minow@decvax.UUCP (Martin Minow) (09/24/84)
When I was a child, my family had a summer home in Union Pier, Michigan. On at least one occasion, I was sent next door to turn on the heat (or perhaps it was a light or an oven) because it was Sabbath Eve and the observant family forgot. If it is "work" to turn on a lamp on the Sabbath, is it not also work to ask someone else to turn that lamp on? Martin Minow decvax!minow
ekrell@ucla-cs.UUCP (09/25/84)
<...>
Not only it is forbidden to ask explicity somebody else to do the work
for you, but even an insinuation is wrong. For example, you forget to turn
on the lights and say "How dark it is !. I can't see a thing", you're
implicitly asking him/her to turn the lights on.
Shana Tova to everybody
--
Eduardo Krell
UCLA Computer Science Department
3804-A Boelter Hall // Los Angeles, CA 90024 // (213) 825-7276
ARPA: ekrell@UCLA-LOCUS.ARPA
UUCP: ...!{cepu,ihnp4,trwspp,ucbvax}!ucla-cs!ekrellwmartin@brl-tgr.ARPA (Will Martin ) (10/11/84)
If you have an electric light switch operated by infrared or microwave detection of the presence of someone in the room, so that it goes on automatically when you enter and goes off when you leave, without you performing any action or uttering any sound, would allowing such an action to take place be permissable? If not, how are thermostatically-controlled furnaces or air-conditioners treated? Do you have to shut them down before sundown Friday and leave them off until the Sabbath has passed? What if you rent, and have no control over the operation of the system except the thermostat in your quarters? And what if you have no thermostat, and are at the landlord's mercy in this case? Will Martin
mls@wxlvax.UUCP (Michael Schneider) (10/15/84)
In the first case, the use of a sensor, we are looking at a class of work that involves a direct action. If such a device were used, then the action of walking into a room would *always* turn the light on *at once*. This is not permitted. Why? First the action of turning on the light is not permitted. Let us assume that setting off a sensor were permitted (and I don't know if it is). Then second, we are performing a permitted act. However, directly related to the performance of a permitted act is a forbidden action. This is the same as washing ones hands in a Sukkah, the washing of the hands is permitted, but the spilling of water on the grass is not since watering plants is forbidden. Thus, either one does not wash ones hands in the Sukkah, or one is VERY carefull. If these cases are the similar, I would assume that the use of a sensor is not permitted. In fact, I discussed such a device with a Rabbi, and he said it was not permitted (no reason was given at the time). The second case, the use of a sensor in a refrigerator, is different. The opening of a door causes warm air into the refrigerator, but the starting of the compressor imay be delayed. In fact, it may start without the door being opened. Thus, there is the question of the second action taking place at once. Note, however, that the use of a light inside the refrigerator is not permitted since it is directly related to the action od opening the door and happens at once. M.L. Schneider
sher@rochester.UUCP (David Sher) (10/17/84)
> > > In the first case, the use of a sensor, we are looking at a class of work > that involves a direct action. If such a device were used, then the action > of walking into a room would *always* turn the light on *at once*. This > is not permitted. Why? First the action of turning on the light is not > permitted. Let us assume that setting off a sensor were permitted (and > I don't know if it is). Then second, we are performing a permitted act. > However, directly related to the performance of a permitted act is a forbidden > action. This is the same as washing ones hands in a Sukkah, the washing of the > hands is permitted, but the spilling of water on the grass is not since > watering plants is forbidden. Thus, either one does not wash ones hands in > the Sukkah, or one is VERY carefull. If these cases are the similar, I > would assume that the use of a sensor is not permitted. In fact, I discussed > such a device with a Rabbi, and he said it was not permitted (no reason was > given at the time). > > The second case, the use of a sensor in a refrigerator, is different. The > opening of a door causes warm air into the refrigerator, but the starting > of the compressor imay be delayed. In fact, it may start without the > door being opened. Thus, there is the question of the second action taking > place at once. Note, however, that the use of a light inside the refrigerator > is not permitted since it is directly related to the action od opening the > door and happens at once. > > M.L. Schneider I find the emphasis on "at once" in this quite learned exposition fascinating. What is the true significance of the lack of a time differential. Isn't the causative relationship between the not forbidden act and the forbidden act enough? To make this question more clear I would like to ask three questions: If I attached a timer to the sensor so that 30 seconds after I enter the room a light turns on, is this forbidden? If I attached a probabilistic timer so that the sensor waited a length of time which corresponded to an element of a exponential distribution with a mean of 30 seconds, is this still forbidden? If I attached a probabilistic device to the sensor so that 95% of the time that I entered the room the light went on, is this forbidden? Finally is there some combination of the conditions in the above question which is allowed? Note also that 30 seconds might be replaced by 30 milliseconds or 30 nanoseconds, 95% by 75% or 99.99% David Sher
yiri@ucf-cs.UUCP (Yirmiyahu BenDavid) (10/17/84)
When you say 'it is not permitted', by whom? And what is the real basis of authority for it? A simple quote from a sage does not satisfy me. While it may be an upopoular (?) point of view, I do not accept a notion simply because the sages/rabbis say it is so. For me at least, that is insufficient grounds. I insist on demonstrating some reasonable grounds for everything from written Torah. I reject the notion that reason can be built on other reasons which were built on other reasons, ad infinitum. I am perfectly willing to grant that you may be correct in relating to us what the sages permit. But sages are subject to error, and it is the Creator I serve, not the sages. The sages served the Creator just as I do and, conversely, I serve the Creator just like theyt did. They may have been more learned. On the other hand, they may also have been mistaken in some matters. Reason and statistics would seem to argue the likelihood that they were mistaken here and there. Unlike the pope, they didn't pretend to be inerrant. Incidentally, when God causes rain on Shabbat, does he contravene His own Torah (watering grass)? If so, which is imperfect, God or Torah? Am I alone in thinking that some of these notions are carried out mechanically to ludicrous extremes? It sometimes seems that these rules are applied mechanically without the use of the brain, without questioning their real basis, validity, authority, etc? I'm not being sardonic nor cutting, I have sincere doubts about what seems to me a blind acceptance of what the medeival sages decided - and sometimes based upon what seems to me less than scientific grounds and questionable religious grounds. I'm not pushing a point here, I'm asking for opinions from other Jews.
yiri@ucf-cs.UUCP (Yirmiyahu BenDavid) (10/19/84)
I would like to question the use of the term 'at once'. 'At once' in today's vocabulary is relative. While the original author might argue that any timer to defer an action would itself be caused by the action, the term 'at once' is a misnomer of itself. There IS a sizable delay. These days we can measure in picoseconds - and frequently have good reason to do so. So there is no distinction between a 'delay' and 'at once' - only a fuzzy matter of how MUCH time exceeds 'at once'. So, how much time DOES exceed 'at once'?
dave@utcsrgv.UUCP (Dave Sherman) (10/21/84)
In article <2257@rochester.UUCP> sher@rochester.UUCP (David Sher) writes:
~| If I attached a timer to the sensor so that 30 seconds after I enter
~| the room a light turns on, is this forbidden?
~| If I attached a probabilistic timer so that the sensor waited a
~| length of time which corresponded to an element of a exponential
~| distribution with a mean of 30 seconds, is this still forbidden?
~| If I attached a probabilistic device to the sensor so that 95% of the
~| time that I entered the room the light went on, is this forbidden?
Although I haven't consulted a Rav on this, I think I can shed
some light. The action is forbidden if there is *either*
(a) a direct, immediate electrical result (e.g., fridge light
goes on), or
(b) an intention to cause the result, followed by the result (thus,
fridge compressor turning on is OK, since you're opening the
fridge to get food, not to cause it to go on).
A practical application of (b) occurs on Yomtov in the use of the
oven. Our practice is to turn up the oven only if the light is on
to indicate that the oven element is already on, and to turn it down
only if the light is off, indicating that the element is already off.
If we need to open the oven to put food in or take it out, we do so
regardless of the state of the light; but we will *not* open the oven
in order that the light may go on so that we can then turn the element
up to a high setting.
It would follow that, to answer David Sher's question, no "probabilistic"
device would be allowed if the purpose of using it was to have it go on
(e.g., by repeatedly walking into the room until you succeeded in getting
the light turned on). Similarly, the delay of 30 seconds is irrelevant.
I believe it is key to the fridge and furnace examples that the action
of opening the fridge or the house door is not done with the intent
of causing the compressor or furnace fan to go on.
Incidentally, we have friends who do not open their fridge
on Shabbos until they hear it's running. (We've sat waiting for the
next course in lunch more than once due to this.) They do, however,
open their front door in winter.
Dave Sherman
Toronto
--
{ allegra cornell decvax ihnp4 linus utzoo }!utcsrgv!davehbb@hou5a.UUCP (10/22/84)
>Incidentally, when God causes rain on Shabbat, does he contravene >His own Torah (watering grass)? If so, which is imperfect, God or >Torah? Am I alone in thinking that some of these notions are >carried out mechanically to ludicrous extremes? It sometimes >seems that these rules are applied mechanically without the use >of the brain, without questioning their real basis, validity, >authority, etc? The same question could be similarly applied to an extreme case, such as murder. If we contend that G-d causes people to die, then ought we take that as evidence that the Bible is wrong and that we should consider murder as a reasonable course of action? I suppose the author of the article would contend that murder comes under the category of "use of the brain" ("mitzvote sichliote") and, therefore, forbidden. Watering of one's lawn, however, would be deemed lacking in "use of the brain" and permitted - Rabbinic ordinances notwithstanding. The Rabbinic ordinances are legitimate as well as those that are written in the Bible. The Bible itself gives legitimacy to the Rabbinic ordinances in the middle of the book of "Devarim" (Deuteronomy,) the beginning of "Parshat Shoftim" (sorry, I don't know the chapter.) -- Harlan B. Braude {most "backbone" sites}!hou5a!hbb
robert@brl-tgr.ARPA (Robert Shnidman ) (10/23/84)
> I would like to question the use of the term 'at once'. 'At once' in > today's vocabulary is relative. While the original author might argue > that any timer to defer an action would itself be caused by the action, > the term 'at once' is a misnomer of itself. There IS a sizable delay. > These days we can measure in picoseconds - and frequently have good > reason to do so. So there is no distinction between a 'delay' and 'at > once' - only a fuzzy matter of how MUCH time exceeds 'at once'. So, how > much time DOES exceed 'at once'? "At once" is approximately 2 seconds; that is, the time to say "Sholom alechem Rebe". Let me discuss the overall question just a bit more fully. First of all, under normal circumstances; such as, no question of life and death or sickness, it is NOT permissible to turn on lights on Shaboss even with indirect means. This is because that to turn on an electric light on Shaboss is prohibitted from the Torah itself and not a Rabbinic decree, since heating a metal to incandescence even without combustion is considered fire. It is not allowed to perform any activity prohibitted by the Torah on Shabbos even indirectly. If it is your specific intention to perform a prohibitted activity, then performing that activity even indirectly and even if only prohibitted by Rabbinic decree is not allowed. If the result is prohibitted by Rabbinic decree, will not take place at once, takes place indirectly, and is not your specific intent; it is permitted to perform the action. For example, opening a refrigerator would be permitted although some people are stringent even in this case. By the way, electricity itself is considered not fire, and operating devices with only motors are generally not allowed by Rabbinic decree. This whole issue is really much more complex as in the Talmud there are mentioned five diferent levels of what is considered indirect action, and each can have somewhat different application. Also on Yom Tov the situation in some cases is more lenient. DISCLAIMER: I am NOT giving any Psak, just giving some backgroud information to aid understanding the issues. Robert Shnidman robert@brl-vld.arpa
robison@eosp1.UUCP (Tobias D. Robison) (10/24/84)
Regarding David Sher's question (could a probabilistic or delay light be acceptable on the Sabbath); without some practice in questions like these it's easy to get hung up on technical details and miss the general thrust of the halachic arguments, which are usually grounded in more practical matters than are immediately evident. In order to construct a lightswitch problem that is more analogous to the refrigerator temperature problem, try this: Suppose I am a professional Orchid grower. To keep a close watch on my most precious orchids, I have a growing area in my bedroom. The bedroom has several climate-control mechanisms, including a light that automatically goes on and off in order to control the amount of light the orchids receive. The same light also goes on and off if I enter the room. The relationship is not directly causal; it's just that the light is more likely to go on some time after I enter the room, than it was to go on if I didn't enter the room. (The reason for this mught be that the light is also controlled by sensors trying to regulate the humidity in the room.) On the Sabbath I cannot easily live and sleep in some other room than the bedroom; I live in a dense population area and my home is small. Now it is just possible that it would be acceptable for me to enter the room on the Sabbath. There is no direct causality or certainty that entering the room will cause the light to go on. If the light does go on, it will not be primarily for my immediate convenience, but rather to carry out a process of climate control I set up before the Sabbath. Finally, this is not a frivolous use of a light switch, but rather a necessary mechanism related to my livelihood and natural life. - Toby Robison (not Robinson!) allegra!eosp1!robison or: decvax!ittvax!eosp1!robison or (emergency): princeton!eosp1!robison
yiri@ucf-cs.UUCP (Yirmiyahu BenDavid) (10/24/84)
Though Harlan did not give the reference, there is no question of its validity (and I haven't looked it up either). Yet, there is still the question of where to draw the line regarding just how far the rabbis/sages can legitimately go (the distinction between interpreting written Torah and legislating law in addition to Torah which is forbidden). I certainly grant that we must hearken to the authorities in the former instance. But I'm also persuaded we must oppose the authorities in the latter instance. The obvious problem then is how individuals draw the distinction between the two.
teitz@aecom.UUCP (Eliyahu Teitz) (11/06/84)
> > I would like to question the use of the term 'at once'. 'At once' in > > today's vocabulary is relative. While the original author might argue > > that any timer to defer an action would itself be caused by the action, > > the term 'at once' is a misnomer of itself. There IS a sizable delay. > > These days we can measure in picoseconds - and frequently have good > > reason to do so. So there is no distinction between a 'delay' and 'at > > once' - only a fuzzy matter of how MUCH time exceeds 'at once'. So, how > > much time DOES exceed 'at once'? > > "At once" is approximately 2 seconds; that is, the time to say "Sholom alechem > Rebe". Let me discuss the overall question just a bit more fully. > > First of all, under normal circumstances; such as, no question of life and > death or sickness, it is NOT permissible to turn on lights on Shaboss even > with indirect means. This is because that to turn on an electric light on > Shaboss is prohibitted from the Torah itself and not a Rabbinic decree, since > heating a metal to incandescence even without combustion is considered fire. > It is not allowed to perform any activity prohibitted by the Torah on Shabbos > even indirectly. If it is your specific intention to perform a prohibitted > activity, then performing that activity even indirectly and even if only > prohibitted by Rabbinic decree is not allowed. If the result is prohibitted > by Rabbinic decree, will not take place at once, takes place indirectly, > and is not your specific intent; it is permitted to perform the action. > For example, opening a refrigerator would be permitted although some > people are stringent even in this case. By the way, electricity itself is > considered not fire, and operating devices with only motors are generally > not allowed by Rabbinic decree. This whole issue is really much more > complex as in the Talmud there are mentioned five diferent levels of > what is considered indirect action, and each can have somewhat different > application. Also on Yom Tov the situation in some cases is more lenient. > > DISCLAIMER: I am NOT giving any Psak, just giving some backgroud information > to aid understanding the issues. > > Robert Shnidman > robert@brl-vld.arpa When it comes to questions of Shabbat one must be extremely careful. The slightest error can lead to severe consequences. With this note I enter the ongoing discussion as to electricity and Shabbat. One must define some terms before starting. A melacha is a type of act that the Torah forbade because that act was done in the building of the Tabernacle ( mishkan ) in the desert. There are sub-categories to melachot ( plural of melacha ) known as toladot ( offspring- similar to a tree with its subtrees ). There are also Rabbinic decrees regarding Shabbat, which fall into three categories. 1. Melacha d'rabanan - an act which the rabbis declared prohibited because it is similar to an act prohibited by the Torah. 2. Gezera - a act which the rabbis prohibited because it might lead to the doing of a melacha. 3. Uvdin D'chol - an act the rabbis prohibited because it is not in the 'spirit' of Shabbat. The E Torah states in Vayikra ( Leviticus, I don't have the exact location offhand ) Shabbaton, which the Ramban ( Nachmanidies, 13th century scholar ) explains as a positive command from G-D to engage in spiritual matters on Shabbat. The Ramban says if one were to sleep the whole Shabbat without rising from bed he would not have violated the pro- hibition of Lo Taaseh Kol Melacha ( do not do any melacha ) but he also would not have fulfilled the positive commandment to engage in spiritual pursuits. The Rabbis prohibited many things on Shabbat for the reason of Uvdin D'chol, such as doing exercise, playing ball, etc. A few more definitions and I'll get to my point. A melacha must be done in its usual manner ( m'lechet machshevet ). If a right handed person was to write with his left hand on Shabbat he would not be culpable a far as the Torah is concerned. Doing something not in its normal way is called kilachar yad ( as if it was being done with the back of one's hand ). The rabbi's prohibited kil'achar yad. Another way of doing a melacha is unintentionally, meaning, I did the melacha, but not for its intended purpose ( eg. I dig a hole so I can use the dirt but not so I should have a hole ). This is called E'no mitkaven ( without intent ). However, if my action will lead directly and definitely If I do an action which must lead to a prohibited act ( eg. drag a chair across the lawn, which in itself is not prohibited, but it will dig a furrow in the ground, and there is no way to avoid doing this ) then even e'no mitkaven, even if I didn't want the furrow, since it had to come, the action is prohibited, for the reason of P'sik resha ( literally, severing the head. If one was to remove a chicken's head, there is no way the chicken could live, so too an action which must occur [ like the death of the chicken ] is prohibited ) .Y Y The definition of immediately does not depend on 2 seconds or 5 or a pico second. It depends on p'sik resha. Is the prohibited act that gets done a direct outcome of my action, or is it not ? The law of 2 seconds as mentioned in the article I am responding to deals with testimony and in general with matters that relate to monetary matters. Now to tie all this together. I am not a physicist so I do not know if electricity is fire. When the question was first asked it dealt mainly with incandescent lights and tubes where a filament glows. The heating of the metal to glowing is considered fire, but te use of electricity is not. Why then can't I turn on a flour- escent light on Shabbat. To this I give a few answers. 1. The action of completing a circuit could be considered boneh ( con- struction ). One must look into the definition of boneh more carefully to see what it really means. Another possible reason is the problem of nolad ( literally, born, meaning something that came into existence on shabbat. One is not allowed to eat an egg that was laid on shabbat because of nolad [ according to one opinion in the Gemara ]). 3. ( 2 is in the middle of the preceeding paragraph ) Uvdin d'chol- nothing spiritual is gained by turning on a light. You might ask, if so, why should I breathe or eat? Breathing is not a good question because we must live and without it Y breathing we wouldn't last too long ( and the Torah says V'chai behem- we should live by these laws [ the entire Torah], and not die by them, so if it would cause us death we can override the laws. This is the verse from where we learn that one can desecrate the shabbat to save a life ). We are specifically commanded to eat on the shabbat, and we learn this from the pasuk ( verse ) in the Prophets which says Oneg, which is explained as a commandment ot eat three meals on shabbat. Anything else should not be done if it does not add to the spiritual nature of shabbat. Playing board games falls in this category. ( Here I must admit that I am not perfect. I do not spend the entire day learning Torah and Davening. I, too, play trivial pursuit on shabbat, but that does not make it right ). Turning on a light or using any electrical appliance could possibly fall under the category of uvdin d'chol. It was asked before why one cannot press a button on his watch but one can move one's arm, which generates more electricity. To this I answer it is not does not fall unde any of the prohibitions mentioned above. No circuit is completed, nor is anything new created, nor can it be called uvdin d'chol. Pressing the button on my watch, however, falls under these prohibitions. I, to, must add the disclaimer that anything written here is not meant as a definitive answer to any question. Rather, if a question arises, a competent rabbi must be approached and I leave to you to decide whom you consider com- petent. eliyahu teitz 201-353-0388 *** REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR MESSAGE ***