[net.religion] Jon's 5 points

david@ssc-vax.UUCP (David Norris) (02/27/84)

I explained in my last article about how statements about God and time often
"cheat":

>>   1.  Firstly, the statements in themselves cheat.  Examples:
>>	a) "..created entire lifetime of the universe at the moment of creation"
>>	b) "..entire lifetime of the universe already exists"
>>
>>   See?  What does it mean that the entire lifetime of the universe
>>   already exists? Reworded, "the future already exists."  Do you mean it
>>   exists *now*?  The future doesn't exist *now*, it exists in the future.

To which Jon White replies:

> I think part of your problem is that you may be confusing God's time with
>our time.  The two are not at all related.  The entire lifetime of the universe
>already exists in God's time, but for us the future doesn't seem to exist yet. 

I wasn't going to say anything about this paragraph, but there are two
inconsistancies which require pointing out.  One, the phrase "God's time" is yet
another example of how the statement cheats.  Jon explains in the next paragraph
that God of course is not constrained by time (I used the phrase "Unbounded
Now", and for clarity's sake, perhaps we had best stick with this phrase as a 
definition).  But there is a second problem with the paragraph: "The future
doesn't seem to exist yet."  This implies that it does exist; but we haven't got
there yet.  This is somewhat inconsistant with another of Jon's arguments, and
I'll refer to it then.

>>   *Now* is a difficult word to apply to God, since it was invented and
>>   refers to being "inside" of time.  Our past, present, and future are
>>   all part of God's infinite Now.  God does not exist in the "future".
>>   He exists.

> Exactly my point!  The entire lifetime of the universe is part of God's
> infinite "Now."  He exists in our past, present, and future.  Our future is
> part of God's Now; therefore, He has already created our future for us.  He
> is even making me write this at this very moment! :-)

The statement is still cheating, Jon.  "He has already created" - the statement
is phrased in the past tense.  He did it; it has been done.  These all imply
that God is constrained by time (as evidenced by "did" and "done"). 

>>   Of course, the point I'm trying to make is that trying to prove Jon's
>>   point by "reaching outside of time", so to speak, is doomed to failure,
>>   because such questions are simply unaddressable.  What was God doing
>>   before time began? The questioner is cheating; he has to reach back
>>   into time to phrase his question (as evidenced by the word "before").
>>   If you disagree, keep the original question in mind and answer "When
>>   was the moment of creation?"  This is yet another trick question, yet
>>   is the substance on which Jon's argument is founded.

> This is not really so difficult as you make out.  The moment of creation is
> the beginning of our time, but is also an event in God's time that is totally
> unrelated to our time.  Therefore, it may not seem reasonable for us to speak 
> in terms such as "before creation" because in our time there is no such thing.
> However, in God's view (which is, I'm sure you'll agree, the ONLY accurate
> view) there is a point at which our time began and even a "period" before our 
> time began.

As I said, this was a trick question.  You have used temporal references to
describe the creation of the universe (an "event" in God's "time"),  and to
describe God's Unbounded Now (a "point" at which our...a "period" "before" our
time).  Still, the question remains unanswered.  When was the moment of
creation?

>>   2.  This is going to sound like my old argument.  You may assume, for the
>>   moment, that God does not exist.  Does the concept of being "outside" time
>>  have any meaning?  If so, then (by your argument) none of us have free will,
>>   since the future "already exists."  

> Wrong.  By my argument, if no God exists, then we have free will even though 
> there is such a thing as being "outside of time."  The reason we don't have
> free will (if an omniscient creator exists) is because God must have 
> instantaneously created the entire lifetime of the universe with perfect 
> foreknowledge.

The statement "cheats" again: he "instantaneously created".  But I now refer
back to the first paragraph, where Jon implies that the reason man does not
have free will is that the future exists (because God has already created it).
What is the logical connection between the future already existing and an
omniscient God having created it? 

There appears to be a contradiction.  You have said that man would have free
will if the concept "outside time" has meaning; or, to put it bluntly, that
the future is in existence in that domain.  Why does that fact that God
"created" (loosely used) this domain obviate human free will?

> The omniscience/free will contradiction still stands.  Merely repeating over
> and over that this issue is "unaddressable" does not resolve the
> contradiction.  David, do you care to try to attack these two points again, or
> would you prefer to have a shot at the three that you didn't mention?

Ok.  Here all all 5 points:

1.  God created entire lifetime of the universe at the moment of creation.

The statement cheats.  It describes actions of God in the past and present
tense ("created" and "moment of creation").  You have commited a reductive
fallacy, creating a simple premise on complex events, perhaps too complex for
us to understand.

2.  If 1, then all of our individual destinies are pre-ordained by God, and we
    do not have free will.

The conclusion is not justified from the premise.  Why are our destinies pre-
ordained by God?  The assumption is that God created "our" future, God "created"
us in our future, God "created" our entire lives and controls us.  The argument
begs the question.

3.  If not 1, how is God omniscient?

You have created a faulty dilemma.  You assume that there are only two
alternatives, when there are more than two.  Both alternatives are based on the
inconsistancy in point 1.

4.  Present contradiction from a different propective.  If God knows what we're
    going to do, is there anything we can do to change the future actions God
    already thinks we will take?

This proposition is very badly worded, and is another form of the faulty
dilemma (like asking if you have stopped beating your wife).  But it goes back
to an earlier statement, foreknowledge does not imply control.  There is another
alternative.  We have the free will to make choices which decide what the future
will look like.  God sees the results of those decisions. Your statement implies
that, unless we can somehow "surprise" God, we don't have free will.  Again, it
begs the question:  We have to be able to "surprise" God to have free will,
but that obviates His Omniscience.  

Here is a thought experiment.  I construct a time machine, go into the future,
observe my actions at 12am, then return.  I already "know" what I'll be doing
tomorrow, but I resolve to do something else.  12am comes, and I do something
else.  But if I've done something else, then I must have seen myself doing
that something else in my time machine trip.  Upon return from my trip, then,
I resolve...  See the dilemma?  Your question cannot be properly answered. 

5.  I have shown that there is an inherent contradiction between 
    omniscience and free will.

Your conclusion (that there is a contradiction) is based on on a reductive
fallacy.  You have reduced an extremely complex issue (God and space-time), one
that I (and many others) contend is unaddressable, into a simple one, easily
manipulated.  Dogmatic assertion of your conclusion becomes, I think, an
"argumentum ad ignorantiam"; i.e., since one position cannot be proven, the
other wins by default.

	-- David Norris        :-)
	-- uw-beaver!ssc-vax!david

jonw@azure.UUCP (Jonathan White) (02/29/84)

David Norris has finally confronted my arguments point by point.  While I
congratulate him for his straightforwardness in this matter, it has taken him
so long to generate this type of response that I (and probably many others) have
gotten quite bored with the whole omniscience/free will affair.  

This article, which is a brief and general response to David's major points,
will be immediately followed by a long article that is a point-by-point
rebuttal of David's last article.  Due to the confusing nature of extensive
nested arguments and the boring nature of endless repetition, I will post no 
further long articles on this subject.  

David's major premises throughout the omniscience/free will discussion seem to 
be the following:

1.  We cannot properly address the issues at hand and thus (by implication) 
should accept David's conception of God.  

2.  The model that I used to explain an omniscient creator is too simple and
therefore incorrect.

Of course, even though my understanding of this subject is severely flawed by
my human perspective, we are given to believe that somehow David knows how God
operates.  If these issues are so all-fired unaddressable, then I wonder how 
David so sure that he understands the "truth"?

My "omniscient creator" model is very simple.  In fact, it's so simple that I
can't understand why David doesn't find a way to attack the model directly.
Instead, he repeats over and over that the issues involved are "unaddressable,"
or that the model is too simple.  Well, correct me if I'm wrong, but according
to current scientific practice the theoretical model that best explains all
the available data in the simplest manner is the preferred model.  (I realize
that we're dealing with mythology rather than science, but my point is still
valid.)  Unless David can explain how my model does not fit the available data
or offer a simpler model that better explains that data, he is not successfully
attacking my model.

			Jon White
			[decvax|ucbvax]!tektronix!tekmdp!azure!jonw

jonw@azure.UUCP (Jonathan White) (02/29/84)

This is a lengthy, point-by-point response to David Norris' last article.  As
I mentioned in part 1, this will be the last long article that I post on this
subject.  I suspect that both David and myself have said about everything that
we have to say.

Throughout this discussion, David has consistently maintained that we humans
can never really understand the issues involved.  Here is an example from 
David that appears to illustrate this point:

>>   1.  Firstly, the statements in themselves cheat.  Examples:
>>	a) "..created entire lifetime of the universe at the moment of creation"
>>	b) "..entire lifetime of the universe already exists"
>>
>>   See?  What does it mean that the entire lifetime of the universe
>>   already exists? Reworded, "the future already exists."  Do you mean it
>>   exists *now*?  The future doesn't exist *now*, it exists in the future.

[Jon]
> I think part of your problem is that you may be confusing God's time with
>our time.  The two are not at all related.  The entire lifetime of the universe
>already exists in God's time, but for us the future doesn't seem to exist yet. 

[David]
   I wasn't going to say anything about this paragraph, but there are two
   inconsist[e]ncies which require pointing out.  One, the phrase "God's
   time" is yet another example of how the statement cheats.  Jon explains
   in the next paragraph that God of course is not constrained by time (I
   used the phrase "Unbounded Now", and for clarity's sake, perhaps we had
   best stick with this phrase as a definition).  

Once again, David, you are confusing God's time with our time.  I doubt that
anyone would argue with the statement that God is not restrained by OUR time.
Just exactly how God is restrained by His own time (and I only use the term
"time" for convenience here) is entirely another question.  It does, however,
appear that He has constraints that are caused by His own omniscience (namely,
He lacks the power to give free will to Himself or us), and so it might be
reasonable to conclude that He could have other restraints as well.  After all,
He is incapable of committing evil, right?

[David]
   But there is a second problem with the paragraph: "The future doesn't seem 
   to exist yet." This implies that it does exist; but we haven't got there 
   yet.  This is somewhat inconsist[e]nt with another of Jon's arguments, and 
   I'll refer to it then.

I have always maintained that given an omniscient creator, the creation's 
future already exists in that creator's time.  I'm not sure what David is 
trying to say.  Here is the statement that is supposedly "inconsistent" to my 
above statement:

> The reason we don't have
> free will (if an omniscient creator exists) is because God must have 
> instantaneously created the entire lifetime of the universe with perfect 
> foreknowledge.

I don't see why these two statements are inconsistent.  David?

[David]
   The statement "cheats" again: he "instantaneously created".  But I now
   refer back to the first paragraph, where Jon implies that the reason
   man does not have free will is that the future exists (because God has
   already created it).  What is the logical connection between the future
   already existing and an omniscient God having created it?

Just exactly what "first paragraph" are you referring to?  Anyway, the logical
connection is that a creator could not be omniscient if the creation consisted
merely of an initial state to which subsequent states spontaneously layered
themselves.  An omniscient creator therefore creates the future (from the
view of those inside the creation).

   There appears to be a contradiction.  You have said that man would have
   free will if the concept "outside time" has meaning; or, to put it
   bluntly, that the future is in existence in that domain.  Why does that
   fact that God "created" (loosely used) this domain obviate human free will?

If God has already created our future, then we are merely acting from a script 
that God wrote.  I can't make it any more clear.

[David]
>>   *Now* is a difficult word to apply to God, since it was invented and
>>   refers to being "inside" of time.  Our past, present, and future are
>>   all part of God's infinite Now.  God does not exist in the "future".
>>   He exists.

[Jon]
> Exactly my point!  The entire lifetime of the universe is part of God's
> infinite "Now."  He exists in our past, present, and future.  Our future is
> part of God's Now; therefore, He has already created our future for us.  He
> is even making me write this at this very moment! :-)

[David]
   The statement is still cheating, Jon.  "He has already created" - the 
   statement is phrased in the past tense.  He did it; it has been done.  
   These all imply that God is constrained by time (as evidenced by "did" 
   and "done"). 

Oh, come on, David.  If the universe exists, it HAS BEEN created (in our time).
If God is omniscient, then the entire lifetime of the universe HAS BEEN created
(in God's time).  I don't see why it is unreasonable to expect that God is
constrained by His own time.

[David]
>>   Of course, the point I'm trying to make is that trying to prove Jon's
>>   point by "reaching outside of time", so to speak, is doomed to failure,
>>   because such questions are simply unaddressable.  What was God doing
>>   before time began? The questioner is cheating; he has to reach back
>>   into time to phrase his question (as evidenced by the word "before").
>>   If you disagree, keep the original question in mind and answer "When
>>   was the moment of creation?"  This is yet another trick question, yet
>>   is the substance on which Jon's argument is founded.

[Jon]
> This is not really so difficult as you make out.  The moment of creation is
> the beginning of our time, but is also an event in God's time that is totally
> unrelated to our time.  Therefore, it may not seem reasonable for us to speak 
> in terms such as "before creation" because in our time there is no such thing.
> However, in God's view (which is, I'm sure you'll agree, the ONLY accurate
> view) there is a point at which our time began and even a "period" before our 
> time began.

[David]
   As I said, this was a trick question.  You have used temporal references to
   describe the creation of the universe (an "event" in God's "time"),  and to
   describe God's Unbounded Now (a "point" at which our...a "period" "before" 
   our time).  Still, the question remains unanswered.  When was the moment of
   creation?

This is terrific.  Here we have an adherent of a mythical creator basically 
arguing that the creator is so incomprehensible that we should all give up and 
accept his conception of this incomprehensible being.  I have already answered 
your "trick" question, now how about you answering mine:  do you agree that God
has the ONLY accurate view of space and time?  If so, then I suggest that you 
do the following:

1. Admit that your illusion of free will is meaningless.

2. Admit that you don't know enough to continue this discussion.

3. Send your life's savings to Jerry Falwell.

Here are David's answers to my questions (rephrased by David):

1.  God created entire lifetime of the universe at the moment of creation.

   The statement cheats.  It describes actions of God in the past and present
   tense ("created" and "moment of creation").  You have commit[t]ed a reductive
   fallacy, creating a simple premise on complex events, perhaps too complex for
   us to understand.

On the contrary, you have committed "argumentum ab Norrisum."  You have 
attempted to refute a simple model by claiming that it is too simple rather 
than showing that the model is incorrect.  (See discussion in part 1.)

2.  If 1, then all of our individual destinies are pre-ordained by God, and we
    do not have free will.

   The conclusion is not justified from the premise.  Why are our destinies pre-
   ordained by God?  The assumption is that God created "our" future, God 
   "created" us in our future, God "created" our entire lives and controls us. 
   The argument begs the question.

Wrong.  If you are saying that God does exist in our future yet has not already
created that future, then I want hear your reasoning.  If you agree that He has
already created that future, then how can you possibly believe that you have
free will?  Please explain.

3.  If not 1, how is God omniscient?

   You have created a faulty dilemma.  You assume that there are only two
   alternatives, when there are more than two.  Both alternatives are based on 
   the inconsist[e]ncy in point 1.

If you have an alternative to point #1 that allows for an omniscient creator
who can endow his creation with free will, then I want to hear it.

4.  Present contradiction from a different propective [perspective?].  If God 
    knows what we're going to do, is there anything we can do to change the 
    future actions God already thinks we will take?

I'll accept David's counter-argument on this one.  In order for me to properly
defend this point, I would have to fall back on the type of "free will is
irrelevant" argument that is being advanced by Byron and Darrell.  (I don't
disagree with their point, but it is quite a bit different from my
"omniscience implies determinism" argument.

5.  I have shown that there is an inherent contradiction between 
    omniscience and free will.

   Your conclusion (that there is a contradiction) is based on on a reductive
   fallacy.  You have reduced an extremely complex issue (God and space-time), 
   one that I (and many others) contend is unaddressable, into a simple one, 
   easily manipulated.  Dogmatic assertion of your conclusion becomes, I think,
   an "argumentum ad ignorantiam"; i.e., since one position cannot be proven, 
   the other wins by default.

Aha! Another classic case of "argumentum ab Norrisum."  Just because I have
developed a simple model, it doesn't necessarily follow that the model is
incorrect.  Just because YOU claim that the issues encompassed in my model are
unaddressable, it doesn't necessarily follow that the model is incorrect.

David, your continued attempts to either evade or obscure the issue have not
been successful.

			Jon White
			[decvax|ucbvax]!tektronix!tekmdp!azure!jonw

rrizzo@bbncca.ARPA (Ron Rizzo) (03/02/84)

Those who don't see any necessary contradiction between free will &
omnipotence (god's or anyone/thing else's) should think about the
last sentence in Laura Creighton's article:

>       What God uses to make a prediction is a condition [or law,
>       etc.] which constrains me to behave in a not-free manner.

Talking about knowing everything (past, present, future) at once
and for always (in order to be able to say that God need not indulge
in "predictions") is MEANINGLESS.  Such a God would exist "out of
time", which is the same as saying such a God does not exist.  The
very idea of "existence" we use depends on the prior idea of "time".

(Also, the idea of "knowledge of everything", as opposed to "all that
can be known" or even "all knowledge" is meaningless, incapable of
being cogently described.)

So:  God must make something like "predictions".  Infallible ones,
of course.  To predict means to invoke a rule (condition, law, etc.)

mwm@ea.UUCP (03/06/84)

#R:ssc-vax:-86100:ea:11300002:000:1510
ea!mwm    Mar  6 23:21:00 1984

/***** ea:net.religion / bbncca!rrizzo / 10:01 pm  Mar  2, 1984 */
Talking about knowing everything (past, present, future) at once
and for always (in order to be able to say that God need not indulge
in "predictions") is MEANINGLESS.  Such a God would exist "out of
time", which is the same as saying such a God does not exist.  The
very idea of "existence" we use depends on the prior idea of "time".
/* ---------- */

You have just placed a constraint on God (God :== Creator of the Universe)
that he cannot logically satisfy. Since God (by definition) created the
Universe, he must exist outside of it. Since the universe bounds time, he
must exist outside of time, also. You claim this implies that God doesn't
exist.

You might try arguing that the Universe does not bound time. In that case,
you better define time without making reference to matter in any way.
Somehow, I think you'll have trouble doing it.

Actually, you can't conclude anything about something that exists outside
of time/the universe. We know zero about anything in such a state, and
can't possible know anything about anything in such a state. All you can
say is that it doesn't exist in any manner we can detect. Of course, the
laws of physics as I believe them imply that said thing can't detect us
either, but that's a rather moot point.

I just realized that, if you allow the above, laura's argument that
omniscience implies determinism doesn't wash. God uses methods we can't, so
we still can't determine our future.

	<mike