dr_who@umcp-cs.UUCP (08/08/83)
Tim Maroney asks for comments on Thelemic morality. I wonder how he thinks rights can exist or be advocated without the existence/advocacy of restrictions (taboos, if you will). Seems to me that to say humans have a right to (example) life, liberty and pursuit of happiness means that others are *required* to (at least) not-interfere with their life, liberty, etc. --Paul Torek, U of MD College Park
tim@unc.UUCP (08/12/83)
Tim Maroney asks for comments on Thelemic
morality. I wonder how he thinks rights can exist or
be advocated without the existence/advocacy of
restrictions (taboos, if you will). Seems to me that
to say humans have a right to (example) life, liberty
and pursuit of happiness means that others are
*required* to (at least) not-interfere with their
life, liberty, etc.
It is of course true that there are de facto taboos in Thelemic
morality. Wanton killing is the most obvious example. However, they
are not stated as restrictions. Thelemism does not derive its
morality from the concept of "rights", but from the concepts of Will,
Restriction, and Love. An action is "wrong" if it is a Restriction of
another's Will (or one's own) without consent. Murdering someone is
wrong because it is a Restriction of their Will, or, if you prefer, a
destruction of their liberty.
The wrong is in creating the restriction, not in violating some
restriction (such as a law). To introduce explicit taboos would be to
undermine the entire system, since this would place restriction in an
exalted position rather than recognizing it as the source of "wrong".
The de facto taboos are readily derivable from the concepts of Will,
Restriction, and Love, and there is thus no reason to risk
deliberately stating them.
Finally, I don't think you have grasped the idea of Will. Will is
that which does not conflict with the Will of others BY DEFINITION.
Thus, a person who does only the Will never imposes Restrictions on the
Will of others unless it is their Will to accept the Restriction.
The idea of taboos just doesn't fit into a Will-oriented system.
___________
Tim Maroney
duke!unc!tim (USENET)
tim.unc@udel-relay (ARPA)
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hillwex@ittvax.UUCP (Alan Wexelblat) (08/15/83)
Tim has engaged in an interesting evasion (which I'm not sure was deliberate): He has defined Will as that which does not conflict with the Will of others. All well and good, except: Even if I accept this definition of Will, how does it relfect on cases where the wants (for lack of a better word) of two people conflict? How does it help me decide which person is truly acting under Will, and which is not? As an instance of what I mean: take the example from my Kant argument. There is an indivisible good which two people desire for (functionally) equivalent reasons. How do I determine which of these people gets the good? I trust that Tim is not trying to say that situations of this sort don't/can't/ shouldn't arise. I would find that to be a position which needs serious defense. --Alan Wexelblat decvax!ittvax!wex