ross@spp2.UUCP (Jonathan Ross) (02/22/86)
[To Matt Weiner and Tom Tedrick: Please keep the debate on
the Net]
It seems to me that it is not possible to definitively
characterize the role of Cryptography in WWII. This is true, I feel, for
the following simple reasons. Too much relevant information still remains
classified. Too much real information was (is) shrouded in disinformation.
Among the important secrets that still remains classified (at
least as of the publishing of the book entitled, I believe, "_The
Radar War_") is the design of the "computer" that Alan Turing used
to break the German codes. I wish I could go into more detail here
but I don't have any sources at hand.
With regards disinformation, until a few postings ago, I was
under the (apparently) mistaken impression that Churchill did allow
Coventry to be bombed unopposed, in order to keep the British
cracking of the German code a secret. (note: I'd love to see sources
on this if anyone knows of any). Another remarkable piece of possible
disinformation (I stray from cryptography here, my apologies) was the
notion that Allied bombing was aided by the Norden bombsight. I
believe that "_The Radar War_" asserts that Radar Guidance Systems
were responsible for the success of Allied bombing. (Note: some have
called into question the idea that Allied bombing was succesful at
all- [from a lecture at Harvard University by John Kenneth Galbraith]).
What makes the idea of "Norden as disinformation" so intriguing is
that I have personally spoken with WWII bomber pilots and bombadiers
who swear that Norden was the key to Allied bombing success. Now, I consider
"_The Radar War_" and similar books ("_The Ultra Secret_", "_A Man
Called Intrepid_", etc.) to be quite reliable sources, but when
stacked up against eyewitness testimony, the accuracy of these books
becomes questionable. I believe that many other pieces of
"conflicting" or "questionable" information have been disseminated,
with the best of intentions, by mostly reliable references. The fact
that such inaccuracies do occur makes the possibilty of arriving at
solid conclusions quite difficult.
J.R.
----------------------------
"Ale Man, Ale's the stuff to drink
For fellows whom it hurts the think...
...And Malt can do more than Milton can
To justify God's ways to Man."
weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P. Wiener) (02/27/86)
In article <869@spp2.UUCP> ross@spp2.UUCP (Jonathan Ross) writes: > [To Matt Weiner and Tom Tedrick: Please keep the debate on > the Net] Sure. Just spell my name correctly: Matthew Wiener. > It seems to me that it is not possible to definitively > characterize the role of Cryptography in WWII. This is true, I feel, for > the following simple reasons. Too much relevant information still remains > classified. Too much real information was (is) shrouded in disinformation. True, true, and true. But it sure is fun to try. > Among the important secrets that still remains classified (at > least as of the publishing of the book entitled, I believe, "_The > Radar War_") is the design of the "computer" that Alan Turing used > to break the German codes. I wish I could go into more detail here > but I don't have any sources at hand. Algorithms to break Enigma have been published in the journal _Cryptologia_. Is that close enough? > With regards disinformation, until a few postings ago, I was > under the (apparently) mistaken impression that Churchill did allow > Coventry to be bombed unopposed, in order to keep the British > cracking of the German code a secret. (note: I'd love to see sources > on this if anyone knows of any). The story is repeated in Winterbotham _The Ultra Secret_ and repudiated with the correct explanation in Calvocaressi _Top Secret Ultra_. The British *had* decrypted the relevant messages. But the name of Coventry was in code ('Korn' if I remember correctly), and no one realized the urgency of identifying what 'Korn' refered to until it was too late. I should mention that the use of codes within the underlying text was part of the difficulty of generating Ultra information. It required systematic accumulation of reams of intercepts to compare with each other and with the actual battlefield and with POW interrogation. The declassified intercepts, for example, are not the literal decryptions, but have been doctored so that most traces of the original codes are removed. [from Lewin _Ultra Goes to War_, Costello _The Pacific War_.] > (Note: some have > called into question the idea that Allied bombing was succesful at > all- [from a lecture at Harvard University by John Kenneth Galbraith]). So does Freemon Dyson in _Disturbing the Universe_, based on his own involvement in the bombing. (An EXCELLENT book, by the way.) > who swear that Norden was the key to Allied bombing success. Now, I consider > "_The Radar War_" and similar books ("_The Ultra Secret_", "_A Man > Called Intrepid_", etc.) to be quite reliable sources, but when > stacked up against eyewitness testimony, the accuracy of these books > becomes questionable. I believe that many other pieces of > "conflicting" or "questionable" information have been disseminated, > with the best of intentions, by mostly reliable references. The fact > that such inaccuracies do occur makes the possibilty of arriving at > solid conclusions quite difficult. It is difficult. Winterbotham's inaccuracy concerning Coventry is just one example. And he was in on most of Ultra. Tom Tedrick's refusal to accept A Foote's account of the Red Orchestra is not unreasonable. This question of what to believe and what not to believe is going to keep interested people busy for a LONG time. > "Ale Man, Ale's the stuff to drink > For fellows whom it hurts the think... > > ...And Malt can do more than Milton can > To justify God's ways to Man." ... "--I tell the tale that I heard told. Mithridates, he died old." ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
wjr@frog.UUCP (03/07/86)
[] I too have been following this discussion with some interest and would like to see it continue, so I am going to try to make a few small contributions of my own. About Turing: Some information about the work at Bletchley Park and Turing's role in it can be found in the recent biography 'Alan Turing: the Enigma' by Andrew Hodges. Another book that I have not seen anybody mention yet is "The Wizard War" by R. V. Jones. I believe it was originally published in Britain as "Most Secret War" It has been a few years since I borrowed it from a library so I don't recall the publishing info, sorry. Anyway, Jones was the head of a British group whos job was to coordinate intelligence about German technical innovation and Allied countermeasures. He discusses Ultra among other things. Further comments: >> = ross@spp2.UUCP (Jonathan Ross) > = weemba@brahms.UUCP (Matthew P. Wiener) >> Among the important secrets that still remains classified (at >> least as of the publishing of the book entitled, I believe, "_The >> Radar War_") is the design of the "computer" that Alan Turing used >> to break the German codes. I wish I could go into more detail here >> but I don't have any sources at hand. > >Algorithms to break Enigma have been published in the journal _Cryptologia_. >Is that close enough? Also there is some description of the "bombes" and how they worked in the Turing biography mentioned above. >> With regards disinformation, until a few postings ago, I was >> under the (apparently) mistaken impression that Churchill did allow >> Coventry to be bombed unopposed, in order to keep the British >> cracking of the German code a secret. (note: I'd love to see sources >> on this if anyone knows of any). > >The story is repeated in Winterbotham _The Ultra Secret_ and repudiated >with the correct explanation in Calvocaressi _Top Secret Ultra_. The >British *had* decrypted the relevant messages. But the name of Coventry >was in code ('Korn' if I remember correctly), and no one realized the >urgency of identifying what 'Korn' referred to until it was too late. If I remember correctly the situation was something like this: The British had, from an Enigma decrypt, a list of targets (by code name only) that were to be attacked in the next couple of weeks, but not the exact order or specific dates. They were able from POW interrogations and other means to make up a tentative list of the cities that corresponded to the list of code names, however the list of cities was a bit longer than the list of code names. By the day of the attack on Coventry they had managed to make some match ups of code names and cities, some after the fact, but when they got the message that 'Korn' would be attacked that night all they could say was that it would probably be one of three cities (including Coventry). It was too late to reinforce the anti-aircraft batteries around all of these cities so all they could do was to alert the RAF to expect a raid over central England that night. >It is difficult. Winterbotham's inaccuracy concerning Coventry is just >one example. And he was in on most of Ultra. Again if I remember correctly, Winterbotham was in the group that managed the distribution of Ultra intelligence to the field commanders. So he certainly knew what use was being made of Ultra in the field, but he was not in a position to see the raw decrypts or follow the work of the intelligence analysts at Bletchley Park, and this may explain some of his inaccuracies. ---- William J. Richard @ Charles River Data Systems 983 Concord St. Framingham, MA 01701 Tel: (617) 626-1112 uucp: ...!decvax!frog!wjr
brian@cheviot.uucp (Brian Randell) (03/12/86)
Following on from the very useful comments by W.J. Richard: The "computer" designed by Turing though very important cryptographically, I understand, does not deserve the term "computer". It seems to have been known as the "bombe", and to have been totally different to the bombe (or bomba) designed before the war by the Polish cryptanalysts. To the best of my knowledge, the most detailed account of the work that Turing was involved in was given in Welchman's "The Hut Six Story". The reference to computers at Bletchley Park normally refers to the "Colossus", with which Turing semms to have had only indirect contact. This was not used for Enigma, but for Fish ciphers. The most detailed account of this machine (or rather set of machines, since a number were built) is the paper by T.H. Flowers entitled "The Design of Colossus", i Annals of the History of Computing, 5,3 (July 1983). The latest volume by Hinsley et al gives an official account of what was learnt by deciphering Fish (or Geheimschreiber) messages. -- Brian Randell - Computing Laboratory, University of Newcastle upon Tyne ARPA : brian%cheviot.newcastle@ucl-cs.arpa UUCP : <UK>!ukc!cheviot!brian JANET : brian@uk.ac.newcastle.cheviot