reiher@ucla-cs.UUCP (07/28/85)
Those who aren't fans of WWII espionage can tune out right now. There's
nothing for you in "A Thread of Deceit". The book is likely to appeal only
to those who have a moderately serious interest in intelligence activities
in WWII. "A Thread of Deceit" is a very short, but none the less dense,
non-fiction examination of several famous espionage myths of the Second
World War, such as whether Churchill let the Germans bomb Coventry, whether
Roosevelt did the same for Pearl Harbor, whether Admiral Canaris was actually
an allied agent, whether the British intentionally or accidentally leaked
information to the Germans about Dieppe and the disastrous Nuremburg raid,
and whether Cicero was actually a double agent working for the Allies. West,
a highly respected historian specializing in British intelligence in WWII,
debunks almost every one of these myths.
A good example is the popularly believed myth that Churchill sacrificed
the city of Coventry to an Axis bombing raid in order to cover up the
Ultra secret. This bit of folklore is now taken almost as gospel by authors
of books about WWII intelligence. It's false. Ultra provided no information
on the Coventry raid. A variety of other intelligence sources suggested
that the Germans were mounting a terror raid on about that date, but the
British were pretty sure it would hit parts of London, Coventry being a
secondary target, and they thought it would occur a day later. The Germans
were using radio beacons to guide their night bombers at that time, and
the British had a spiffy jamming device that would cause them to drop the
bombs on empty fields instead of their targets. The fact that the British
discovered, as the beacons went up, that the target was really Coventry,
should have made no difference, as the jammer should have worked anyway.
Unfortunately, an error resulted in jamming the wrong frequencies. Hence,
Coventry got wiped, despite Churchill's efforts to defend it.
The basic information West provides is interesting, such as his debunking
of whether Canaris was Mata Hari's lover in WWI (only if they met on the
two days they were simultaneously in Spain). The problem is that the book
is written for professional historians, not the general reader. Quotes and
citations are frequent, and though West tries to make sure we are introduced
to all of the figures involved, sometimes he assumes we know far too much.
Also, his descriptions of people and events are rarely clear enough to fix
firmly in one's mind. Thus, following some of his arguments is a real effort.
Also, West is overly fond of finding small errors, such as incorrect first
names and name spellings, one day mistakes in dates, and so on, and pointing
out sententiously that a historian who gets these things wrong is likely to
mess up other details, as well. West seems particularly pleased when the
error occurred in a best-seller or was a matter of public record.
If you make a habit of going around saying uncomplimentary things about how
the Allied secret services behaved in the Second World War (don't laugh, I
know people who do), you should read "A Thread of Deceit" to get a more
balanced picture. Also, real fans of WWII espionage should wade through it
(it's less than 200 pages), so that they can triumphantly contridict less
well-read rivals, but others probably shouldn't bother.
--
Peter Reiher
reiher@LOCUS.UCLA.EDU
{...ihnp4,ucbvax,sdcrdcf}!ucla-cs!reiher