, women who have abortions also have to live with themselves. Although I do not believe abortion to be murder, it must be very difficult for a woman NOT to think of it that way. But as long as the fetus is part of that woman, dependent on her for sustenance, and incapable of living on its own, I believe she, AND SHE ALONE, has the right to decide whether that fetus should continue on toward birth or be aborted. -- People not interested in religious arguments may go on to the next article now -- My religious stance is that I do not believe a soul enters the child till just prior to birth. I do believe in reincarnation (I also believe Christ's "born again" references REFER to reincarnation) and I also believe that the soul will have another chance in another child and does not suffer from abortion. BUT, my religious stance should have no bearing on the law concerning abortions. I also believe in STRICT separation of church and state, ESPECIALLY in reference to abortion legislation. A person from one church has no right to legislate that church's position into law. Government arbitrates Man's laws. God (or whatever higher power you wish to ascribe to) arbitrates God's laws. Atheists must rely on The Golden Rule. Please don't respond to my religious views in this newsgroup, I will be happy to argue them in net.religion if anyone is interested. Love and Peace be with you all. -Pete Zakel (..!{hplabs,amd,pyramid,ihnp4}!pesnta!valid!pete)
john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) (01/23/86)
In article <892@cybvax0.UUCP> mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) quotes me: >> And yet the murder would still be wrong. > >> It's not the possibility of punishment that makes an action wrong. > >Is this fallacy "suggestion by repeated affirmation" or "suggestion by use >of a confident manner"? I certainly see no other argument here. First, I didn't suggest anything -- I stated it. Second, has anyone disputed the statement? I said, essentially, "Murder is wrong even if there's no chance you'll get caught." If anyone wants to dispute that, go ahead. But nobody has, and it doesn't strike me as likely that anyone will. I regarded the statements as non-controversial, an appeal to shared values to illustrate a point I was making. We do share this value, don't we? Or does anyone believe that murder is morally okay as long as there's no way it can be punished? You don't see another argument because I didn't think anyone disagreed. -- Peace and Good!, Fr. John Woolley "Compared to what I have seen, all that I have written is straw." -- St. Thomas
mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) (01/26/86)
In article <452@cisden.UUCP> john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) writes: > In article <892@cybvax0.UUCP> mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) quotes me: > >> And yet the murder would still be wrong. > > > >> It's not the possibility of punishment that makes an action wrong. > > > >Is this fallacy "suggestion by repeated affirmation" or "suggestion by use > >of a confident manner"? I certainly see no other argument here. > > First, I didn't suggest anything -- I stated it. Check out the definitions of suggestion in a dictionary. I was referring to two common fallacies of argument (see "How To Think Staight" by Thouless or other books on informal fallacies of argument). > Second, has anyone disputed the statement? I said, essentially, "Murder is > wrong even if there's no chance you'll get caught." If anyone wants to > dispute that, go ahead. But nobody has, and it doesn't strike me as likely > that anyone will. I regarded the statements as non-controversial, an > appeal to shared values to illustrate a point I was making. Ah, the argument ad populum. Well, perhaps I wasn't explicit enough when I wrote (and you "cleverly" deleted): > > ... the possibility of error argues strongly that "don't murder > > even if you think you can get away with it" is still a good heuristic. Simply, I don't believe in right or wrong as absolutes: you are reifying cultural norms. This is obvious, since different cultures have different definitions of murder. What is perhaps justified killing in one culture (self-defense or adultery perhaps) may be murder in another (perhaps a pacifistic sect such as the Mennonites.) > We do share this value, don't we? Or does anyone believe that murder is > morally okay as long as there's no way it can be punished? While we may individually share the value that murder is wrong, our philosophical basis for it is entirely different. Mine recognizes the Machievellian facts of life: there are people who behave precisely as if they believe murder is morally ok as long as they aren't punished. Those people have nothing to gain by professing such beliefs. > You don't see another argument because I didn't think anyone disagreed. Pollyanna. -- Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) (01/28/86)
Mike Huybensz directs an important question to me in article <892@cybvax0.UUCP>:
>Why don't you simply tell us why you think murder is wrong?
Okay, I'll give it a shot. I oppose murder and abortion for three reasons
primarily (although these overlap a lot). First, I'm a humanist; second, a
civilised man; third (in order but not importance) a Christian.
As to the first. I claim to be a humanist, by which I mean that I believe,
without needing to inquire really deeply into the reasons for the belief and
without any formal proof asked or given, that human things are good. I
believe that people are valuable and, yes, inherently dignified; and that
this value and dignity do not depend on my or anyone else's perception, but
are a real aspect of what people *are*. Further, that nothing ever can
remove this human dignity from someone, and that any treatment of people
that devalues them or treats them as less than human, as not valuable, is
wrong; not wrong in some relative or utilitarian sense, but wrong absolutely.
Second, I am civilised, a part of Western civilisation, the tradition of
Moses, Aristotle, Cicero, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Dante, Shakespeare,
Pascal, Mozart, Dickens. (To name only a very few.) It seems to me that
one of the greatest "themes", if you will, of that civilisation is our
gradually coming to realize that individuals are to be protected and
nurtured by society, and that individual weakness is not an excuse for
exploitation, but the exact opposite, a just claim for protection. And
that life, liberty, and property are to be guaranteed by society as far as
possible.
Third, I am Christian, and believe therefore that all our race has been
created after the image of the eternal God, that in our very nature we
have the stamp and likeness of eternity. And further, that the Word has
become flesh, has taken our nature into His own, and therefore that all
flesh is holy, human-ness taken up into God and filled with His perfect
love and joy. And therefore, that to kill or injure a person is not only
inhuman, not only unjust, not only imprudent and uncivilised, but an act
of blasphemy, a declaration of enmity with love Himself, an attempted
violence against Reality.
That's why I think murder is wrong. The third reason will appeal mostly
to Christians (and in part to Jews); but the first and second seem to me
to be pretty universal among what used to be called "people of good will".
--
Peace and Good!,
Fr. John Woolley
"Compared to what I have seen, all that I have written is straw." -- St. Thomasrichard@boulder.UUCP (Richard Byrd) (02/01/86)
In <464@cisden.UUCP> John Woolley states why he believes murder to be wrong. >As to the first. I claim to be a humanist, by which I mean that I believe, >without needing to inquire really deeply into the reasons for the belief and >without any formal proof asked or given, that human things are good. I >believe that people are valuable and, yes, inherently dignified; and that >this value and dignity do not depend on my or anyone else's perception, but >are a real aspect of what people *are*. ... I think most all reasonable moral people agree with these sentiments but they are too vague too be useful in the present context. For most purposes it is perhaps not necessary to inquire into the reasons for your belief. However, when agreement as to who is human is lacking it is necessary to say what properties of a human make human life valuable in order to determine whether a given entity deserves the respect accorded humans. If you cannot do this you are reduced to arguing about the definition of "human" which is purely a matter of semantic convention and not necessarily related to the value and goodness of humans.