tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu (Tom Tedrick) (03/14/86)
from Panzer Battles, by Major General F. W. von Mellenthin (Ballentine paperback edition, printed 1984) (First published 1956) (a good book, by the way, for those interested in the subject) [on the encirclemnt of German forces at Stalingrad, pages 201-203] " ... meanwhile the Russian offensive had been launched with a crushing superiority in numbers and all the advantages of surprise." "On 19 November General Rokossovsky's Tank Army attacked in overwhelming strength ... in conjunction with an attack from [another bridgehead] ... both blows fell on Rumanians ... I pass in silence the scenes of panic and confusion produced by this new Russian offensive; the two thrusts made rapid headway ..." [a frequent Soviet tactic was (and is :-) to attack the weakest points, in this case the Rumanian armies, whose morale, training and equipment was below the German standard. This illustrates one way in which information about locations of enemy forces is useful. Since voluminous reports were sent from the front to Hitler containing such information, cryptographic intercepts would have been particularly rich sources of such information. Of course there are other ways of getting some idea of where enemy forces are, but there is nothing like having the whole thing handed to you on a silver platter via crypto intercepts.] "On 20 November things began to happen around Stalingrad ... ... Something very serious must have happened." "On 21 November we heard from our supply troops ... that Russian tanks were approaching ... other supply units informed us by wireless that Russians were approaching ... " [the point is that the Soviet attack went through an area without regular troops, indicating that the Soviets knew where German forces were located.] "It was clear that the encirclement of Stalingrad would soon be a reality ..." "On 24 November it became very clear beyond any doubt that we had been encircled by strong Russian forces." "... Russian forces, ... had advanced ... from the south without encountering any serious resistance, as there were no German fighting troops in that sector, only supply units." [again, the Soviets were able to attack at the weakest point, by knowing locations of German forces.] "At the end of November Colonel General Paulus, commander in chief of Sixth Army, decided to launch an attack in a westerly direction to break the encirclement ... but Hitler sent the order [via ENIGMA] 'Hold out. Relief will come from outside.'" [being able to read such signals would obviously be of great help to the Soviets]
berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman) (03/19/86)
> from Panzer Battles, by Major General F. W. von Mellenthin > (Ballentine paperback edition, printed 1984) > (First published 1956) > > (a good book, by the way, for those interested in the subject) > > [on the encirclemnt of German forces at Stalingrad, pages 201-203] > > " ... meanwhile the Russian offensive had been launched with a > crushing superiority in numbers and all the advantages of > surprise." > > "On 19 November General Rokossovsky's Tank Army attacked in > overwhelming strength ... in conjunction with an attack from > [another bridgehead] ... both blows fell on Rumanians ... > I pass in silence the scenes of panic and confusion produced > by this new Russian offensive; the two thrusts made rapid > headway ..." > > [a frequent Soviet tactic was (and is :-) to attack the weakest > points, in this case the Rumanian armies, whose morale, training > and equipment was below the German standard. This illustrates > one way in which information about locations of enemy forces > is useful. Since voluminous reports were sent from the front > to Hitler containing such information, cryptographic intercepts > would have been particularly rich sources of such information. > Of course there are other ways of getting some idea of where > enemy forces are, but there is nothing like having the whole > thing handed to you on a silver platter via crypto intercepts.] > One of the most standard technique of intelligence gathering of the Soviet Army was sending special 'intelligence troops' across the front line to catch so called 'tongues', i.e. enemy soldiers. After several months of stalemate Soviets had to know where are German units, and where are Italian, Hungarian and Romanian units. Thus the value of crypto intercepts was quite moderate under those circumstances. Additionally, during the retreat (and during 1942 it was quite ordrerly one) Soviets left some intelligence personell on the other side of the front. Keep in the relevant information was not a set of encrypted messages, but the physical location of very large units. Thus it was sufficient to observe railroad movement etc. to figure the location of German units in the rear of the front. Thus I would think that the influence of Western supplied intelligence was not crucial. Even more, if German generals were competent at all, they had to expect that the counter-offensive would go through the Romanian segment of the front. However, after overextending their forces by the offensive in two directions simultaneously (Volga and Caucasus), they had to little room for maneouver besides the retreat on at least one direction, which was a thing vetoed by Hitler. > [being able to read such signals would obviously be of great help Piotr Berman *** REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR MESSAGE ***