laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (02/29/84)
Hello gang. Despite claims to the contrary, I haven't been sent to eternal damnation. Those of you who are waiting for the day are just going to have to keep waiting. I want to get into this debate, from a slightly different perspective. Mostly, though I am coming down on the same side as Jon White and Darrell Plank. I think that I am making a hash of Byron Howes argument, though, so what I need from him is a distinction between "time from God's perspective" and "time from man's perspective". My whole argument hinges on time being invariant over anybody's perception of it. If this is not the case, chaos invariably follows in this (and most) arguments. Okay. what I want to demonstrate is that "freedom" (something I sincerely and passionately believe in) and "omniscience" are 2 perfectly valid concepts which cannot exist in the same universe as realities (as opposed to ideas). Thus it follows that if man is free then God is not omniciscient IF GOD IS WITHIN THE UNIVERSE THAT MAN IS IN. We can have multiple universes, some of which contain omniscinent Gods and some of which contain free agents -- what we cannot have is the two existing in the same universe. Let me close off one escape hatch first before I get down to the argument. You do not escape by saying that God is "outside time". God may be outside time, but if God interacts with man in any way then He must act within time. Jesus is a very good example of a "God within time" -- given that the Bible is accurate, he really did have a temporal existence. Thus the God connected with Christianity exists within time (perhaps in addition to existing outside of time) which is enough to place Him in our universe. Therefore He is constrained to either not be omniscient or interact with agents who are not free. (yes, I know, I know, I haven't demonstrated this yet...) Okay. there are some very simple-minded arguements against the existence of God which go: "If God can do anything, then can he create a round square". (if this is the first time you have seen this, it is very old news so please don't freak out. It is not a very good proof that God cannot exist, though it is fun to bring up at parties.) The only thing that you have to do with this argument is to recognise that the definition of "round" precludes the definition of "square" in the same object. (as opposed to the definition of "red", for instance). Thus, if God can create a round square he is going to have to create it in some universe where "round" and "square" are not mutually exclusive by definition. Such universes may exist -- but physics there is going to be very different than physics here. Since I only want to worry about this universe I am sitting in (which presumably is the same one where Jesus walked around in) I am not going to worry about this much. "free will" however and "omniscience" are as mutually exclusive as "round" and "square". This is a harder point to see, but it is as inescapable. Free will implies the existence of an agent who does things. Right now I am going to raise either my right or my left hand. There. I raised my left hand. Now I am pretty well convinced that *I* did this. I am also pretty well convinced that nobody could have predicted which hand i was going to raise since I just made the decision and did it. Some people would deny this. they would maintain that either God or even man could predict what hand I was going to raise. Skinnerian behaviourists could clamour that I was conditioned in some way to respond to this decision by raising my left hand. Certain others would maintain that if they could get an accurate representation of the chemicals in my brain they could predict all the thoughts that I would ever have (using lots of simulation given te laws of chemistry) and theat they too would be able to predict that I would raise my left hand. Suppose they are right. then where does that leave the "I" that did the raising? Clearly it had no effect on the outcome, since the outcome was predictable. My very self is thus no more significant to my decisions than the clothes I wear, or the size of my feet or any one of many other details about me. Indeed, you begin to see that the "I" is merely the sum of my experiences or some entirely predictable chemical soup. In this case, the notion of personal responsibility vanishes. I was not responsible for the chemical soup I was born with, and I am not responsible for who my parents were, and indeed most of the experiences I have had. (Neither, of course, are my parents under this model -- they are as unfree as I.) If I am a mass-murderer or a saint it makes no difference -- for the chemical soup or experiences which produced the mass murderer must produce a mass murderer by definition and the same holds for saints. Mother Teresa had not choice in the matter -- she had to be what she had to be given her conditioning or her chemistry. Something seems wrong here -- huh? I think so as well. Now, by what means does one say that God's omniscience is in any way different than the omniscience of a determinist/behaviourist or a determinist/chemist in the question? By no means that stikes me as logically valid. If God knows me so well that He can know whether I will raise my left hand or my right then it does not matter *how* God knows this (though he can use Skinnerian Behaviourism or Chemistry if they works ad He wants to), by the very fact that this was knowable my action becomes not-free. Whatever God uses to make a prediction is a condition which constrains me to behave in a not-free manner. * * * * * * * Okay David. See what you make of this. Laura Creighton utzoo!laura -- Laura Creighton (NOTE NEW ADDRESS) utzoo!laura
rf@wu1.UUCP (02/29/84)
As part of a discussion of free will, Dave Norris writes:
A cannon ball doesn't have the ability to change course, even
if it had the free will to do so.
According to quantum mechanical findings, a cannon ball can
change course.
There is a sense in which automata capable of random behaviour
can do more than strictly deterministic automata -- a fact of
considerable value to network designers, who use routing
programs based on such methods. So, I pose these questions:
1. Can we construct systems which will not work without randomness?
2. Do such things exist in nature?
3. Does what we call "free will" actually consist of
randomness?
Randolph Fritz
bch@unc.UUCP (Byron Howes ) (03/01/84)
Well, I'm not sure whether Laura made hash out of my argument or not since she seems to sum it up fairly well in the following paragraph: >>Suppose they are right. then where does that leave the "I" that did the >>raising? Clearly it had no effect on the outcome, since the outcome was >>predictable. My very self is thus no more significant to my decisions than >>the clothes I wear, or the size of my feet or any one of many other details >>about me. Indeed, you begin to see that the "I" is merely the sum of my >>experiences or some entirely predictable chemical soup. The only point I made was that free will (as a local phenomenon, a human sense of making choices) is largely irrelevant in the face of omniscience (the BIG perspective.) Either Laura attributed someone else's argument to me, or I misstated my arguement very badly (entirely possible considering the time of night I generally submit news) or she misread me very badly. What I was trying to get away from is the notion of G-d's responsibility in the matter of human actions. This does not, however, imply that humans are necessarily responsible (in the ultimate sense) for their actions. In the matter of G-d vs. human perception of time, I imagine that G-d sees time much like human's see physical dimensions, only with unlimited vision and resolution. (I agree with Dave Norris [*gasp*] that 'where' G-d was 'in/on' that dimension when it created the dimension itself is an ill-formed question.) Man, standing in the dimension sees muddily toward the past, and almost not at all toward the future and is, in fact, only sort of philosophically aware that the dimension exists at all. This conception spawns some fascinating problems, particularly with respect to interactions twixt G-d and man, but I'll leave those for another time. -- "Pay no attention to that man behind the curtain!" Byron Howes UNC - Chapel Hill ({decvax,akgua}!mcnc!unc!bch)
david@ssc-vax.UUCP (David Norris) (03/03/84)
>> "But I think my original point still holds up. God, being omniscient, knows >> that we are going to disobey the law of jurisprudence tomorrow and fall on >> our butt. It does not follow that He *makes* it happen, because watching >> someone do something is not the same as making them do it." > I agree Dave. Darrell, you are forgetting yourself. This is net.religion. You are not supposed to agree with anyone here. :-) > I think I finally am beginning to realize why Dave and I disagree on this > subject. Dave misunderstands my position. I am not saying it is God's > fault if we fall tomorrow. I said in my letter to Dave that while we may > not be constrained to do God's will, we nevertheless have no choice in the > matter of whether we fall tomorrow. > Please understand, Dave. I am not blaming God for MAKING me fall tomorrow. > I am only stating that if God, an omniscient being, KNOWS I'm going to fall > then that is exactly what will happen and I don't have any choice about it. As I said in an earlier article to Jon White, this device can be used independently of God by asking yourself if the future yet "exists" (I use that term loosely). Yet, there remains the task of showing why you do not have any choice in the matter. No logical connection between the two has not yet been made. > ..... but it is predetermined where it will land and it has NO choice in the > matter. We are like that ball. God may not FORCE us to do what we do, but > we nonetheless don't have any say in the matter ourselves, assuming the > omniscience of God. Analogies serve to illustrate. I could carry your example out, and also demonstrate that the ball is going to follow along that same path whether anybody is watching it or not (i.e., God isn't looking, so it "sneaks" a quick right-hand turn??). But I think this is a mis-use of analogy. Metaphors are a poor proof. A cannon ball doesn't have the ability to change course, even if it had the free will to do so. Also, the cannon ball simply obeys a natural law that man himself must obey. We cannot decide to turn back after we have jumped over a cliff (note here that this implies we do not have free will independently of the omniscience or even existence of God). Don't misunderstand; analogies have their legitimate uses. But even the best analogy must be followed by evidence. What needs to be done is to logically show how God's foreknowledge renders man choiceless. I contend that this is not QED. -- David Norris :-) -- uw-beaver!ssc-vax!david
laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (03/03/84)
Byron, I think that we get to the same conclusions, but we get there by different paths. If this is not the case then I am still misunderstanding you. You say: What I was trying to get away from is the notion of G-d's responsibility in the matter of human actions. This does not, however, imply that humans are necessarily responsible (in the ultimate sense) for their actions. However, the whole notion of "responsibility" will require re-examination if God is deemed to be omniscient. We have already concluded that in that case, human beings are not responsible for their actions. Thus "responsibility" is either God's or it is itself a meaningless phrase like "round square". To drive this one closer to home -- if God is omniscient, could Jesus sin? It is pretty well agreed that He didn't -- but a good question is "Could He?". If He could, then there must be some moment in time where He could have behaved differently than he did. In that case, could God the Father have predicted His action? Suppose Jesus had decided not to go through with the crucifying, for instance. If Christianity is correct, then this has serious implications for Mankind. What happened in the Garden of Gethsemene anyway? Could Jesus have let the cup pass from Him? If so, was God the Father upstairs sweating it out because he knew one decision would have had terrible consequences for His Son and the rest would have terrible consequences for Mankind? This is sort of the way that they picture it in most of the Easter enactments at the various Christian Churches I have attended. On the other hand, this does not seem to jibe well with the God the All-Knowing Father bit. For a third hand, remember that Jesus is supposed to be God. Was He omniscient as he walked through life? Somehow it kind of detracts from the story line when you picture Jesus saying "okay, in 10 minutes it is time for the Sermon on the Mount, and this is real important and I remember what I will have said...later I am going to curse the fig tree --- boy they are going to puzzle over that for centuries ..." It also makes Jesus rather less (though as well more) than human, for indeed it is a very basic that all human beings sin. If Jesus couldn't Sin and human beings can, then presumably Jesus never had to feel sorrow for his sins, or shame or guilt as all human beings I know have felt. I think that in this case he seems to have missed out on important experiences. Of course, if he couldn't because he had no free will and neither do any of us, then all of our guilt and shame seem rather pointless, so it is impossible to say that they are important in any way -- for all seems rather meaningless. In the matter of G-d vs. human perception of time, I imagine that G-d sees time much like human's see physical dimensions, only with unlimited vision and resolution. (I agree with Dave Norris [*gasp*] that 'where' G-d was 'in/on' that dimension when it created the dimension itself is an ill-formed question.) Man, standing in the dimension sees muddily toward the past, and almost not at all toward the future and is, in fact, only sort of philosophically aware that the dimension exists at all. This is the bit that I don't agree with you about. The future is every bit as understood as a dimension in human perception as the past. The distinction is "what is the present"? What makes the present the present? Why do I feel *this* as now rather than 10 minutes ago or ten minutes from now? This is a very serious question. If your vision of God's perception is correct, then there seems no reason for us to have a concept of now -- moreoever, there seems no reason why I should share my perception of *now* with the others that I am with. Given problems of continuity and the indivisibility of a line, the question "what is now"? or "when is now"? is not easy. However, I will agree with you -- it spawns fascinationg problems. -- Laura Creighton (NOTE NEW ADDRESS) utzoo!laura
speaker@umcp-cs.UUCP (03/04/84)
From: laura@utzoo.UUCP Newsgroups: net.religion Hello gang. Hello Laura. Okay. what I want to demonstrate is that "freedom" (something I sincerely and passionately believe in) and "omniscience" are 2 perfectly valid concepts which cannot exist in the same universe as realities (as opposed to ideas). Interesting propositon... let's see if you can pull it off. "If God can do anything, then can he create a round square". The only thing that you have to do with this argument is to recognise that the definition of "round" precludes the definition of "square" in the same object. (as opposed to the definition of "red", for instance). Thus, if God can create a round square he is going to have to create it in some universe where "round" and "square" are not mutually exclusive by definition. Such universes may exist -- but physics there is going to be very different than physics here. Since I only want to worry about this universe I am sitting in (which presumably is the same one where Jesus walked around in) I am not going to worry about this much. "free will" however and "omniscience" are as mutually exclusive as "round" and "square". This is a harder point to see, but it is as inescapable. Words, words words... merely a restatement of your original proposition. The fact that "round" and "square" are exclusive IN NO WAY lends creedence to your statement that "free will" and "omniscience" are exclusive. Suppose they are right. then where does that leave the "I" that did the raising? Clearly it had no effect on the outcome, since the outcome was predictable. My very self is thus no more significant to my decisions than the clothes I wear, or the size of my feet or any one of many other details about me. Indeed, you begin to see that the "I" is merely the sum of my experiences or some entirely predictable chemical soup. What you are looking for is a metaphysical agent to distinguish "free will" from the rest of existance. But you ruled this out in your original proposition... and I don't think you're going to claim that there is anything metaphysical about the mind of man... especially when you haven't granted God similar attributes. This is the very point at which we should find your proof that the two are mutually exclusive... and we find only a hand-wave. C'mon Laura, I know you can do better than this. "My very self is thus no more significant to my decisions than the clothes I wear or the size of my feet..." hardly constitutes much of a proof. Your argument is the old, "Predestination both removes all of my free will, and my responsibility." It has also been used to justify many religious beliefs. What if your actions ARE predictable? You are still free to act. You might know exactly what gold futures are going to do tomorrow... but that won't change the value of gold in the sightest... nor will it change the actions of ivestors the world over... unless you tell them, but that STILL doesn't exclude freedom of action. Their freedom to act has remained unchanged, and their responsibility unchanged. In this case, the notion of personal responsibility vanishes. Well yes and no. Apparently God reserves the right to sit back and "watch" for himself. Then again, perhaps he doesn't use his omniscience that often. Maybe he likes surprises! No, it only means that you were under no duress to act or restrict your actions. God neither aids nor restricts those who make such decisions, thus it still remains YOUR responsibility even though he could tell you what you are going to do, and what the ramifications of your actions will be. Actually, I'll amend that. There ARE times in the Bible (let's talk about that God for a moment) in which God makes vague statements concerning the future of peoples and the world... but I would hardly call these predictions any kind of restraint on the actions of man. In fact, predictions or not, mankind just continues on his typically destructive path. If the Bible is any kind of window to the future, it certainly isn't stopping us. Now you might argue... "Well, the fact that it was all predestined removes all of the non-determinism from the situation. I contend that as long as God does not act upon his omniscience, you're still in good shape. Here's another example of what I mean... I can take a program, and given that the environment it runs in is predictable and stable, tell you EXACTLY what the outcome will be. This in no way prevents the program from operating. It does not remove that program's ability to make "free-willed" decisions. Yes, that makes man little more than an automaton, but it still works. It might also be that God is omniscient, but does not use this omniscience to the degree that you suggest... for the very reasons that I suggest. If he did, it would make his creations little more than automatons. Mother Teresa had not choice in the matter -- she had to be what she had to be given her conditioning or her chemistry. Exactly. Now, by what means does one say that God's omniscience is in any way different than the omniscience of a determinist/behaviourist or a determinist/chemist in the question? By no means that stikes me as logically valid. Words, words, words... there is nothing to exclude the existance of determinist/behaviourists... It is logically valid, although I doubt that the determinist/behaviorists are correct. If God knows me so well that He can know whether I will raise my left hand or my right then it does not matter *how* God knows this (though he can use Skinnerian Behaviourism or Chemistry if they works ad He wants to), by the very fact that this was knowable my action becomes not-free. Words, words, words... WHY does this fact make your actions "not-free." Your actions are perfectly free... just known. This is merely a restatement of your original proposal and not a proof to it. Your action becomes free will even if known before-hand. Whatever God uses to make a prediction is a condition which constrains me to behave in a not-free manner. Another restatement. I know exactly where you're coming from, Laura, but I think you argument is more intuitive than anything else.