fred@mnetor.UUCP (05/29/85)
Well, those that represent our interests have still not decided whether we are to participate in the U.S. "Star-Wars" defence research. I feel I should contribute my two cents worth, so here it goes. I believe that we should not invest any effort or cash in this project; not because I am pro-communist, (I am a member of the PC's and a friend of John Gamble - which should stand me solidly on the right!), but because from what I've heard of it, it won't work. It only defends against ICBM delivery, and it is not even 100% at that! It is very easy for the Soviets to say OK, we'll just deliver the bombs by a different method, (ie. planes, trucks,...), and the west can play with all their high tech toys all they like. It is even possible that nuclear devices be planted in strategic locations far in advance of hostilities for detination at the convenient time, *without warning*. The cost is very low compared to the budget for Star Wars. This means that the whole effort is a waste of time from a stategic standpoint. About the only advantage I can see is the development of a capability to handle this kind of technology. The spin-offs might be rather neat. But it doesn't really justify the expence. We could spend the money to much better advantage elsewhere, and that could include conventional military weapons as well as more peaceful research. Things that are more likely to be used. That's it folks...any comments? Cheers, Fred Williams.
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (05/30/85)
> It is very easy for the Soviets to say OK, we'll just deliver > the bombs by a different method, (ie. planes, trucks,...), and > the west can play with all their high tech toys all they like. Planes and trucks we *know* how to defend against. Not necessarily easy, mind you, but easier than ICBMs. > It is even possible that nuclear devices be planted in strategic > locations far in advance of hostilities for detination at the > convenient time, *without warning*. ... Possible, but very hard to keep completely secret. Hard to do in bulk -- we're not talking one or two bombs here -- without provoking an immediate war, hence useless as a deterrent. (Smuggling nuclear bombs into an unfriendly country sure sounds to me like something that the "recipient" would class as an act of war.) -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
fred@mnetor.UUCP (Fred Williams) (05/30/85)
In article <5642@utzoo.UUCP> henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) writes: >> It is very easy for the Soviets to say OK, we'll just deliver >> the bombs by a different method, (ie. planes, trucks,...), and > >Planes and trucks we *know* how to defend against. Not necessarily easy, >mind you, but easier than ICBMs. WHAT?!?! If we know how to defend against these, How come so much dope gets smuggled into the country? With only a small fraction of the proposed Star Wars budget I could smuggle humdreds of "bombs" into the US, or any other country, and plant them, and maintain them in a ready state. A few might be intercepted, but the percentage would be good! > >> It is even possible that nuclear devices be planted in strategic >> locations far in advance of hostilities for detination at the >> convenient time, *without warning*. ... > >Possible, but very hard to keep completely secret. Hard to do in bulk -- >we're not talking one or two bombs here -- without provoking an immediate >war, hence useless as a deterrent. (Smuggling nuclear bombs into an >unfriendly country sure sounds to me like something that the "recipient" >would class as an act of war.) >-- > Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology > {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry Not if they don't know who was doing it. Suppose it was some members of a terrorist group. Suppose the bomb were of the defending countries own design. Also if the bomb has not actually exploded I doubt that a nation would start a war over it. The consequences would be deadly. Cheers, Fred Williams.
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (05/30/85)
> >Planes and trucks we *know* how to defend against. Not necessarily easy, > >mind you, but easier than ICBMs. > > WHAT?!?! If we know how to defend against these, How come so > much dope gets smuggled into the country? With only a small > fraction of the proposed Star Wars budget I could smuggle > humdreds of "bombs" into the US, or any other country, and > plant them, and maintain them in a ready state. A few might > be intercepted, but the percentage would be good! The resources invested in dope smuggling are probably an order of magnitude larger than those invested in stopping it. It's no surprise that a lot gets through, given that imbalance. Don't mistake this for a fundamental inability to reduce the success rate drastically. > >Possible, but very hard to keep completely secret. Hard to do in bulk -- > >we're not talking one or two bombs here -- without provoking an immediate > >war, hence useless as a deterrent... > > Not if they don't know who was doing it. Suppose it was some > members of a terrorist group. Suppose the bomb were of the > defending countries own design. Also if the bomb has not actually > exploded I doubt that a nation would start a war over it. The > consequences would be deadly. When I said "hard to keep secret", I meant who's doing it as well as the fact that someone is. No way could this be hidden if hundreds of bombs are involved. If for no other reason than that the number of organizations in the world that are capable of building hundreds of nuclear bombs is *very* small. Remember, we are talking about lots of bombs, not just one or two. Smuggling those bombs, and arming them when an "attack order" seems imminent -- nobody in his right mind leaves explosives of any kind, let alone nuclear weapons, ready to explode when you don't want them exploding! -- will require hundreds of people. No way can that many people keep a secret that big; some of them will blab, and probably a few of them will be planted spies. As for whether the nation would start a war over it... Shipping nuclear weapons into a country is a nuclear attack in the making. Remember, there is no way for the defender to know that those bombs aren't going to be exploded at once. If other means of nuclear-weapon delivery have been rendered impotent by defences -- and if not, why bother smuggling? -- then there is no risk of immediate devastating retaliation for starting a war. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
fred@mnetor.UUCP (05/31/85)
In article <5645@utzoo.UUCP> henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) writes: >> >Planes and trucks we *know* how to defend against. Not necessarily easy, >> >mind you, but easier than ICBMs. >> >> WHAT?!?! If we know how to defend against these, How come so >> much dope gets smuggled into the country? ... > >The resources invested in dope smuggling are probably an order of magnitude >larger than those invested in stopping it. It's no surprise that a lot >gets through, given that imbalance. Don't mistake this for a fundamental >inability to reduce the success rate drastically. > >> >Possible, but very hard to keep completely secret. Hard to do in bulk -- >When I said "hard to keep secret", I meant who's doing it as well as the >fact that someone is. No way could this be hidden if hundreds of bombs >are involved. If for no other reason than that the number of organizations >in the world that are capable of building hundreds of nuclear bombs is >*very* small. Remember, we are talking about lots of bombs, not just one >or two. Smuggling those bombs, and arming them when an "attack order" >seems imminent -- nobody in his right mind leaves explosives of any kind, >let alone nuclear weapons, ready to explode when you don't want them >exploding! -- will require hundreds of people. No way can that many >people keep a secret that big; some of them will blab, and probably a few >of them will be planted spies. > Hundreds of bombs are not necessary. If one were going to explode hundreds of bombs, one might as well do it on their own territory. It would shortly get to the rest of the world anyway! A couple of dozen should be sufficient, or at least the most one could expend while still maintaining a situation where life might be worth living afterwards. Yes, I know there are probably more military targets than that, but lets not go totally insane, or have we already? Lots of people can keep a secret that big, though. Remember D-day? Also leaving chemical explosives around for a while may cause them to deteriorate, but nuclear devices or the kind we are discussing should store quite well. The fissionable material is chemically only metal, and hydrogen and such may need replenishing or whatever, but mostly a status check once a month would be all that is necessary. Smuggling things across the border into the U.S. is not an expensive proposition, merely illegal. With such a long border and so few people defending it,(per mile), it would be a very simple matter. The Soviet Union would be more difficult, but they aren't planning a Star Wars defence system . . . yet. Just a thought, this may already have been done. Have a nice day! Cheers, Fred Williams. >As for whether the nation would start a war over it... Shipping nuclear >weapons into a country is a nuclear attack in the making. Remember, there >is no way for the defender to know that those bombs aren't going to be >exploded at once. If other means of nuclear-weapon delivery have been >rendered impotent by defences -- and if not, why bother smuggling? -- >then there is no risk of immediate devastating retaliation for starting >a war. >-- > Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology > {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
ken@alberta.UUCP (Ken Hruday) (06/01/85)
In article <893@mnetor.UUCP> fred@mnetor.UUCP writes: > > Well, those that represent our interests have still not decided >whether we are to participate in the U.S. "Star-Wars" defence >research. I recall watching a news program in which the Official Canadian "reaction" to Star Wars was discussed. The consensus of the experts was that the Mulroney Government had probably already made up their minds that they would participate, the percieved purpose of the study they initiated was that it is a stalling tactic to allow the government to gauge public opinion and to prepare the people for the inevitable. > ... but because from what I've heard of it, >it won't work. It only defends against ICBM delivery, and it >is not even 100% at that! > It is very easy for the Soviets to say OK, we'll just deliver >the bombs by a different method, (ie. planes, trucks,...), and >the west can play with all their high tech toys all they like. >It is even possible that nuclear devices be planted in strategic >locations far in advance of hostilities for detination at the >convenient time, *without warning*. The cost is very low compared >to the budget for Star Wars. This means that the whole effort is >a waste of time from a stategic standpoint. Actually, the consensus seems to be that the system can be easily overwhelmed by increasing the number of ICBMs without resorting to different delivery schemes. This would likely result in an escalation in armaments since this "counter Star Wars stategy" is the simplest and most cost effective of all. The Russians don't need to do anything different than what they're doing now - they just do more of it. But additional delivery methods are an alternative, with a cruise missle type of approach being the most likely - if and when they develop the appropriate technology. > About the only advantage I can see is the development of a >capability to handle this kind of technology. The spin-offs >might be rather neat. But it doesn't really justify the expence. Some observers claim that this is the very reason that the Soviets are worried about the Star Wars scheme - not so much that they expect it to work but the possibly large technology gap that could be created. It is difficult to say whether this type of program would "create" more technology than a more directed program such as the Japanese 5th generation project. >We could spend the money to much better advantage elsewhere, and >that could include conventional military weapons as well as >more peaceful research. Things that are more likely to be used. > That's it folks...any comments? > >Cheers, Fred Williams. I agree that the money could be better spent elsewhere but it wasn't clear to me whether Canada would be footing the bill or whether the U.S. military would be contracting out to Canadian companies. Does anyone have clarification on this? If the Canadian government was to sponser any involvement, my vote is also NO. Our money could be spent more effectively on more peaceful research or on reducing the national debt. It seems to me that the Star Wars scheme is another instance of throwing money at a problem and hoping that it'll go away. Some problems have no monetary solution and I'm afraid that world peace is one of them. Constructing an "Ultimate Defense Shield" is, in some ways, easier than solving the problem the old fashioned way - ie. compromise. I suspect that the White House would rather acheive peace without conceding anything to the Russians (the reverse also holds, although the Russians aren't in a position to propose anything as ambitious as Star Wars). I don't believe that Star Wars is a solution to global destruction, the only sure way to prevent missle attack is to insure that there are no missles to launch. Ken Hruday University of Alberta
robinson@ubc-cs.UUCP (Jim Robinson) (06/02/85)
In article <524@alberta.UUCP> ken@alberta.UUCP (Ken Hruday) writes: >I agree that the money could be better spent elsewhere but it wasn't >clear to me whether Canada would be footing the bill or whether the >U.S. military would be contracting out to Canadian companies. Does >anyone have clarification on this? If the Canadian government was >to sponser any involvement, my vote is also NO. Our money could be >spent more effectively on more peaceful research or on reducing the >national debt. As far as I know Washington has dropped the requirement for a formal answer to their invitation and will now be satisfied if the various NATO countries merely allow their companies to bid on the contracts. J.B. Robinson
george@mnetor.UUCP (George Hart) (06/03/85)
In <524@alberta.UUCP>, Ken Hruday writes, > Actually, the consensus seems to be that the system can be easily > overwhelmed by increasing the number of ICBMs without resorting to > different delivery schemes. This would likely result in an escalation > in armaments since this "counter Star Wars stategy" is the simplest > and most cost effective of all. The Russians don't need to do anything > different than what they're doing now - they just do more of it. > But additional delivery methods are an alternative, with a cruise > missle type of approach being the most likely - if and when they > develop the appropriate technology. Don't look now, but they already have the appropriate technology. In fact, they have already flight tested a cruise missile prototype. Perhaps not quite as advanced, but with a nuclear warhead, does it *really* matter? -- Regards, George Hart, Computer X Canada Ltd. {cbosgd, decvax, harpo, ihnp4}!utcs!mnetor!george
andrews@ubc-cs.UUCP (James H. Andrews) (06/04/85)
I submit to you that SDI, the Star Wars plan, is not a program of altruistic
research designed to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Rather, I submit, it
is a program of research designed to upset the Cold War balance of terror in
favour of the U.S., as such is dangerously destabilizing, and as such is not
a good thing for Canada to get into as it stands.
{ Note: I'm not even considering the unlikelihood of anything coming of SDI
(which makes it even more of a sop to the military industry of the U.S.)
or the violation of various treaties that would come of the U.S. deploying
such a system. }
A Star Wars system, if deployed, would have only one effect on the world's
military situation: it would decrease the effectiveness of the Soviets'
weapons in times of war. If the Reagan administration were sincere in
wanting SDI to "make nuclear weapons obsolete", it could take several
different approaches than it has.
One thing it could do is to develop the SDI technology in full cooperation
with the Soviets, or have full disclosure of the products of that research
to the Soviets. This would allow both superpowers to deploy Star Wars systems
simultaneously, decreasing the number of effective nuclear weapons while
maintaining stability. This, of course, was the gist of Reagan's crazed
suggestion in the second Presidential debate, which was immediately
explained away by his advisors.
Another positive way Star Wars technology could be applied is for the US to
commit itself to dismantling a comparable number of nuclear weapons as would
be destroyed by a Star Wars system. This is basically a "nuclear build-down"
scheme, explained before in this newsgroup by people more knowledgeable in
its intricacies than I.
As proposed by the Reagan administration, the SDI research does none of this.
It simply moves toward development of a neat doodad we can put in orbit to
blow away Soviet missiles.
So far, indeed, it's only research. But that makes me even more amazed that
they haven't at least suggested that maybe they will attempt to use the
technology being researched in a truly positive way, sometime in the future.
Make no mistake. The *only* nuclear weapons that the Reaganauts want to make
obsolete are the *Soviet* ones. If Canada joins in the SDI research at all,
it should be to research ways in which the technology could be turned around
to benefit humankind, the way Uncle Ronnie says it should be.
--Jamie.
...alberta!ubc-vision!ubc-cs!andrewshenry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (06/04/85)
> ... Hundreds of bombs are not necessary. ... A couple of dozen > should be sufficient, or at least the most one could expend while > still maintaining a situation where life might be worth living > afterwards. Yes, I know there are probably more military targets > than that, but lets not go totally insane, or have we already? It depends on what we're talking about. If we are talking about whether smuggled bombs are a realistic alternative to an ICBM force, and hence a realistic counter-argument to SDI deployment, then it's not at all clear that a couple of dozen is enough. Especially given the Soviet view of targeting, which is *not* the same as the US view. The Soviets don't believe in the idea of holding civilian populations hostage, and never have. Not because they're sweethearts, mind you, but because they have a rather different philosophy of deterrence. The US philosophy can be summed up as "make it clear that a nuclear war would totally destroy both sides, so the Soviets will be too scared to start one". The Soviet philosophy, by contrast, is "make it clear that the US cannot possibly win a nuclear war, so they will be too scared to start one". So the Soviets point their ICBMs at military targets -- broadly defined, e.g. Toronto International is a military target because military aircraft could operate from it -- and not (except as an accidental result of the location of military targets) at population centers. Again, *not* because they are sweethearts, but because population centers per se are not tools for fighting a nuclear war, so attacking them is pointless -- it won't affect the US's ability to fight a war. When hundreds of bombs are involved, the difference quickly becomes academic, because all too many targets of military value are in or near population centers. When only a couple of dozen are involved... damned if I know. It's not at all obvious to me that the Soviets would think a couple of dozen bombs a useful deterrent. (Incidentally, learning about Soviet targeting philosophy -- on this fairly general level -- does not require access to anything classified. They are quite open about it, the same way the US is quite open about MAD. All you have to do is make an effort to find out, rather than just blindly assuming that both sides think the same way.) > Lots of people can keep a secret that big, though. Remember D-day? I sure do. And the Germans knew about it ahead of time too, although they had been carefully misled about the exact strategy and location. No, lots of people cannot keep a secret that big. If you want some proof, one of the photos in David Kahn's "The Codebreakers" is of a German telegram saying essentially "the `go' signal for the invasion has been broadcast, so the Allies will land tomorrow morning". The Germans were expecting a diversionary attack at Normandy followed by the real landing at Calais, so D-Day hit defences that weren't quite as strong as they might have been. And the notification of impending invasion hadn't gotten to all the German units that should have heard. But the German command most definitely knew about it well in advance. > Also leaving chemical explosives around for a while may cause > them to deteriorate, but nuclear devices or the kind we are discussing > should store quite well. The fissionable material is chemically > only metal, and hydrogen and such may need replenishing or whatever, > but mostly a status check once a month would be all that is necessary. A once-a-month status check is still enough to require a permanent organization in place. And nuclear bombs, by the way, contain chemical explosives. But you've missed my point; the reason one does not leave chemical explosives armed is not because they deteriorate, but because they might go off! Safe explosives handling requires elaborate paranoia. (For example, not only are detonators never stored already installed in explosives, but they are never stored in the same room as explosives, and are never transported in the same vehicle.) Nuclear bombs make this worse, not better: at least in peacetime, there must be no chance whatsoever that a nuclear bomb will explode without positive authorization to do so. Which means that the bomb must be armed only after an explosion has been authorized. The Soviets are, if anything, fussier about such positive central control than we are; it's one of the reasons why they are reluctant to rely heavily on missile subs. > Smuggling things across the border into the U.S. is not an > expensive proposition, merely illegal. With such a long border > and so few people defending it,(per mile), it would be a very > simple matter. If you assume that the US remains totally ignorant of what's going on, sure. As discussed above, this is an unrealistic assumption. And my previous comments about such smuggling being an act of war are also relevant. > The Soviet Union would be more difficult, but they > aren't planning a Star Wars defence system . . . yet. I hate to tell you this, but the Soviet Union has been more committed to antimissile defences than the US for many years. If they aren't planning the equivalent of SDI, it's a problem of capability rather than intent. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
fred@mnetor.UUCP (Fred Williams) (06/05/85)
In article <5661@utzoo.UUCP> henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) writes: > >The Soviets don't believe in the idea of holding civilian populations >hostage, and never have. Not because they're sweethearts, mind you, but >because they have a rather different philosophy of deterrence. The US >philosophy can be summed up as "make it clear that a nuclear war would >totally destroy both sides, so the Soviets will be too scared to start one". >The Soviet philosophy, by contrast, is "make it clear that the US cannot >possibly win a nuclear war, so they will be too scared to start one". The so-called American view is quite realistic. In a nuclear war of such proportions that it would cripple either side's ability to make war, there would be no survivors! Yes I suppose this would mean that the US did not win. >So the Soviets point their ICBMs at military targets -- broadly defined, >e.g. Toronto International is a military target because military aircraft >could operate from it -- and not (except as an accidental result of the >location of military targets) at population centers. Again, *not* because >they are sweethearts, but because population centers per se are not tools >for fighting a nuclear war, so attacking them is pointless -- it won't >affect the US's ability to fight a war. Let face it there are no "sweethearts" in these circles. One military reality that is observed to some extent by both sides is the principle that if territory cannot be occupied, it is not captured. But lets not be decieved. So far the babies on both sides of this planet have been playing with the same toys and the way they intend to use them depends only on which stage of the hostilities they are at. > >When hundreds of bombs are involved, the difference quickly becomes >academic, because all too many targets of military value are in or near >population centers. When only a couple of dozen are involved... damned >if I know. It's not at all obvious to me that the Soviets would think >a couple of dozen bombs a useful deterrent. Would they think hundreds of bombs to be suicide? > >(Incidentally, learning about Soviet targeting philosophy -- on this >fairly general level -- does not require access to anything classified. >They are quite open about it, the same way the US is quite open about >MAD. All you have to do is make an effort to find out, rather than >just blindly assuming that both sides think the same way.) If you believe this, I've got some land in Florida your just going to *love*. >I hate to tell you this, but the Soviet Union has been more committed to >antimissile defences than the US for many years. If they aren't planning >the equivalent of SDI, it's a problem of capability rather than intent. I never said that they didn't have anti-missle defences. I am quite sure that it is only a problem of their capability. That is also the reason we don't have an SDI, *yet*. Like I said before, there are no sweethearts anywhere in this game. The real question here is one of technology. Developing anything of the level of the proposed SDI would result in a tremendous boost in technology. This can be translated into dollars. What is really happening is that the US, with a very strong ecenomy, is proposing to boost the cost of the arms race beyond the range of the Soviets who have a weak economy, (by compasison). SDI hits them right where it hurts most...in the pocket book. That is why they are upset! I don't blame them. It would be a major blow from which they may never recover. >-- > Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology > {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry Cheers, Fred Williams
hogg@utcsri.UUCP (John Hogg) (06/05/85)
Henry Spencer has made statements about the nuclear philosophies of the two
superpowers. While I respect him as the most informed contributor to this
newsgroup, I would like to dispute his claim that the US policy is MAD, and
only MAD.
While this may be the current party line, the military is moving away from
it, dragging the politicians as they go. The new doctrine is one of
"flexible response": there is a continuous spectrum of options ranging from
conventional forces through tactical nukes on up to full-scale
shoot-the-works. Nuclear wars are no longer expected to be over in an hour
and a half; each side can chuck a few warheads over, inspect the results,
and decide whether to hang in for another round. Military planners are
seriously discussing exchanges of this nature that continue for *weeks* or
*months*.
The Soviets have claimed that their response will be one of massive
retaliation to any nuclear strike. If this is true, then it makes the
flexible response strategy meaningless. I believe the Soviets in this
particular case, as it fits in with my opinion of their way of
thinking. Choose your own model of Russian behaviour; just keep it
consistent through all your arguments.
Generally, Henry is right about bombs-in-a-basement being farfetched. The
inability of SDI to deal with this is not one of its numerous failings. A
group here at CSRI has presented a brief to the Liberal Task Force on
Peace, Security and World Disarmament outlining the serious dangers of SDI
from a computer scientist's point of view. I will try to get the authors'
permission to post it. As time permits, I will also point out the major
flaws in the physics and strategy of the system.
I realize that (in typical Usenet style) I have provided no references for
my claims. However, if anybody asks, I will hunt them down.
--
John Hogg
Computer Systems Research Institute, UofT
{allegra,cornell,decvax,ihnp4,linus,utzoo}!utcsri!hogghenry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (06/05/85)
> The so-called American view is quite realistic. In a nuclear war > of such proportions that it would cripple either side's ability to > make war, there would be no survivors! Yes I suppose this would mean > that the US did not win. I have minor disagreements with this (my opinion of humanity's survival potential is obviously higher than yours), but not major ones. However, I must point out that the Soviets don't necessarily agree. I'm not sure whether they agree or not, but it cannot be taken for granted. Please don't claim "it's only logical", because that logic relies on a number of assumptions, which are not necessarily universally shared. > >... It's not at all obvious to me that the Soviets would think > >a couple of dozen bombs a useful deterrent. > > Would they think hundreds of bombs to be suicide? Good question. I don't know. Soviet strategic thinking would probably be profoundly altered by the existence of an effective antimissile system, but it's hard to decide in what direction. > >(Incidentally, learning about Soviet targeting philosophy -- on this > >fairly general level -- does not require access to anything classified. > >They are quite open about it, the same way the US is quite open about > >MAD. All you have to do is make an effort to find out, rather than > >just blindly assuming that both sides think the same way.) > > If you believe this, I've got some land in Florida your just > going to *love*. I stand by my comment. I'm sorry, Fred, but you are simply being ignorant. Any well-researched and reasonably thorough book on nuclear strategy will explain the differences between US and Soviet targeting philosophies. (The actual targeting decisions are highly secret, but the basic philosophy is taught to hundreds of thousands of officers on both sides, and cannot possibly be kept secret. Neither side even tries.) For starters, the best popular treatment of this that I've seen is Nigel Calder's "Nuclear Nightmares", which is recent enough that you should be able to find it in any large bookstore. Do your homework, please. It is *important* that people realize that the US and the USSR don't agree about basic philosophy; it is more than a little frightening that most US politicians -- probably including Reagan -- assume identical responses to identical stimuli. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
konkin@sask.UUCP (Doug Konkin ) (06/05/85)
For those that are interested in a well-argued discussion of something
close to our home turf, the Strategic Computing Programme component of
SDI, I recommend this month's Atlantic Magazine. It highlights the
"a little knowledge is dangerous" trap of technocracy -- the US DoD doesn't
really understand what an undertaking of the size of SCP entails, and
simply believes that diligence and effort will make it work. Tell that to
the last subtle bug that made your life miserable!
Doug Konkin
U of Saskatchewan
{alberta, ihnp4, utcsri}!sask!konkinhenry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (06/05/85)
As a postscript to John Hogg's comments about the US departing somewhat
from MAD-and-only-MAD... US policy of late has moved somewhat towards
being able to fight a lengthy nuclear war (as opposed to a single quick
spasm), and there has been considerable uproar about how this attitude
(fighting a war, as opposed to just pushing all the buttons and dying)
"increases the risk of nuclear war". I have sometimes wondered whether
in fact it's the other way 'round. Soviet thinking about nuclear war
has always stressed the need to be able to *fight* a war well enough
that the US could not possibly win, to convince the US that there is
no point in starting one. So in effect, the recent changes in direction
in the US may have the accidental side effect of bringing the two nations'
basic philosophies of nuclear deterrence closer together. This improves
the chances of mutual understanding on such issues, and might actually
help *prevent* war!
--
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henryfred@mnetor.UUCP (Fred Williams) (06/06/85)
In article <5669@utzoo.UUCP> henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) writes: >. . . So in effect, the recent changes in direction >in the US may have the accidental side effect of bringing the two nations' >basic philosophies of nuclear deterrence closer together. This improves >the chances of mutual understanding on such issues, and might actually >help *prevent* war! >-- > Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology > {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry HENRY, Henry, Henry. . . I can see that you and I see the world through two entirely different set of eyes. The idea of fighting a limited nuclear war only has the attraction of one's being able to pull out if things if they appear to be getting too hot. This makes the whole endeavour seem less threatening, and therefore more thinkable. Some military types feel that it is worth sacrificing a few cities if they could just get rid of the other side. I think such ideas are dangerous. By the way, just in case we don't have enough to disagree about already; suppose you were the leader of , oh, say either side and you were told that three ICBM's were going to impact on your country in about ten minutes,(more or less). What is your opinion of the best, or say sanest response? Just to be fair I'll give you mine. I think that without any other special circumstances I would not launch a counter-strike right away. I would go to the highest alert status and make every effort to contact the other side. If three "targets" were destroyed, there would be no doubt about who was responsible for the first strike, or perhaps the only strike. I think the leader of the agressors would go down in history along with Hitler, even in his/her own country. The war could be won without even firing a shot. Furthermore, even if lost, how long do nations last on this earth, anyway? A few centuries? In the larger scheme of things, it is not worth risking the death of the human,(and many other), species for a temporary political victory. Looking forward to your response, Cheers, Fred Williams.
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (06/06/85)
> HENRY, Henry, Henry. . . I can see that you and I see the world > through two entirely different set of eyes. The idea of fighting a > limited nuclear war only has the attraction of one's being able to pull > out if things if they appear to be getting too hot. This makes the > whole endeavour seem less threatening, and therefore more thinkable.... FRED, Fred, Fred... You missed my point completely. I agree with you that the ability to fight a limited war makes war more likely, and I also agree with the implication that escalation to major disaster is more likely. But this is not the *only* implication of the shift in strategy! As I said in the article you refer to, it also has the side effect of bringing US and Soviet thinking *somewhat* closer together. It is *just* possible -- not certain -- that in the long run this just *might* be of sufficient benefit to balance out the increased risk. Whether this is enough to justify the change is another question entirely. My own view on "limited nuclear war" is that it is a theoretical concept only. In practice, in any war in Europe there will be enormous pressure to avoid "going nuclear". This will probably postpone the use of nuclear weapons long enough that the outcome will already have been decided. If the outcome is favorable, there will be no need for nuclear weapons. If it is not, there will be little to be gained. Considering this, and considering the significant risks involved in less-probable alternate scenarios, my own view is that tactical nuclear weapons in general are not earning their keep, and should be unilaterally scrapped at once. > Some military types feel that it is worth sacrificing a few cities > if they could just get rid of the other side. I think such ideas are > dangerous. There is just the faintest chance that those people are right, that in the long term this hypothetical (and probably impossible) one-sided exchange would be our best course of action. But you're right that the concept is dangerous; quite apart from the moral aspects (which I am not dismissing, just declining to discuss right now), there is too much chance that they are wrong, and too little chance that things could be made to go "as planned". (Before I have to dig out my asbestos terminal, let me repeat: I am not saying these people are right. I am saying that the chances of them being wrong are not quite 100%.) > By the way, just in case we don't have enough to disagree about > already; suppose you were the leader of , oh, say either side and > you were told that three ICBM's were going to impact on your country > in about ten minutes,(more or less). What is your opinion of the > best, or say sanest response? Clearly the sanest *immediate* response is to put everything on alert but do nothing irrevocable. The report might be a mistake. Just how much of an alert is justified, in fact, would depend on how solid the information was and where the ICBMs were headed (if this were known). Except perhaps for the case of a strike against command centers, three ICBMs are not going to do crippling damage to retaliatory forces, so there is no need for immediate drastic action. This is, by the way, supposedly current official US policy: there will be no commitment to a nuclear attack until nuclear warheads have exploded on US territory. Just how well this corresponds to the real policy is, of course, hard to tell. > ... I think the leader of the agressors would > go down in history along with Hitler, even in his/her own country. I think this possible but by no means certain. > The war could be won without even firing a shot. What do you mean by "won"? Even if the leader of the aggressors goes down in history as a villain, that doesn't necessarily mean that the mob will lynch him tomorrow. In fact, it's unlikely. Unless there is a major revolutionary movement poised to strike anyway, I see little chance of immediate adverse consequences to the people involved. In fact, they could claim that they have won, by forcing us to back down on our promises to retaliate. With considerable justice, too. What do we do if they launch another three ICBMs next week? There is also the domestic political situation to consider. Whether or not the aggressors perceive their victory in a refusal to retaliate, the people that I (the leader) am supposed to be leading and protecting most assuredly will. If I refuse to retaliate for millions of deaths and a major blow to our economy, the lynch mob might come for *me*! I will surely be deposed almost immediately, and my successor is likely to be a "bomb them back to the Stone Age" hardliner. I fear that some sort of retaliation is both inevitable and necessary. What form it should take is a hard question. If we were sure we could do it, perhaps invading and conquering one of their satellite countries might do. If it was necessary to retaliate with nuclear weapons, I think I would launch three ICBMs, one at a time with a substantial delay in between, making some attempt to select targets analogous to the ones they hit. This is really a no-win situation. > Furthermore, even if lost, how long do nations last on this earth, > anyway? A few centuries? In the larger scheme of things, it is not > worth risking the death of the human,(and many other), species > for a temporary political victory. Clearly, then, we should not risk the planet over our current disagreements with the Soviets, and we should surrender to them right now... It should be obvious that I don't agree with this philosophy. There are things that are worth risks; freedom is one of them. How *big* a risk... now that's a hard question. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (06/06/85)
> > By the way, just in case we don't have enough to disagree about > > already; suppose you were the leader of , oh, say either side and > > you were told that three ICBM's were going to impact on your country > > in about ten minutes,(more or less). What is your opinion of the > > best, or say sanest response? > > Clearly the sanest *immediate* response is to put everything on alert > but do nothing irrevocable. ... Forgot to mention: clearly *the* sanest immediate response, if it's available, is to shoot down those three ICBMs before they arrive. And then call up the other side and ask them what happened and what they plan to do about it. Of course, if the people opposed to "Star Wars" get their way, this option is closed to us. (Incidentally, I realize that going ahead with SDI does not guarantee us this option, for various reasons including the risk that SDI deployment will precipitate a full-scale war. But not going ahead with it, or something like it someday, most assuredly makes it impossible for us to defend ourselves. "Defend", as opposed to "deter".) -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
jchapman@watcgl.UUCP (john chapman) (06/07/85)
> > Furthermore, even if lost, how long do nations last on this earth, > > anyway? A few centuries? In the larger scheme of things, it is not > > worth risking the death of the human,(and many other), species > > for a temporary political victory. > > Clearly, then, we should not risk the planet over our current disagreements > with the Soviets, and we should surrender to them right now... It should be > obvious that I don't agree with this philosophy. There are things that > are worth risks; freedom is one of them. How *big* a risk... now that's > a hard question. > -- > Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology > {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry I'm glad someone finally brought this up. Do the majority of people in, say, North America really have a "better dead than red" attitude? Personally I think most people would rather risk soviet domination (which, as the original message points out, would necessarily be of a temporary nature) than risk seeing/having their children and grandchildren (friends, lovers, etc. etc) roasted alive, dying of radiation poisoning, starving to death in the aftermath, or simply left alive and wandering in the aftermath. I also think there would be few people in the soviet union who would be willing to make this trade. Even if the people on both sides did sincerely have this "better dead..." attitude they certainly don't have the right to take the rest of world with them, which a nuclear exchange would certainly do. Two problems I have with the arms race and immediate participants: 1. the people in charge are old and personally I think this makes them a lot more likely to die. ronnie reagan probably doesn't have nearly as much desire to keep living as I do; he's going to go soon anyhow. 2. the people who on both sides who would be the ones to start an exchange will be the ones most likely to survive it. It is the civilians who will suffer the big losses. Politicians & generals will have a *much* better chance of surviving. I read an interview with the director/head (can't remember the exact title) of emergency planning (canada) once. He had just described how the leaders of government, industry and the military would be in deep underground bunkers and would come out after an exchange to help restore society. When asked how this would be done since everyone not in a shelter would be dead the answer was along the lines of "well we think lots of people will survive in remote areas so we'll just send the army out to put them into (forced) labour camps until things get straightened out". So the very people who will destroy society will come out on top (relatively) again.
mack@ubc-vision.CDN (Alan Mackworth) (06/07/85)
From the Globe and Mail, June 7, 1985: "Robert McNamara has warned that President Ronald Reagan's proposed Star Wars missile defence system will sharply escalate the arms race because the Soviets will expend unlimited funds to invent the weapons to defeat it. Mr. McNamara, who served as defence secretary in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, said the President's original proposal in March 1983, seemed theoretically plausible because it called for substituting defensive for offensive nuclear weapons. Since that time it has become clear that building a 'leak-proof defence' is not possible, he said." When McNamara says that you'd better believe him. He's well-informed and not known (to put it non-libellously) for his peace-loving behaviour. What is interesting is his remark on the initial apparent plausibility of Star Wars. In the current issue of Harper's Magazine parts of a study commissioned by High Frontier (the military space lobby that dreamed up Star Wars) are reprinted. The study outlined their plans for the lobbying and media manipulation required to sell Star Wars in an era in which unlimited military extravagance was finally coming to public attention. The main recommmendation of the study was to recapture the peace symbols that the freeze movement had built in the public consciousness. Rompin' Ronnie's initial media barrage was very carefully crafted to achieve that effect. Although the Star Wars fantasy is finally being exposed for what it is (even by McNamara, NATO, et al), the distressing thing is that the endless public debate generated and the energy that has been diverted by it have in fact achieved the ends of those that proposed it, namely, to protect the insane levels of public expenditure on the armaments industry and to block any progress in arms control which stands in the way of further increases in the military budgets. As usual the peace movement has been out-manouevered. For a while we actually had the initiative but now we are once again reacting to the fantasies of the military lobby. The willingness to engage in rational debate on such irrational notions as increasing security through making our doomsday machine larger and laser-equipped legitimizes those fantasies. They should be exposed for what they are. Alan Mackworth <mack@ubc.csnet> | <mack@ubc-vision.uucp>
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (06/09/85)
> ... Do the majority of people > in, say, North America really have a "better dead than red" attitude? > Personally I think most people would rather risk soviet domination > (which, as the original message points out, would necessarily be of > a temporary nature) than risk [the nasty consequences of nuclear war.] > ... I also think there would > be few people in the soviet union who would be willing to make this > trade. It all depends on the size of the risk; not all risks are equivalent. As witness the lack of popular revolt against the current situation (the anti-nuclear marchers are numerically insignificant against the population of the nations involved), most people are willing to take a (perceived) small risk of nuclear war to avoid a (perceived) large risk of Soviet domination. This is a reasonable approach, since life inside the Soviet Union and its satellites is not a lot of fun. Even people who have never known anything else sometimes find Soviet life intolerable to the point of risking the near certainty of harsh punishment for rebellion, as witness the Novocherkassk [sp?] incident and others. Avoiding this is worthwhile. On the other hand, "better dead than red" is a political slogan rather than something most people really agree with all the way. Most people, most of the time, would rather be live cowards than dead heroes -- if those are *really* the only choices. Most people don't really think that the current situation is that simple; they would prefer to face *neither* Soviet rule nor nuclear war. As for the temporary nature of Soviet domination, when "temporary" is defined as centuries, it's permanent as far as most folks are concerned. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
jchapman@watcgl.UUCP (john chapman) (06/10/85)
> > ... Do the majority of people > > in, say, North America really have a "better dead than red" attitude? > > Personally I think most people would rather risk soviet domination > > (which, as the original message points out, would necessarily be of > > a temporary nature) than risk [the nasty consequences of nuclear war.] > > ... I also think there would > > be few people in the soviet union who would be willing to make this > > trade. > > It all depends on the size of the risk; not all risks are equivalent. ^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Quite true. I think that in a risk taking situation you should use a measure that includes both the cost and the size of the risk; e.g. (consequences of risk not working out)*(probability of risk not working out). What would a reasonable probability of nuclear war be? If we include war precipitated by accidental detonation/launch or phantom attacks being percieved by "defense" installations as well as actual planned attacks then perhaps a probability greater than 0.0000000....0000000001 would be resonable. How about the consequences? Since we are talking about what would very likely be the complete anihilation of all life on earth I think a value of infinity would be appropriate. > As witness the lack of popular revolt against the current situation (the > anti-nuclear marchers are numerically insignificant against the population > of the nations involved), most people are willing to take a (perceived) What do you consider insignificant? Polls indicate more than half of the canadian public does not want cruise testing in canada. Anywhere from 50,000 to 80,000 people (depending on whose estimates you want to believe) were in the last vancouver peace march ( I know that this is insignificant compared to the US/USSR populations but it is large for Canada and we do participate in the nuclear arms race in one way or another). > small risk of nuclear war to avoid a (perceived) large risk of Soviet > domination. This is a reasonable approach, since life inside the Soviet > Union and its satellites is not a lot of fun. Even people who have never > known anything else sometimes find Soviet life intolerable to the point of > risking the near certainty of harsh punishment for rebellion, as witness > the Novocherkassk [sp?] incident and others. Avoiding this is worthwhile. > > On the other hand, "better dead than red" is a political slogan rather than > something most people really agree with all the way. Most people, most > of the time, would rather be live cowards than dead heroes -- if those > are *really* the only choices. Most people don't really think that the > current situation is that simple; they would prefer to face *neither* > Soviet rule nor nuclear war. Yes, most people, ..... but what about Reagan and/or the joint chiefs? Are you really that confident that Ron would rather give in to the soviets than commit global holocaust. Are you also sure that a war will not be started by mechanical/electronic/human-judgement error? > > As for the temporary nature of Soviet domination, when "temporary" is > defined as centuries, it's permanent as far as most folks are concerned. > -- Well as far as I personally/physically am concerned it is permanent too. However from a racial perspective it is but the bat of an eye whereas nuclear war is the end. Making decisions and promoting behaviour whose beneficial consequences will not be experienced for extremely long periods is, I hope, not completely foreign to the human race. I hope for example that few (although I know there would be some) people would condone the dumping of nuclear waste in geologically unstable sites merely because they probably wouldn't leak out for a couple of centuries. I suppose my attitude is, sure it's harder and costs more to do something correctly, but why not get it right while there is a chance to do so. > Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology > {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry John Chapman ....!watmath!watcgl!jchapman
jchapman@watcgl.UUCP (john chapman) (06/10/85)
Two more points. Sorry to be so verbose. > > ... Do the majority of people > > in, say, North America really have a "better dead than red" attitude? > > Personally I think most people would rather risk soviet domination > > (which, as the original message points out, would necessarily be of > > a temporary nature) than risk [the nasty consequences of nuclear war.] I don't know if you changed my original wording to the paraphrase above simple on the grounds of brevity (which I sympathize with) or because you don't like emotionally loaded sentences. In case it was the latter I have a comment. Normally I prefer that both discussions and arguments be conducted without undue emotionalism. The key word here is undue. This is a very nasty thing we are talking about here and I think that it should be described in suitable terms so that people are constantly, inescapably, nauseatingly (literally) reminded of the consequences of the actions under discussion. Human beings have an amazing ability to commit quite disgusting acts of brutality and violence providing they are able to distance themselves from it in some way; "The subject exhibited a negative response to the stimulae" rather than "we hurt it and it didn't like it" or "You [violent act goes here] and [authority figure goes here] will take complete responsibility". Various studies have confirmed this. Newspeak phrases like "build-down" are particualrily offensive to me. Perhaps if everytime someone spoke or thought about nuclear war they had to try and visualize it there wouldn't be such support war the arms race. > > ... I also think there would > > be few people in the soviet union who would be willing to make this > > trade. > > It all depends on the size of the risk; not all risks are equivalent. > As witness the lack of popular revolt against the current situation (the > anti-nuclear marchers are numerically insignificant against the population > of the nations involved), most people are willing to take a (perceived) > small risk of nuclear war to avoid a (perceived) large risk of Soviet > domination. This is a reasonable approach, since life inside the Soviet > Union and its satellites is not a lot of fun. Even people who have never > known anything else sometimes find Soviet life intolerable to the point of > risking the near certainty of harsh punishment for rebellion, as witness > the Novocherkassk [sp?] incident and others. Avoiding this is worthwhile. > > On the other hand, "better dead than red" is a political slogan rather than > something most people really agree with all the way. Most people, most > of the time, would rather be live cowards than dead heroes -- if those > are *really* the only choices. Most people don't really think that the > current situation is that simple; they would prefer to face *neither* > Soviet rule nor nuclear war. > > As for the temporary nature of Soviet domination, when "temporary" is > defined as centuries, it's permanent as far as most folks are concerned. > -- > Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology > {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry No one has responded to my other point: what gives the USSR and the US the right to take this risk with the lives of the other few billion inhabitants of the planet??
fred@mnetor.UUCP (06/11/85)
In article <5685@utzoo.UUCP> henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) writes: >As for the temporary nature of Soviet domination, when "temporary" is >defined as centuries, it's permanent as far as most folks are concerned. That applies to "folks" who only think about themselves. When we start talking about global politics we have to expand our veiw to include much more than the here & now. >-- > Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology > {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry Cheers, Fred Williams
sophie@mnetor.UUCP (06/12/85)
> 1. the people in charge are old and personally I think this makes > them a lot more likely to die. ronnie reagan probably doesn't > have nearly as much desire to keep living as I do; he's going > to go soon anyhow. > Actually, I think this psychological analysis is somewhat flawed. My impression of people as they grow old is that in general they become more scared of dying rather than less. Maybe because death seems more real, who knows.... I do seriously wonder what we happen if "our side" was to unilateraly disarm. Would the "ennemy" really have all the resources needed to invade the rest of the world and maintain their power? Given that they probably do not have enough resources to invade with conventional weapons, would nuked-out wastelands really be of any use to them? Even if we assume that they managed to successfully invade the rest of the world with conventional means, would they ever be able to keep their power against an opposition of 4 (or is it 5 now) billion people? This all seems pretty unlikely to me, and it often makes me believe that the "red menace" is a hoax. -- Sophie Quigley {allegra|decvax|ihnp4|linus|watmath}!utzoo!mnetor!sophie
jchapman@watcgl.UUCP (john chapman) (06/18/85)
> > 1. the people in charge are old and personally I think this makes > > them a lot more likely to die. ronnie reagan probably doesn't > > have nearly as much desire to keep living as I do; he's going > > to go soon anyhow. > > > Actually, I think this psychological analysis is somewhat flawed. My impression > of people as they grow old is that in general they become more scared of dying > rather than less. Maybe because death seems more real, who knows.... Well it's certainly simplistic and so flawed in the way all such analyses are I admit. My point though is that someone like reagan has already lived the vast majority of his life, knows he will die "soon" anyhow, and may feel strongly enough about the "red menace"/"soviet monsters" (pick your favourite reagan description of the ussr) that trading a few last years in return for destroying/stopping them may not seem like such a horrible idea. > > I do seriously wonder what we happen if "our side" was to unilateraly disarm. > Would the "ennemy" really have all the resources needed to invade the rest of > the world and maintain their power? Given that they probably do not have > enough resources to invade with conventional weapons, would nuked-out wastelands > really be of any use to them? Even if we assume that they managed to > successfully invade the rest of the world with conventional means, would they > ever be able to keep their power against an opposition of 4 (or is it 5 now) > billion people? This all seems pretty unlikely to me, and it often makes me > believe that the "red menace" is a hoax. I think that is a very good question and I would like to add to your points. Very little attention is spent (at least publicly) on the question of why they would want a war. I can immediately think of two reasons. 1. real estate (raw materials, resources etc) As you say, nuked out wastelands are probably of not much use to either of them. Sufficiently strong conventional forces should make it undesirable to attack with nonnuclear means as well (although if the nuclear problem is ever solved I think we had better turn our attention to chemical/biological weapons pretty damn quickly before they proliferate in the same way). 2. because they percieve a threat to their existence Stop threatening them. We (our governments) do do this and I think it would be a good idea for the west to make some gesture aimed at saying we'll leave them alone if they leave us alone. Our international relations have all the flavour of a schoolyard fight between two kids who are too overwrought to come to any accomodation so they just stand their calling each other names and claiming to each be the "right" one. Unfortunately their doesn't seem to be any teachers around to calm the juvenile emotions in our case. How many nukes do we need? If the nuclear winter people are right then we need no nukes at all; if they attacked they would doom themselves just as surely. What if they were drop only a few to cripple the west (three would do canada quite effectively)? Well perhaps we could keep a few; enough so they would be too worried about a tit for tat type of exchange to start and in addition reasonably strong conventional *defensive* forces. It would seem that a hundred or less nukes would be more than sufficient; again, even if they don't hit their targets the nuclear winter will solve the "problem" for all of us anyhow. Thousands of nuclear missiles? How can anyone seriously believe we need so many nukes? Even if the soviets were the danger they are often painted to be, thousands of nukes? geez, give me a break. > -- > Sophie Quigley > {allegra|decvax|ihnp4|linus|watmath}!utzoo!mnetor!sophie John Chapman ...!watmath!watcgl!jchapman
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (06/18/85)
> What would a reasonable probability of nuclear war be? If we include > war precipitated by accidental detonation/launch or phantom attacks > being percieved by "defense" installations as well as actual planned > attacks then perhaps a probability greater than 0.0000000....0000000001 > would be resonable. How about the consequences? Since we are talking > about what would very likely be the complete anihilation of all life > on earth I think a value of infinity would be appropriate. As I've said before, this reasoning indicates that our only rational course of action is to surrender to the Soviets immediately. Why are you not out campaigning for this? For that matter, why are you living in Canada instead of New Zealand (which would not be immune to nuclear winter, but would be a lot less likely to be badly affected in the absence of n.w.)? Clearly you yourself believe that some risks are worth taking. > > As witness the lack of popular revolt against the current situation (the > > anti-nuclear marchers are numerically insignificant against the population > > of the nations involved), most people are willing to take a (perceived) > > What do you consider insignificant? Polls indicate more than half of > the canadian public does not want cruise testing in canada. Anywhere > from 50,000 to 80,000 people (depending on whose estimates you want > to believe) were in the last vancouver peace march ( I know that this > is insignificant compared to the US/USSR populations but it is large > for Canada and we do participate in the nuclear arms race in one > way or another). 50,000-80,000 *is* insignificant in a population of 25,000,000, dammit! That's a small fraction of one percent of the total population of Canada. It doesn't matter what fraction of the public would prefer not to have cruise testing in Canada, what matters is how many of them care enough about it to act. Since very few do, obviously most of that "more than half" are really almost indifferent, with only a slight bias against. > Are you really that confident that Ron would rather give in to the > soviets than commit global holocaust. Are you also sure that a war > will not be started by mechanical/electronic/human-judgement error? I have no confidence that any of our world leaders, Soviet, US, or for that matter Canadian, would surrender rather than trigger catastrophe. I see no difference between Reagan and almost any other potential US president in this regard. > > As for the temporary nature of Soviet domination, when "temporary" is > > defined as centuries, it's permanent as far as most folks are concerned. > > -- > Well as far as I personally/physically am concerned it is permanent > too. However from a racial perspective it is but the bat of an eye > whereas nuclear war is the end. Making decisions and promoting > behaviour whose beneficial consequences will not be experienced for > extremely long periods is, I hope, not completely foreign to the > human race. Not completely foreign, but damn close. My point is that "it's only temporary" is an attempt to make the prospect of a Soviet-controlled world more palatable, and it fails completely because the time span is far too long. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (06/19/85)
> I do seriously wonder what we happen if "our side" was to unilateraly disarm. > Would the "ennemy" really have all the resources needed to invade the rest of > the world and maintain their power? Given that they probably do not have > enough resources to invade with conventional weapons... If they take it a bit at a time, sure they have. If we disarm, they don't need to hurry about it. Keeping civilian populations under control is not nearly as hard as fighting professional armies. > ... Even if we assume that they managed to > successfully invade the rest of the world with conventional means, would they > ever be able to keep their power against an opposition of 4 (or is it 5 now) > billion people? ... Sure they would, because some substantial fraction of those 4-5 billion would help. The rulers of Poland, and the people who enforce their orders, are Poles. Granted, things would change quickly if the Soviets weren't lurking in the background, but active Soviet involvement is largely unnecessary. For another example, in most Nazi-occupied European nations, there was no shortage of locals cooperating with the Nazis. There were entire SS divisions formed of volunteers from conquered countries. And most of those 4-5 billion will be unwilling to support rebellion. Even in the American Revolution, a fairly classic case of well-justified revolt against foreign oppression, only about 1/3 of the population of the colonies actively favored the revolution, and nearly the same number opposed it to some degree. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
fred@mnetor.UUCP (06/19/85)
In article <5697@utzoo.UUCP> henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) writes: > >As I've said before, this reasoning indicates that our only rational course >of action is to surrender to the Soviets immediately. Why are you not out >campaigning for this? For that matter, why are you living in Canada instead >of New Zealand (which would not be immune to nuclear winter, but would be a >lot less likely to be badly affected in the absence of n.w.)? Clearly you >yourself believe that some risks are worth taking. > If I may get my two cents in; Yes. Some risks are worth taking. You should see me driving to work in the morning. It makes the probability of nuclear war pale to insignificance, although the consequences of war would be somewhat more widespread. But rather than surrender to the Soviets immediately, perhaps they should surrender to us. We do have more fire-power. The case will not be won with nuclear weapons but only through greater mutual understanding. In the meantime, there are those of us who simply do not want to gain from contributing to a system that will lure the US military into a false sense of security. The safest situation is when both sides are scared stiff of pressing that button, until someone is smart enough and powerful enough to take their toys away from them. >> > As witness the lack of popular revolt against the current situation (the >> > anti-nuclear marchers are numerically insignificant against the population >That's a small fraction of one percent of the total population of Canada. >It doesn't matter what fraction of the public would prefer not to have >cruise testing in Canada, what matters is how many of them care enough >about it to act. Since very few do, obviously most of that "more than >half" are really almost indifferent, with only a slight bias against. > But you can't say that only the people who showed up at that one rally constitute the total Canadian support of disarmament. That many people turning out in one city is impressive, especially in Canada where apathy usually reigns supreme. How many people were demonstating in the streets in favour of the cruise testing? Even if it had been cancelled, how many would really object enough to march on Parliament? If we divide the population up accordingly, 50,000 to 0, extrapolated over 25,000,000 ; We may presume that everybody in Canada, with the possible exception of Henry, was in favour of not testing the cruise. Well, that may be a little unkind. Just kidding Henry! Actually I rather thought the cruise testing was OK myself. It serves to keep the Soviet button pressers scared which is half of our safety,(see above). Maybe now we should offer to test some of ther Soviet weaponry just to keep things even? >> Are you really that confident that Ron would rather give in to the >Not completely foreign, but damn close. My point is that "it's only >temporary" is an attempt to make the prospect of a Soviet-controlled >world more palatable, and it fails completely because the time span >is far too long. >-- > Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology > {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry Yes, it is too long if we are only to think of ourselves. If the alternative is death for all of the higher life forms on Earth then maybe a few generations of reduced lifestyle and some political oppression don't look so bad. But I believe the future will belong to neither the US nor the USSR. China is instituting certain reforms which can be termed downright capitolistic. The economy is starting to move over there. Western manufacturers can get labour at $80 / month per person. They seem to be following in the footsteps of Japan, except that they have over a billion people. Can you imagine what that could develop into in say 20 or 30 years? If China is given free reign, both the US and the USSR together won't be able to stop them. Henry, do you know where I can get lessons in speaking Chinese? Cheers, Fred Williams
jchapman@watcgl.UUCP (john chapman) (06/24/85)
> > I do seriously wonder what we happen if "our side" was to unilateraly disarm. > > Would the "ennemy" really have all the resources needed to invade the rest of > > the world and maintain their power? Given that they probably do not have > > enough resources to invade with conventional weapons... > > If they take it a bit at a time, sure they have. If we disarm, they don't > need to hurry about it. Keeping civilian populations under control is not > nearly as hard as fighting professional armies. Are "they" going to nuke some small country they want to take over? If not then I think the "we" are surely capable of resisting with conventional arms. . . . > > And most of those 4-5 billion will be unwilling to support rebellion. Even > in the American Revolution, a fairly classic case of well-justified revolt > against foreign oppression, only about 1/3 of the population of the > colonies actively favored the revolution, and nearly the same number > opposed it to some degree. > -- > Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology > {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry It was a succesful revolution though, wasn't it?
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (06/25/85)
> Are "they" going to nuke some small country they want to take over? > If not then I think the "we" are surely capable of resisting with > conventional arms. Tell it to the Afghans. They are most assuredly trying. No luck. For that matter, tell it to the Poles or the Czechs or the Hungarians. They tried too. And incidentally, if they rule the world, why not threaten to simply obliterate opposition? After they follow through once or twice, things will quiet down remarkably. > It [the US] was a succesful revolution though, wasn't it? Barely. And only because England had bigger worries at the time, and the US was far from home and not all that valuable. And it's worth remembering that a significant fraction of the total population then packed its bags and moved to Canada; their reaction might have been stronger without a place to go. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
mmt@dciem.UUCP (Martin Taylor) (06/26/85)
>> It [the US] was a succesful revolution though, wasn't it? > >Barely. And only because England had bigger worries at the time, and the >US was far from home and not all that valuable. And it's worth remembering >that a significant fraction of the total population then packed its bags >and moved to Canada; their reaction might have been stronger without a >place to go. >-- > Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology The way I heard it, there was a strong segment of public opinion in England supporting the views of the US revolutionaries (and that included the much-maligned King George III). It was largely the bull-headed attitudes of conservative politicians that forced the Americans into revolution, and even after the war began, a lot of the English still supported the revolutionaries. So the English in America were much like the 200-years later Americans in VietNam. -- Martin Taylor {allegra,linus,ihnp4,floyd,ubc-vision}!utzoo!dciem!mmt {uw-beaver,qucis,watmath}!utcsri!dciem!mmt
robinson@ubc-cs.UUCP (Jim Robinson) (06/27/85)
In article <2089@watcgl.UUCP> jchapman@watcgl.UUCP writes: >> > I do seriously wonder what we happen if "our side" was to unilateraly disarm. >> > Would the "ennemy" really have all the resources needed to invade the rest of >> > the world and maintain their power? Given that they probably do not have >> > enough resources to invade with conventional weapons... >> >> If they take it a bit at a time, sure they have. If we disarm, they don't >> need to hurry about it. Keeping civilian populations under control is not >> nearly as hard as fighting professional armies. > > Are "they" going to nuke some small country they want to take over? > If not then I think the "we" are surely capable of resisting with > conventional arms. I don't see why a few well placed *neutron* bombs wouldn't solve the problem. No more people, but lots of usable real estate. (So much for resisting with conventional weapons) J.B. Robinson
clarke@utcs.UUCP (06/27/85)
In article <1126@ubc-cs.UUCP> robinson@ubc-cs.UUCP (Jim Robinson) writes: >I don't see why a few well placed *neutron* bombs wouldn't solve the >problem. No more people, but lots of usable real estate. (So much for >resisting with conventional weapons) > >J.B. Robinson It is a popular fallacy that a neutron bomb doesn't leave a big hole in the ground. The balance between radiation damage and mechanical damage is different in a neutron bomb from the balance in a "conventional" (?!) nuclear bomb (and the total yield is probably less than average, since the neutron bomb is intended to be a "tactical" weapon), but it still makes a VERY big bang. There was an article on this in the Scientific American a few years back, when the neutron bomb was a big issue.
jchapman@watcgl.UUCP (john chapman) (06/28/85)
> > Are "they" going to nuke some small country they want to take over? > > If not then I think the "we" are surely capable of resisting with > > conventional arms. > > Tell it to the Afghans. They are most assuredly trying. No luck. > For that matter, tell it to the Poles or the Czechs or the Hungarians. > They tried too. Again not exactly a valid comparison when the are going to have to contend with the US. In fact in a nonnuclear world the US might be a little more vigorous about things like Afghanistan since the risk entailed by interfering might not be so great. > > And incidentally, if they rule the world, why not threaten to simply > obliterate opposition? After they follow through once or twice, things > will quiet down remarkably. If they take over the world then they can take over the world? Probably. It's just the first time through that would be a problem I think. . . > -- > Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology > {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
robinson@ubc-cs.UUCP (Jim Robinson) (07/01/85)
In article <719@utcs.UUCP> clarke@utcs.UUCP (Jim Clarke) writes: >In article <1126@ubc-cs.UUCP> robinson@ubc-cs.UUCP (Jim Robinson) writes: >>I don't see why a few well placed *neutron* bombs wouldn't solve the >>problem. No more people, but lots of usable real estate. (So much for >>resisting with conventional weapons) >> >>J.B. Robinson > >It is a popular fallacy that a neutron bomb doesn't leave a big hole in >the ground. The balance between radiation damage and mechanical damage >is different in a neutron bomb from the balance in a "conventional" (?!) >nuclear bomb (and the total yield is probably less than average, since the >neutron bomb is intended to be a "tactical" weapon), but it still makes >a VERY big bang. > >There was an article on this in the Scientific American a few years back, >when the neutron bomb was a big issue. I wasn't under the impression that the neutron bomb didn't leave holes in the ground, however, I was under the impression that the radiation emitted by said bomb had an *extremely* short half-life. Thus making it feasible to nuke a region or country and then repopulate that area in a very short space of time (hence my comment concerning usable real estate) when the radiation had died down. Anyone out there know just how long it would take for the radiation to diminish to an acceptable level? Also, is there any reason that the neutron bomb could not be used as a "strategic" weapon? J.B. Robinson
jimomura@lsuc.UUCP (Jim Omura) (07/07/85)
As I understood it, Jim's point wasn't the size of the hole
a neutron bomb makes, but the amount of radiation it leaves behind.
This determines when the target area will be humanly occupiable.
OK. Guys, I'm out of touch with that technology. Are Neutron
bombs currently feasible?
--
James Omura, Barrister & Solicitor, Toronto
ihnp4!utzoo!lsuc!jimomura