tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.BERKELEY.EDU (Tom Tedrick) (02/11/86)
> [ paraphrasing Matt: Sorry Tom, you lose ... ]
[Sorry if this appears more than once. My machine is acting
up today.]
Well, thanks for the info. But I think you have underestimated
my side of the story. The system wouldn't let me post a response
to your message when I tried, but:
(1). As I said I have read hundreds of books on the subject.
They are quite consistent with the hypotheses I presented.
(2). The notion of a spy on the general staff was part of the
effort to hide the source of information.
(3). It is a lot of work to present references, so in a way the
request for references is slightly unfair. On the other
hand I certainly can't expect you to accept what I have
said as proven. But I would ask that you put my theories
in the "possible" category, and investigate their truth
if you are interested.
(4). Let me give another reference off the top of my head, since
I don't have access to the UC library this semester. In
"Scorched Earth" by Paul Carrels (spelling/title may be a
little different), a book about the Eastern campaign, the
author traces the leak of information to the Soviets to
the very room where encrypted signals were broadcast, but
never considers the possibility that the cryptosystem was
insecure. After eliminating almost every other possibility,
he comes up with a theory that the people sending out the
info somehow stuck in some extra info about the keys in use.
(The book was published in the 1950's, I believe.)
Well, anyway, thanks for your interest in the subject. As I said,
although I don't claim I have proved my case, I have done a lot
of work in this area and I have more weapons in my arsenal, but
not a lot of time to argue about it. If you have references for
your side, I would appreciate your sending me a list and where
I can aquire them, if you have time.
Best wishes,
-Tom
[ps- I will revert to email for the rest of this discussion unless
someone besides Matt and I is interested.]rab@well.UUCP (Bob Bickford) (02/14/86)
<BUG?!> In article <11809@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>, tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.BERKELEY.EDU (Tom Tedrick) writes: > > [ps- I will revert to email for the rest of this discussion unless > someone besides Matt and I is interested.] I, for one, am fascinated by this discussion and would appreciate at least an occasional summary from the two of you. Robert Bickford (rab@well.uucp) ================================================ | I doubt if these are even my own opinions. | ================================================
outer@utcsri.UUCP (Richard Outerbridge) (02/14/86)
> [ps- I will revert to email for the rest of this discussion unless > someone besides Matt and I is interested.] The only strategic victory directly attributed to ULTRA is the Battle of the Atlantic. Like any source of good intelligence ULTRA was a strategic weapon: it had a 'multiplier' effect on operational and tactical forces. While it often played a crucial role it was seldom indispensable. In the battle against the U-boat blockade, however, ULTRA was THE deciding factor until the advent of HF/DF. Even if (as can at least be inferred from Philby's memoirs if nothing else) the Soviets had high level access to the fruits of English cryptanalysis it is questionable what value Stalin placed on this intelligence or whether it was indispensable to the Russian victory. Without having studied the matter, offhand I'd say it wasn't of much value to Stalin and the Russians could have done without it. In that case, the only overiding effect of ULTRA on the Eastern Front was keeping England in the war. Given that the Russians defeated the Germans almost single-handedly, did the 'western' Allies make that much of a difference? Would the Russians have won anyway? -- Richard Outerbridge <outer@utcsri.UUCP> (416) 961-4757 Payload Deliveries: N 43 39'36", W 79 23'42", Elev. 106.47m.
weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P. Wiener) (02/15/86)
In article <650@well.UUCP> rab@well.UUCP (Bob Bickford) writes: >> >> [ps- I will revert to email for the rest of this discussion unless >> someone besides Matthew and I is interested.] > > I, for one, am fascinated by this discussion and would appreciate at >least an occasional summary from the two of you. Glad you like it, but we are nearly at a consensus about our own positions, so there might not be too much more anymore. Here is essentially my response to Tom over e-mail: >Well, thanks for the info. But I think you have underestimated >my side of the story. The system wouldn't let me post a response >to your message when I tried, but: They're getting sick of us, eh? >(1). As I said I have read hundreds of books on the subject. > They are quite consistent with the hypotheses I presented. I believe it. >(2). The notion of a spy on the general staff was part of the > effort to hide the source of information. Yes, it's a common cover up for cryptological success. >(3). It is a lot of work to present references, so in a way the > request for references is slightly unfair. I was expecting a one-book reference! > On the other > hand I certainly can't expect you to accept what I have > said as proven. But I would ask that you put my theories > in the "possible" category, and investigate their truth > if you are interested. It certainly is possible. The world of cryptography is extremely weird. But the weaknesses I gave at the end of my last article seem too serious. >(4). Let me give a few more references off the top of my head, since > I don't have access to the UC library this semester. In > "Scorched Earth" by Paul Carrels (spelling/title may be a > little different), a book about the Eastern campaign, the > author traces the leak of information to the Soviets to > the very room where encrypted signals were broadcast, but > never considers the possibility that the cryptosystem was > insecure. After eliminating almost every other possibility, > he comes up with a theory that the people sending out the > info somehow stuck in some extra info about the keys in use. > (The book was published in the 1950's, I believe.) How about the possibility of the Soviets breaking Enigma themselves? The mathematical problem was solved once, why not a second time? My general feeling is that something so amazing as you propose would have been trumpeted in some book by now, using all the declassified Enigma material. I see no reason why Eastern front intercepts would be considered more sensitive. If anything, they would seem like a grand way to horn in on the credit! >Well, anyway, thanks for your interest in the subject. As I said, >although I don't claim I have proved my case, I have done a lot >of work in this area and I have more weapons in my arsenal, but >not a lot of time to argue about it. I would certainly like to read your paper that you mentioned. > If you have references for >your side, I would appreciate your sending me a list and where >I can aquire them, if you have time. Most of my references are of the negative variety: the chances where it could have been mentioned but it wasn't. You might also like L Kopolev, _Ease My Sorrows_, which is about the Malvino sharashka where much Soviet cryptography was done. A Solzhenitsyn, _The First Circle_, is a fiction- alized description of the camp. Concerning the Red Orchestra, Ballantine Books has a paperback series on military intelligence with, I believe, one book devoted to that topic. Where do you get declassified stuff? I don't really know, try writing Aegean Park Press/PO Box 2837/Laguna Hills CA 92653/(714) 586-8811. They've already published lots of stuff on WWI cryptography. I believe Cambridge University Press is publishing a series on Allied Intelligence in WWII, including Enigma intercepts as primary sources. Ask over at University Press Books on Bancroft. Also, check the bibliographies of R Lewin, _Ultra goes to War_, and Costello, _The Pacific War_ (?). Those books used Enigma/Purple intercepts, so they might have the information. And look through back issues of the journal _Cryptologia_. ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
tbm@hou2a.UUCP (T.MERRICK) (02/15/86)
I'm very interested in Tom and Matt's discussion. I see no protests from others. We have seen in countless books and movies support for theses such as the war could not have been won had it not been for this or that ( such as the aircraft carrier in the pacific or rapid development and employment of radar, etc.). Because of the sensitive nature of cryptography and its uses, the details of the role it has played in past wars have only emerged over the past few years and have not been subjected to widespread historical criticism. I've heard some very interesting stories about more recent wars, and some are in the Ripley's believe-it-or-not category. I don't want to pass them along because they did not come from knowledgeable sources. Matt Weiner and Tom Tedrick seem very knowledgeable. I'm fascinated, so please play on ( that's my vote anyway). D.P. Maher AT&T Bell Labs
brian@cheviot.uucp (Brian Randell) (02/17/86)
As a recent subscriber to net.crypt, I have found the correspondence about the impact of ULTRA very interesting, and hope it continues on the net, rather than via email. My own assumption has been that the best source of published information on this topic is the now almost complete series of volumes "British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its influence on strategy and operations" by F. H. Hinsley et al (HMSO, London, 1979 et seq). The most recent volume, for example, starts to reveal what was obtained from Enigma decrypts, via bombes, and what was obtained of more strategic importance from Fish decrypts, via the Collossi. I would be interested to learn how these volumes are now regarded, and what assessments there have been regarding their accuracy. -- Brian Randell - Computing Laboratory, University of Newcastle upon Tyne ARPA : brian%cheviot.newcastle@ucl-cs.arpa UUCP : <UK>!ukc!cheviot!brian JANET : brian@uk.ac.newcastle.cheviot
tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.BERKELEY.EDU (Tom Tedrick) (02/18/86)
More references regarding the role of ULTRA in the Eastern Campaign: (Also someone doubted that there was a campaign of psychological warfare aimed at Hitler, so I include references to that as well) From "A Man Called Intrepid", by William Stevenson (Ballentine paperback first printed 1977) Pages 217-235 (on the delay in Hitler's invasion of Russia caused by British tricks in the Balkans) Refering to Hitler, and the psychological warfare aimed at him, Churchill is quoted: "we calculated that his superstitious mind could be unbalanced ..." Stevenson: " ... what Churchill called 'the single outstanding intelligence coup of any war.' This was to create the diversion that delayed BARBAROSSA, trapped the German armies, and brought them to defeat." "what Churchill wanted was some upset in Hitler's timetable to delay his contemplated attack on Russia. In this way, it was thought that Hitler would face defeat." "ULTRA's recovery of Hitler's fateful Directive 21: Operation Barbarossa was submitted for analysis." "Churchill had meanwhile been following the redeployment of Panzer divisions. The movement orders for supply units and dive-bomber squadrons convinced him that Hitler would move in May 1941." "They knew Hitler planned to invade Russia. They had the text of what Hitler called 'the greatest deception plan in the history of war' to disguise his preparations. But they could not convince Stalin. Was this because Hitler's deception plan was working? It seemed so. In that case it was necessary to save Stalin from his own folly." "Churchill threw himself into this task unreservedly ... His prime concern was to win time for the Russians to recover from the first surprise attack. The place to do it was the Balkans." [it goes on to describe in some detail how Hitler was working to manipulate the Balkan countries, so as to secure his southern flank before invading Russia.] "The German plans had been known through ULTRA for some time ... [all the British could do was ] warn Stalin and make whatever moves they could in the Balkans." "Hitler was preparing a complete strategic surprise. ... If the Russians were to be taken this way, then, Churchill argued, let the Nazi blitzkrieg bog down in the same Russian snows that defeated Napoleon. As it turned out, Donovan's intervention succeeded. Hitler was forced to postpone the attack until the very anniversary of Napoleon's own catastrophic invasion- to the very day and hour- an ill omen that nobody, least of all Hitler, should have ignored." "If the Nazis met resistance in the Balkans, a long drawn-out guerrilla war would bleed Germany. The possibilities were examined by British secret intelligence ..." " [refering to Bulgaria] ... In result, they hesitated before implementing their proposed intervention on Germany's side ..." "The success of Donovan's mission could be followed step by step by Churchill, reading the exchanges between the German High Command and German diplomats, between German intelligence and Hitler. Most of this material came through Bletchley ..." " ... Donovan ... found [Yugoslavia] ... preparing to join the Axis ..." "Churchill, reading the blow-by-blow reports of Nazi leaders, including Hitler himself ..." "There was one group in Yugoslavia capable of resistance: Tito's communists. ... [Tito] had returned from the Soviet Union a year earlier, [ ... disguised ... ], and carrying a British passport issued in Canada. How this came about is still classified information." "British intelligence put pressure on the Yugoslav Air Force Chief ..." " [Hitler issued an ultimatum to Yugoslavia on March 22] ... [Yugoslav] officers mounted a ... revolt. The officers rebellion overthrew the Prince-Regent." "[Donovan gave a nationwide speech March 25] ... The speech was guaranteed to throw Hitler into an angry fit. The Fuhrer was known to blunder when his tantrums were unpremeditated, and not staged for effect. ... The speech reached Hitler and, as intended, threw him into a dangerous and this time uncalculated rage. A week later [April 6] ... , German bombers began to raze Belgrade. ... The devastation was a consequence of [British/American] intelligence operations ..." "On April 7, ... German troops ... crossed the frontier ... Thereafter all happened as Roosevelt and Churchill had forseen. ULTRA signals revealed how NAZI forces closed in upon Yugoslavia. ..." "The resistance of Yugoslavia, unexpected by the Germans, diverted Nazi forces and prolonged their advance through Greece. They had meant to use their divisions in Bulgaria against Turkey as a preliminary move before the attack on Russia. [operation BARBAROSSA was delayed 6 weeks and in Yugoslavia the result was] a four-year quagmire of guerrilla warfare." "Churchill was emphatic that the fatal delay in Hitler's invasion of Russia resulted from this ... [ie from] what would be called later 'destabilizing' a foreign country." [it goes on to discuss how the British expedition in Greece was designed to provoke] "... Hitler's angry and ill-considered plunge into the Balkan quagmire." " 'Churchill's decision to reinforce Greece was not the romantic gamble of an amateur', Stephenson said ..." "FDR signalled Churchill 'You have done ... very useful work in Greece [due to] ... the necessity for an enormous German concentration and resulting enormous German losses in men and material ... You have fought a wholly justifiable action." "There was no sign that Stalin yet understood that he had been given only a brief reprieve. On the contrary [he] ... continued to disbelieve the warnings." "Hitler ... achieved both [tactical] ... and strategic surprise ... on ... June 22, 1941, his warplanes caught 1400 Russian aircraft dozing on the ground. ... German troops [advanced] ... 400 miles in four weeks. What saved the Russians was the fact that the first strike failed to reach its distant goal before the onset of winter." "Tito later wrote 'Hitler's Command was forced to postpone the attack on Russia by 38 days ... every 9th Yugoslav lost his life in the aftermath." " [Goebbels] blamed the Balkans bloodbath on 'the notorius Colonel Donovan who later created the infamous OSS spy ring. He brought disaster to Yugoslavia in order to pull other countries like Greece into the war. ... The most vile cannard of our enemies is that the Fuhrer is losing the Second World War because of personal rage and spite, delaying the attack on Russia to wreak vengeance on a small and harmless neighbor ..." "Stephenson was bringing into an operation a fake astrologer to help irritate Hitler still more ... his superstition might as well be fed by fortunetellers and rumor mills. The Nazis would soon be locked in a titanic struggle with the Soviets, and new weapons of psychological and political warfare were being forged to demoralize the enemy or provoke him into still further folly."
peralta@dali.berkeley.edu.BERKELEY.EDU (Rene &) (02/19/86)
[This is Tom, tedrick@ernie.berkely.edu] In article <11915@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> weemba@brahms.UUCP (Matthew P. Wiener) writes: >Tom, you've missed my complaint! I have read Stevenson's book (a long >time ago), and please, a simple two or three paragraph summary would >suffice. But what you quote comes no closer to supporting your claim >that THE BRITISH KEPT THE SOVIETS INFORMED OF THE CONTENTS OF EASTERN >FRONT ENIGMA intercepts at key times *anytime* after Barbarossa. I do >not doubt your claim that the Russians knew more than has generally >been admitted. I *strongly* doubt the particular route you suggest, >on both political and practical grounds. Although I do claim that the British passed ULTRA based info to the Soviets, I am not really concerned with that point. What I am concerned with is the original problem of whether cryptographic intercepts played an important role in the campaign on the eastern front. Since you are a mathematician I give you the benefit of the doubt in assuming that you are not using rhetorical tricks in trying to sidetrack me from the point of my argument :-) If you are really only concerned with how the Soviets got the ENIGMA information, not whether they had it, I would just as soon stop this discussion, since my interest is in what effect cryptography had in the military campaign. So perhaps I should assume you admit my point that intercepts of cryptographic information were of critical importance to the Soviets throughout the eastern campaign? That is really all am I concerned with. >I would like to point out that I *did* mention in my original posting >re the Eastern Front the importance of the Balkan delay in the start >of Barbarossa. OSS/Ultra was only part of the reason; the botched >invasion of Greece by Italy certainly helped; Hitler's own insanity >was just as important. I am willing to throw Ultra in as part of the >Balkan delay, but not give it equal credit with my other reasons. Well, this is a subtle problem. I would call ULTRA a vital factor. I think the importance of information in war has been underestimated. Without the information, the other factors could not have been exploited. We can argue about the Balkan fiasco if you like, but I am more interested in the later parts of the campaign in the east, like Stalingrad and Kursk (2 of my favorite battles). >To summarize my views: > >The role of cryptography in WWII has been ignored for nearly 40 years >by just about everyone. It is only now being granted its proper due >(declassification helps!), but I think there is the revisionist danger >of giving it too much credit. Well, I certainly hope I am a dangerous revisionist! Stop me now if you don't want to hear the rest of my revisionist views on the war in the east :-) -Tom tedrick@ernie.berkely.edu
tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.BERKELEY.EDU (Tom Tedrick) (02/20/86)
>The only strategic victory directly attributed to ULTRA is the Battle of >the Atlantic. Like any source of good intelligence ULTRA was a strategic >weapon: it had a 'multiplier' effect on operational and tactical forces. >While it often played a crucial role it was seldom indispensable. In >the battle against the U-boat blockade, however, ULTRA was THE deciding >factor until the advent of HF/DF. I claim that ULTRA was decisive (ie indispensable) in North Africa, the Battle of Britain, and on the Eastern Front. Also, I think the "multiplier" paradigm is misleading. >Even if (as can at least be inferred from Philby's memoirs if nothing >else) the Soviets had high level access to the fruits of English >cryptanalysis it is questionable what value Stalin placed on this >intelligence or whether it was indispensable to the Russian victory. >Without having studied the matter, offhand I'd say it wasn't of much >value to Stalin and the Russians could have done without it. My view is different. I think the information the Soviets obtained was indispensible. Hope I've made my view clear (I'll watch for flames :-) I've spent an enormous amount of time trying to dig out the truth of this matter. >In that case, the only overiding effect of ULTRA on the Eastern Front >was keeping England in the war. Given that the Russians defeated the >Germans almost single-handedly, did the 'western' Allies make that much >of a difference? Would the Russians have won anyway? Well, I agree that the campaign in the East was very severe, but not that the Russians defeated the Germans almost single-handedly. If Germany had not had to fight anyone but Russia, and the Russians had not had information from Enigma sources, I claim that Russia would not have been able to defeat Germany. It might have been a stalemate, though. Also, up until the point when Atomic weapons came into play, I claim that were it not for ULTRA Germany could have held her own against all the Allies. Thanks very much for posting your article. -Tom tedrick@ernie.berkely.edu
weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P. Wiener) (02/20/86)
In article <711@hou2a.UUCP> tbm@hou2a.UUCP (T.MERRICK) writes: >I've heard some very interesting stories about more recent wars, and >some are in the Ripley's believe-it-or-not category. I don't want >to pass them along because they did not come from knowledgeable >sources. Pass them along! Just give them reliability ratings. (B is about the best post-WWII rating possible.) > Matt Weiner and Tom Tedrick seem very knowledgeable. ^^^^^^^^^^^ I try to avoid spelling flames, but here goes: it's Matthew Wiener. ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P. Wiener) (02/23/86)
In article <586@cheviot.uucp> brian@cheviot.newcastle.ac.uk (Brian Randell) writes: >As a recent subscriber to net.crypt, I have found the correspondence about >the impact of ULTRA very interesting, and hope it continues on the net, rather >than via email. My own assumption has been that the best source of published >information on this topic is the now almost complete series of volumes >"British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its influence on strategy >and operations" by F. H. Hinsley et al (HMSO, London, 1979 et seq). >The most recent volume, for example, starts to reveal what was obtained from >Enigma decrypts, via bombes, and what was obtained of more strategic importance >from Fish decrypts, via the Collossi. I would be interested to learn how >these volumes are now regarded, and what assessments there have been regarding >their accuracy. A recent book, Nigel West _MI6_, cites in his introduction one example where the series is (apparently deliberately) understating what happened. Tom, you may want to go look at this book and its chapter on Scandinavia. There is one (one!) paragraph that says the British passed Enigma secrets to the Soviet Union starting in summer 1943. Absolutely no details or references are given. He also says the attempts to hide the true source, despite broad hints that they knew where it came from, were probably amusing to the Soviets, as they had already penetrated MI6. As I was under the impression that it was MI5 that was penetrated, I wonder where his information comes from. Also, Tom expressed doubts about the Red Orchestra. From D Kahn _The Codebreakers_: Of all Soviet networks during the war, by far the most important was the Swiss. It owed its supremacy in part to its location in neutral Switzerland, where it oper- ated for a long time out of reach of the German Abwehr, and in part to having in the network the agent codenamed LUCY.... This was Rudolf Roessler.... His sources appear to have been ten WWI companions,... five of whom became generals and served at least part of the time in OKW. ... Roessler provided the Russian general staff with nothing less than the day-to-day German order of battle. Foote, in fact, believes that "Moscow very largely fought the war on Lucy's messages." ... [The ring was broken up in October 1943.] Kahn cites Alexander Foote _Handbook for Spies_. Foote, in turn, was the chief radioman in the Swiss ring. ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.BERKELEY.EDU (Tom Tedrick) (02/25/86)
To clarify things: I am interested in the theory of war, more particularly the role of information in that theory. The particular historical problem I find most interesting is the role of information leaks in the failure of German military operations in WW2. We seem have agreed that it is not completely clear how these leaks affected the campaign on the Eastern front, so I am focusing on that problem. As far as the theory of war, what I find most interesting is the role of planning, and how information affects planning. I think the "multiplicative" paradigm mentioned earlier is misleading, since information leads to qualitative rather than quantatative changes, i.e. different plans altogether. While the multiplicative paradigm is somewhat seductive at first glance, I cannot accept it without a lot more explanation. As far as how information reached the Soviets goes, I prefer not to worry so much about that, rather I am interested in how the Germans gave it away in the first place (ie mostly through insecure cryptosystems rather than traitors, I claim), whether the Soviets had it, and what use they made of it. Again this is because I am primarily interested in how it affected military operations. Hope that makes things clearer ... More references regarding the role of ULTRA in the Eastern Campaign: From "A Man Called Intrepid", by William Stevenson (Ballentine paperback first printed 1977) (I am almost finished reading this poorly written book, which however does contain a lot of interesting information (or disinformation as the case may be), and will get into something more interesting soon, I hope.) Page 419: (discussing among other things reasons for the raid on Dieppe, and overall Anglo-American strategy in 1942) "There was a compelling reason for Churchill's concern to convince the Soviet Union that a cross-channel invasion in 1942 would be suicidal. He wished to prevent Russia from deserting her allies. ULTRA and other Bletchley code-breaking teams were watching Russia flirt with the possibility of a negotiated peace. Germany dangled tempting bait. If the Soviet Union agreed to an armistice, Germany would be content with the land already captured. The Russians might take the bait if they believed Anglo-American strategy was to let Hitler and Stalin destroy one another, delaying a second front for this reason only. Churchill's fears were well founded, as ULTRA subsequently proved when it retrieved messages concerning the unprecedented journey that Molotov made, 200 miles into German occupied territory, to discuss a seperate peace with the Nazis in June 1943, an astonishing episode never officially made public." "The Molotov peace mission was wrapped in mystery until ULTRA's story became known thirty-one years later."
brian@cheviot.uucp (Brian Randell) (03/01/86)
As a recent subscriber to this newsgroup, I am concerned at the uncritical faith that many correspondents seem to have in much of the extremely dubious "literature" that has appeared in recent years regarding code-breaking and its impact on WW II. Though my own efforts as a historian have been limited to studying the origins of computers (which have interesting links with the WW II codebreaking activities in the UK), and I make no claim to being a military historian, I find little difficulty in distinguishing between scholarly books by professional modern historians, which have received detailed favourable reviews by knowledgable reviewers, from sensationalist popular accounts. In the first category I would for example place the Hinsley volumes I have referred to earlier, and also: Christopher Alexander: "Secret Service: The making of the British Intelligence Community", Heinemann, London (1985) and perhaps Ronald Lewin "Ultra Goes To War: The secret story", Hutchinson, London (1978). In the second category, over and above such pseudonymous "authors" as Nigel West, pride of place surely goes to William Stevenson (spelling?), author of "A Man Called Intrepid" and Antony Cave Brown, author of "Bodyguard of Lies", whose allegations about Churchill and the Coventry Raid, for example, have been thoroughly refuted, yet nevertheless have caused great anger to professional historians, leave alone distress to the families of those involved, whether actively, or merely as citizens of Coventry. Unfortunately, the more sensational the story, the more often it gets repeated. To end, let me just repeat that I would very much urge anyone interested in this topic to study the Hinsley volumes om "British Intelligence in the Second World War" - they are not light reading, and it is a pity that (for defensible reasons) few individuals are identified personally, but until I am given good reason to think otherwise, I will continue to regard these as by far the best source for assessing the impact of the Bletchley Park work on WW II. (This is not to say that they cannot be faulted with respect to assignment of credit between the Polish and the British crypto- graphers for the early breaking of Enigma.) I will be very interested in other peoples opinions on these volumes. -- Brian Randell - Computing Laboratory, University of Newcastle upon Tyne ARPA : brian%cheviot.newcastle@ucl-cs.arpa UUCP : <UK>!ukc!cheviot!brian JANET : brian@uk.ac.newcastle.cheviot