torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (03/25/86)
In article <738@hounx.UUCP> kort@hounx.UUCP (B.KORT) writes: >[...] does rational behavior mean "predictable" >behavior or "successful" behavior, or what? (Or not?) Is the appearance >that you present a function of the observer? (That is, does it depend >on how the observer answers the second question in this paragraph?) > >[...] What *exactly* do we mean by completely rational behavior? We mean, behavior that follows the norms of reason. Some examples: modus ponens and the law of non-contradiction are norms of reason. Somewhat more controversially, the principle "maximize subjective expected utility" is a norm of reason. Still more controversial are norms for the formation of "expectation" in this sense (i.e., probability judgements) and "utility" functions (i.e., value systems). --Paul Torek torek@umich
kort@hounx.UUCP (B.KORT) (03/25/86)
Paul Torek joins the discussion on specifying the prescription for "rational behavior"... >> What *exactly* do we mean by completely rational behavior? [Kort] >We mean, behavior that follows the norms of reason. Some examples: modus >ponens and the law of non-contradiction are norms of reason. Somewhat >more controversially, the principle "maximize subjective expected utility" >is a norm of reason. Still more controversial are norms for the formation >of "expectation" in this sense (i.e., probability judgements) and "utility" >functions (i.e., value systems). Is it not the case that the "norms of reason" are not only controversial, they have evolved steadily over historical times, with major and lasting contributions from many times and cultures? Even today, we see such contributions as Axelrod's work on the Evolution of Cooperation, and new branches of Logic such as Combinatorial Logic, Frege Logic, and the like (or dislike). Is it not the case that each generation of philosophers found a dilemma in the preceding structure, and resolved it by enlarging the dimensionality of the space in which the philosophical structure resided? (Example: Law of the Excluded Middle. We now have propositions which are formally undecidable as True or False. They have "truth-value" somewhere in betweens, as in Fuzzy Logic.) --Barry Kort ...ihnp4!hounx!kort
torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (03/27/86)
In article <755@hounx.UUCP> kort@hounx.UUCP (B.KORT) writes: >(Example: Law of the Excluded Middle. We now have >propositions which are formally undecidable as True or False. They >have "truth-value" somewhere in betweens, as in Fuzzy Logic.) I for one am not ready to see LEM go. Non-propositions must be distinguished from unprovable-but-true propositions. And then there's the "quantum logic" issue (is that what you're talking about?), but I don't see the need for "quantum logic" ... see L. Jonathan Cohen, ``Can Human Irrationality be Experimentally Demonstrated?'' _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ 1981. (Also, Cohen refers to Haack, _Deviant Logic_, which I haven't read but sounds interesting...) --Paul Torek torek@umich
herb@uwvax.UUCP (Benington Herb) (03/27/86)
As I have been reading messages on the Paradox and on rational behaviour, I am reminded of a statement which I read many years ago which defined a logical mind. Since I was studying mathematics and engineering at the time at MIT, it struck me as somewhat whimsical but it has continued to appeal and comfort me. In a book whose name I have forgotten, the psychiatrist Otto Fenichel wrote: "A logical mind is tolerant of tension, capable of postponement, rich in countercathexis, and ready to judge reality on the basis of its own experience." Since I consider the quality of "logic" to be more demanding and constaining than the quality of "rationality, I would be interested to hear reactions on the paradox from those more experienced and urgently challenged than I am.