robison@eosp1.UUCP (Tobias D. Robison) (10/24/84)
The R. Eliezer story, in which the majority ignored ignored the miracles he called for as evidence that his argument was correct, has a corollary mentioned in commentaries that I find pleasing. If a person attempts to prove an argument by summoning miracles, there is doubt as to whether a good or evil (to lead us astray) agent is performing the miracles. Therefore even if a person can claim "may this river reverse its course if I am right!", it is still better for a group to base its decision on rational argument. - Toby Robison (not Robinson!) allegra!eosp1!robison or: decvax!ittvax!eosp1!robison or (emergency): princeton!eosp1!robison
dk@browngr.UUCP (David Kantrowitz) (10/31/84)
> ... Therefore even if a person can claim "may this river reverse its course > if I am right!", it is still better for a group to base its decision on > rational argument. Let me throw a hammer into the works: The principal of not believing miracles derives from the Torah, which we accept as authoritative because it was God-given. This we believe because of the miracles associated with the Torah's arrival. So rational argument alone seems as if it will get you nothing in the end, because you start with nothing. Comments? Corollary: Would those people who insist on proving everything with rational objective arguments, and refuse to take anything on faith, be even slightly convinced by a large miracle?