hofbauer@utcsri.UUCP (John Hofbauer) (03/11/86)
This discussion has been fascinating so far. I don't even mind the mudslinging over accuracy of source material. Anyhow, I would like to enlarge the discussion to include the future. Suppose, heaven forbid, WWIII should break out. Speculate on the role of cryptography in such a conflict. Would each side be able to keep its most secret secrets secret by using "unbreakable" codes? How would the Yanks try to break such codes? What if the Russki's knocked out Fort Mead? Could they? Can/would the allies be trusted? Would it be over so fast that it wouldn't even matter? Start slinging...
gwyn@brl-smoke.UUCP (03/14/86)
In article <2302@utcsri.UUCP> hofbauer@utcsri.UUCP (John Hofbauer) writes: >Anyhow, I would like to enlarge the discussion to include >the future. Suppose, heaven forbid, WWIII should break out. >Speculate on the role of cryptography in such a conflict. >Would each side be able to keep its most secret secrets secret >by using "unbreakable" codes? How would the Yanks try to >break such codes? What if the Russki's knocked out Fort Mead? >Could they? Can/would the allies be trusted? Would it be over >so fast that it wouldn't even matter? Start slinging... First, be aware that tactical intelligence and signal security are the responsibility of the armed services, each of which has a junior counterpart to the NSA. For a variety of reasons, field cryptosystems tend to be less secure against analysis than strategic or diplomatic systems. Sometimes nominally secure systems break down or are misused. Traffic analysis is also a very important source of intelligence. Therefore, communications intelligence will be of some importance in actual conflict situations. Whether or not it would be a decisive factor is hard to predict; much depends on luck. Keeping secrets is primarily a human problem, and no cryptosystem can guarantee that secrets won't be lost, bought, or stolen. As far as breaking "unbreakable" codes goes, one has to capture traffic that is generated by broken crypto gear, or else supplement the traffic with auxiliary information such as known "cribs", or in some cases capture the same message with different encipherments ("isomorphs"). Some cryptosystems are resistant to all such attacks and are truly "unbreakable" (e.g. one-time pads).
tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu (Tom Tedrick) (03/14/86)
In article <2302@utcsri.UUCP> hofbauer@utcsri.UUCP writes: >This discussion has been fascinating so far. I don't even >mind the mudslinging over accuracy of source material. >Anyhow, I would like to enlarge the discussion to include >the future. Suppose, heaven forbid, WWIII should break out. >Speculate on the role of cryptography in such a conflict. I'm so glad you asked :-) My view is that information is in some sense the most vital factor in war. Without good information force is much more difficult to use effectively. In order to cooperate for maximum effectiveness units on the same side need to exchange information. Intercepted enemy communications can make a fundamental difference in strategy and tactics. And so on ... This opens up a whole new area for discussion, so I won't say everything I have to say now, but in time it will come out, most likely. >Would each side be able to keep its most secret secrets secret >by using "unbreakable" codes? One time pads are secure in the standard models. Other encryption systems based on apparently intractable mathematical problems like factoring large integers may also provide a measure of security. >How would the Yanks try to >break such codes? What if the Russki's knocked out Fort Mead? >Could they? Can/would the allies be trusted? Would it be over >so fast that it wouldn't even matter? Start slinging... Some issues to be considered are: Trojan horse programs (ie sneaking these little devils into enemy computers), simulating enemy cryptosystems (ie give misleading information to the enemy, which could be decisive should the war last only a few minutes), maintaining the peace through exchange of information which makes it impossible for either side to mount a surprise attack, etc. If, God forbid, there is another superpower war, it could be the first war decided almost exclusively by information and related areas. For example coordinating Star Wars type weapons would be largely handled by computers ... Again, you have opened up a very wide field for discussion, so only the surface can be scratched in this posting ...
desj@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (David desJardins) (03/16/86)
In article <1812@brl-smoke.ARPA> gwyn@brl.ARPA writes: >Sometimes nominally secure systems break down or are misused. Substitute "always" for "sometimes" in the above. The most difficult task in introducing any technology (and from what I have heard cryptography is no exception) is getting people to use it correctly (or, in practice, designing it to be very difficult to misuse). Even one-time pads are vulnerable to this! -- David desJardins