dennisf@teklabs.UUCP (06/18/83)
In view of your last response, we seem to tbe failing to communicate.
I'll accept (at least part of ) the blame for this and be much more
specific. I have re-examined all the "Plunge" discussion articles, and
will here respond to specific parts of your articles.
>From "Taking the Plunge" (18 APR), first two paragraphs - about the
parable of the munchkins: this argument (which is similar to Anthony
Flew's invisible-gardener argument) assumes, first of all, that
(unlike Flew) the word "God" is not meaningless. The word is recognized to
have (presumably the Xn) meaning; otherwise talk about "correctness"
and "criticizing what Xns say about God" would itself be meaningless.
The crux of this argument (like Flew's) is bound up in the meaning of
words like "validity", "evidence", and what constitutes "reasons to believe".
My belief in (the biblical) God is not based on any sensual observation
of him. And even if I did "see" him, my perception of him would still be
limited at least by my own limitations and thus would be subject to
various interpretations. The existence of God could not possibly be
established on the basis of experimental observation (as munchkins, in
principle, could be) but only on a basis commensurate with the nature of the
being in question. The scope of munchkin activity is limited to refrigerators,
nothing more;so we would be entitled to limit our investigations of
munchkins to this scope. Similarly, for Santa, etc. Since God is not a
localized, observable, physical entity, applying the munchkin argument fails
in the analogy. Evidence for the Creator of the whole of our space-time
is a very different kind than for spatio-temporial entities. My point is:
the wrong kind of evidence is being sought for God. If we stick with the
biblical meaning of who God is, then the kind of evidence we should
reasonably expect to find of such a being will be evident to us on a
more abstract level than physical perception. This in itself should not
be unfamiliar to you, since scientific theories are abstractions from
perception which we regard as true and not as merely a way to catalog our
observations. But scientific theories are limited in their subject-matter
and methodology and could not, even in principle, give a total account of
human experience. So we can't look to science as a means of obtaining the
kind of evidence we need for God.
I know of only two disciplines that have sufficient scope for the evidence
we seek: philosophy and theology. Both deal with the totality of reality
and consequently have the same subject-matter (but different purposes).
At this level, we are dealing with our greatest abstractions from physical
reality (i.e., raw sensual impressions), and it is here (if at all) that
God will be "evident" to us. *Whatever* our ultimate view of reality is at
this level, it is a heuristic vision, an intuitive recognition, which is
achieved on the basis of our entire experience of life. Our rational
efforts to formalize this "world-view" give rise to talk about beliefs we hold.
But my point is: whatever we believe at this level is an intuitive,
heuristic achievement, not a logical conclusion. (Our reasoning about
basic beliefs assumes them intuitively.) Thus, the reasons I gave before
are admissible as this *kind* of evidence for God; they are intuitive
clues to his nature, not logical deductions of his existence. Are you
excluding this kind of evidence? If so, then doesn't the kind of evidence
you are willing to admit also place limits on the kind of God you are
willing to consider? In this case, you'll have to say what your meaning
of "God" shall be. If it's not the biblical God, I'll be inclined to
agree with your assertions. So when you say ("Taking the Plunge"):
" ... there is, to my knowledge, absolutely NO EVIDENCE FOR THE VALIDITY OF
CHRISTIAN BELIEFS. In other words, there is no evidence which compels a
reasoning individual to change from a non-Christian to a Christian ..."
shouldn't you qualify this claim (which has universal intent among rational
beings) by specifying just what evidence you are limiting the claim to?
You ask (same article):
" Am I being unreasonable to expect a thoroughly explained (i.e., "good")
reason? If so, tell me why."
This request, in itself, is not unreasonable, but is a thorough explanation
all you really want? It doesn't look like it. How can something so basic
as a world-view - a heuristic vision - be thoroughly explained independent
of it? Are you asking to be convinced of Xny purely on the grounds of another,
incompatible, heuristic vision (namely, naturalism)? Is this reasonable to
attempt for *any* world-view?
Moving on to "Response to Dennis Feucht" (17 MAY):
Point 1: By transcendence I simply mean that God is not a (necessary) part
of our space-time. If we take the Xn meaning of God, he *is* the ultimate -
the final "meta", by "definition".
"Does this serve as a justification for your religious beliefs, or is it
merely a reflection of the same needs which cause you to adopt those
beliefs?"
Neither. It is a clue to God, just as maxims serve as clues to a skillful
performance. Of course, some story on the level of psychological needs
must be true, but it is the wrong logical level for this discussion. I
didn't become a Xn because it satisfied my psychological needs but rather
(partly) because my previous naturalistic view failed to satisfy them.
Point 2: There is no "threshold" below which intelligence and personality
would not, for me, compel an explanation of their existence. I am not
relating "complexity" to "rational explanation" in the way these questions
suggest. My point here is simply that if personality has "arisen" in an
otherwise impersonal universe, then if personality (or other forms of
meaningful complexity) have any meaning to us, they must have a rational
explanation for their existence. To say they originated from the
impersonal is just another way of saying they have no real meaning;
otherwise, where did the meaning come from? So I am affirming a rational
source for that meaning (i.e., God) rather than an argument from (metaphysical)
chance, which is irrational. That is, to argue that meaning has its source
in random chance is to me the "blind leap" of naturalism since we don't
otherwise ascribe meaning to random behavior.
Point 3: Yes, this one is dependent upon what is meant by a Xn society.
I mean societies with a dominant citizenry living by the lifestyle of the
first-century church, according to their world-view. Their appeal is a
token of Xn truth. These qualities are, in principle, possible in
generic non-Xn societies, but their actual tendency of non-occurrance
suggests that this social quality is related to the world-view of the
societies demonstrating it. As to representative Xn societies, I gave the
criterion (again above). But what you make of, say, Dutch Reformation
society is, in the final act, a personal judgement. Our judgements
may differ.
Point 4: Here you refer to circularities in the argumant:
"If 'trustworthiness' means you believe what they say is true, how can this
be used to justify ... your belief that what they say is true ...?"
Again, this is a personal assessment of character. I find the Bible authors
to be trustworthy because they held values which I find correlate strongly
with trustworthy people I know.
"If the process of 'reasoning' associated with evolving from your axioms
to your religious beliefs is totally unlike the process of reasoning I use
when discussing things accessible via my own perceptions, then we're up
a creek."
First, I meant "axioms" ("values") to be the world-view - the fundamental
beliefs, since they are not deduced by reason but envisioned intuitively.
Intuition is the inescapable ground of conscious activity upon which
reason serves us as a (very important but limited) mental tool. We're
not up a creek because both of us excercise *both* modes of mind as
essential in dealing with our beliefs. (Surely you don't believe that
all your beliefs are deduced from perception?)
"If the act of 'encountering' God assumes an arbitrary belief IN God, we
have no need for evidence of ANY kind ..."
I agree. This is a purely existential approach to God, devoid of objective
reference. What I'm suggesting is a more appropriate kind of evidence for the
task at hand.
"I have never equated 'knowing' God with rationally arriving at a belief in
God."
" Please describe in detail how I can test the claim of Christian beliefs ..."
"What IS the 'methodology' whereby you 'know' the God in question?"
Biblically, the person who knows (and is known by) God is the person who is
in right standing with him. This is largely an issue of personal values.
As one comes to believe in God, the importance of one's relationship
with/to him is found in being in right standing with him. This, first of all,
involves recognizing him for who he is - the Lord of the universe, and
good to us, though we don't deserve it, and secondly, who he tells us we
are - made "in his image" but morally fallen and in need of the free gift
of redemption from our fallen state through his work done in Christ on our
behalf. This is not an argument for why you should become a Xn but a
brief statement of the "methodology" - rather, what you face in considering it.
I don't expect you to blindly leap into "trying" to believe since this
"trying" to believe something one doesn't actually believe is itself a
denial of Xn belief about intellectual honesty. But you *can* think through
the consequences of belief. If you do begin to become persuaded that God
exists, you'll be better prepared for the consequences of that belief.
And actually, the consequences often play a big role in the matter of
belief itself. Many people are not prepared to acknowledge God because this
would mean having to deal with the consequences of that acknowledgement.
Values do affect belief!
Finally, in "Second Response to Dennis Feucht": I don't see this as a
different approach but a statement *about* previous reasons. But more
significantly, you state that you don't believe that
" ...only 'non-materialists' can honestly believe their lives have
'meaning, value, and purpose.'"
More precisely, I don't doubt that they believe their lives *can*, but
I don't believe they do on the basis of their materialistic beliefs for
reasons stated earlier here about the source of meaning. And I'm not
using the word "meaning" in some uniquely "religious" sense either.
So I would like to know why you "don't buy this at all". If my
view of materialism or naturalism is in error, please inform me of it.
"Dennis, this is hardly a justification for your belief."
Of course it isn't. It's a statement on the ultimate limitations of
justifying activity, and where to go from there. By "personal involvement"
I mean personally considering what the consequences for both your ethical
and metaphysical orientations would be from a Xn framework. (I can do this
for atheism without becoming an atheist.)
At last, I accept your comment about ad hominem arguments to the extent you
can say that the argument is independent of the person making it. Beliefs
and motives for them are not independent of arguments about beliefs and
motives for them, are they? ... in the cases cited?
Apologizingly long,
Dennis Feucht
Tek Labs