samet@sfmag.UUCP (A.I.Samet) (05/24/85)
> I pose this question to the net: Is the Talmud an unchangeable work of God, > written down by Jewish scribes, or is it the work of men interpreting the Torah, > and thus subject to re-evaluation? Frank always has good questions. Imagine what would be if there were no court system in America. everyone would go around interpretng the laws as he liked, or saw fit, and the law would not really function as intended. Fortunately, the writers of the constitution established a judiciary branch of government. If the Torah were given without designating specific authority for its interpretation, no one could ever claim that any interpretation was authoritative. Therefore the Torah was given together with an oral law, which was transmitted via Moshe rabbeinu to the sages, ands from the sages of each generation to those of the next. Part of this written/oral package was the law which designates the Sages as the sole authorities for ruling on its interpretation. The Talmud is a record of that process of jurisprudence. The process continues, via the sages of each generations, until this day. G*d's plan was that the sages would fulfil the role of a "supreme court" (lehavdil). Such a supreme court reflects the will of G*d by FAITHFULLY explaining His Torah just as our supreme court (supposedly) explains the constitution (rather than introducing innovations which were not there.) (The sages were also given certain legislative authority, which is a separate mitzvah and issue.) We are bidden to regard their rulings as the reflection of G*d's will, and we believe that he guides them, so that we obey their rulings just as we obeyed the rulings of Moshe rabbeinu. In Moshe's time, Korach tried to undermine this process by challenging the legitimacy of Moshe's authority, arguing that everyone could interpret the Law. There have been groups throughout history who have tried to usurp authoriry from the sages who received the oral Law via a chain leading back to Har Sinai. Today, some groups and individuals try to exploit the Talmud for this purpose. They argue (as Korach did) that the oral Torah is really a work of man, and they thereby license thmeselves to rationalize whatever they want via their so-called "halakha". A key difference between the legitimate rabbis and the fakers is this: The former are committed to subjugating themselves to G*d and to a rigorous discipline of jurisprudence, while the fakers prostitute themselves to "man-centered" interests and they twist the talmud mercilessly towards those ends. Chag Sameach To All Yitzchok Samet
david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin) (06/05/85)
> > > .............................. Such a supreme court reflects the > > > will of G*d by FAITHFULLY explaining His Torah just as our > > > supreme court (supposedly) explains the constitution (rather than > > > introducing innovations which were not there.) > > > > The side comment by Yitzchok is illuminating, ironic, and contradictory. > > > > Illuminating in that it reveals Yitzchok's sympathy for the > > Conservatives' desire for a strict interpretation of the U.S. > > Constitution. > > Sorry, but the pigeonhole is incorrect (and not relevant to the > subject of the Talmud). Actually, I have no preference one way > or the other concerning the constitutional issue (strict vs. > broad). I hoped that readers would understand that the analogy to > the supreme court is necessarily simplistic and not get side- > tracked by the obvious differences. I threw in the word > "supposedly" only to avoid the side issue of discrepancies > between ideal and practice, not to suggest that I favor strict > construction. Actually this issue deserves to be addressed. > > > Ironic in that he implicitly presumes that, while the secular > > jurisprudence is subject to error and may be questioned in good faith, > > religious jurisprudence is not and may not be. > > Why not ask me to clarify what I meant before attacking me for > what I presumably presume? It sounds like you're interested in > criticism rather than information. However, since you raised a > good point, I'll answer briefly for readers. > > All men are fallible, in reasoning and in their vulnerability to > temptations and partiality. The Torah deals with the latter > weaknesses by placing extensive emphasis on the moral caliber of > judges and in the impartiality of court proceedings. Similarly, > Torah sages are required to achieve high levels of piety as well > as scholarship. This emphasis contrasts with the relatively > confined emphasis on scholarship in the realm of secular law, > lehavdil. > > The Torah also obligates us to heed the rulings of the sanhedrin, > and the sages of later generations. Accordingly, those who > receive the oral tradition learn to revere their teachers and the > sages of earlier generations. (It is forbidden to learn Torah > from someone who lacks basic moral integrity.) Such reverence may > seem slavish or arbitrary to an outsider, but it can be > understood by someone who invests labor in understanding the > Torah she'bal peh (oral Torah.) > > The Talmud and the halacha is characterized by strenuous debate. > This implicitly recognizes that there are many points of view. > However, the moral caliber of Talmudic and later sages is > appreciated by Torah scholars and their INTEGRITY is not > questioned. Again, this contrasts with the common attitude that > secular lawyers and judges frequently fail to be impartial or > disinterested. > > The oral tradition hinges on understanding the fact of this > integrity. Moreover, the Torah view is that the sages, while > fallable, are given Divine help to prevent them from stumbling. > The Torah requires us to accept their rulings as authoritative > despite the logical possibility that they erred. There are > provisions however, for peers of the sages to correct such > errors. Such an approach would obviously be inappropriate for > a man-made law. However, for a G*d given Law, it is not illogical > to accept the idea of a commandment to obey the sages "even if > they say right is left and left is right", in the Torah's words. > The Talmud explains that it may appear to us that they are > saying right is left. It may be that we don't understand them, or > that they actually erred. We can't be sure which is the case. > However, to allow ourselves to veto their authority would > undermine the overall system. Our interests and biases could > easily mislead us to believe that they were wrong. Therefore, G*d > commanded us to subjugate ourselves to their authority > unconditionally. The assurance that He often prevents them from > erring makes this palatable. (However, someone unaccustomed to > thinking in terms of G*d and Torah will find this difficult to > digest, even if he can see that it is not illogical.) > > > Contradictory in the advocacy for literalism in interpreting the US > > Constitution. Surely Yitzchok does not take the Torah literally, but > > abides by an expansive interpretation of it. > > Yet it is Yitzchok who has selected the analogy of Torah to > > Constitution, Talmud to Supreme Court rulings! It may be a good > > analogy for someone who wishes to narrowly (or broadly) interpret > > both, but not for someone who would narrowly interpret one and broadly > > interpret the other. > > A very shallow criticism. A minute's thought would tell you that > their is no reason to extrapolate from a man-made constitution to > the G*d given Torah (lehavdil) and hence no contradiction. > Analogies can be used to illustrate points without requiring that > we apply them literally. > > Yitzchok Samet > > PS - It seems to me that you are arguing solely for the sake of > criticism. This is a waste of time. *** REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR MESSAGE ***
david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin) (06/05/85)
>>> .............................. Such a supreme court reflects the >>> will of G*d by FAITHFULLY explaining His Torah just as our >>> supreme court (supposedly) explains the constitution (rather than >>> introducing innovations which were not there.) >> The side comment by Yitzchok is illuminating, ironic, and contradictory. >> Illuminating in that it reveals Yitzchok's sympathy for the >> Conservatives' desire for a strict interpretation of the U.S. >> Constitution. > Sorry, but the pigeonhole is incorrect (and not relevant to the > subject of the Talmud). Actually, I have no preference one way > or the other concerning the constitutional issue (strict vs. > broad). I hoped that readers would understand that the analogy to > the supreme court is necessarily simplistic and not get side- > tracked by the obvious differences. I threw in the word > "supposedly" only to avoid the side issue of discrepancies > between ideal and practice, not to suggest that I favor strict > construction. Actually this issue deserves to be addressed. My apolgies, then. However, I hope the next time you consider an analogy to be so poor as to be irrelevant, you will consider simply not using it. >> Ironic in that he implicitly presumes that, while the secular >> jurisprudence is subject to error and may be questioned in good faith, >> religious jurisprudence is not and may not be. > Why not ask me to clarify what I meant before attacking me for > what I presumably presume? It sounds like you're interested in > criticism rather than information. However, since you raised a > good point, I'll answer briefly for readers. I am argumentative. I don't think that I'm hypercritical, but that's just my opinion... > All men are fallible, in reasoning and in their vulnerability to > temptations and partiality. The Torah deals with the latter > weaknesses by placing extensive emphasis on the moral caliber of > judges and in the impartiality of court proceedings. Similarly, > Torah sages are required to achieve high levels of piety as well > as scholarship. This emphasis contrasts with the relatively > confined emphasis on scholarship in the realm of secular law, > lehavdil. First, generally the men selected to the Supreme Court are of good character. Second, piety only protects against impiety; it does not protect against error. > The Torah also obligates us to heed the rulings of the sanhedrin, > and the sages of later generations. Accordingly, those who > receive the oral tradition learn to revere their teachers and the > sages of earlier generations. (It is forbidden to learn Torah > from someone who lacks basic moral integrity.) Such reverence may > seem slavish or arbitrary to an outsider, but it can be > understood by someone who invests labor in understanding the > Torah she'bal peh (oral Torah.) > The Talmud and the halacha is characterized by strenuous debate. > This implicitly recognizes that there are many points of view. > However, the moral caliber of Talmudic and later sages is > appreciated by Torah scholars and their INTEGRITY is not > questioned. Again, this contrasts with the common attitude that > secular lawyers and judges frequently fail to be impartial or > disinterested. Torah scholars are not disinterested nor impartial. They are not the former because their status hinges in an obvious fashion upon how the Torah is accepted/interpreted/used by Jews. They are not impartial, as the selection of Torah scholars, as a process, tends to substantially limit the diversity of opinion. Indeed, while debate can be vigorous and carefully considered, while the debaters are all of the highest character and possess the best of intentions, the fact that the debate is limited to a relatively homogenous (when compared to the larger group to which the debate pertains) means that the debate is of decidedly limited breadth. > The oral tradition hinges on understanding the fact of this > integrity. Moreover, the Torah view is that the sages, while > fallable, are given Divine help to prevent them from stumbling. > The Torah requires us to accept their rulings as authoritative > despite the logical possibility that they erred. There are > provisions however, for peers of the sages to correct such > errors. Such an approach would obviously be inappropriate for > a man-made law. However, for a G*d given Law, it is not illogical > to accept the idea of a commandment to obey the sages "even if > they say right is left and left is right", in the Torah's words. > The Talmud explains that it may appear to us that they are > saying right is left. It may be that we don't understand them, or > that they actually erred. We can't be sure which is the case. > However, to allow ourselves to veto their authority would > undermine the overall system. Our interests and biases could > easily mislead us to believe that they were wrong. Therefore, G*d > commanded us to subjugate ourselves to their authority > unconditionally. The assurance that He often prevents them from > erring makes this palatable. (However, someone unaccustomed to > thinking in terms of G*d and Torah will find this difficult to > digest, even if he can see that it is not illogical.) Two questions: how do we know which decisions are divinely inspired (and thus protected)? How do we know that there IS such a thing as divine inspiration? You (and these scholars) say that the Torah commands us to accept their interpretations. But that is their interpretation! If that first interpretation is mistaken...moreover, it is certainly imaginable that over the course of a few thousand years, the power of interpretation, even if granted by the Torah to a certain class of individuals, may have accidently shifted to the incorrect class. >> Contradictory in the advocacy for literalism in interpreting the US >> Constitution. Surely Yitzchok does not take the Torah literally, but >> abides by an expansive interpretation of it. >> Yet it is Yitzchok who has selected the analogy of Torah to >> Constitution, Talmud to Supreme Court rulings! It may be a good >> analogy for someone who wishes to narrowly (or broadly) interpret >> both, but not for someone who would narrowly interpret one and broadly >> interpret the other. > A very shallow criticism. A minute's thought would tell you that > their is no reason to extrapolate from a man-made constitution to > the G*d given Torah (lehavdil) and hence no contradiction. > Analogies can be used to illustrate points without requiring that > we apply them literally. See first comment. > PS - It seems to me that you are arguing solely for the sake of > criticism. This is a waste of time. You, too, are guilty of pigeon-holing... I argue not for its own sake, but to illuminate, mostly for my own benefit, but perhaps incidentally for others. Even an argument which ends inconclusively (i.e. without either side capitulating) generates light as well as heat. David Rubin {allegra|astrovax|princeton}!fisher!david
samet@sfmag.UUCP (A.I.Samet) (06/06/85)
> Two questions: how do we know which decisions are divinely inspired > (and thus protected)? How do we know that there IS such a thing as > divine inspiration? You (and these scholars) say that the Torah > commands us to accept their interpretations. But that is their > interpretation! If that first interpretation is mistaken...moreover, > it is certainly imaginable that over the course of a few thousand > years, the power of interpretation, even if granted by the Torah to a > certain class of individuals, may have accidently shifted to the > incorrect class. Your questions are important and critical and I'm sure you have more. However, I don't feel I can do justice to this extensive and complicated subject in the limited space of a net article, with my limited time. It would take a book. There are some excellent books which address your questions thoroughly. Two that come to mind are "Anvil of Sinai" and "The Oral Tradition". You can probably find one of these in a good Jewish bookstore. If you can't, I am willing to have them sent to you by such a store. Also, I recently posted an ad on the net for a weekend seminar which promises to address this issue. It's being held this coming weekend in the Catskills. Finally, if you like, I am willing to spend a few hours discussing the issue over the phone. Drop me mail and we can set up a time. The above offers go for anyone who is sincerely interested in exploring these issues. > I argue not for its own sake, but to illuminate, mostly for my own > benefit, but perhaps incidentally for others. Even an argument which > ends inconclusively (i.e. without either side capitulating) generates > light as well as heat. Sorry. I felt the tone of the questions was unnecessarily antagonistic. I apologize for the misjudgement. Yitzchok Samet