tedrick@ernie.BERKELEY.EDU (Tom Tedrick) (11/14/85)
Keywords:Outwitting KGB
Here is a possible application for cryptographic
signature schemes.
"The KGB regularly produces forgeries which the Soviet
press and agents then cite as 'proof' that the United
States is guilty of whatever pefidy it is being accused
of at the moment."
-from "KGB Today", by John Barron
It should be possible to apply some of the cryptographic
signature schemes that have been published in the last
few years (see Proceedings of Crypto 83, 84, proceedings
of Eurocrypt 84, 85 etc.) so that secret documents have
verifiable cryptographically secure signatures included,
which would do away with this problem.
-Tom
tedrick@ucbernie.arpalevy@ttrdc.UUCP (Daniel R. Levy) (11/15/85)
In article <10970@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>, tedrick@ernie.BERKELEY.EDU (Tom Tedrick) writes: >Keywords:Outwitting KGB >Here is a possible application for cryptographic >signature schemes. >"The KGB regularly produces forgeries which the Soviet >press and agents then cite as 'proof' that the United >States is guilty of whatever pefidy it is being accused >of at the moment." > -from "KGB Today", by John Barron >It should be possible to apply some of the cryptographic >signature schemes that have been published in the last >few years (see Proceedings of Crypto 83, 84, proceedings >of Eurocrypt 84, 85 etc.) so that secret documents have >verifiable cryptographically secure signatures included, >which would do away with this problem. > -Tom Better yet, keep the documents themselves secret, like they are supposed to be. -- ------------------------------- Disclaimer: The views contained herein are | dan levy | yvel nad | my own and are not at all those of my em- | an engihacker @ | ployer or the administrator of any computer | at&t computer systems division | upon which I may hack. | skokie, illinois | -------------------------------- Path: ..!ihnp4!ttrdc!levy
don@allegra.UUCP (Don Mitchell) (11/18/85)
Keywords: Outwitting Yourself Here is another use the CIA could make of RSA. In "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence", a senior official of the agency tells how the CIA's disinformation division was so successful, that their phony information often found its way back to unknowing intelligence analyists at CIA headquarters.
rpt@warwick.UUCP (Richard Tomlinson) (11/19/85)
Summary: Expires: Sender: Followup-To: Distribution: Keywords: Xpath: warwick snow snow ubu In article <576@ttrdc.UUCP> levy@ttrdc.UUCP (Daniel R. Levy) writes: >Better yet, keep the documents themselves secret, like they are supposed to >be. I think you've missed the whole point of the original idea. Since the documents are forgeries, keeping documents secret would make no difference. But, if all secret documents are kept encrypted along with a secure signature then it would be possible to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 'proof' that the KGB provide is forged. Richard. -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ...!mcvax!ukc!warwick!snow!rpt
lambert@boring.UUCP (11/20/85)
In article <332@snow.warwick.UUCP> rpt@warwick.UUCP (Richard Tomlinson) writes: > In article <576@ttrdc.UUCP> levy@ttrdc.UUCP (Daniel R. Levy) writes: >> Better yet, keep the documents themselves secret, like they are supposed to >> be. > I think you've missed the whole point of the original idea. Since the > documents are forgeries, keeping documents secret would make no difference. > But, if all secret documents are kept encrypted along with a secure > signature then it would be possible to prove beyond reasonable doubt that > the 'proof' that the KGB provide is forged. Another advantage of this approach is that the KGB could then *prove* that a secret document leaked to them *is* authentic, which currently only gullible people tend to believe. Seriously, I think that there are two motives for keeping documents secret: (1) they may contain information about strategy etc. that opponents can use to their advantage in determining their strategy; and (2) the documents may contradict publicized policies, such as "respect for human rights" or peaceful intentions. In the first case, an opponent would not want to reveal the fact that the information was no longer a secret. In the second case, the originator would be silly to attach an unforgeable signature. Lambert Meertens ...!{seismo,okstate,garfield,decvax,philabs}!lambert@mcvax.UUCP CWI (Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science), Amsterdam -- Lambert Meertens ...!{seismo,okstate,garfield,decvax,philabs}!lambert@mcvax.UUCP CWI (Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science), Amsterdam
levy@ttrdc.UUCP (Daniel R. Levy) (11/23/85)
In article <332@snow.warwick.UUCP>, rpt@warwick.UUCP (Richard Tomlinson) writes: >In article <576@ttrdc.UUCP> levy@ttrdc.UUCP (Daniel R. Levy) writes: >>Better yet, keep the documents themselves secret, like they are supposed to >>be. > >I think you've missed the whole point of the original idea. Since the >documents are forgeries, keeping documents secret would make no difference. >But, if all secret documents are kept encrypted along with a secure >signature then it would be possible to prove beyond reasonable doubt that >the 'proof' that the KGB provide is forged. > >Richard. > This is presuming that the KGB is willing to provide the "original" which was intercepted then deciphered as proof. I doubt that they would; we all know a petty detail like that also doesn't stop Russia's baldfaced lies. -- ------------------------------- Disclaimer: The views contained herein are | dan levy | yvel nad | my own and are not at all those of my em- | an engihacker @ | ployer or the administrator of any computer | at&t computer systems division | upon which I may hack. | skokie, illinois | -------------------------------- Path: ..!ihnp4!ttrdc!levy
rpt@warwick.UUCP (Richard Tomlinson) (11/28/85)
Summary: Expires: Sender: Followup-To: Keywords: Xpath: warwick snow snow ubu In article <599@ttrdc.UUCP> levy@ttrdc.UUCP (Daniel R. Levy) writes: >This is presuming that the KGB is willing to provide the "original" which was >intercepted then deciphered as proof. I doubt that they would; we all know >a petty detail like that also doesn't stop Russia's baldfaced lies. I think that once a secure signature scheme was established then the KGB would have to produce the original document to give their acusations any credibility. If they refused then I think the civilised world would dismiss the acusations and the KGB might then stop (but I doubt it!). -- -------------------------------------------------------------------- ...!mcvax!ukc!warwick!rpt