yiri@ucf-cs.UUCP (Yirmiyahu BenDavid) (10/24/84)
Robert Shnidman brings out some good points. I think that some of them also need to be questioned in greater depth however. The point regarding the performance of 'any activity prohibited by Torah on Shabbat [ed] even indirectly' is well made and I agree. Further, his point was well stated that 'if it is your specific intention to perform a prohibited activity, then per- forming that activity even indirectly ...' would transgress Torah. My departure however, is that phrases such as 'it is not allowed', 'it is prohibited', 'it is permitted', and the like seem more like a mechanical regurgitation of Talmud to me that a thought-out rational for accepting the assertion. Mechanical regurgitation of rules can be programmed into a machine, it doesn't take human intelligence. With new learning and new input over time, my feeling is that the rabbinic 'rules' should be re-examined to verify that they are indeed in line BOTH with Torah (written) AND the latest learning and knowledge. But what I see is simply a regurgitation of those 'rules' unquestioningly. In my opinion, we could eventually find ourselves in a situation similar to the Christians who are debating over whether Galileo should be forgiven for his heresies - since he was right. Knowledge is the cornerstone of Judaism. In Temple times, we were a people of Torah, today we seem to be a people of Talmud. I'm persuaded this is not an improve- ment. It is also no simple question since the determination of mishpat by authorities is clearly ordered in Torah. This was done quite differently in Temple times however. History should have great weight in the analysis of the issue. (It would be an error to attribute the difference simply to the presence of the Temples - since this was also true during the Babylonian exile.) Torah states that these things are not in the heavens that we need somebody to travel to Mars for them, nor in the depths of the sea that we need some super submarine, etc. We don't need sages to tell us what Torah means. Any Jew can read it and learn it without an intermediary to ex- plain it to him. What we do need are authorities who will interpret those laws in terms of applications to specific cases, establish precedence/case law (mishpat) and enforce the law to protect the observant from those who would take advantage of them. But legislation of new law is forbidden by Torah, hence the imposition of 'safety fences' (and rabbinic decree when it falls into that category) would be clearly transgressing Torah. When rabbinic decree comes under the category of mishpat, then it has the same force as Torah and so no distinction should be made as to whether it was the written Torah or the mishpat authorized by written Torah which was transgressed - in either case Torah was transgressed. It seems to me that any scholarly discussion should deal with these questions rather than simply regurgitate rules which anyone could simply look up for themselves in Talmud if that was all there was to it (and much of it simply by referencing the Shulkhan Arukh). When examining the basis for the rules, the basis should also be examined. For example, Robert gives us several grounds for the rules he references (which was also well done since he did not rely solely on regurgitating rules), but the assertion that 'heating a metal to incandescence even without combustion is considered fire', begs the question. Who considers it fire? (avoiding circular reasoning) Just how should fire be defined? And by whom? And what is their expertise in the physics of fire? Similarly, 'electricity itself is considered not fire'. By whom? How is electricity defined? By whom? And what is their expertise in the physics of electricity? Just how much do these 'definers' know about physics? As someone on the net brought out some time ago, metabolism meets the criteria of fire and, by simple invocation of the rules, is prohibited on Shabbat. Intent is not a deciding factor. If, on Shabbat, you hold a magnifying glass over paper to read better, and the sunlight kindles it, you have kindled a fire and transgressed Torah. It is a misstep rather than a deliberate transgression, but a transgression nevertheless. It also seems to me that to declare that '"at once" is approximately 2 seconds...' is at best arbitrary without providing some basis. Even though Talmud may well state or imply so (I haven't looked it up), 'at once' today is different than it was then. Now if written Torah says that, then I will buy it anyway - but it does not. My conclusion continues (for the present at least) to be that there is no valid prohibition against the use of electricity, per se, in Torah unless it results in the kindling of a flame. Further, that an electrical spark, such as in an electric motor or spark plug, is also not encompassed in the Torah injunction, nor is a resulting explosion. The KINDLING OF fire, as it was understood by Moshe, for instance, was synonymous with the effort and activity associated with generating flames, and not the same as lightning nor an explosion. Electricity was not at all intended. For this reason, I also see no problem with driving on Shabbat. In both cases, the primary injunction could well be argued that the purpose was to curtail the 'work' which was involved it such activities. There is no evidence that modern interpretations of 'creative acts' was known in those early times. The consequence of such a conclusion would be that if it were the work which was involved which was the reason for forbidding kindling a fire and travel, then the lack of work in turning on a range (with pilot light already lit), an electric range, an electric light, or operating an automobile removes the cause of the prohibition. Since the prohibition of kindling a flame is specifically forbidden however, it remains just that. The intertwining of the two by those who interpret Torah to us is, in my opinion, subject to question and of doubtful validity. Thanks to Robert Shnidman for his contribution. It stimulated thought and, hopefully, will provoke continued thought and examination in increasingly greater depth.
sher@rochester.UUCP (David Sher) (10/29/84)
> Electricity was not at all intended. For this reason, > I also see no problem with driving on Shabbat. In > both cases, the primary injunction could well be > argued that the purpose was to curtail the 'work' > which was involved it such activities. There is no > evidence that modern interpretations of 'creative > acts' was known in those early times. The consequence > of such a conclusion would be that if it were the > work which was involved which was the reason for > forbidding kindling a fire and travel, then the > lack of work in turning on a range (with pilot light > already lit), an electric range, an electric light, > or operating an automobile removes the cause of the > prohibition. Since the prohibition of kindling a > flame is specifically forbidden however, it remains > just that. The intertwining of the two by those who > interpret Torah to us is, in my opinion, subject to > question and of doubtful validity. The entire article that this is from is well thought out and interesting. However, I would like to point out that the work involved in starting a car (opening door putting on seat belt starting an engine) is comparable to the work of taking a candle and lighting a pile of kindling (I doubt that even in Moshe's time they gathered a new pile of wood for every fire). If your car has an internal combustion engine then combustion results (my apologies if you have an electric car). Thus while the other acts you mention may or may not be easily justified as forbidden work, starting a car probably is forbidden work even by this simple logical argument. -David Sher
bds@homxa.UUCP (B.STERMAN) (10/30/84)
I'd like to introduce myself to the net. My name is Baruch and I
just started at Bell Labs. Reading through some of the recent
correspondence, I came across some issues and opinions that moved me
to add my own thoughts. I specifically address my remarks to Mr.
Ben David concerning the question of electricity on Shabbat, but
the implications of my words may be of broader scope.
While Mr. Ben David's presentation of the electricity issue discusses
many approaches, I belive he neglects an important (perhaps the most
important) idea. The prohibition against using fire on Shabbat hinges
on the definition of 'fire', but that definition must take into account
not only the physics of a plasma or the thermodynamic equations of state,
but the philosophical implications and intentions of the term as well.
The bible singles out the laws of fire from among the various laws of
Shabbat. Fire is an amazing thing. Isaac Asimov, in the introduction
to one of his books sets up a scenario. Imagine men from Mars landing on
Earth and trying to decide which species of life here they should deal
with. They try to find some objective criteria by which to judge the life
forms in order to determine the most advanced. They suggest first the
development of social order, then communication but all these things are
shared by many species. Finally they decide that humans are indeed superior
because, says Asimov, they are the only species on the planet capable of
using fire and harnessing its power.
Asimov is in fact retelling the Prometheus story. Fire is what separates
us from animals and has long been considered as a gift from the gods.
(There is a wonderful Medrash that describes man's discovery of fire in
a similar fashion) The idea is not merely mythological. The prohibition
against doing work on Shabbat is fundamentally a call to cease from the
manipulation of nature and spend some time in passive contemplation of it.
Whether or not one accepts the Hazon Ish's association of electricity with
fire, the idea that on Shabbat one must retreat for a brief period and
stop changing, subduing, conquering the world, is at the very heart of the
Shabbat experience. In the times of old the harnessing of nature's power
was seen through the use of fire. Today things are different. Nevertheless,
be it the energy of a fusion reaction, the beam of a free electron laser,
or the altering of a single bit of information in a flip-flop, the idea
of fire and the exploitation of nature is present.
Certainly, the legal code must work to define it's terms so that it can be
consistent and reliable. Even the creation of loopholes is important for
the legislation of extreme cases and emergencies. But, the system must be
developed not only by those who, as Mr. Ben David says, show "expertise in
the physics of electricity", but by those who understand the theology and
philosophy of the law as well. Which brings me to my next point.
I believe that Mr. Ben David is quite correct in his opposing "mechanical
regurgitation of Talmud", and opting instead for a thought out, rational
religion, a religion of conscience, if you will. I would like, perhaps not
to disagree, but rather to qualify this notion.
Judaism has, in a certain way, a most democratic legal system. Anyone,
without exception, has the right to enter into the conversarion, debate
the issues, and change the law. There is, however, one condition. He/she
must become proficient first. How foolish it would be for someone to
suggest corrections to the theory of special relativity without first
mastering the complicated methods of tensor analysis amd complex clculus.
But Baruch, you might say, there is a profound difference. In one case
we are dealing with objective equations and in the other with spiritual and
moral principals that are in ways worthless if they are not internalized
by the individual. This is very true, and so perhaps a distinction must be
made. The Talmud at the beginning of Horiot says that if an individual
follows the ruling of the court when he knows they are mistaken, he is
guilty. (There are many interpretations to this passage, but the simple
meaning is valid, at least according to some authorities. I cite Rav
Hirschinson, a giant of the last generation who decided, based on this
passage, that one who transgresses a law because his conscience allowed
no alternative is not culpable.) The Talmud requires though, that the
individual must not be an 'Am Haaretz'. This is also only in a case where
to do otherwise would be morally wrong. Discipline is still a value.
For an individual act of conscience the law recognizes one's right to
dissent PRIVATELY. For PUBLIC pronunciation of law, however, a different
standard is operative. The individual who seeks to decide law for others
must be a 'Bar Hachi'. In general he must be involved with the law, fluent
in it, understand its methods as well as its intentions and goals, and
have, as the Talmud calls it, 'Heavenly aid'. To decide law for others is
a huge responsibility. The Jews are first and foremost a people with a
law. That law is the single most important manifestation of our religion,
and developing, altering, adding, and updating it, while being absolutely
essential to its function and purpose, must not be done in a capricious or
flippant manner.
Someone who spends a few hours a week studying physics will probably never
discover the Unified Field Theorem. Years of preparation and research are
required and expected. In my humble opinion, we should treat the Torah
with the same dignity.
Baruch Sterman
(201)949-3821dk@browngr.UUCP (David Kantrowitz) (10/31/84)
Furthermore, in addition to David Sher's evaluation of comparative difficulty of kindling fire in old times, the Sabbath prohibition against carrying objects, even of the slightest weight and bulk, from the public domain to the private domain can scarcely be considered difficult. Yet it was prohibited then as now. Also, I claim that the understanding of work on Sabbath as creative activity is not a new idea at all. I believe the Talmud itself discusses how fire is the only kind of 'work' that is destructive instead of creative. In addition, the Talmud contains discussions of the arguments about whether bruising yourself is 'work'; one opinion holds that it is not work because it is not creative but rather destructive. I would suggest that a lot of confusion about difficulty and ease of work is due to the concentration on the word "work" (and its Hebrew equivalent) although I am only guessing.
yiri@ucf-cs.UUCP (Yirmiyahu BenDavid) (11/01/84)
It seems to me that the philosophical implications and intentions re the prohibition against 'fire' on Shabbat are, in large measure, shaped and constrained by the definition of 'fire' one uses. It was not my intention to neglect the philosophical implications, but rather to direct consideration to the validity of the popular defi- nition upon which the philosophical implications are currently dependent upon to a great extent (apparently). Much of the philo- sophical implications flow rather naturally from the definition. At any rate, I think these implications were treated quite well in Baruch's article and I am in agreement with his assessment for the most part. The article also provides much food for thought and reflection rather than any mechanical regurgitation of rules. I look forward to his future contributions.
yiri@ucf-cs.UUCP (Yirmiyahu BenDavid) (11/07/84)
From robison@eosp1.UUCP (Tobias D. Robison) Sun Feb 6 01:28:16 206
Subject: Re: "fences" (cont)
Summary:
I'd like to make sure my main argument is clear. If one decides
to base Judaism on the Torah, and not on Talmud, one must re-interpret,
and invent meanings for, many things. The Torah is not an unambiguous
document. Therefore it is not possible to view rejection of Talmud
as "going back to basics", or any similar notion.
*********************************
Yiri responds:
There is no logical basis for your 'therefore'. Further, there are no
premises even offerred to support your assertion that meanings must be
invented. On top of that, new problems and situations will always
continue to present new challenges in understanding the intent of Torah.
I just don't think your position is very strong logically. For one
thing, it seems more valid to me to look back into Jewish history into
the time when there were many sects within Judaism to ascertain more
clearly what kind of flexibility there was in this area before the
Pharisees began to legislate additional constraints. If interpretations
are based on these findings, then it is not valid to asssert that these
are new interpretations, or re-interpretations, or invented meanings. If
anything, the converse would be more valid - that the Pharisaic position
was the new interpretation, etc. and the old interpretation was the
valid interpretation. I quite agree with your position however, against
substituting new interpretations for established interpretations...
except where new situations, conditions, or knowledge show there has
been error in understanding the new situations, etc. Such errors should
be corrected. While the jury is still out as to whether there were
errors regarding the definition of fire, electricity, etc. it is my
OPINION that there seems to have been. Therefore, it should be carefully
reconsidered. This is not happening (except maybe on our net). The
rabbinic leadership shows only intransigence and obduracy in this area.
I don't think this is healthy for Judaism. I think Judaism should be a
religion where the scholar and intellectual can take satisfaction that
Judaism is in harmony with logic, physics, mathematics, and the other
sciences rather than stubbornly rejecting them as secular - and this is
happening in significant measure.
*******************************
Because a great deal of Torah interpretation is necessary, it makes
a great deal of sense to stay with the mainstream that we have
(in Talmud). Among the compelling reasons are:
- consider that it may indeed be divinely inspired
- it has withstood the test of time as a driving force
in the longterm survival of the religion
********************************
Yiri responds:
Of the two premises...
- consider that it may not be divinely inspired, and may
contain errors which may be an impediment to continued
learning and the health and progress of Judaism
- it has not necessarily withstood the test of time in the
longterm since the available evidence suggests that it does
not predate the Hasmonean period.
*********************************
Although I stated that other interpretations would also "constrain" the
meaning of Torah, I did not mean to imply that other interpretations
would inevitably lead to a system of fences. (I suspect this is
inevitable, but that is just my opinion.) Another interpretation of
Torah will lead to an equivalent other Talmud (first oral, later
written). This alternative may differ in style and structure,
and it may differ in the degree of adherence it requires, but it will
certainly exist to fill in the question of what Torah means.
*********************************
Yiri responds:
I do not agree that reverting to an earlier more flexible position would
in any sense result in any 'equivalent other Talmud'. This will have to
be shown. It is not to be assumed. The modern position in fact,
necessarily implies that pre-Hasmonean Judaism, at least for the most
part, either had no sense of what Torah means or had an equivalent other
Talmud - neither of which is a valid supposition.
*********************************
I personally am deeply suspicious of new attempts to interpret Torah
along new grounds, or to bring it "up to date". My concerns are
the reasons listed above. I particularly feel that new interpretations
may create a religion that cannot last 200 years. Who knows what makes
a religion last for millenia??
*********************************
Yiri responds:
I am also deeply suspicious of many new attempts but I think we need to
be more stringent in defining what we are suspicious of. New conditions
make new interpretations necessary. Few would seem to argue that. The
problem becomes more pronounced (in my attempt to focus in on the
problem perhaps a LITTLE closer?) when there is an attempt to CHANGE the
interpretations BASED ON SUBJECTIVE considerations rather than on such
considerations as emergence of new phenomena such as electricity,
nuclear power, travel in space, etc.
In summary then, my opinion is that
1) reverting to an old, more flexible, position is not a new
interpretation
2) new interpretations are justified by new conditions
3) new interpretaions without new conditions should be viewed with
suspicion unless error can be shown in the understanding and/or
perceptions of those who made the interpretation regarding such
new conditions