[can.ai] Star Wars North

mack@ubc-vision.CDN (Alan Mackworth) (03/28/85)

          Canada should decline the invitation  from  the  United
     States  to  participate  in the Strategic Defense Initiative
     (SDI), for the following reasons:

     -   It  is  a  destabilizing  project  leading  to   further
     acceleration of the arms race.

     -  Canadian participation will destroy  any  credibility  we
     may  have  left  as  an  honest  broker on the international
     stage.

     -  The goals of the SDI violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Mis-
     sile treaty.

     -  We cannot afford it.

     -  Canadian participation would lead to  the  militarization
     of the Canadian scientific research community. This point is
     worth emphasizing.  Many Canadian scientists,  who  may,  in
     the  public  mind,  be seen as beneficiaries of the research
     dollars that would flow from a commitment to  SDI  research,
     are  adamantly opposed to the militarization of science.  We
     have chosen to live, work  and  teach  in  Canada  precisely
     because  Canadian  science,  although not well-funded, is at
     least not subservient to military research as it is  in  the
     United States.

     -  SDI is an inefficient and wasteful  way  to  pursue  job-
     creation.    Weapons   research  and  development  has  been
     compared, in its economic impact, with digging  an  enormous
     hole  in  the ground and filling it in again.  It has little
     spinoff benefit to the industrial and consumer economy.  The
     economic  multiplier effects are minimal compared with other
     activities.  Using lasers, particle beams and  computers  to
     dig  the  hole does not change that fact! The United States'
     economy is now overheated because of massive military expen-
     ditures.  It appears however that, fundamentally, that econ-
     omy is in decline.   In  1984  the  United  States'  current
     account  balance  of  payments deficit was $101,600,000,000.
     It is now a net debtor nation.  Is this the economic perfor-
     mance we want to emulate?


          Instead of SDI and military research we should  concen-
     trate   our  efforts  on  developing  a  humane  technology,
     oriented at the consumer market and at the enormous problems
     we  face  in  manpower training, health, education, resource
     management and manufacturing technology.   These  are  areas
     that  have  high  economic  multipliers, generate meaningful
     employment and wealth, and at the same time do not  threaten
     our survival.

          As professionals we must speak up and let the    
     decision makers know our feelings, loud and clear.

chris@aquila.UUCP (chris) (03/29/85)

     Canada should support its NATO allies and the United States
in its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) for the following reasons:

- SDI is a research project and as such is not destabilizing.
Actual deployment of defensive systems would be destabilizing, unless both
sides deployed roughly equivalent systems at the same time.  However, after
an effective defense system is deployed, greater stability should result.
The possibility of war started by belligerent nations with nuclear weapons
or the potential for creating them (examples: Israel, Iraq, Pakistan, India,
Brazil, South Korea, or South Africa) then escalating into general war would be
greatly lessened.

- Canada is a member of NATO, and NATO has approved the SDI research.

- The Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty does not disallow research and development
of anti-ballistic missiles or other defensive systems.

- militarization of scientific research is not an automatic result
of SDI. Research dollars will flow into SDI-related work; this may
imply less dollars for other work, but not a militarization of that
work. Less dollars for other work is lamentable, but defence may be
more important to more people.

- all defence spending is a 'waste'; in this imperfect world, however,
every nation must spend money on defence to survive. SDI is NOT a job
creation scheme; neither is feeding and clothing our regular armed forces!
Solely economic arguments for SDI are rightfully suspect.

- nuclear weapons threaten our survival; anything that lessens that
threat is worth pursuing. Instead of targetting Russian children,
SDI proposes to target Russian missles.

>          As professionals we must speak up and let the    
>     decision makers know our feelings, loud and clear.

	You just heard my opinions.

mmt@dciem.UUCP (Martin Taylor) (03/30/85)

I don't think it's the militarization of science that is the problem
with the SDI "offer".  In my view, militarization is necessary except
in an ideal world in which we have no need to worry about aggressors.
What bothers me about it is that it is aggressive militarization.  I
have worked for DND all my working life, and have felt that I have been
doing something useful, precisely because Canada's armed forces were
used always for what I believe to be good purposes -- mainly UN Peacekeeping.
I worry greatly about our getting tied into the US offensive military
buildup, and I don't know what my position would be if the Defence
Research labs got involved in Star Wars.

But you should make a clear distinction between the kind of anti-military
feeling that the US behaviour in VietNam induced and the need for the
kind of military role that Canada has played (and I hope will continue
to play).  We can do without the Americans running roughshod over the
world (and us, if we don't look after our own territory); we can't do
without our own military, much as most of us would like to.  And our
military needs the best that science can offer.
-- 

Martin Taylor
{allegra,linus,ihnp4,floyd,ubc-vision}!utzoo!dciem!mmt
{uw-beaver,qucis,watmath}!utcsri!dciem!mmt

rggoebel@water.UUCP (Randy Goebel LPAIG) (03/30/85)

I think it's important to acknowledge the question of how SDI will
affect research, and AI research in particular.  However, I also
think that Alan Mackworth has suggested that we can debate something
very simple before we start to rationalize ``defense'' research:  a
focus on benefits to society from the economic and cultural is not
unreasonable.   As many people have observed, the Japanese fifth
generation project seeks to provide the tools for transition to an
information society.  This includes lots of things like improving
quality of life, improving the the production and delivery of good and
services, and providing better access to knowledge of all kinds.
I would like to see those who have defended defense research on the basis 
of our ``imperfect world'' try their hand at explaining why these goals
are not more important?

Randy Goebel
Logic Programming and Artificial Intelligence Group
Computer Science Department
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, Ontario, CANADA N2L 3G1
UUCP:	{decvax,ihnp4,allegra}!watmath!water!rggoebel
CSNET:	rggoebel%water@waterloo.csnet
ARPA:	rggoebel%water%waterloo.csnet@csnet-relay.arpa

cdshaw@watrose.UUCP (Chris Shaw) (03/31/85)

Although this doesn't relate directly to star wars, I think the goal of the
Japanese in the fifth generation project is not entirely a "nice" one.
The major goal of Japanese Industry and (by extension and policy) the Japanese
Government for the last 20 years has been commercial domination of free-
market countries. It is clear from their domestic BUY JAPANESE policies that
they are not really interested in fair (foreign) competetion except where they 
have no control over it.

The Fifth Generation project may indeed find a new way to distribute goods,
but the major goal is to acheive a technical domination of the US & Canada,
and by virtue of that domination, extend their economic influence substantially.

The US, on the other hand, is interested in commercial and military domination
of the world. Their motives are clear, however, and the US can't be accused
nearly so effectively of not being fair to its trading partners.

Now which Strategic Initiative will you support ??
Japan's Strategic Commercial one ?
Or the more-obviously-threatening US version?

Put that in yer pipe & smoke it!
Chris Shaw
University of Waterloo

mmt@dciem.UUCP (Martin Taylor) (03/31/85)

>unreasonable.   As many people have observed, the Japanese fifth
>generation project seeks to provide the tools for transition to an
>information society.  This includes lots of things like improving
>quality of life, improving the the production and delivery of good and
>services, and providing better access to knowledge of all kinds.
>I would like to see those who have defended defense research on the basis 
>of our ``imperfect world'' try their hand at explaining why these goals
>are not more important?
>
>Randy Goebel

Of course these goals are more important than the *goal* of defence.
But if defence is necessary at all, it is so that goals like these
can be pursued.  I remember a science-fiction story once about the
late stages of a looong world war "to preserve the West for poetry"
and so forth.  It turned out that to win the war they needed a poet,
but the last one had been drafted and killed long since.

If we don't have a reasonable defence, we may not have much quality
of life;  if we don't remember why we want defence, we may not need any,
because we will have lost anyway.  I don't think there are many people
doing defence research (in Canada) who think of defence as a *goal*.

It is a perversion of language to equate defence with aggression.
Unfortunately, this perversion seems to have a tendency to reflect
nature in some countries.  For some, it may well be a goal to have
their country dominate much of the world.  We don't have to support
that attitude in order to support the increase of our *defensive*
ability.

[I have taken can.general out of the newgroups, and added can.politics].
-- 

Martin Taylor
{allegra,linus,ihnp4,floyd,ubc-vision}!utzoo!dciem!mmt
{uw-beaver,qucis,watmath}!utcsri!dciem!mmt

mmt@dciem.UUCP (Martin Taylor) (03/31/85)

>Although this doesn't relate directly to star wars, I think the goal of the
>Japanese in the fifth generation project is not entirely a "nice" one.
>The major goal of Japanese Industry and (by extension and policy) the Japanese
>Government for the last 20 years has been commercial domination of free-
>market countries. It is clear from their domestic BUY JAPANESE policies that
>they are not really interested in fair (foreign) competetion except where they 
>have no control over it.

Read "Kempai-Tai: a history of the Japanese Secret Service" (approximate
title, author forgotten) which was on the paperback shelves recently, and
still may be.  Throughout the history of Japanese interaction with other
countries, their focus has been on economic domination, interrupted by
a relatively short period in the 1930s-1940s in which they tried the
military route.  The secret service was always after commercial secrets,
with military ones when necessary, rather than the reverse.  The quoted
opinion from Chris Shaw is entirely consistent with that history.

But is it bad? I think that commercial competition of this kind is more
likely to bring benefits to all who practice it than is military competition,
in which we must participate just to stay alive.

[I have deleted can.general and replaced it with can.politics]
-- 

Martin Taylor
{allegra,linus,ihnp4,floyd,ubc-vision}!utzoo!dciem!mmt
{uw-beaver,qucis,watmath}!utcsri!dciem!mmt

nixon@utai.UUCP (Brian Nixon) (03/31/85)

Chris is concerned with the "possibility of war started by belligerent nations"
with nuclear capacity or potential, and includes Israel in a list of such
nations.  Calling Israel "belligerent" ignores the fact that the state
has been under attack since its establishment in 1948.  Also, the fact 
that Israel has put some of Iraq's nuclear capacity out of commission has
been omitted.

Brian Nixon.

banner@ubc-vision.CDN (Allen Banner) (04/01/85)

We seem to be straying from the question of whether Canada should become
involved in SDI research.

I would like to raise another issue which was brought up by Chris:

     >SDI is a research project and as such is not destabilizing.

I think that it is important to realize that weapons do not have to be
actually deployed before the destabilization is felt.  Weapons systems
require years to develop and deploy.  Each side must try to evaluate what
the other will do in the years ahead and start working on their response to
that in order to make sure they don't get "caught with their pants down".

	Imagine that you are in a pair of *Soviet* shoes.  Reagan has 
now got 21 more MX missiles.  They are to be placed in Minuteman 
silos and are vulnerable to a first-strike.  It follows that they 
cannot be intended to be used in a retaliatory strike...are they 
an American first-strike weapon?  The Trident submarines are each 
capable of annihilating most of the Soviet Union using the new 
Trident II missiles with a flight time of only 10 minutes or so 
(not enough time to respond) and are largely invulnerable...another 
first-strike weapon?  The cruise missiles are capable of evading 
detection and penetrating through defenses...another first-strike 
weapon?  In the Strategic Computing Initiative, one of the projects 
is to develop the capability to develop an "autonomous vehicle" 
which are capable of "reconnaissance and attack missions".  They 
specify that some will work in high radiation environments.  There
have been a multitude of reports of talk in the Pentagon of "fighting
and winning a protracted nuclear war".

	Now these guys (remember you're a Russian) are talking of 
putting up an impenetrable umbrella to protect themselves (ie the 
U.S. not the rest of the NATO allies?).  However, there is a 
widespread concern that the umbrella will "leak" up to 10 or 20 
percent...enough to mean the end of American society in the event 
of a full Soviet nuclear strike.  What if the defense was intended 
to protect the U.S. from a weak retaliatory strike by the U.S.S.R. 
after an American first strike?!!  It would be much more effective 
for that!  It would also be very effective to destroy Soviet 
satellites (to blind them) just prior to an American first-strike.

	You find it very hard to believe that the Americans would do 
such a thing.  Well I find it hard to believe that's Ronald Reagan's 
real intention as well.  The all important point, however, is that 
the Russians may not find it so hard to believe...they are nervous!

	William Arkin quotes a written answer from the Pentagon to 
congressional inquiries in 1984:

	All evidence to the contrary notwithstanding, Soviet
	paranoia concerning U.S. possibility of attacking the 
	Soviet Union with nuclear weapons is not only pervasive,
	but also very deep-seated....Periods of rapid and com-
	prehensive build-up in U.S. strategic forces...seem to
	have had no effect whatsoever on Soviet paranoid fear.

			Arkin, William M. 1985.
			The drift toward first strike.
			Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 41(1):5-6.

	I don't believe for a moment that the Americans are working 
toward a first-strike capability.  They are doing the same thing as 
the Soviets.  They are trying to guess the moves of the other side 
*in advance* using the only prudent criterion...better safe than 
sorry.  With both sides doing this, weapons systems such as SDI 
(and the Soviet response) become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  If this 
research goes ahead in a major way, you can bet that it will eventually 
be implemented because it will *have* to be...the Soviets will have 
their own programs going!  Another unsettling factor (Arkin again),

	There is no mad war planner in the basement of the 
	Pentagon to be flushed out.  Nor is there a shred of
	evidence that the Pentagon is consciously preparing 
	for a premeditated first strike.  A far more complex
	and dangerous situation exists:  the accumulation of 
	weapons capabilities, together with improved planning,
	command and communications, are shaving away uncertain-
	ties, creating forces which will be perceived by their
	controllers as too tempting to let alone during a con-
	flict.

	Whether we have the weapons or not is not the only factor 
contributing to destabilization...the fact that one side perceives 
that the other is trying to develop a system is also destabilizing 
since it forces them to develop something as a "defense" to it.  In 
the case of SDI, the Soviet response could be to build their own 
defensive system (very expensive), build more offensive weapons to 
saturate the defense (what they have publicly said their response 
will be), or worst of all, to launch a pre-emptive strike to get rid 
of the problem (the U.S. and its NATO allies) once and for all...ne-
glecting the fact that this response would probably induce a nuclear 
winter and spell their doom as well as ours.  We must consider how 
*they* will react to our moves and should tailor what we do to 
encourage them to react in a manner which will enhance our *mutual* 
security...it has been said that we all live in a very fragile life-
boat suspended in space...we cannot blow holes in the other end of 
the lifeboat without drowning ourselves!

	Surely, any stable peace must be built upon mutual trust.
And that trust can only be developed over time through a gradual
reduction in military forces with an accompanying increase in 
dialogue and understanding between the two nations.  Neither side 
must be put in a position where they feel they are vulnerable 
until relations are such that there is a mutual belief that each 
side has nothing to gain through aggression.  Yes, its pretty 
tough to trust them when you hear about some of things happening 
in Afghanistan and elsewhere.  However, we *do* trust them in other
respects such as international trade and going to funerals of
leaders to express "our condolences" (ie. Margaret Thatcher and 
George Bush did not fear for their lives when they went over there).
It is also true that deterrence has the undesirable quality of 
encouraging the opposing side to become the monster that we want 
to deter because of all the military posturing and exchanges of 
threats.  Holding a gun to somebody's head is a great way to make 
a normally passive person turn to violence as a means to save their 
skin.

	Regardless of how difficult it is, somebody must start the 
development of that international trust.  Star Wars is an attempt 
to use technology to evade this step, and the loss of face which 
would occur if it became widely known that Soviets are human too!
As hard as it may be to believe that spending $26 billion over 
five years could be "trying to take the easy way out", that's 
exactly what it is!  And that's only a start!  Here is an excerpt
from a article of the arms discussion news group:

"Hans Bethe, in a lecture at Cal Tech last week, very conservatively 
estimated the cost of deploying the space-based laser alone, even 
after the outrageous assumption that they would operate at all, would 
cost between 2 and 6 TRILLION dollars."

(1 trillion dollars looks like $1,000,000,000,000 when in numbers) 
If you spent 1 MILLION dollars for EVERY DAY since the birth of 
Christ, you would *still* not have 1 trillion dollars!  Think of all
the other things in the world that money could be spent on.

To believe that there can be a "technological panacea" for our dilemma is a
*very* dangerous misconception.  The fundamental problem is one of human
interrelations and greed (for money and power).  Canadians should NOT
participate in SDI because it simply aggravates these underlying problems.


				Al Banner

haapanen@watdcsu.UUCP (Tom Haapanen [DCS]) (04/01/85)

In article <890@ubc-vision.CDN> mack@ubc-vision.CDN (Alan Mackworth) writes:

>     -  Canadian participation will destroy  any  credibility  we
>     may  have  left  as  an  honest  broker on the international
>     stage.

Not true.  Canada is a part of NATO, and as such should take part in
NATO projects (next you'll be telling me we should get out of NATO).

>     -  SDI is an inefficient and wasteful  way  to  pursue  job-
>     creation.    Weapons   research  and  development  has  been
>     compared, in its economic impact, with digging  an  enormous
>     hole  in  the ground and filling it in again.  It has little
>     spinoff benefit to the industrial and consumer economy.  The
>     economic  multiplier effects are minimal compared with other
>     activities.  Using lasers, particle beams and  computers  to
>     dig  the  hole does not change that fact! The United States'
>     economy is now overheated because of massive military expen-
>     ditures.  It appears however that, fundamentally, that econ-
>     omy is in decline.   In  1984  the  United  States'  current
>     account  balance  of  payments deficit was $101,600,000,000.
>     It is now a net debtor nation.  Is this the economic perfor-
>     mance we want to emulate?

I am not saying that SDI is the greatest way to pursue job-creation,
but it is a delusion to say that it does not have an economic impact.
Just how did you figure that ``multiplier effects are minimal''.  As I
remember from my Econ courses, multiplier effect stems from the fact
that money circulates in the eonomy, and spending by one person
results in income by another, and hence further spending.

Well, SDI money would not just be thrown away; it would be spent on
salaries, equipment and materials.  Purchases of each one of these
result in income to somebody else (scientists, technicians, computer
companies, ...) who will once again spend the money for a further
multiplier effect.  There IS a significant economic impact from
significant spending, regardless of whether it's for the military or
not.

>          Instead of SDI and military research we should  concen-
>     trate   our  efforts  on  developing  a  humane  technology,
>     oriented at the consumer market and at the enormous problems
>     we  face  in  manpower training, health, education, resource
>     management and manufacturing technology.   These  are  areas
>     that  have  high  economic  multipliers, generate meaningful
>     employment and wealth, and at the same time do not  threaten
>     our survival.

An admirable thought (especially the ``meaningful jobs'' part).
However, the Russians DO threaten our survival, too, and we can't
quite ignore them.

>          As professionals we must speak up and let the    
>     decision makers know our feelings, loud and clear.

I'm only a student, but you heard mine.


				   \tom haapanen
				   watmath!watdcsu!haapanen
Don't cry, don't do anything
No lies, back in the government
No tears, party time is here again
President Gas is up for president		 (c) Psychedelic Furs, 1982

henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (04/01/85)

While calling Israel "belligerent" is pushing things rather far, one
should recognize that Israel is one of the few (so far) nations which
has both nuclear weaponry and a serious possibility of getting into
sufficiently dire straits to consider using it.  The one major reassuring
note is Israel's considerable non-nuclear combat superiority over its
hostile neighbors.

We can only hope that the fragile peace in the Middle East gets a bit
less fragile.  The prospect of Israel having to choose between its own
destruction and starting even a local nuclear war is most unsettling.
-- 
				Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
				{allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry

henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (04/01/85)

> ...focus on benefits to society from the economic and cultural is not
> unreasonable.   As many people have observed, the Japanese fifth
> generation project seeks to provide the tools for transition to an
> information society.  This includes lots of things like improving
> quality of life, improving the the production and delivery of good and
> services, and providing better access to knowledge of all kinds.
> I would like to see those who have defended defense research on the basis 
> of our ``imperfect world'' try their hand at explaining why these goals
> are not more important?

Any consideration of economic and cultural benefits assumes that you will
survive and remain free long enough to be interested.  Given an imperfect
world, this cannot be taken for granted.
-- 
				Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
				{allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry

henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (04/01/85)

A couple of issues of fact, first:

> The Trident submarines are each 
> capable of annihilating most of the Soviet Union using the new 
> Trident II missiles with a flight time of only 10 minutes or so 
> (not enough time to respond) and are largely invulnerable...another 
> first-strike weapon?

Trident II is barely under development; it will be years before it is
operational.  The current subs carry Trident I.

> The cruise missiles are capable of evading 
> detection and penetrating through defenses...another first-strike 
> weapon?

A first-strike weapon that takes hours to reach its target?  Come off it.
"Evading detection" does not mean that they are invisible, just that they
are relatively hard to find and shoot down.  It doesn't mean that there
is any major difficulty in determining that you are under attack from
them.  (If for no other reason than that they won't all arrive at their
targets simultaneously, and their low speed means that there will be a
considerable spread of arrival times.)  Any ICBMs that are left around by
the time a cruise missile arrives, have been left around deliberately.

These points are *not* quibbling; inflation of the threat is a classic
tactic of propaganda.  It is difficult to debate issues intelligently
when you cannot agree on the basic facts first.

> In the Strategic Computing Initiative, one of the projects 
> is to develop the capability to develop an "autonomous vehicle" 
> which are capable of "reconnaissance and attack missions".  They 
> specify that some will work in high radiation environments.

Virtually anything the US military buys these days is specified to work
in a nuclear-war environment.  There is nothing unusual in this being
specified for a new device.

> There
> have been a multitude of reports of talk in the Pentagon of "fighting
> and winning a protracted nuclear war".

And such talk has been a standard feature of Soviet strategy for over
thirty years.  Not because they are evil, but because they view nuclear
war differently.  They are convinced that any major war *will* go nuclear,
and that the *only* way to deter such a war is to convince the US that it
cannot possibly win.  This requires being prepared to fight such a war.
Note that this is quite different from orthodox US policy, which is to
deter a war by convincing the Soviets that it would be too horrible to
contemplate.  The difference in views, and the lack of recognition of
the difference, are most worrisome.  One might, with great hesitation,
consider the recent shift in attitudes in the Pentagon a *favorable*
sign -- at least the two sides are on the same wavelength.  Maybe.

> ...  What if the defense was intended 
> to protect the U.S. from a weak retaliatory strike by the U.S.S.R. 
> after an American first strike?!!  It would be much more effective 
> for that!

This is a real and serious worry.

> It would also be very effective to destroy Soviet 
> satellites (to blind them) just prior to an American first-strike.

Not really.  It would constitute giving advance warning of the attack.
Why *else* would one blind Soviet satellites??  Such a move by the US
is quite unlikely, simply because it *might* trigger an all-out attack.

> 	You find it very hard to believe that the Americans would do 
> such a thing.  Well I find it hard to believe that's Ronald Reagan's 
> real intention as well.  The all important point, however, is that 
> the Russians may not find it so hard to believe...they are nervous!

It is worth remembering that at one point, back in pre-missile days,
there were some American generals who seriously believed that a nuclear
first strike against the Soviet Union was not only reasonable but the
right thing to do.  Fortunately, they were not in positions of influence.
You can bet the Soviets remember them, though.

> ...  We must consider how 
> *they* will react to our moves and should tailor what we do to 
> encourage them to react in a manner which will enhance our *mutual* 
> security...

Quite true.  But see my note earlier, about the two sides not thinking
the same way about quite fundamental issues.  Many ill-informed people
assume that the US view of deterrence is the only view; not so.  If you
want another example...  Orthodox US policy (still deeply ingrained,
despite recent noises) is to aim missiles at Soviet civilians, on the
"deter war by making it too horrible" theory, otherwise known as "Mutual
Assured Destruction".  But the Soviets have never believed in MAD, and
have always aimed their missiles at military targets, although the effect
is much the same because many of these are in or near cities.  If you
are going to engage in the intricate dance of encouraging the Soviets
to think (hence react) in specific ways, remember these differences!

The if-we-do-this-then-they'll-think-this-and-do-this-so-we-should...
reasoning, and the involved strategies that go with it, are not part
of Soviet thought at all.  They consider such elaborate chains of
hypotheses ridiculous.  Maybe they're right.

>	Surely, any stable peace must be built upon mutual trust.

This is not entirely obvious.  Switzerland has not had to fight a war
in quite a long time, probably long enough for its peaceful relations
to be considered "stable".  (Longer than most peaces have lasted, in
fact.)  The Swiss did *not* get this way by mutual trust with their
neighbors; they got this way by being (a) friendly and willing to trade,
and (b) armed to the teeth in case somebody had different ideas.  I am
not saying that the Swiss model is necessarily right for the current
context, just pointing out that the "peace comes only from trust" claim
is verifiably false.

> "Hans Bethe, in a lecture at Cal Tech last week, very conservatively 
> estimated the cost of deploying the space-based laser alone, even 
> after the outrageous assumption that they would operate at all, would 
> cost between 2 and 6 TRILLION dollars."

Many people think this estimate is preposterous, hopelessly biased.
If for no other reason, consider that most of this is launch costs,
and a small fraction of that money, spent on better reusable launchers,
would cut launch costs by an order of magnitude or more.

> (1 trillion dollars looks like $1,000,000,000,000 when in numbers) 
> If you spent 1 MILLION dollars for EVERY DAY since the birth of 
> Christ, you would *still* not have 1 trillion dollars!

Divided by the population of the Western world, it's about $2000 apiece.
A lot, but not ridiculous.

> Think of all
> the other things in the world that money could be spent on.

But it wouldn't get spent on them, would it?  It would get spent on cars
and cosmetics and tobacco.  "Think of the other things we could do with
that money" is a moving plea, but quite unrealistic.

> To believe that there can be a "technological panacea" for our dilemma is a
> *very* dangerous misconception.

To believe that technology cannot solve the problem, or at least change it
beyond all recognition, is an equally dangerous misconception.  Ask the
African tribes who attacked heavily-outnumbered British troops a century
ago, confident that they would win... and found themselves facing machine
guns.  The technological gap between breech-loading rifles and machine
guns is small, but the effect is huge.  It is fashionable nowadays to
proclaim that technology cannot solve anything, or change anything, in
any important way.  This too is verifiably false.  It can, and does.
The question of whether technology can solve this *particular* problem
remains open.  It is neither a sure thing nor a self-evident folly.

> The fundamental problem is one of human
> interrelations and greed (for money and power).

But is there a fundamental solution?  One that we can really achieve,
not just one to dream about?  History is not encouraging; the major
cases of sustained peace that I am aware of started out as "peace through
strength", not "peace through goodwill", although some of them eventually
evolved into the latter.

> Canadians should NOT
> participate in SDI because it simply aggravates these underlying problems.

But if we opt for an attack on these underlying problems, will we get
anywhere?  Greed is awfully fundamental.  Maybe a (careful) treatment
of the symptoms is the best we can hope for.  Freeman Dyson, for one,
has argued that antimissile defences are a part -- not the only part! --
of a viable treatment.
-- 
				Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
				{allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry

rggoebel@water.UUCP (Randy Goebel LPAIG) (04/02/85)

Henry Spencer, as well as others, haven't answered my question.  All this
``imperfect world'' discussion doesn't say anything.   There is obviously
a trade off between concern for society and its defense.  Too much concern
for the former means no defense, and too much for the latter means nothing
to defend.  I would much rather debate the tradeoff than argue about whether
it exists.   So tell me, where do you think Canada stands?  The US? Japan?

julian@deepthot.UUCP (Julian Davies) (04/03/85)

I agree with Alan's original comments. 
Some brief comments on other remarks:
 I haven't seen anything to suggest that "NATO has approved of the
SDI".  Events generally in Nato on the other side of the atlantic
(e.g. over disposition of cruise missiles) indicate that most Nato
participants are less willing to cosy up to the US administration than
is Canada.
  Statistics indicate that $ for $, military expenditures result in
fewer new jobs per dollar spent than any other significant area of
economic activity.  The reason in short is that most of the money goes
into high-tech devices rather than into salaries/pay for ordinary
people.  Of course, the better-paid classes of engineers, technicians
and scientists do pretty well out of military expenditures.
  Not only is the SDI destablizing, but it is clearly contrary to the
terms of the 1972 ABM Treaty.  This treaty banned the development of
new anti-ballistic-missile systems which are sea-based, space-based,
or mobile-land-based, precisely because new systems of those kinds
tend to undermine the 'balance of power' that has prevailed
(imperfectly).
  I don't think anyone with technical knowledge any longer seriously
believes that the SDI has any chance of making nuclear weapons
"obsolete" as President Reagan originally said it would;  so the
virtually inevitable consequence will be just another upward spiral of
the arms race.
		Julian Davies

gwhawkins@watrose.UUCP (gwhawkins) (04/03/85)

The idea that the future of humanity would be in the control of
complex AI systems is rather appealing.  Using the good ol' GIGO
rule, the computers would eventually decide to blow us out of 
existence (after all they will be programmed by/as military minds).
This would kill most "higher" forms of life on earth leaving the
lowliest of amoebas (sp?) to start evolution all over again.

Maybe nature wouldn't make the mistake of inventing man this time.

		have a nice day (if we live that long)
		larry fast (Universty of Waterloo)
		broadcasting from exile

henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (04/03/85)

> Henry Spencer, as well as others, haven't answered my question.

We can only answer the questions that you ask.

> All this
> ``imperfect world'' discussion doesn't say anything.   There is obviously
> a trade off between concern for society and its defense.  Too much concern
> for the former means no defense, and too much for the latter means nothing
> to defend.  I would much rather debate the tradeoff than argue about whether
> it exists.

Sure sounded like you were arguing against its existence.  Glad to hear
otherwise.
-- 
				Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
				{allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry

mmt@dciem.UUCP (Martin Taylor) (04/04/85)

>Henry Spencer, as well as others, haven't answered my question.  All this
>``imperfect world'' discussion doesn't say anything.   There is obviously
>a trade off between concern for society and its defense.  Too much concern
>for the former means no defense, and too much for the latter means nothing
>to defend.  I would much rather debate the tradeoff than argue about whether
>it exists.   So tell me, where do you think Canada stands?  The US? Japan?

OK, you asked. [I still think can.politics is the better group for
this discussion, but since you insist on keeping it here, here goes.]

I think Canada should not at present be concerned with any trade-off
between defence and society, since we pay far too little for each.
We should be supporting research, especially the so-called "soft"
sciences, very much more strongly than we are.  The best defence is
not to be attacked, and we (and the world) need to find other ways
of avoiding being attacked than just to put up terrifying defences.
Defence need not involve killing people -- it should mean that no-one
tries to kill or subjugate us.

We need to spend a great deal more on cultural things.  Canada has been
getting better in this respect over the last couple of decades, but
we have a long way to go before public awareness is sufficient to
support an indigenous Canadian culture in the presence of the strong
US presence (in context of this discussion, consider it as supplying
extra calcium to prevent strontium-90 poisoning from fallout).

We need to spend more on conventional defence and on defence research,
since that is the only way I can see of avoiding complete US domination,
or of persuading a potential attacker that it wouldn't be worthwhile
to follow through (but I don't mean acquiring our own nuclear deterrent).
The need for defence research follows from the fact that our ships
probably wouldn't last ten minutes in a Falklands type of war, and
we don't have much ability to handle sophisticated weapons in any field.
But I really think the biggest amount of money to be spent on defence
research should be in peace psychology (ie conflict resolution and
related sociological subjects).

In summary, where we stand relative to the US and to Japan is --
nowhere, man.  Where we should stand is in neither place.  Lester
Pearson showed us where we should be going, but we have lost the
way.  Remember that Pearson designed NATO as a three-pronged affair:
military, cultural, and economic.  The strength of the Atlantic
Alliance was to depend on all three areas, and I think the failure
of the Alliance is that the military leg of the tripod has been the
only one seriously supported.  It is the leg that should not be
very necessary if the others were truly functional (I know, the Science
Council exists, and funds Workshops and Advanced Study Institutes,
but it's far from the cultural alliance Pearson had in mind).
The West would be very strong if NATO functioned as Pearson hoped,
and would probably spend a great deal less on military hardware,
because it would be so strong otherwise.
-- 

Martin Taylor
{allegra,linus,ihnp4,floyd,ubc-vision}!utzoo!dciem!mmt
{uw-beaver,qucis,watmath}!utcsri!dciem!mmt