fairley@wivax.UUCP (Dr. Richard Fairley) (09/19/84)
> > During my time in college life (student 7 1/2 years, teacher 6 years), I saw > many, many problems with the tenure system. Giving someone almost total job > security as a reward for 6 years of excellence does not work well enough to > provide students with an environment of academic excellence. I have seen far > too many of my colleagues reach the rank of full professor, and then burn out > as teachers, but continue leading classes. I have also watched four different > departments try to fix this problem; none succeeded, as the posession of tenure > protected the offending party all too well. > > I have talked over several possible solutions with both tenured and untenured > faculty, department chairs, and administrators at about a dozen universities and > colleges. Except for a few die-hard pro-tenure people (all tenured), they have > all agreed that the following idea should be workable. > > At the point in a professor's (generic term, not rank) career when the tenure > decision is traditionally made, the prof is instead granted a long-term > contract (say, for ten years, pun intended). Half-way through this contract > (five years), the prof comes up for review again. If the review is favorable, > the old (half-completed) contract is replaced by a new one of the same length. > If the review is unfavorable, the prof comes up for review again in two years. > If this review is favorable, the old contract is replaced with a new one as > above. If this second review is also unfavorable, the prof has the remainder > of the old contract (three years) to find a new job. > > For example, Professor X serves State University faithfully from fall 1984 > through spring 1990. At this point, "X" is eligible for "tenure", and is given > a contract through spring of 2000. In 1995, "X" is reviewed again, found to be > a jolly good person; the old contract is replaced by a new one which runs until > spring 2005. In 2000, "X" comes up for review again, and is found to be a fool. > "X" works diligently on teaching style, and passes the 2002 review with flying > collars (no rings); now "X" is given a contract that runs through spring 2012. > "X"s next review is in 2007. This time, "X" doesn't care anymore, failing this > review and the subsequent one in 2009. "X" now has until spring 2012 to find a > new job. > > Yes, this method allows a doubly-proved ninny to hang around for an extra > three years (or whatever, depending on contract length). However, I believe that > this is far better than allowing a perennially adjudged ninny hang around until > retirement age. It gives the individual a large amount of job security, time to > prove new teaching methods, and an equally fair review process, while allowing > the college to move out "dead wood" in relatively short order. > > My thanks to the people, both students and faculty, who helped me hammer out > the details of this idea. > > Any response from the net? Feasibility at your university, additions, etc > are appreciated. > > -- > T.F.Prune (Bill Wickart) {allegra | ihnp4 | tektronix} !ogcvax!inteloa > > -- "Operator, trace this call and tell me where I am" Wang Institute of Graduate Studies is a non-profit, independent educational institution with degree granting authority. The majority of our financial support comes from the Wang family of Wang Laboratories, but we are not affiliated with Wang Labs. Our initial offering is a Masters degree program in Software Engineering. Other graduate-level programs will be offered in the future. We maintain an academic environment in every regard except for tenure; faculty members are on a contract system that is binding on Wang Institute but non-binding on the faculty member. The following proposal for contract renewal is under consideration by our faculty: New faculty members are given three year contracts. At the end of the second year a renewal decision is made. If the decision is favorable the current contract is replaced with a five year follow-on contract; if the decision is unfavorable, the faculty member has one year to find another job. At the end of the third year in the five year follow-on contract the faculty member is again reviewed. If the review is favorable the current contract is extended to five years from the date of review. If the review is unfavorable the faculty member has one year to correct specific problems and is again reviewed at the end of the year. If the second review is favorable the contract is extended to five years. The five year pattern is then replicated. If the second review is unfavorable the reviewee has one year to find another job. Our proposed policy is similar to the one stated in the referenced article, operating on a five year time frame instead of ten years. The advantage of a five year contract is that unsatisfactory faculty members can be phased out in a shorter time period. The disadvantage is that every faculty member must undergo a "tenure-style" review every three years. Longer contracts (for example, ten years) would decrease the frequency of reviews but would allow a lame duck faculty member up to ten years of guaranteed income. The trade-off is thus between the frequency of comprehensive reviews and the length of the phase-out period for unsatisfactory faculty members. I recently read (can't remember where) that experience with contract systems in academe indicates that the tendency is to award longer and longer contracts to satisfactory faculty members with passing time. This may be in order to reduce the frequency of reviews. On the other hand, if contract length is variable, who makes the recommendation for contract duration? The faculty chair? A faculty committee? The Dean or Academic Vice-President? In each case, there are opportunities for political games and abuses. We would like to hear creative suggestions for academic contracts. Dick Fairley, Faculty Chair School of Information Technology Wang Institute of Graduate Studies Tyngsboro, Massachusetts
blenko@rochester.UUCP (Tom Blenko) (09/19/84)
> > During my time in college life (student 7 1/2 years, teacher 6 > years), I saw many, many problems with the tenure system. Giving > someone almost total job security as a reward for 6 years of > excellence does not work well enough to provide students with an > environment of academic excellence. I have seen far too many of my > colleagues reach the rank of full professor, and then burn out as > teachers, but continue leading classes. I have also watched four > different departments try to fix this problem; none succeeded, as the > posession of tenure protected the offending party all too well. > > I have talked over several possible solutions with both tenured and > untenured faculty, department chairs, and administrators at about a > dozen universities and colleges. Except for a few die-hard pro-tenure > people (all tenured), they have all agreed that the following idea > should be workable. > > At the point in a professor's (generic term, not rank) career when > the tenure decision is traditionally made, the prof is instead granted > a long-term contract (say, for ten years, pun intended). Half-way > through this contract (five years), the prof comes up for review > again. If the review is favorable, the old (half-completed) contract > is replaced by a new one of the same length. If the review is > unfavorable, the prof comes up for review again in two years. If this > review is favorable, the old contract is replaced with a new one as > above. If this second review is also unfavorable, the prof has the > remainder of the old contract (three years) to find a new job. > > For example, Professor X serves State University faithfully from > fall 1984 through spring 1990. At this point, "X" is eligible for > "tenure", and is given a contract through spring of 2000. In 1995, "X" > is reviewed again, found to be a jolly good person; the old contract > is replaced by a new one which runs until spring 2005. In 2000, "X" > comes up for review again, and is found to be a fool. "X" works > diligently on teaching style, and passes the 2002 review with flying > collars (no rings); now "X" is given a contract that runs through > spring 2012. "X"s next review is in 2007. This time, "X" doesn't care > anymore, failing this review and the subsequent one in 2009. "X" now > has until spring 2012 to find a new job. > > Yes, this method allows a doubly-proved ninny to hang around for an > extra three years (or whatever, depending on contract length). > However, I believe that this is far better than allowing a perennially > adjudged ninny hang around until retirement age. It gives the > individual a large amount of job security, time to prove new teaching > methods, and an equally fair review process, while allowing the > college to move out "dead wood" in relatively short order. > > My thanks to the people, both students and faculty, who helped me > hammer out the details of this idea. > > Any response from the net? Feasibility at your university, > additions, etc are appreciated. -- T.F.Prune (Bill Wickart) {allegra | ihnp4 | tektronix} !ogcvax!inteloa -- "Operator, trace this call and tell me where I am" Your article seems to presume that the purpose of tenure is to provide job security. That may be one consequence of the tenure system, but it isn't the purpose for which tenure was intended. Tenure is intended to provide protection for the intellectual endeavors of faculty members. After an institution has had the opportunity to evaluate the quality of a faculty member, it makes a decision about whether the individual merits tenure or not. This protection is deemed necessary to protect the quality of intellectual endeavors. It prevents, for example, the termination of faculty members because they choose to pursue research in Keynesian economics or biological evolution. This places the responsibility of judging the (intellectual) value of research endeavors in the hands of the researchers, rather than the trustees or adminstrators of the nation's institutions. In practice, the tenure decision is often associated with a continue-or-terminate decision. The principal reason for this, I understand, is that the faculty, rather than the institutions, wish to prevent faculty members from being continued indefinitely without tenure. Otherwise, an institution might find it to its advantage to make a common practice of indefinite continuation, with tenure being extended only in exceptional circumstances. Tenure is imperfect, as was indicated in the previous article. It protects non-performers. It doesn't go far enough to protect a faculty member against adminstrative sanctions. I'm sure there are lots of finer-grained problems. There are any number of (what I judge to be) misinterpretations of tenure: 1) That tenure should guarantee lifetime employement. 2) That protection of a faculty member's intellectual endeavors should include non-professional endeavors. For example, I see no reason why a faculty member's non-professional statements/activity should be protected by tenure, e.g., Mathematics professors who use their positions to make statements about defense policy. There also seem to be abundant mis-applications of tenure as a suitable practice for protecting intellectual integrity: 1) Tenure is given to faculty of institutions whose primary criterion for evaluation is not research activity. 2) Tenure is given to faculty of institutions in which research activity is an irrelevant criterion for evaluation (e.g. community colleges and high schools). The proposal which has been offered seems to address the issue of faculty who become tenured and then become non-performers in their teaching duties. Several comments: In many good-quality universities, teaching ability/performance is a negligible factor in tenure decisions. One can hardly expect these institutions to be concerned about teaching performance after a tenure decision if they are unconcerned about it prior to the tenure decision. If a faculty member's primary duties are teaching, why not make that explicit, including making his/her position untenurable? In short, (I claim) tenure is not the source of the problem you have identified, but the practice of institutions (and the AAUP!) in granting/demanding it. Tenure is imperfect, with respect to the purposes I have outlined, but your proposal doesn't address that (and apparently doesn't intend to). There is lots of management experience dealing with the issue of addressing employees' performance, so if that's the problem, that seems like a good place to look. Tom
smh@mit-eddie.UUCP (Steven M. Haflich) (09/20/84)
How quickly we forget! Doesn't anyone remember why tenure exists? It is not to protect incompetence or malfeasance. Rather, it protects unpopular opinions -- be they about academic subjects or not -- as manifestations of free thinking. If you could find a way to allow majority judgement about the performance of an individual without judging that individual's opinions, then you are probably qualified to be a deity. 1966: Hey, let's vote against renewing Jones. That commie pinko turkey is always flaming about the war in Vietnam. 1968: Darn that fool Jones, all that publicity he brings upon the University caused NSF to turn down our proposal. Let's finally get rid of him... Steve Haflich, MIT (untenured faculty)
ron@brl-tgr.ARPA (Ron Natalie <ron>) (09/20/84)
Of course, this is all well and good. But tenure is no guarantee. The Johns Hopkins University has been successful at "retiring" even productive tenured professors for the sole purpose of being able to pull in more junior and lower paid professors in their place. -Ron
jab@uokvax.UUCP (09/20/84)
/***** uokvax:net.misc / inteloc!bill / 6:19 pm Sep 16, 1984 */ During my time in college life (student 7 1/2 years, teacher 6 years), I saw many, many problems with the tenure system. /* ---------- */ I have seen many problems with the "tenure system", although probably not as many as some of the folks out in "notes-land". (Hi, Mom!) One very nice side effect of the "tenure system" is that a professor can involve himself in UNPOPULAR ISSUES (be they political, social, academic, or whatever) without fearing for his/her job. To come up with reviews for professors would be great, I would think, until "the committee to re-elect" decides they don't like Professor Smith. After that, it's all over. (And don't kid yourselves, it can happen; I'm sure it happens a little now with the "tenure system".) Jeff Bowles Lisle, IL
mark@elsie.UUCP (Mark J. Miller) (09/21/84)
> > During my time in college life (student 7 1/2 years, teacher 6 years), I saw > many, many problems with the tenure system. Giving someone almost total job > security as a reward for 6 years of excellence does not work well enough to > provide students with an environment of academic excellence. ...... > At the point in a professor's (generic term, not rank) career when the tenure > decision is traditionally made, the prof is instead granted a long-term > contract (say, for ten years, pun intended). Half-way through this contract > (five years), the prof comes up for review again. If the review is favorable, > the old (half-completed) contract is replaced by a new one of the same length. > If the review is unfavorable, the prof comes up for review again in two years. > If this review is favorable, the old contract is replaced with a new one as > above. If this second review is also unfavorable, the prof has the remainder > of the old contract (three years) to find a new job. > ....... > T.F.Prune (Bill Wickart) {allegra | ihnp4 | tektronix} !ogcvax!inteloa Your proposal has many good points and would go a long way toward solving the problem of professors who retire as soon as they receive tenure. However, this proposal would creat several new and dangerous situations, situations that tenure was designed to guard against: 1.) Protection for teachers with unpopular views. During the 50's, the McCarthy era, there was heavy presure to fire many "pink" (i.e. liberal) professors. Tenure protected many of them, untenured faculty got fired. Given the current political climate, this is likely to happen again in the next few years. Yes, I know your 10 year contract would reduce this risk, but the McCarthy era spanned almost ten years. 2.) Encouraging researchers to take risks. Tenure gives faculty members the freedom to branch out into new areas and start new research projects. Sometimes these are fruitful, often not. Certainly there would be less encouragement to do this if one knew that (s)he would be "pounding the street" if it didn't work. 3.) Economic protection. In times of tight budgets there is great temptation for administers to hire younger professors at lower salaries by letting the older facility go as their 10 year contracts expire. Several schools would probably develop policys of NEVER granting contract extensions after the first 5 years, unless you have a Nobel, are in the NAS, etc. (this is especially true for "top tier schools", who have an over supply of top people). It is also likely that the 10-5-3 system you propose would soon become a 5-3-1 system, then a 3-2-1 one. The power to fire is the power to dictate and control. That is NOT a good environment for academia. I'm not tenured and I agree the tenure system has many flaws. It would do many schools much good to get rid of dead wood. Heavens we have a lot of dead wood around here at the NCI. But, given three years or not, it is still very hard to find a new job when you're 50. Perhaps a 5 year review of tenured faculty could be held and a positive decision made if the contract is to be terminated at the end of the next five years. The review should be made by people outside the school with no financial interest, much the way grant reviews and tenure decisions are made today. The point is, that if a decision is made to terminate the contract, reasons for the termination must be stated, in writting. This would give the faculty member a basis for appeal and possible court action. Incidently, it's not that hard to get rid of tenured faculty today. I've seen it done. You give such people no lab space, no promotions, a heavy teaching load of uninteresting classes ("Chem 101: chemistry for non-science majors who can't add) and combine that with peer contempt. They soon leave. -- Mark J. Miller NIH/NCI/DCE/LEC UUCP: decvax!harpo!seismo!umcp-cs!elsie!mark Phone: (301) 496-5688
cunningh@noscvax.UUCP (Robert P. Cunningham) (09/24/84)
Replacing academic tenure with limited-term contracts might well cost some universities some of their professors who are foreign nationals. Basically, in order to apply for a permanent visa, a non-national in the U.S. must have indefinite or permanent employment. An employment contract with a definite term is, technically, a violation of that condition. Thus, a foreign national offered an employment contract in lieu of tenure would not qualify for a permanent visa, and would have to settle for a temporary "H-1" visa (one year, but renewable). This would probably discourage a considerable number of well-qualified people. Recently, this situation has come up at the University of Hawaii. Besides being an "equal opportunity" employer of faculty, the University has a policy of picking applicants according to their qualifications, regardless of where they are from. The usual practice at UofH is to offer faculty members it hires for possible permanent employment a 10-year tenure track - making them eligible for tenure and permanent status after 5 years (although 10 years is actually nearer the actual time it takes...and after 10 years, if not granted tenure, they are asked to leave). All non-tenured faculty work under successive one-year contracts as temporary hires. At the moment, there are roughly 60 foreign faculty members working on this pre-tenure track. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has recently pointed out that the H-1 visas are only renewable once (or at most twice, under various circumstances), and not - legally - for the 4-5 or more years some faculty members need to stay on the track. Nonetheles, INS has been renewing the visas...but their latest interpretation of the law indicates that they legally cannot any more. Of course, the law could be changed....