rrizzo@bbncca.ARPA (Ron Rizzo) (01/31/84)
Subtle Is The World.... I applaud Tynor & Moody's neat disposal of Kofahl's "postulates" for science on net.misc. I add the following observations to emphasize how much at sea dogma- tism puts us when confronting science. Tynor & Moody state "Dr. Kofahl's five assumptions are indeed accepted by the standard philosophy of science". But science does not require these assumptions: > a) I am real. > b) The external world is real. > c) My natural senses [redundant phrase] give me a reasonably > reliable [also redundant?] perception of the external > world [the mind, not the senses, issues perceptions; the > brain transforms sensory input in ways still poorly under- > stood]. > d) The natural world [redundant] is lawful and reproducible > and therefore worthy of systematic investigation. > e) The laws of logic are valid ["true" rather than "valid"?]. In fact, making these assumptions eliminates the most intractable yet productive problems in philosophy. There can be scientists who are solipsists or zen buddhists (but not fundamentalists? That's right, more or less. See the footnote below). The existence of an integral self ("I") & an external world in which that self participates as a real object among other real objects (a. & b.), the assertion of an identity obtaining between the cause of my perceptual imagery and an external object (c.), the adoption of a conviction that nature possesses a noncontingent structure (i.e., one independent of my method of inquiry) rather than of an EXPECTATION that nature is orderly (d.), and the claim that logic as-is represents THE laws of (correct) reasoning rather than an ongoing search for such laws (e.) : these are all decisions on questions of the ultimate status, or nature, of things, strictly philosophical questions (in fact aban- doned by most 20th century thought as insoluble, improper or meaningless) that science is INTRINSICALLY incapable of handling. Science requires only that we assume appearances and correspondences, not realities and identities. For example, scientific interest in the sen- tence "I see the penny" is limited to assuming that a consistent & public correspondence obtains between appearances, i.e., the perceptions we each have of an apparent object (penny); science cannot, need not, & does not wish to posit a real object that causes our mental images. Such a char- acterization is strictly philosophical. In fact, philosophy itself offers varying theories: the relation between percept & object may be unanalyz- able (can't be shown to be causal, etc.) & the percept said to be only a "manifestation" (not an effect) of the object, or the "object" may be a composite (a field of images) & my perception of a "single object" the result of a creative act on my part (coining a unifying name or defining an abstract object). This isn't hairsplitting pedantry (though it may be turgid): actual deve- lopments in science underscore the point. Eg., concerning e., particle physics theorists are revising basic logic & discarding the property of transitivity (if A then B, & if B then C, then if A the C) by adopting the idea of a "partially ordered set" (in which some members are incomparable) as a model. The above is not as strange as it appears. Think of scientific literature you've read: science often uses the everyday idioms of ordinary language, locutions that (rather poetically) affirm with prodigious industry the reality and truth of a multitude of physical objects and ideas, as a con- venient shorthand comprehensible to everyone. But the more technical scientific writing becomes, the more its vocabulary displays the non- committal and skeptical character shown above. Dealing in appearances and correspondences is as much an exercise of a philosophical option as affirming realities and identities. Science does have basis, & therefore a bias, in philosophy; but one even less dogmatic, more elusive, & subtler than that indicated by a debate which centers on inventories of heavily-committed philosophical theses. Cheers, Ron Rizzo FOOTNOTE: Unlike solipsism or zen buddhism, fundamentalist beliefs con- tain factual claims. Still, very [sic.] strictly speaking, according to my scheme a fundamentalist could be a scientist, but he'd be in the very absurd position of eg., granting science's account of cosmic history as the only factual account that could possibly be obtained AND at the same time positing underlying "realities" ("real facts" [sic.]?) that systema- tically contradict that account. Despite the fundamentalist penchant for trading only in thundering absolutes, I don't think any "reborn chris- tian" would want to propound a doctrine of the utterly illusory nature of the world that would daunt the most rigorous buddhist. Subject: Re: Tynor & Moody's "Re: Can Creationism.." on net.misc (long article) Newsgroups: net.religion