unbent@ecsvax.UUCP (03/03/84)
Ref: cornell.6686 Determinism is the thesis that there are no free actions. The thesis that what happens happens *necessarily* is called *fatalism*. The argument sketched by rej runs these two together, but they're not the same. The problem with rej's argument has nothing to do with the law of excluded middle, but is simply that it commits a non sequitur, moving from hypotheses about what *happens* (S'pose that I will dye my hair green) to conclusions about *choice* (I HAVE NO CHOICE but to dye my hair green). The right way to look at this case is: Either I will dye my hair green or I won't. Now let's assume "free will" in the form: I will do what I *choose* to do. Case 1: I *will* dye my hair green. Conclusion 1: I will *choose* to dye my hair green. Case 2: I *won't* dye my hair green. Conclusion 2: I *won't choose* to dye my hair green. Ergo, either I will *choose* to dye my hair green or I won't. The point is simply that what rej's argument shows is that the actions which I will perform and the choices which I will make must *match*, not that I won't or can't make any choices. The system I'm on (ecsvax) doesn't subscribe to net.religion, so I haven't been following the omniscience vs determinism debates. I don't therefore know whether anyone's yet pointed out that Saint Augustine sorted that one out about 1600 years ago. That God knows what I will do doesn't imply that I can't do what I choose. It only implies that, if I *can* do what I choose, then God *also* knows what I will choose. But there's nothing "deterministic" about that. We *often* know what someone will choose. For example, I know that, given a choice between rice and potatoes, my wife will choose potatoes. It's not that she *can't* choose rice. What I know is that she *won't* choose rice. She dislikes rice and vastly prefers potatoes. Yours for clearer concepts, --Jay Rosenberg Philosophy, UNC-Chapel Hill (...mcnc!ecsvax!unbent)