wef (02/15/83)
The ontological "proof" for the existence of God hinges on existence being a quality, like rotund, bearded, and wearing a red suit are qualities. It is also assumed that it is a *positive* quality, that is, it is in some sense *better* to have it than not to have it. Given these assumptions the following interesting "contradiction" can be obtained by applying the ontological argument to the existence of the devil: The devil is God's opposite in all respects (by definition). If God is that being than which none greater (more perfect) can be conceived, then the devil is that being than which none less perfect can be conceived. For any existing being, a being with exactly the same qualities, but which does not exist, is less perfect. Therefore the devil cannot exist. (Rephasing) If God is that being than which none greater (more perfect) can be conceived, then God has all positive attributes, including being the most good. The devil must have all negative attributes, including the opposite of goodness, evil, and so must be the being that is most evil. But certainly a being that does not exist cannot be as evil as a being that does exist. Therefore the devil must exist. (This argument is vaguely recollected from an article in a philosophy journal about 20 years ago. Sorry I can't remember the author's name. It's almost certainly invalid, but presents a novel twist to Anselm.) Bill Fuller