[net.religion] determinism and bad arguments

unbent@ecsvax.UUCP (03/03/84)

Ref:  cornell.6686

	Determinism is the thesis that there are no free
actions.  The thesis that what happens happens *necessarily*
is called *fatalism*.  The argument sketched by rej runs these
two together, but they're not the same.  The problem with
rej's argument has nothing to do with the law of excluded
middle, but is simply that it commits a non sequitur, moving
from hypotheses about what *happens* (S'pose that I will dye
my hair green) to conclusions about *choice* (I HAVE NO CHOICE
but to dye my hair green).  The right way to look at this case
is:
	Either I will dye my hair green or I won't.
	Now let's assume "free will" in the form:  I will do
what I *choose* to do.
	Case 1:  I *will* dye my hair green.
	Conclusion 1:  I will *choose* to dye my hair green.
	Case 2:  I *won't* dye my hair green.
	Conclusion 2:  I *won't choose* to dye my hair green.
	Ergo, either I will *choose* to dye my hair green or I
won't.
The point is simply that what rej's argument shows is that the
actions which I will perform and the choices which I will make
must *match*, not that I won't or can't make any choices.

	The system I'm on (ecsvax) doesn't subscribe to
net.religion, so I haven't been following the omniscience vs
determinism debates.  I don't therefore know whether anyone's
yet pointed out that Saint Augustine sorted that one out about
1600 years ago.  That God knows what I will do doesn't imply
that I can't do what I choose.  It only implies that, if I
*can* do what I choose, then God *also* knows what I will
choose.  But there's nothing "deterministic" about that.  We
*often* know what someone will choose.  For example, I know
that, given a choice between rice and potatoes, my wife will
choose potatoes.  It's not that she *can't* choose rice.  What
I know is that she *won't* choose rice.  She dislikes rice and
vastly prefers potatoes.

Yours for clearer concepts,
				--Jay Rosenberg
			Philosophy, UNC-Chapel Hill
			(...mcnc!ecsvax!unbent)