david@ssc-vax.UUCP (David Norris) (02/21/84)
The free will vs. omniscient debate is getting fun. Byron Howes recently posted an article and Darrell Plank sent a letter on the subject, and I thought the matter was of sufficient interest to be posted to the net. (Hope you don't mind, Darrell; nothing derogatory here.) I don't think that a definition of terms is necessary; free will implies ability to choose. Further, it implies that there is a selection of choices to make (you can't "choose" to eat only bananas on a deserted island if there is no other fruit to be had). This is an important point to make, as I shall try to demonstrate. Darrell made the analogy of a ball/trajectory: > If I calculate the exact trajectory of a ball that is thrown into the air, > you can claim that I only KNEW the flight of the ball but I didn't ALTER the > flight in any way. It still remains a fact that the ball didn't have free > will in its flight. Free will implies that along the way the ball could > "make its own decisions" and suddenly veer off to the right. Of course this > is not true. Balls do not have free will. Balls don't have will of any > kind, free or constrained. This is good fun. Doesn't this work whether God exists or not? If God does not exist, then we may say the ball is only obeying the law of gravity. But a person will obey that same law of gravity. This implies that man does not have free will, regardless of the existence of an external Diety. We have no choice but to obey certain kinds of laws, among them gravity, friction, inertia, etc. But certainly this does not imply lack of free will. These laws exist regardless of the existence of God. As I said earlier, free will implies the existence of choices; the ball has none. (The same argument could be used for Byron's piece of yarn analogy, I think) But there are other kinds of laws that may be called "spiritual" laws. They are, I hope, higher than the "natural" laws. These include what we may call common sense, jurisprudence, and the "moral" law. In these cases, we almost always have a choice (we may may exceptions for mentally disturbed types, but let's concentrate on the general case). You always have the choice to be mean or kind to the beggar on the corner. It may be painfully obvious to point out that the free will of man only comes into play in these cases, because only in these cases is there real choice. Real choice, then, arises from one of the spiritual laws (it is interesting to note that a bad choice in the spiritual realm often results in a bad consequence in the natural realm. As C.S. Lewis said, if you don't obey the law of jurisprudence when walking on a slippery sidewalk, you may suddenly find yourself obeying the law of gravity). But I think my original point still holds up. God, being omniscient, knows that we are going to disobey the law of jurisprudence tomorrow and fall on our butt. It does not follow that He makes it happen, because watching someone do something is not the same as making them do it. But I might point out that this view (that God can't be omniscient because we have free will) operates on the idea that God is not omnipotent. It puts a limit on God's ability. Finally, Byron will be correct in pointing out that this may be in violent contradiction to Calvinist teaching. But I am not here to defend the Calvinists. -- David Norris :-) -- uw-beaver!ssc-vax!david
bch@unc.UUCP (Byron Howes ) (02/22/84)
I think that David Norris has at least caught the drift of the omniscient
G-d vs. free will argument if I read his last submission correctly:
"God, being omniscient, knows that we are going to disobey the law
of jurisprudence tomorrow and fall on our butt. It does not follow that He
makes it happen, because watching someone do something is not the same as
making them do it."
This is, I think, more or less the point that various people have been
trying to make. If the Deity is omniscient, then it knows what we
are going to do today, tomorrow, or for eternity. It doesn't *matter*
whether or not we are made to do it. To an all-knowing diety, the
outcome and all outcomes are *known.* The human notion of "free will"
is irrelevant in the face of that knowledge.
--
"Pay no attention to that man behind the curtain!"
Byron Howes
UNC - Chapel Hill
({decvax,akgua}!mcnc!unc!bch)amigo2@ihuxq.UUCP (John Hobson) (02/22/84)
Byron Howes sums up his argument as: >> If the Deity is omniscient, then it knows what we are going >> to do today, tomorrow, or for eternity. It doesn't *matter* >> whether or not we are made to do it. To an all-knowing >> diety, the outcome and all outcomes are *known.* The human >> notion of "free will" is irrelevant in the face of that knowledge. But that is just the point, just because God knows what we are going to do makes not the slightest bit of difference as to whether or not we choose to do it. Our choice is not dependent on someone else's knowing what the outcome is, particularly when there is no attempt to communicate that knowledge to us. John Hobson AT&T Bell Labs Naperville, IL (312) 979-0193 ihnp4!ihuxq!amigo2
pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc) (02/22/84)
> ... If the Deity is omniscient, then it knows what we > are going to do today, tomorrow, or for eternity. It doesn't *matter* > whether or not we are made to do it. To an all-knowing diety, the > outcome and all outcomes are *known.* The human notion of "free will" > is irrelevant in the face of that knowledge. I dissagree. The simple statement David Norris was trying to make is that precognition is not the same as predetermination. God's foreknowlege does not make him responsible for man's choices, nor does it require Him to intervene and change the outcome. After all, the God we are speaking of has free will also. The notion of free will (whether from God's perspective or ours) is not irrelevant in the face of the omniscience of God. As long as man has the ability to freely choose right from wrong, God is in no way responsible for that decision. Paul Dubuc
dap@ihopa.UUCP (afsd) (02/23/84)
From David Norris: "But I think my original point still holds up. God, being omniscient, knows that we are going to disobey the law of jurisprudence tomorrow and fall on our butt. It does not follow that He *makes* it happen, because watching someone do something is not the same as making them do it." I agree Dave. I think I finally am beginning to realize why Dave and I disagree on this subject. Dave misunderstands my position. I am not saying it is God's fault if we fall tomorrow. I said in my letter to Dave that while we may not be constrained to do God's will, we nevertheless have no choice in the matter of whether we fall tomorrow. Please understand, Dave. I am not blaming God for MAKING me fall tomorrow. I am only stating that if God, an omniscient being, KNOWS I'm going to fall then that is exactly what will happen and I don't have any choice about it. I maintain my analogy. I may not FORCE a thrown ball to land in a certain spot, but it is predetermined where it will land and it has NO choice in the matter. We are like that ball. God may not FORCE us to do what we do, but we nonetheless don't have any say in the matter ourselves, assuming the omniscience of God. Darrell Plank ihnp4!ihopa!dap
bch@unc.UUCP (Byron Howes ) (02/23/84)
Perhaps I am arguing a subtly different point from Jon White, but I never
made the statement that I thought G-d was responsible for man's decisions.
The statement I *did* make, which I think is equally clear, is that
given absolute precognition by G-d, man's decisions and use of free will
are irrelevant. The outcomes are already known.
There are a number of curious theological points that arise from this,
such as what is the purpose of the testing of Job, or the purpose of
the various Biblical covenants (or indeed the purpose of anything?) But
I will leave those discussions to individuals who have more invested
than I in that kind of argument.
--
"Pay no attention to that man behind the curtain!"
Byron Howes
UNC - Chapel Hill
({decvax,akgua}!mcnc!unc!bch)palmer@uw-june (David Palmer) (02/23/84)
<>
An interesting question to ask (and the road to Hell is paved with
interesting questions >:-) ) is whether an omniscient G-d* has free
will. Since he knows everything he is ever going to do, he obviously
cannot choose to do something different.
One answer to this is that G-d had free will once, but then, being
omnipotent, he gave himself omniscience, and thereby lost free will.
He used up all of his free will in that one act, but that act was a
result of free will.
Some philosophers (e.g. Leibnitz) have suggested that, being
omnibenevolent, G-d is constrained to one course of action, that which
has the best results ("all is for the best in this, the best of all
possible worlds." as Candide said). I agree with Voltaire that this is
a pretty pessimistic view of the world.
David Palmer
----
* G-d is a trademark of "The Moral Majority", and may not be used
without its permission :-)edhall@randvax.ARPA (Ed Hall) (02/25/84)
------------------------- I have to agree with Paul on this one: God's omniscience does not imply determinism. If I somehow knew every move you were going to make before you made it, it would be a case for my having precognition but not against your having free will. So, God's knowing what you will do in the future doesn't mean that you have no choice in doing it. Foreknowledge does not imply causality. Or is there something here I am missing? It seemed remarkable enough for me to be agreeing with Paul that I had to post this. However, this is all pretty academic to me, as my actual beliefs do not include the person-god that we are discussing. But she/he *is* fun to discuss! -Ed Hall decvax!randvax!edhall