larry@ihlpf.UUCP (08/22/83)
#R:grkermit:-60300:ihlpf:22600030: 0:2267 ihlpf!dap1 Aug 21 16:59:00 1983 I don't necessarily agree with your first proposition, namely that human thought is "outside" the chain of causality. Just because we can't accurately determine a person's behavior every time doesn't mean it doesn't have a cause. We also can't detect earthquakes with perfect accuracy, but in both cases (earthquakes and behavior) we are getting better and better at such predictions. I propose the following thought experiment. Imagine two parallel universes (I know its a cliche but its the only way I can express this) such that at some instant in time all the objects, all the atoms, all the quarks, etc., etc. are moving in an identical fashion in both universes. I claim that these universes would remain identical for all eternity. If not, say that they remain the same up to some time T. What change occurs at time T between the universes? Why should that change occur? Does one atom suddenly head off in one direction in universe A while the corresponding atom in universe B heads off in another? Why? Obviously any answer that applies to one universe applies to the other also. It seems to me that each universe would remain in "synch" forever. This seems then to imply that given the state of the universe at any point in time, the future is entirely deterministic. This would include the actions caused by any cognition in the universe. Another point is that even if cognition itself is outside the chain of causality, something must cause the cognition to come about in the first place. A vacuum does not suddenly start thinking by itself. Your argument still has to explain how the "first cause" came about (as do all these "first cause" arguments). I also do not see the need for a "first cause" even if I accept your first hypothesis. It's sort of like saying that there must be a "last cause". Why? Why can't the universe just continue on like it is going now forever? Even if you don't believe this to be the case, it is not hard to imagine that it is at least possible. Likewise, why did there have to be a "first cause"? As you move back in time, when is this "first cause" necessitated? Given any point in time, X, I have no trouble imagining a time before X which caused the conditions present at time X. Darrell Plank