weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P. Wiener) (02/11/86)
>>>I claim cryptography was the key factor. >>We were discussing the Eastern Front. As far as I've heard, >>cryptography played no role there. Since I think the Western >How about the fact that information which was gained vi ULTRA >and passed to the Soviets (without their knowing it came through >cryptography of course) played a key role in the Soviet plan for >encirclement of German forces at Stalingrad? And in allowing >the Soviets to block von Manstein's relief attempt? What about >the fact that plans for the German offensive at Kursk were >known to the Soviets (due to intercepts which were passed >to them again), which allowed them to prepare a defensive >zone a hundred miles deep, which broke the force of the >German attack, and to prepare a counterblow from which >the Germans never recovered? > >You know of course that information from ULTRA was passed >to the Soviets throughout the campaign on the Eastern Front. >And played a vital role in many respects ... Well, Tom, you may win yet. Just give us some references! I must admit I am *very* surprised. I find it hard to believe the US/UK would want Stalin to know how good our intelligence was. It was a delicate issue just sharing Enigma intercepts with the US! ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.BERKELEY.EDU (Tom Tedrick) (02/11/86)
>>>>I claim cryptography was the key factor. >>>We were discussing the Eastern Front. As far as I've heard, >>>cryptography played no role there. Since I think the Western >>How about the fact that information which was gained vi ULTRA >>and passed to the Soviets (without their knowing it came through >>cryptography of course) played a key role in the Soviet plan for >>encirclement of German forces at Stalingrad? And in allowing >>the Soviets to block von Manstein's relief attempt? What about >>the fact that plans for the German offensive at Kursk were >>known to the Soviets (due to intercepts which were passed >>to them again), which allowed them to prepare a defensive >>zone a hundred miles deep, which broke the force of the >>German attack, and to prepare a counterblow from which >>the Germans never recovered? >> >>You know of course that information from ULTRA was passed >>to the Soviets throughout the campaign on the Eastern Front. >>And played a vital role in many respects ... > >Well, Tom, you may win yet. Just give us some references! I had to piece this together from some of the hundreds of books in this area that I have read. For example, it was well known that the plans for the Kursk offensive had been compromised, but not until recently how. I wrote an article which should appear in the proceedings of Eurocrypt 85, whenever it comes out, but the field seems to be open for a lot more historical analysis if anyone cares to give it a shot. I think if one reads some of the books on Enigma, like the "Ultra Secret" and the new book on Alan Turing, then rereads the books about the war with an eye towards picking out the influence of ULTRA, a lot that was unclear in the past becomes clear. I can give you a list of things I read if you like, most of them are in the UCB main library. A few that come to mind are books by von Manstein, Kesselring, Paulus, Guderian, "The Rommel Papers", Zhukov, etc. As I said there are hundreds more ... >I must admit I am *very* surprised. I find it hard to believe the >US/UK would want Stalin to know how good our intelligence was. It >was a delicate issue just sharing Enigma intercepts with the US! Quite right. It was evidently a very difficult job deciding what information to give the Soviets, and to disguise the source. I certainly don't know every detail as to what passed to them. The Soviets aren't too cooperative about discussing such things :-)
weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P. Wiener) (02/11/86)
In article <11796@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.UUCP (Tom Tedrick) writes: >>>You know of course that information from ULTRA was passed >>>to the Soviets throughout the campaign on the Eastern Front. >I had to piece this together from some of the hundreds of books I knew, of course, while you had to piece this together? Be fair! >in this area that I have read. For example, it was well known >that the plans for the Kursk offensive had been compromised, >but not until recently how. I wrote an article which should >appear in the proceedings of Eurocrypt 85, whenever it comes >out, but the field seems to be open for a lot more historical >analysis if anyone cares to give it a shot. I was under the impression that Soviet penetration of OKW was rather high--"the Red Orchestra". The only reason we know more about their penetration of Japan is because their spy Sorge was caught. This, I think, is a more natural explanation of Soviet intelligence. >I think if one reads some of the books on Enigma, like the >"Ultra Secret" and the new book on Alan Turing, then rereads >the books about the war with an eye towards picking out >the influence of ULTRA, a lot that was unclear in the past >becomes clear. I can give you a list of things I read if you >like, most of them are in the UCB main library. A few that come >to mind are books by von Manstein, Kesselring, Paulus, Guderian, >"The Rommel Papers", Zhukov, etc. As I said there are hundreds more ... Concerning Enigma, the book by Winterbotham, _The Ultra Secret_, is not very good. He passes on many false stories, including the famous one that Churchill let Coventry get bombed to keep Ultra secure. R Lewin, _Ultra goes to War_, is quite good, with an emphasis on the Western front, not on the mental wizardry. At least one book using declassified Purple sources has come out, detailing Purple's role in the Pacific theatre. You have me beat for WWII memoirs by a long shot. But as I said, I think there is another, more plausible piecing together of the clues you have found. >>I must admit I am *very* surprised. I find it hard to believe the >>US/UK would want Stalin to know how good our intelligence was. It >>was a delicate issue just sharing Enigma intercepts with the US! > >Quite right. It was evidently a very difficult job deciding what >information to give the Soviets, and to disguise the source. >I certainly don't know every detail as to what passed to them. >The Soviets aren't too cooperative about discussing such things :-) I'm not convinced. I thought you were going to tell me about all the now declassified Bletchley Park reports you read, etc. Aegean Press is publishing as many of them as they can. There are several flaws in your theory. Where did the British listen in on to encrypted transmissions about Eastern front troop movements and dispositions? By asking the Soviets? Remember, intelligence was gained not by one or two key messages, but a slow putting together of all sorts of clues, including correlation of German statements about Allied troops and terrain with known facts about the Allies. Except there weren't known facts about Soviet troops and terrain! And the physical process of decryption wasn't free either. Given a choice between another dozen submarine intercepts or a dozen Eastern front army intercepts, I think the British would have gone unhesitatingly for the submarine messages. Their food supply depended on it. Tom, I think you lose. ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.BERKELEY.EDU (Tom Tedrick) (03/06/86)
From time to time I am posting references which appear to support my thesis that information lost by Germany through insecure cryptosystems played a vital (perhaps decisive) role in the campaign on the Eastern Front. For the Nth time (I am getting tired of explaining this) I do not endorse any particular reference, or claim that any single reference proves anything. Read the old postings before you flame at me for using poor references, OK? Anyway, I am rereading "The ULTRA Secret" currently. By the way, someone mentioned the role cryptography played in Rommel's campaigns. This is a fascinating area, and fairly well documented. There is a book waiting to be written examining this question, if anyone is ambitious. From "The ULTRA Secret", by F.K. Winterbotham (Dell paperback printed 1982) Page 187: (Refering to ULTRA intercepts) "On the Eastern Front the situation reports by the German commanders showed the relentless Russian pressure now pushing the German armies back." [someone had argued that ULTRA was not used to obtain intercepts related to the eastern front] Page 197: " ... two further armoured divisions, the 9th and the 10th, were on their way from the Russian front to Caen." [also, it must be admitted that some German forces were diverted from the Eastern Front by the attacks of England & the USA. Some had argued that the Soviets defeated the Germans almost single handedly.] "The fact that Hitler was bringing armour from the hard-pressed Eastern Front to Normandy meant he was now determined to stop us ..." Page 207: (refering to von Kluge) "His record ... in Russia had been good" Page 210: "Signals came in showing that the two SS Panzer Divisions the 11th and 12th, which had come from Poland ... were now ordered to be kept at Caen."
weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P. Wiener) (03/07/86)
In article <12202@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.UUCP (Tom Tedrick) writes: >From "The ULTRA Secret", by F.K. Winterbotham This is the book that repeats the 'Coventry was bombed to protect Ultra' story. >[someone had argued that ULTRA was not used to obtain intercepts > related to the eastern front] I argued that Ultra was not used to obtain detailed information about the Eastern Front and that it was not passed to the Soviets. There's a difference. I agree that the top level information was readable. But local radio messages between units in the Ukraine? It sounds difficult. >[also, it must be admitted that some German forces were diverted >from the Eastern Front by the attacks of England & the USA. Some >had argued that the Soviets defeated the Germans almost single >handedly.] "almost" "almost" How many divisions were not diverted? Who ever denied that German forces were diverted in the first place? By the way, more than 20 million Russians were killed in WWII. Far less than a million Americans were killed in Europe. I do not recall the British casualty count. --------------------------------------------------------------------- > Read the old postings >before you flame at me for using poor references, OK? We're not asking you to cite all your references, Tom. We want to remind you that piecing together what happened in the secret side of WWII is very difficult. The published stuff can be contradictory, incomplete, erroneous, and of dubious credibility. Reading it uncritically is possibly worse than not reading it. Rejecting a work because it disagrees with your worldview/theory is not enough: there are lots of worldviews/theories. An example is the question of how effective Rote Kapelle == the Red Orchestra was. I cited a source and his sources for the story. I believe a high level Soviet defector Suvorov(?) pooh poohs Rote Kapelle in one of his books, but I can't tell how he would know one way or the other. How to choose? I don't know. I'd appreciate it if you read my old postings before claiming I said X when in fact I said X.Y, or claiming I denied Z because I said nothing about it. Perhaps this comes from the rather complete theory/worldview you've worked out: you take my denial of W as a denial of every part of your theory/worldview, and respond by supporting those other parts. This very request of yours is an example of my previous postings being misrepresented by simplification: I first asked what your references were, you finally answered, and I acknowledged. Nobody has flamed you for using poor references, except (deservedly) over in net.philosophy for citing Goebbels' diaries as a source of information about Franco's "Jewish blood". Goebbels was an insane professional liar. Concerning references in general: I pretty much remember most of my WWII history--I studied it intensively in high school--and do not need references for well-known historical facts. But when you come up with a claim not in the standard histories--give us references! OK? ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.BERKELEY.EDU (Tom Tedrick) (03/07/86)
In article <12213@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> weemba@brahms.UUCP (Matthew P. Wiener) writes: >In article <12202@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.UUCP (Tom Tedrick) writes: >>From "The ULTRA Secret", by F.K. Winterbotham > >This is the book that repeats the 'Coventry was bombed to protect >Ultra' story. Look, I've said over and over that I don't claim its a perfect reference. >>[someone had argued that ULTRA was not used to obtain intercepts >> related to the eastern front] > >I argued that Ultra was not used to obtain detailed information about >the Eastern Front and that it was not passed to the Soviets. There's >a difference. I agree that the top level information was readable. >But local radio messages between units in the Ukraine? It sounds >difficult. And I am arguing that some information was lost by the Germans through insecure cryptosystems, and that the Soviets got some of it which was extremely useful to them. I'm not arguing about how it got there. There are too many loose ends for me to know that. There was a book by Allen Dulles which did claim that info was passed from the western powers to the Soviets, for example. At first, my understanding was that you claimed that cryptography played a minor role in the east. That was what I was trying to argue against. Also you are getting a little subtle and tricky with your arguments, which I don't like coming from a sophisticated mathematician. You know damn well you can twist things around when you are sophisticated enough logically. I don't mind you pulling that stuff on other people, but I don't like it when you do it to me. I've had some experience with logic too. For one thing, there seems to be some fuzziness about where the dividing line is between "detailed information" and "top level information". Also I never said anything about "local radio messages ... in the Ukraine". I don't know anything about that and I never claimed I did. Its beyond my competence to judge technical questions like that. I get the feeling you are playing games with me rather than having a direct, honest fight :-) >>[also, it must be admitted that some German forces were diverted >>from the Eastern Front by the attacks of England & the USA. Some >>had argued that the Soviets defeated the Germans almost single >>handedly.] > >"almost" "almost" How many divisions were not diverted? Who ever >denied that German forces were diverted in the first place? Noone. But fighting a war on 2 fronts is a damn sight more difficult than fighting a single enemy. The contribution of the west *WAS* important. I agree that the campaign in the east was much more severe. I don't agree that the Soviets would have won without help from the West. Hmmm, why are you so pro-soviet these days anyway? :-) (sorry, just kidding. I couldn't resist that one.) >By the way, more than 20 million Russians were killed in WWII. Far >less than a million Americans were killed in Europe. I do not recall >the British casualty count. I could look it up for you if you want. I think I have it in one of Montgomery's books. By the way, from the start of the war up until D-Day, one of his books had a note that more British were killed in car accidents than in combat. Please don't try to make it look like I am arguing about which sector saw the most severe fighting. I never said it was as bad in the west. I *KNOW* it was more severe in the east. I've read a *LOT* of books about the eastern front, probably 100 by now. I *SAID* it was more severe when this subject came up earlier. >--------------------------------------------------------------------- >> Read the old postings >>before you flame at me for using poor references, OK? > >We're not asking you to cite all your references, Tom. We want to >remind you that piecing together what happened in the secret side >of WWII is very difficult. The published stuff can be contradictory, >incomplete, erroneous, and of dubious credibility. I said basically the same thing when I first started posting this stuff. I know it is difficult to piece together what happened. I estimate that I read 500 books on the subject before I came to my conclusions about cryptographic information playing a role in the campaign on the eastern front. Usually there was a page worth of relevant information per book, at most. You haven't heard even 1 percent of the stuff I have seen that is relevant, yet you expect me to agree with your denial of my position and stop posting references? You were the one who got me started with this by challenging me to post even one reference in support of my argument. Now you want me to stop? OK, if thats what the readers want, I will stop. How am I supposed to "piece together what happened" without quoting references, by the way? >Reading it uncritically is possibly worse than not reading it. Are you accusing me of reading it uncritically? >Rejecting a work >because it disagrees with your worldview/theory is not enough: Hmmm, are you accusing me of that also? >there >are lots of worldviews/theories. An example is the question of how >effective Rote Kapelle == the Red Orchestra was. I cited a source >and his sources for the story. I believe a high level Soviet defector >Suvorov(?) pooh poohs Rote Kapelle in one of his books, but I can't tell >how he would know one way or the other. How to choose? I don't know. As I said, I *DON'T KNOW* how effective Rote Kapelle was. All I am claiming is that information which could only have been leaked through insecure cryptosystems wound up in Soviet hands, and was used to great effect in their military operations. I could hardly be expected to unravel all the secret activities of WW2. But there are certain overt things that can't be hidden so easily that support the claim that the Soviets did somehow get ahold of the information. >I'd appreciate it if you read my old postings before claiming I said X >when in fact I said X.Y, or claiming I denied Z because I said nothing >about it. Perhaps this comes from the rather complete theory/worldview >you've worked out: you take my denial of W as a denial of every part of >your theory/worldview, and respond by supporting those other parts. I agree you are a subtle and clever and difficult opponent. But I responded honestly to your positions as I understood them. I hope I didn't overindulge in sophistry at the expense of truth. I did rely on memory, ie I read your postings when they first came out and my responses are based on my perhaps faulty memory. I suspect you sometimes also misrepresent my position, perhaps unintentionally. It may be the email communication problem, as certain info seems to not be communicated well over this type of medium, which leads to sometimes severe misunderstandings. >This very request of yours is an example of my previous postings being >misrepresented by simplification: I first asked what your references >were, you finally answered, and I acknowledged. Nobody has flamed you >for using poor references, Yes they have, although some of it was via email and not posted here. I didn't have you in mind at all when I posted the article. *IT WAS NOT YOU I WAS TALKING ABOUT MATTHEW!* >except (deservedly) over in net.philosophy >for citing Goebbels' diaries as a source of information about Franco's >"Jewish blood". Goebbels was an insane professional liar. Man, what do I have to do? I said in that article that Goebbels was not known for his truthfullness. Still, when the article I was responding to claimed that Franco was an ally of the Nazis, I thought Goebbels diaries were a reasonable source for counterargument. Are you claiming that Franco had no Jewish ancestry, by the way? Also, I hope you are not trying to portray me as pro-Nazi or anti-Jewish. For the record, I am anti-Nazi and pro-Jewish. >Concerning references in general: I pretty much remember most of my >WWII history--I studied it intensively in high school--and do not need >references for well-known historical facts. But when you come up with >a claim not in the standard histories--give us references! Now you want more references again? >OK? OK, I take it you are giving me a loophole for more references. For the record, I am dead broke right now, and don't have access to the University library this semester. So I can't afford to buy new books at present, and can't get my hands on some of my old references. So I am only quoting books I have around the house. I promise you though, that this summer when I will have access to the library again, and a reasonable job, you will regret ever trying to argue that cryptography was not a decisive factor in the campaign on the eastern front :-) There are some really great books on the eastern front, by the way. Manstein's "Lost Victories" was my favorite. Guderian's books were good too.
weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P. Wiener) (03/07/86)
Yes, Tom, the war was 40+ years ago. Let's keep it that way. I apologize for misreading your postings. ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
gwyn@brl-smoke.UUCP (03/09/86)
The only relevance of all these historical discussions to cryptology that I can see lies in what we can learn from history. So, what have we learned? Arguments about who did what when seem to be in the same category as debating how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, with about as much relevance to the subject of this newsgroup.
weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P. Wiener) (03/09/86)
In article <1643@brl-smoke.ARPA> gwyn@brl.ARPA writes: >The only relevance of all these historical discussions to >cryptology that I can see lies in what we can learn from >history. So, what have we learned? > >Arguments about who did what when seem to be in the same >category as debating how many angels can dance on the head >of a pin, with about as much relevance to the subject of >this newsgroup. Tom and I tried to stop it ourselves, but people asked us to continue. Cryptology is cryptology, period. Foiling bad guy dial-ins seems to have as much relevance as discussing what the Soviets did in WWII. Frankly, I'm in the mood for Tom to convince me that he's right. O-) Megaton Man, on patrol! Wooo! ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu (Tom Tedrick) (03/09/86)
From "Alan Turing the enigma" by Andrew Hodges,
Simon and Schuster, 1983 (hardcover)
(The above book I found to be extremely interesting, and well
worth reading.)
(By the way I hate the word "cryptology". I have never been
able to get used to it. I grew up with the word "cryptography"
and am too used to it to change. I think the new terminology
has some point to it, but I also think it introduces a new
level of jargon into the subject that doesn't really serve
to aid a deep understanding. In fact I am inclined to think
it was introduced by mediocrities who had nothing better to
contribute to the field.)
[refering to Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union: (page 205)]
"the Luftwaffe Enigma evidence pointing to an imminent German
invasion had been the subject of another fight between GC and CS
on the one hand and the service chiefs on the other."
[refering to which German cryptosystems were subject to
attack: (page 218)]
"... at GC and CS they had established a principle of attacking
everything, however apparently insignificant ..."
[page 237]
"... by 1942 Bletchley Park was no longer outside the ordinary
channels: it dominated them. Its productions were not the spice
added to some other body of knowledge. It was nearly all they
had - photo reconnaisance and POW interrogation adding points of
important detail but never matching in scale what they had fresh
from the horses mouth. There were sixty key systems broken, producing
fifty thousand decrypted messages a month- one every minute. The
old days of 'Red' and 'Yellow' were long over and the soaring
imagination of the analysts, exhausting the colors of the rainbow,
had plundered the animal and vegetable kingdoms: Quince for the
SS key, Chaffinch for Rommel's reports to Berlin, Vulture for
the Wehrmacht on the Russian front."
[In cased you missed it, I quote again: "Vulture for the Wehrmacht
ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT"]
" ... except for [certain] gaps, the German radio communication
system had become an open book ..."
[pages 237-238]
" ... the setting of agents, the suborning of informants, the
sending of messages written in invisible ink, the masquerading,
the dressing up, the secret transmitters ... all turned out to
be largely cover for [ULTRA] ... "
[page 238]
"Who was to know what ... ? Liason with
[the Americans] was just one problem; there was the deception
of Dominions, free forces, and Russians"
[I repeat RUSSIANS]
[page 239]
" ... was allowing Soviet authorities access to Enigma decrypts."weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P. Wiener) (03/10/86)
In article <12284@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.UUCP (Tom Tedrick) writes: >From "Alan Turing the enigma" by Andrew Hodges, > Simon and Schuster, 1983 (hardcover) Considering that I read the book and reread the WWII chapters, I'm surprised I didn't remember the reference. I was definitely surprised then at the assertion. Hodges gives NO references. But it does seem true, so I would like to know how much a role Ultra actually played in the Eastern Front. For example, did Ultra detect troop movements that partisans did not? In the West, Ultra gave the generals very detailed information during the battles: exact troop counts and whereabouts. How about the East? And did the Soviets break Enigma on their own? >(By the way I hate the word "cryptology". I have never been >able to get used to it. I grew up with the word "cryptography" >and am too used to it to change. I think the new terminology >has some point to it, but I also think it introduces a new >level of jargon into the subject that doesn't really serve >to aid a deep understanding. In fact I am inclined to think >it was introduced by mediocrities who had nothing better to >contribute to the field.) Too bad, Tom. That's been the correct terminology for quite a long time and has all the force of correct etymology behind it. I'll look up the reference in Kahn, but I believe it was introduced by an expert cryptologist. People serious about their subject tend to be serious about their neologisms. Deep understanding? It makes it clear what one is talking about. Nothing mediocre about that. Perhaps you are misled by the fact that the NSA only admits to doing cryptography. ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
gwyn@brl-smoke.UUCP (03/14/86)
In article <12284@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.UUCP (Tom Tedrick) writes: >(By the way I hate the word "cryptology". I have never been >able to get used to it. I grew up with the word "cryptography" >and am too used to it to change. I think the new terminology >has some point to it, but I also think it introduces a new >level of jargon into the subject that doesn't really serve >to aid a deep understanding. In fact I am inclined to think >it was introduced by mediocrities who had nothing better to >contribute to the field.) "Cryptology" is hardly a new term. The first use of it I know of is in William Friedman's work decades ago. It is not synonymous with "cryptography".
tedrick@ernie.Berkeley.EDU (Tom Tedrick) (07/06/86)
More references to the role of enigma intercepts on the eastern front. From "Enigma", by Wladyslaw Kozaczuk (University Publications of America, Inc. 1984) page 124: [refering to the Cadix group which included several Polish cryptologists who had escaped first from Poland to France, then to Vichy] "... after the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, ... Cadix's monitoring took in the Russian front ... at night ... " page 140: "In early 1942, 150 messages obtained from an agent's radio correspondence with the Abwehr were read ... They ... dealt exclusively with Russian affairs. Their contents were communicated to the Soviet military representative at Vichy ... and attempts at radio liason with Moscow were made ... for more rapid communication."