[net.religion.jewish] Logic based on different sets of assumptions

rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff) (02/26/85)

The article which I have repeatedly mentioned as a basis for discussion,
article <509@pyuxd.UUCP> on "Logic based on different sets of assumptions",
had never been responded to.  And apparently with good reason:  it never
"got out there".  It has been reposted to net.religion for your perusal.
The article-ID is <589@pyuxd.UUCP>, and should be accessible through parent
commands in applicable software.
-- 
Life is complex.  It has real and imaginary parts.
					Rich Rosen  ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr

rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Dr. Emmanuel Wu) (04/10/85)

Now that the superfluous brouhaha over definitions has hopefully passed,
perhaps we can return to discussing the main points of this article.
I'll include some additional wording to placate certain people who don't
like certain accepted definitions of words, so that they too may answer
the points in this article.  Since many adherents to non-religious belief
systems have claimed (1) that their belief systems are religions and (2)
that I shouldn't have included them in my analysis (NOTE:  I didn't, but...),
let me say that if they are religions, then they weren't included in the
analysis, but if they aren't then obviously they weren't included, so why are
you complaining?  Since such people seem to want to be included in the
analysis, I will gladly do so.  I have made some significant rewrites to
accomplish this (to a point).

[ORIGINALLY...]
| From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff)
| Newsgroups: net.religion
| Subject: Logic based on different sets of assumptions
| Message-ID: <509@pyuxd.UUCP>    [ ... and again as <589@pyuxd.UUCP> ]
| Date: Mon, 11-Feb-85 12:29:14 EST
| Article-I.D.: pyuxd.509  [pyuxd.589]
| Posted: Mon Feb 11 12:29:14 1985
| Date-Received: Mon, 11-Feb-85 12:29:14 EST
| Organization: Huxley College

Since there is no hard evidence to support the existence of a deity or, for
that matter, of any so-called "supernatural" entity, one would normally work
(in a typical analysis of a non-religious oriented phenomena) from the
assumption that the thing for which there is no evidence does not exist. 
Without evidence showing verifiable evidence of a thing's existence, or its
observed effect on the "physical" world, via Occam people would generally
assume that it does not exist until evidence of a viable nature presents
itself.  The *possibility* that it may exist is left open, but such a
possibility evinces itself if and only if evidence is presented to support it.

However, obviously some people do believe in the existence of deities and other
forms of the so-called supernatural despite the lack of realistic evidence. 
One can only assume that 1) these people have a different set of criteria for
acceptability of evidence, and/or 2) they have some vested interest in
believing that particular outcome of analysis that they believe to be true. 
Quite possibly both.  I think we have shown endless times that the nature of
the subjective evidence offered in favor of religious belief is tainted: 
How come your subjectivity shows a different world view than someone else's? 
Which one is right?  WHY is his/hers wrong and YOURS right? If he/she is being
deceived, how can you be sure it is not YOU who has been deceived?  (Not to
mention the way the brain is known to impose patterns onto events/phenomena/
observations that upon closer examination are shown to be quite wrong---like
"recognizing" someone at the airport and realizing that it wasn't them after
all.)

With that in mind, the only other reason that such people might readily accept
the notion of the existence of a god (or any other "supernatural" entity or
form) is precisely because they already believe it to be so:  they hold the
existence of such a thing as an assumption, an axiom, and work ALL analysis of
the world from there.  "Why is life full of problems? Because god designed the
world that way knowing that it would be best for us not to have a perfect life
but rather to struggle and learn."  Contrast this with the simpler, less
presumptive notion that life is full of problems because all those problems
are simply a part of the natural flow of things, based on what we observe and
codify as physical laws.  We experience them as problems because they conflict
with our wishes for a world ordered around our lives, and because such
conflicts are inevitable in a world with trillions of organisms and objects
caught up in the "natural flow".  As opposed to assuming, for whatever reason,
the existence of an ultimate "good" force that "designed" the universe to be a
certain way.  These assumptions are not confined to religions (or, if you
prefer, theistic religions).  The belief in so-called "supernatural" phenomena
of all sorts stems from the same sort of presumptions.  For example, when
statements are made about the similarities between experiences of "mystics"
of different belief systems, this is cited as "evidence" that there is a
supernatural force behind them, rather than the more likely rational
possibilities centering on simple human psychology and biochemistry---the
"physical" realm that some people would claim that these experiences are (a
priori) not a part of.  (Again, the question always left unanswered:  what is
meant by "non-physical" or "supernatural", if not "beyond that which humans
can perceive"?)

I contend that all such analysis of the world by religious believers, and the
answers offered in such analysis, stem directly from an a priori assumption of
the existence of god, or of some supernatural force of their own design. 
Lewis' works are prime examples.  Jeff Sargent, for example, has used the
phraseology "Why would you want to believe that human beings are 'nothing but'
lab specimens?"  (... when you have this other possibility to believe
instead.)  Laura Creighton has spoken in net.philosophy of how without the
existence of "free will", she would find her existence meaningless, and how
thus she chooses to believe in free will.  "Wanting to believe", the
desirability of holding certain beliefs as opposed to others owing to their
intrinsic "aesthetic" value rather than their veracity, becomes a factor in
forming belief systems for certain people.

Thus my question is: why DO you presume the existence of god/the supernatural
as a given (obviously I and many others simply do not), if not because you
have some vested interest in believing that it is so, what I have endlessly
and perhaps monotonously labelled as WISHFUL THINKING?  (From here on in,
please assume that phrases akin to "existence of god" refer to "existence of
any presumed supernatural phenomena".)

Given that we are dealing with two forms of logic, one of which starts off
making the assumption that god exists and the other of which does not, a person
using one form of logic cannot possibly convince the person using the other
form of logic to accept his position.  This is not always true, because the
two forms of logic and their two sets of assumptions are NOT disjoint sets. 
In fact, for most reasonable people, they are practically equivalent, with the
addition of the a priori assumption of god being the only major difference
between the two sets.  Conclusions drawn from the two sets of assumptions,
however, can and will (and do) wind up being radically different.  The
"impossibility of convincing" that I mentioned above only comes into play when
the "extra" assumption has a role in the formation of some conclusion. 
Religions have (individually and collectively) formed whole volumes of such
conclusions and codified them.  In many cases, "existence of god" and other
assumptions don't even enter into certain of these conclusions, and they form
viable conclusions about the world at large and life itself. (Some have devoted
entire lifetimes to thinking and writing about such analysis and conclusions.)
In other cases, assumptions about the nature of god and "god's word" take
precedence over both scientific investigation and individual human needs.

The conflict comes into play where "existence of god" assumptions (compounded
by assumptions about what IS "god's word" and who is qualified to be god's
authority representative on earth) are contradicted by rational inquisitive
analysis and investigation of the world itself, or by individual human needs
(arbitrarily?) denied/forbidden/not met by "god's word".  Those who make such
assumptions may deny the claims of the investigators (in "protest") solely
because the claims would force them to change their whole view of the
universe based on the evidence.  If those people are in positions of earthly
authority, we may witness repression of such ideas, and of people who hold
them.  We HAVE witnessed such repression in the past, and we may be witnessing
it again today.  Some belief systems that include notions of supernatural
phenomena and even deities do not fit this mold.  I am specifically talking
about those that do.

The points are: 1) Given that evidence contradicts, if not the basic assumption
that there IS a god, further assumptions that certain texts labelled as god's
word are what they are purported to be (absolute truth), what is the basis for
retaining those assumptions? and 2) Given that repression as described above
does indeed take place in the advent of that which contradicts the status quo,
can we afford to let ANY group, religious or otherwise, wield enormous power
over people's lives when the basis for their governing involves, not rational
thinking, but "does it conform to pre-conceived assumed ways of thinking?"

Despite what some people feel obliged to point out, I do NOT assume that there
is NO god, I simply do not assume that there is one.  The two are not
equivalent.  My point is not to show that "god doesn't exist" (I've speculated
on the net several times about what such a deity might be liked if it does
exist), but rather to show that there may be something very wrong with certain
notions of "god"-ness, when those notions were formulated based on presumptions
about the nature of the universe that may seem "appealing", not based on
evidence about reality, and when the premises surrounding those notions appear
to be contradictory and malformed.  These contradictions and flaws may be
present in a number of religions and belief systems, but my purpose is NOT to
simply poke around and find flaws with personal belief systems, since all such
systems are a matter of personal taste, and human beings need not justify
personal taste.  UNLESS that personal taste extends into interference in the
lives of other people, the imposition of one unprovable set of moralistic
notions unto all people.  At that point, when a movement seeks such control,
the very basis and foundations of the belief system must be questioned.
--
"When you believe in things that you don't understand, you'll suffer.
 Superstition ain't the way."		Rich Rosen  ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
-- 
Meet the new wave, same as the old wave...
      				Rich Rosen     ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr

laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (04/10/85)

	Now that the superfluous brouhaha over definitions has
	hopefully passed, perhaps we can return to discussing the main
	points of this article.

Probably not, Rich. I think that your definitions are embedded in your
article and we will jsut find more of them.

	I'll include some additional wording to placate certain people
	who don't like certain accepted definitions of words, so that
	they too may answer the points in this article.  Since many
	adherents to non-religious belief systems have claimed (1) that
	their belief systems are religions and (2) that I shouldn't
	have included them in my analysis (NOTE:  I didn't, but...),
	let me say that if they are religions, then they weren't
	included in the analysis, but if they aren't then obviously
	they weren't included, so why are you complaining?  Since such
	people seem to want to be included in the analysis, I will
	gladly do so.

Because, what we perceived you as doing was setting your own definition
of ``religion''. In particular, it seemed to exclude a lot of what are
commonly considered religions -- but worse, it excluded many, if not
most of the people who claim to have the subjective experiences that
you claimed to want to talk about.

	I have made some significant rewrites to accomplish this (to a
	point).

	Since there is no hard evidence to support the existence of a
	deity or, for that matter, of any so-called "supernatural"
	entity,

Aha. Here is Rich Rosen belief #1. This belief is definitely not shared
by most of the people who claim to have religious experiences. They
claim that there is a lot of hard evidence that they are having an
experience.  This may not correspond to what you mean by a
``supernatural entity'', though. We can now play ``what does
supernatural mean'', but I warn you, there is much greater disagreement
here than over ``what does religion mean''.

	one would normally work (in a typical analysis of a
	non-religious oriented phenomena) from the assumption that the
	thing for which there is no evidence does not exist.

Wrong from the point of view of the people who have a religious
experience.  They think that there *is* evidence. Their problem is
``why don't you recognise it'' and ``why doesn't it happen to you as
well''?

	Without evidence showing verifiable evidence of a thing's
	existence, or its observed effect on the "physical" world, via
	Occam people would generally assume that it does not exist
	until evidence of a viable nature presents itself.

Again, wrong for the same reasons. I already *have* evidence, the
problem is that *you* won't accept it. You are waiting for evidence
that you will accept. The question becomes -- how likely is it that I
will *ever* present evidence that you will accept? Currently, I think
that the answer is ``extremely unlikely''. At this point, I generally
pack it in.

	The *possibility* that it may exist is left open, but such a
	possibility evinces itself if and only if evidence is presented
	to support it.

Again, this argument is only good if there in fact *is* no evidence. If
there *is* evidence then in dealing with you I have a problem. Either
the problem is one of communication, or the problem is that you are in
some way incapable of understanding even perfect communication.

	However, obviously some people do believe in the existence of
	deities and other forms of the so-called supernatural despite
	the lack of realistic evidence.

No. you cannot badger me into saying that my evidence is ``not
realistic'' because it does not suit you.

	One can only assume that 1) these people have a different set
	of criteria for acceptability of evidence, and/or 2) they have
	some vested interest in believing that particular outcome of
	analysis that they believe to be true.

The other assumption is that the people who do not accept the evidence
have some sort of problem which prevents them from accepting what they
normally would accept.

	Quite possibly both.  I think we have shown endless times that
	the nature of the subjective evidence offered in favor of
	religious belief is tainted:  How come your subjectivity shows
	a different world view than someone else's?

What is so odd about that? People have different world views regardless
of what experience is being evaluated. Why do some people like rock
music and some people like classical and some people like both?

	Which one is right?

Yes, you want to ask that question. A good many mystics *don't* and
find it quite irrelevant. They either say ``they are all right'' or
``they are all wrong'' depending.

	WHY is his/hers wrong and YOURS right?

If you mean in some absolute sense, then you are going to find very few
mystics who say that somebody else's religious experience is
``wrong''.  Misunderstood, perhaps. The reason you say that someone is
misunderstanding something is that they have a collection of
inconsistent beliefs that you believe can be made consistent.  You
explain your consistent version. If they like it, they say ``gee, I
made a mistake'' and if they don't like it they generally go along
their merry way and continue to do things that you think are a result
of a misunderstanding.  After some time you may find that it was *you*
who had the misunderstanding, or they may gradually come to see  their
misunderstanding themselves.

	If he/she is being deceived, how can you be sure it is not YOU
	who has been deceived?

You can't be absolutely sure. But you apply the same procedure that you
apply to find inconsistencies in any other beliefs that you have. By
the way, your phrasing ``YOU who has been deceived'' implies that the
deception is something that something else does to you. This fits into
the ``my religion is correct, yours is inspired by Satan'' model which
very few Christians use all across the board these days. Many
Christians use it to refer to a few religions, but at least they don't
seem to use it towards major religions any more. This is not the
generic mystic position which is more along the lines of ``deception is
something that you do to yourself''.

	(Not to mention the way the brain is known to impose patterns
	onto events/phenomena/ observations that upon closer
	examination are shown to be quite wrong---like "recognizing"
	someone at the airport and realizing that it wasn't them after
	all.)

If you mean this as an attempt to discredit mystics experiences as
happening at all, I would counter that by this logic you should not
believe that you ever recognise anyone since you could be mistaken.

If this is to insinuate that people who have religious experiences do
not question that they could be mistaken in interpreting them, then the
insinuation is wildly off the mark -- this is the second most common
topic of discussion whenever 2 or more mystics get together anywhere I
have been.  (The first is ``comparing notes''...)

	With that in mind, the only other reason that such people might
	readily accept the notion of the existence of a god (or any
	other "supernatural" entity or form) is precisely because they
	already believe it to be so:  they hold the existence of such a
	thing as an assumption, an axiom, and work ALL analysis of the
	world from there.

But here you reveal the axiom that you are using -- that the reason
Rich Rosen does not accept the evidence for the supernatural is that
such evidence does not exist. You conclusion, ``wishful thinking''
follows from that. But what about your axiom?  How can you be sure that
this is not ``wishful thinking'' on your part?

	"Why is life full of problems? Because god designed the world
	that way knowing that it would be best for us not to have a
	perfect life but rather to struggle and learn."  Contrast this
	with the simpler, less presumptive notion that life is full of
	problems because all those problems are simply a part of the
	natural flow of things, based on what we observe and codify as
	physical laws.

``The natural flow of things'' is, from my perspective, a lot less
simple than ``because God wanted it that way''. What makes you say that
it is simpler?

	We experience them as problems because they conflict with our
	wishes for a world ordered around our lives, and because such
	conflicts are inevitable in a world with trillions of organisms
	and objects caught up in the "natural flow".

Are such conflicts *really* inevitable? If our understanding *really*
grew, is it not possible that we could learn to avoid such conflicts
and not act in a manner that puts one into conflict with other
organisms?

	As opposed to assuming, for whatever reason, the existence of
	an ultimate "good" force that "designed" the universe to be a
	certain way.

This assumption is characteristic of theistic religions, but not
non-theistic religions.

	These assumptions are not confined to religions (or, if you
	prefer, theistic religions).  The belief in so-called
	"supernatural" phenomena of all sorts stems from the same sort
	of presumptions.

This statement is utterly inconsistent with religiojus belief that
``good'' and ``evil'' as such do not exist, or that teh universe was
not created, or that the universe *is* God.

	For example, when statements are made about the similarities
	between experiences of "mystics" of different belief systems,
	this is cited as "evidence" that there is a supernatural force
	behind them, rather than the more likely rational

``more likely'' -- here we find the embedded axiom that the existing
evidence is not good enough again...

	possibilities centering on simple human psychology and
	biochemistry---the "physical" realm that some people would
	claim that these experiences are (a priori) not a part of.

What an incredibly small number of mystics you must have talked to,
Rich.  I do not know a *single* one who claims that these experiences
have nothing to do with psychology and biochemistry. This leaves the
big question open, though. Psychology and biochemistry are facets of
the relationship that a man has with the rest of whatever-there-is --
God, the rest of the world, the supernatural, whatever.

What you need is a theory of meaning. Are my religious experiences any
more or any less meaningful than my expriences of a symphony, or of my
friends, or of any readoing on cosmology that I happen to be doing, or
watching a tv soap opera, or getting drunk? How one decides on how more
or less meaningful these things are depends on what values a person
holds. How one gets what values one has is a good question. You and I
will never agree to how it happens, however, since I think that certain
values are freely chosen, and you don't believe in free will.

	(Again, the question always left unanswered:  what is meant by
	"non-physical" or "supernatural", if not "beyond that which
	humans can perceive"?)

Ah, beyond which *certain* humans can perceive. The people who claim to
be doing the perceiving don't think that they are doing something which
they cannot do.

	I contend that all such analysis of the world by religious
	believers, and the answers offered in such analysis, stem
	directly from an a priori assumption of the existence of god,
	or of some supernatural force of their own design.

	Lewis' works are prime examples.  Jeff Sargent, for example,
	has used the phraseology "Why would you want to believe that
	human beings are 'nothing but' lab specimens?"  (... when you
	have this other possibility to believe instead.)  Laura
	Creighton has spoken in net.philosophy of how without the
	existence of "free will", she would find her existence
	meaningless, and how thus she chooses to believe in free will.

No. I do not ``choose to believe in free will''. I am incapable of
actually disbelieving it. There is a difference -- you (strangely for
someone who does not believe in free will) imply that I *could* choose
to not believe in it. But I find the effort of *trying* to disbelieve
in free will produces results which are sufficient for me to
extrapolate *if* I could disbelieve in free will *then* I would kill
myself.

	"Wanting to believe", the desirability of holding certain
	beliefs as opposed to others owing to their intrinsic
	"aesthetic" value rather than their veracity, becomes a factor
	in forming belief systems for certain people.

But I care about *both* veracity and aesthetic values.

	Thus my question is: why DO you presume the existence of
	god/the supernatural as a given (obviously I and many others
	simply do not), if not because you have some vested interest in
	believing that it is so, what I have endlessly and perhaps
	monotonously labelled as WISHFUL THINKING?  (From here on in,
	please assume that phrases akin to "existence of god" refer to
	"existence of any presumed supernatural phenomena".)

Because we think that we have sufficient evidence and for some reason
you can't accept it. Perhaps you have a vested interest in not seeing
it; perhaps you honestly can't see it; perhaps you *could* but just
couldn't be bothered to.

	Given that we are dealing with two forms of logic, one of which
	starts off making the assumption that god exists and the other
	of which does not,

Your claim, Rich. Your axiom. Atheists discover religion and religious
people become atheists. Both religious and non-religious people would
dispute that ``there is a good'' or ``there is no god'' was an axiom in
their thinking.

	 a person using one form of logic cannot possibly convince the
	person using the other form of logic to accept his position.

This doesn't explain why people leave or join churches very well.

	This is not always true, because the two forms of logic and
	their two sets of assumptions are NOT disjoint sets.  In fact,
	for most reasonable people, they are practically equivalent,
	with the addition of the a priori assumption of god being the
	only major difference between the two sets.  Conclusions drawn
	from the two sets of assumptions, however, can and will (and
	do) wind up being radically different.  The "impossibility of
	convincing" that I mentioned above only comes into play when
	the "extra" assumption has a role in the formation of some
	conclusion.

Again -- why do conversions happen? Why do people leave the church?

	Religions have (individually and collectively) formed whole
	volumes of such conclusions and codified them.  In many cases,
	"existence of god" and other assumptions don't even enter into
	certain of these conclusions, and they form viable conclusions
	about the world at large and life itself. (Some have devoted
	entire lifetimes to thinking and writing about such analysis
	and conclusions.) In other cases, assumptions about the nature
	of god and "god's word" take precedence over both scientific
	investigation and individual human needs.

	The conflict comes into play where "existence of god"
	assumptions (compounded by assumptions about what IS "god's
	word" and who is qualified to be god's authority representative
	on earth) are contradicted by rational inquisitive analysis and
	investigation of the world itself, or by individual human needs
	(arbitrarily?) denied/forbidden/not met by "god's word".  Those
	who make such assumptions may deny the claims of the
	investigators (in "protest") solely because the claims would
	force them to change their whole view of the universe based on
	the evidence.  If those people are in positions of earthly
	authority, we may witness repression of such ideas, and of
	people who hold them.  We HAVE witnessed such repression in the
	past, and we may be witnessing it again today.  Some belief
	systems that include notions of supernatural phenomena and even
	deities do not fit this mold.  I am specifically talking about
	those that do.

So, if you had made this clear 2 months ago, we wouldn't have had all
of this trouble.

Laura Creighton
utzoo!laura

barry@ames.UUCP (Kenn Barry) (04/15/85)

	Rich, I actually agree with most of what you say when applied
to the kind of religion you seem to have had in mind when you wrote your
article. The point of the rebuttal I make below is that the question of the
existence of God/gods is not seen as a simple either/or question by everyone.
If you feel what follows strays from the issues you were raising, you're
probably right, but it seemed worth posting, anyway.

From pyuxd!rlr (Rich Rosen):
>Since there is no hard evidence to support the existence of a deity or, for
>that matter, of any so-called "supernatural" entity, one would normally work
>(in a typical analysis of a non-religious oriented phenomena) from the
>assumption that the thing for which there is no evidence does not exist. 
>Without evidence showing verifiable evidence of a thing's existence, or its
>observed effect on the "physical" world, via Occam people would generally
>assume that it does not exist until evidence of a viable nature presents
>itself.  The *possibility* that it may exist is left open, but such a
>possibility evinces itself if and only if evidence is presented to support
>it.

	Seems to me you have some assumptions about "deity" built into your
argument which do not hold true for all deities. When one is specifically
discussing an *external* deity who is able to influence the material world in
mysterious ways, then your argument applies; this, however, is not the only
possible conception of "deity". If I am unconcerned about whether my
experience of god has to do with a being whose existence and powers are
independent of my consciousness, then I think your argument fails. I can agree
that my "religious" experience can be explained solely in terms of brain
chemistry, and does not constitute evidence for an external deity; yet still
claim that the experience is meaningful because it enriches my understanding
of the perceivable world. If neither of us feel that logic and mathematics are
invalid because they are carried out via brain chemistry, why should brain
chemistry invalidate religious experience?
	My conception of religious experience (i.e., my way of understanding
it, not necessarily The Truth) is that it involves perceiving reality through
fewer layers of mental "filter", bypassing analysis and preconception and
objectification. We cannot know reality directly; our senses and preconscious,
lower-level brain functions are always participants in the creation of what we
perceive. But I think there can be times when we meet reality through the
lowest possible number of intervening curtains, and it is these experiences
which we call "mystical".
	Because such experiences bypass the rational, cognitive levels of
filter, they are not expressible in everyday terms. Like dreams, they present
an ordering of reality which ill-fits the dialectic strictures of human
language. When expression of such ideas is attempted (as I'm doing now),
distortions of the pristine experience are unavoidable.

>However, obviously some people do believe in the existence of deities and
>other forms of the so-called supernatural despite the lack of realistic
>evidence.  One can only assume that 1) these people have a different set of
>criteria for acceptability of evidence, and/or 2) they have some vested
>interest in believing that particular outcome of analysis that they believe
>to be true.  Quite possibly both.  I think we have shown endless times that
>the nature of the subjective evidence offered in favor of religious belief
>is tainted:  How come your subjectivity shows a different world view than
>someone else's?  Which one is right?  WHY is his/hers wrong and YOURS right?
>If he/she is being deceived, how can you be sure it is not YOU who has been
>deceived?  (Not to mention the way the brain is known to impose patterns
>onto events/phenomena/ observations that upon closer examination are shown
>to be quite wrong---like "recognizing" someone at the airport and realizing
>that it wasn't them after all.)

	I think the above paragraph makes two assumptions about believers in
deities which are not always true of them. The first is that all believers in
deities would make claims which are testable in theory. If someone, a Deist or
pantheist perhaps, claimed that there can be no physical evidence for their
claims, because no claims were being *made* about the workings of physical
reality, then the lack of objective evidence for their claim is *part* of
their claim, and does not argue against it.
	The second assumption is that all theists assert that their claims are
the only correct ones, and those of other theists, mistaken. While this
is true of some religions, and even common among Christian sects, it is
far from universally true. Not all religions are exclusivist; some conceive
of the various creeds as different paths to the same destination.
  	
>These assumptions are not
>confined to religions (or, if you prefer, theistic religions).  The belief
>in so-called "supernatural" phenomena of all sorts stems from the same sort
>of presumptions.  For example, when statements are made about the
>similarities between experiences of "mystics" of different belief systems,
>this is cited as "evidence" that there is a supernatural force behind them,
>rather than the more likely rational possibilities centering on simple human
>psychology and biochemistry---the "physical" realm that some people would
>claim that these experiences are (a priori) not a part of.  (Again, the
>question always left unanswered:  what is meant by "non-physical" or
>"supernatural", if not "beyond that which humans can perceive"?)

	Well, I, for one, don't assert *anything* supernatural, yet I'd still
describe some of my ideas as "mystical". And if I choose to believe there are
meaningful aspects of reality which are beyond my ability to apprehend
rationally, this is not meant to gainsay materialism, but to augment it. Is it
irrational for me to believe that the universe may have subtleties that cannot
be fully analyzed and understood in strictly Aristotelian terms? Even if I
accept your apparent assertion that the universe is mechanistic and "natural"
in its operations, I have no guarantee that my main tool for dealing with
reality (a human consciousness using the limited rational tools of human
consciousness) is sufficient for a complete understanding of What's Going On.
Speaking for myself, I find I need a meta-framwork in which to embed my
materialism.
	The picture of reality we receive through our senses is inevitably
highly incomplete. It is local, it is filtered through less than perfect
sensory equipment, and it is filtered through preconceptions we have learned
so thoroughly that we're hardly even aware of their existence. The essential
claim of the mystic, as I understand it, is to have had a more direct
experience of reality than this. Must such a claim be considered
"supernatural", a priori? Or is it that the thoroughgoing materialist may
*assume* that a supernatural claim is being made, because their preconceptions
of what is "religious" includes supernaturalism? I understand that your
remarks were only directed at those making supernatural claims; my point
is that it may not always be clear if claims *are* supernatural.
 
>Thus my question is: why DO you presume the existence of god/the
>supernatural as a given (obviously I and many others simply do not), if not
>because you have some vested interest in believing that it is so, what I
>have endlessly and perhaps monotonously labelled as WISHFUL THINKING?  (From
>here on in, please assume that phrases akin to "existence of god" refer to
>"existence of any presumed supernatural phenomena".)

	To the extent that I understand your use of the terms "god" and
"supernatural", I would have to say that I do not believe in such things,
though I try to keep an open mind. There are some who would describe my
beliefs as theistic, however, and that's OK, too. The point I'm trying to make
is that you assume too much even about those whom you *would* consider
theistic. Not all such people use their beliefs as their source for
understanding physical phenomena. If anything, it's the moral dimension of
existence which is most relevant to religious belief. In any case, your real
grievance seems to be against those who would give over their power to make
moral decisions to some higher authority, be it god, government, or gurus.

>The conflict comes into play where "existence of god" assumptions
>(compounded by assumptions about what IS "god's word" and who is qualified
>to be god's authority representative on earth) are contradicted by rational
>inquisitive analysis and investigation of the world itself, or by individual
>human needs (arbitrarily?) denied/forbidden/not met by "god's word".  Those
>who make such assumptions may deny the claims of the investigators (in
>"protest") solely because the claims would force them to change their whole
>view of the universe based on the evidence.  If those people are in
>positions of earthly authority, we may witness repression of such ideas, and
>of people who hold them.  We HAVE witnessed such repression in the past, and
>we may be witnessing it again today.  Some belief systems that include
>notions of supernatural phenomena and even deities do not fit this mold.  I
>am specifically talking about those that do.

	And some belief systems that *don't* incorporate supernatural
assumptions, *do* fit the mold. The evils you describe above seem to occur
whenever the group in power believe that they know what's best for everyone.
Many groups which do not meet your definition of religion, such as Communists
and Nazis, share this conviction of utter rightness, and act accordingly. If
your purpose is to warn of the dangers of being a True Believer, you can sign
me up on your side right now. But the Will of God is only one of many excuses
people have used for persecution of those they dislike. I share your dislike
of those who would defend repression as "God's will", but I find it no more
attractive when the defense is "historical imperative" or "manifest destiny"
or "the will of the people". It's all a cop-out.

-  From the Crow's Nest  -                      Kenn Barry
                                                NASA-Ames Research Center
                                                Moffett Field, CA
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 	USENET:		 {ihnp4,vortex,dual,hao,menlo70,hplabs}!ames!barry

ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (04/16/85)

Rich -	This article is in response to a few questions you recently
	posed in these newsgroups.

>However, obviously some people do believe in the existence of deities and
>other forms of the so-called supernatural despite the lack of realistic
>evidence.  One can only assume that 1) these people have a different set of
>criteria for acceptability of evidence, and/or 2) they have some vested
>interest...

    These people are no different from you or me.

    As mentioned in another article, you apparently believe in your
    own thoughts. They are plainly nonobjective. 

    At another level, you clearly believe in the physical world
    and in causality. These are also items of belief.

    Determinism, which cause you have espoused in many previous articles,
    is not only a philosophically  unjustified leap of faith on your part,
    it is also probably unscientific.

    Yet you BELIEVE.

>I think we have shown endless times that the nature of the subjective
>evidence offered in favor of religious belief is tainted: How come your
>subjectivity shows a different world view than someone else's?  Which one is
>right?  WHY is his/hers wrong and YOURS right? If he/she is being deceived,
>how can you be sure it is not YOU who has been deceived?

    This is an extremely good point, Rich. There are many people out
    there who frequently label the beliefs of others as `WRONG' while
    and label their own beliefs as `CORRECT'.

    Religious faith does not have to be judgemental. We should ALL
    take note of your observation.

>With that in mind, the only other reason that such people might readily
>accept the notion of the existence of a god (or any other "supernatural"
>entity or form) is precisely because they already believe it to be so:  they
>hold the existence of such a thing as an assumption, an axiom, and work ALL
>analysis of the world from there. 

   For example, determinism. There is a glut of believers in determinism
   on this net. At least most Christians and Jews recognize that their
   belief is part of a religion; the fanatical believers of determinism
   incorrectly claim to have objective scientific support for their dogma. 

   This makes them very difficult to reason with.

>Thus my question is: why DO you presume the existence of god/the
>supernatural as a given (obviously I and many others simply do not), if not
>because you have some vested interest in believing that it is so, what I
>have endlessly and perhaps monotonously labelled as WISHFUL THINKING?  (From
>here on in, please assume that phrases akin to "existence of god" refer to
>"existence of any presumed supernatural phenomena".)

    Since you hold so many supernatural beliefs yourself, the
    answer to this question should be apparent upon introspection.

		Khronos estai ouketi

-michael

rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Dr. Emmanuel Wu) (04/19/85)

> 	Seems to me you have some assumptions about "deity" built into your
> argument which do not hold true for all deities. When one is specifically
> discussing an *external* deity who is able to influence the material world in
> mysterious ways, then your argument applies; this, however, is not the only
> possible conception of "deity". If I am unconcerned about whether my
> experience of god has to do with a being whose existence and powers are
> independent of my consciousness, then I think your argument fails. I can agree
> that my "religious" experience can be explained solely in terms of brain
> chemistry, and does not constitute evidence for an external deity; yet still
> claim that the experience is meaningful because it enriches my understanding
> of the perceivable world. If neither of us feel that logic and mathematics are
> invalid because they are carried out via brain chemistry, why should brain
> chemistry invalidate religious experience? [KENN BARRY]

If, by "internal (as opposed to external) deity", you mean some sort of
self-determiner evincing free will, the same things really do apply.  See
my discussions with Ms. Creighton on the subject.

> 	My conception of religious experience (i.e., my way of understanding
> it, not necessarily The Truth) is that it involves perceiving reality through
> fewer layers of mental "filter", bypassing analysis and preconception and
> objectification. We cannot know reality directly; our senses and preconscious,
> lower-level brain functions are always participants in the creation of what we
> perceive. But I think there can be times when we meet reality through the
> lowest possible number of intervening curtains, and it is these experiences
> which we call "mystical".

It would seem just the opposite to me:  such experiences would seem to have
even more additional intervening preconceptive curtains, not fewer.

>>However, obviously some people do believe in the existence of deities and
>>other forms of the so-called supernatural despite the lack of realistic
>>evidence.  One can only assume that 1) these people have a different set of
>>criteria for acceptability of evidence, and/or 2) they have some vested
>>interest in believing that particular outcome of analysis that they believe
>>to be true.  Quite possibly both.  I think we have shown endless times that
>>the nature of the subjective evidence offered in favor of religious belief
>>is tainted:  How come your subjectivity shows a different world view than
>>someone else's?  Which one is right?  WHY is his/hers wrong and YOURS right?
>>If he/she is being deceived, how can you be sure it is not YOU who has been
>>deceived?  (Not to mention the way the brain is known to impose patterns
>>onto events/phenomena/ observations that upon closer examination are shown
>>to be quite wrong---like "recognizing" someone at the airport and realizing
>>that it wasn't them after all.)

> 	I think the above paragraph makes two assumptions about believers in
> deities which are not always true of them. The first is that all believers in
> deities would make claims which are testable in theory. If someone, a Deist or
> pantheist perhaps, claimed that there can be no physical evidence for their
> claims, because no claims were being *made* about the workings of physical
> reality, then the lack of objective evidence for their claim is *part* of
> their claim, and does not argue against it.

Nor does it offer support---it merely makes it into nothing BUT a claim.
They would claim "no physical evidence", yet their own physical bodies (their
brains at least) are affected).  By a "mystical source", or by their own
imposition of interpretation on their physical experience?

> 	The second assumption is that all theists assert that their claims are
> the only correct ones, and those of other theists, mistaken. While this
> is true of some religions, and even common among Christian sects, it is
> far from universally true. Not all religions are exclusivist; some conceive
> of the various creeds as different paths to the same destination.

Yes, I know.  This doesn't change the nature of subjectivity, though.

>>These assumptions are not
>>confined to religions (or, if you prefer, theistic religions).  The belief
>>in so-called "supernatural" phenomena of all sorts stems from the same sort
>>of presumptions.  For example, when statements are made about the
>>similarities between experiences of "mystics" of different belief systems,
>>this is cited as "evidence" that there is a supernatural force behind them,
>>rather than the more likely rational possibilities centering on simple human
>>psychology and biochemistry---the "physical" realm that some people would
>>claim that these experiences are (a priori) not a part of.  (Again, the
>>question always left unanswered:  what is meant by "non-physical" or
>>"supernatural", if not "beyond that which humans can perceive"?)

> 	Well, I, for one, don't assert *anything* supernatural, yet I'd still
> describe some of my ideas as "mystical". And if I choose to believe there are
> meaningful aspects of reality which are beyond my ability to apprehend
> rationally, this is not meant to gainsay materialism, but to augment it. Is it
> irrational for me to believe that the universe may have subtleties that cannot
> be fully analyzed and understood in strictly Aristotelian terms?

What does it mean to "augment materialism"?  Are you adding things to the
"lists" of things that ARE existing beyond those listed as "material"?  Why
weren't they in the list of "material" things?  Because we couldn't perceive
them?  Be careful what you're leaping into here.

> 	The picture of reality we receive through our senses is inevitably
> highly incomplete. It is local, it is filtered through less than perfect
> sensory equipment, and it is filtered through preconceptions we have learned
> so thoroughly that we're hardly even aware of their existence. The essential
> claim of the mystic, as I understand it, is to have had a more direct
> experience of reality than this. Must such a claim be considered
> "supernatural", a priori? Or is it that the thoroughgoing materialist may
> *assume* that a supernatural claim is being made, because their preconceptions
> of what is "religious" includes supernaturalism? I understand that your
> remarks were only directed at those making supernatural claims; my point
> is that it may not always be clear if claims *are* supernatural.
 
Good point.  Still, we must distinguish between your presumption that those
people are somehow closer (fewer intervening layers) to reality, and mine
(yes, it's a presumption, though I think a far more reasonable one) that they
are further (more layers) because they add in their preconceptions.

>>The conflict comes into play where "existence of god" assumptions
>>(compounded by assumptions about what IS "god's word" and who is qualified
>>to be god's authority representative on earth) are contradicted by rational
>>inquisitive analysis and investigation of the world itself, or by individual
>>human needs (arbitrarily?) denied/forbidden/not met by "god's word".  Those
>>who make such assumptions may deny the claims of the investigators (in
>>"protest") solely because the claims would force them to change their whole
>>view of the universe based on the evidence.  If those people are in
>>positions of earthly authority, we may witness repression of such ideas, and
>>of people who hold them.  We HAVE witnessed such repression in the past, and
>>we may be witnessing it again today.  Some belief systems that include
>>notions of supernatural phenomena and even deities do not fit this mold.  I
>>am specifically talking about those that do.

> 	And some belief systems that *don't* incorporate supernatural
> assumptions, *do* fit the mold. The evils you describe above seem to occur
> whenever the group in power believe that they know what's best for everyone.
> Many groups which do not meet your definition of religion, such as Communists
> and Nazis, share this conviction of utter rightness, and act accordingly. If
> your purpose is to warn of the dangers of being a True Believer, you can sign
> me up on your side right now. But the Will of God is only one of many excuses
> people have used for persecution of those they dislike. I share your dislike
> of those who would defend repression as "God's will", but I find it no more
> attractive when the defense is "historical imperative" or "manifest destiny"
> or "the will of the people". It's all a cop-out.

Yes, it's but one of a number of "techniques" and excuses.  You'll find though
that such excuses are more often than not TIGHTLY COUPLED with "god".  (Why
is it our manifest destiny?  Because God said so!---or go back and read Don
Black if you need further clues)  Maybe such people who have inferiority
complex problems that lead them to make such claims about manifest destiny
and such will find some other excuse in the absence of a belief in a god.
Removing this avenue and showing it for what it is will at least remove IT
from the pool of excuses.  Without the ability to claim that it's "willed
by god", where would they turn?
-- 
Otology recapitulates phonology.
					Rich Rosen    ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr