[net.religion] Coherence of belief systems

nlt@duke.UUCP (N. Tinkham) (06/25/84)

[Norris:]
>> Some final words on this newsgroup in general.  Sadly, I have come away with
>> a much lower opinion of the value of this forum.  My main aim was to show
>> that Christianity is a logical and coherent faith.  

[Rosen:]
>To show that the internal logic of the faith is coherent is not enough.  One
>can take any set of random beliefs and create some form of internal consistency
>out of them.  When asked to substantiate that which you put forth, you
>failed.  Please accept that responsibility in the same way you've apparently
>seen fit to accept the "responsibility" of defending your faith.

------------------------------------------------
   Two of Mr. Rosen's statements in this portion of his recently posted article
seem to me to require clarification or restatement, in light of earlier
postings.
   1)  "To show that the internal logic of the faith is coherent is not
enough."  Rich, in earlier articles (if I remember correctly) you have
described yourself as a Rationalist.  Yet you say that you would not find
it satisfactory merely to be shown the internal consistency of a belief
system.  Can more be demonstrated *using reason alone*?  One can prove
that a given set of theorems follows from a given set of axioms; but I
don't think one can prove (in the sense of mathematical or logical proof)
that a given axiom or theorem holds in the "real world", whatever that
may be.
   Are you saying that you demand "external" consistency, consistency with
the axioms for a larger belief system of which religious belief would
be only a part?  Or are you trying to mingle sense perceptions with your
axioms?  In the latter case, I think you lose the claim to a purely logical
system (unless you can prove via "pure reason" the reliability of sense
perception).
   2) "One can take any set of random beliefs and create some form of internal
consistency out of them."  Granted, "some form of internal consistency"
is vague enough and weak enough that perhaps the statement can stand.
But if you mean that any set of beliefs can be proven internally consistent,
you're mistaken.  Any set of propositions containing as a subset
{p, not-p}, for some proposition p, cannot be proven consistent.
Obvious, yes?
   If you mean that people can convince themselves that inconsistent
propositions are indeed consistent, then you are correct.  But in that
case the response should be "Your proof is faulty because...", not
"Consistency is irrelevant".

                                        N. Tinkham
                                        duke!nlt (Duke University)