nlt@duke.UUCP (N. Tinkham) (05/04/84)
The story so far:
Rich Rosen has been arguing for materialism [i.e., the view that the
universe and all its phenomena are composed of or due to matter alone]
and asked for any counterevidence to support the view that mind exists
separately from (or distinct from) matter. David Norris offered the
common human idea of morality as such counterevidence. Rosen accused
Norris of constructing a world view to fit the way he (Norris) wants
to see the world, and I stepped in to draw a distinction between one's
perceptions of the world and one's preferences regarding the world.
[There. If I've represented everyone fairly, then I've successfully
eliminated about a page of quotes. Now then:]
In response to my statement that there are apparent contradictions between
the implications of materialism and human perceptions [of morality],
R. Rosen asks: "What are these contradictions and implications?" I'll
try to make my point more clearly. There are several basic intuitions
or perceptions which seem to be common to many, if not most or all, humans,
which cannot be proven but nevertheless are so persistent that it generally
takes great effort to explain them away or live as though they were false
perceptions. Among these are (to state it in the first person): 1) that
I exist; 2) that other minds exist; 3) that the material world exists,
as matter, not merely as a manifestation of mind; 4) that deductive logic
can be applied to the world to yield true (sound) statements about the
world; 5) that some actions are morally good and some morally evil,
that it is meaningful to speak of good and evil. It is this last intuition
that we are addressing.
The claim is being made that materialism does not provide sufficient
grounds for morality. To state it personally: I do not find, in a
materialistic world view, a reason to judge one act good and another
bad. Physical and chemical processes are generally regarded as neutral,
having neither malice nor good will and thus not moral agents; it is
thus not clear to me why physical and chemical processes occurring in
a human brain and body can be termed good or evil.
If you know of a good argument for a basis of morality within materialism,
then present it now and we'll discuss it. (I may easily have overlooked
something.) If not, then this stands as counterevidence against materialism,
as was requested. (No, of course it's not *disproof*. Counterevidence.)
Note that I have not appealed to the way I wish the world to be. That
is not relevant to this argument.
"This must be Thursday. I never could get the hang of Thursdays."
N. Tinkham
duke!nltrlr@pyuxn.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (05/04/84)
This should be short and sweet. Reply to N. Tinkham: > The claim is being made that materialism does not provide sufficient > grounds for morality. To state it personally: I do not find, in a > materialistic world view, a reason to judge one act good and another > bad. OK... > Physical and chemical processes are generally regarded as neutral, > having neither malice nor good will and thus not moral agents; Fine. Continue... > it is thus not clear to me why physical and chemical processes occurring in > a human brain and body can be termed good or evil. Nor is it clear to me. Go on... > If you know of a good argument for a basis of morality within materialism, > then present it now and we'll discuss it. (I may easily have overlooked > something.) If not, then this stands as counterevidence against materialism, > as was requested. (No, of course it's not *disproof*. Counterevidence.) Wait a second. First, I know of no such argument, and I have no need for one. Second, this is not even counterevidence, let along disproof. All you've said is that there is no basis in the concept of materialism for "good" and "evil". You have failed to state a reason why there is a need to evaluate notions of "good" and "evil" as anything but precepts evolving from human intellect (yes, the biochemical content of human brain processes). Indeed, you have overlooked something. > Note that I have not appealed to the way I wish the world to be. That > is not relevant to this argument. Except that you would like to see "good" and "evil" as concepts external to material reality, when you have failed to provide any logical need for such a beleif. -- Pardon me for ... oh, never mind!! Rich Rosen pyuxn!rlr
crm@duke.UUCP (Charles R. Martin) (05/04/84)
The question of whether 'mind' exists seperate from matter presupposes that there is such a thing as 'mind' -- no wait, I'm not getting cynical on you! Our consciousness itself seems (to me and to Buddhist/Hindu philosophies) to be a consequence of the way that we deal with information in the day-to-day world, i.e. by semantic symbol systems. It is, in this view, a manifestation of the fact that we ordinarily must organize our thoughts around words, which are then used to encode information which we use by agreement. However, the fact that we can 'talk to ourselves' is not sufficient reason to believe that we are in some sense manifesting a thing called 'mind', which is separate from the normal physical reality. (Re: the Buddhist reference above: this is one interpretation of the doctrine of an-atman. Take it seriously at your own risk.)