lew (02/21/83)
Steve Hutchison remarked: Does the inclusion of the "modern scientific dogma" in discussions in net.religion mean that there is an attempt at hand to establish it as a religion?? ------------- I think it does, but Steve is the one who is making the effort. Actually, I once formulated the sublime opinion that science is a religion. This was the springboard for an afternoon debate with a friend of mine (who found the idea shocking) which ended with me in confused defeat. I started with the idea that science is opposed to religion and progressed to the point that it must therefore be operating on the same plane, so to speak, and so be a rival religion to the traditional ones. Steve is probably alluding to the "secular humanism" business which is cited by creationists as the religion behind evolution. Perhaps consistently with my aforestated opinion, I have a certain amount of sympathy with this point of view. The question of appropriate public school curricula gets into some very sticky areas. Incidentally, I have Garner Ted Armstrong to thank for the inspiration to actually read "The Origin of Species", realizing as I did that I was among those who accepted evolution as unchallenged dogma. I found that Garner Ted might very well have been using the chapter on "Difficulties of the Theory" as a source, leaving off the suggested resolutions of course. Lew Mammel, Jr. ihuxr!lew
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (10/17/84)
I would like to examine this religion of science which Rich Rosen and
others advocate. Since Rich seems to think that my arguments are
predicated upon the tenets of christianity, I will, when I have to
appeal to a religion at all, to buddhist and possibly to Taoist tenets.
Science is a method of arriving at empirical truths (i.e., principles
about the universe which appear to be true, based upon experience).
In this form, it has no conflict with religion, although some Buddhists
might claim that since the world is illusion, there is no point to trying
to find out the properties of that illusion. To claim that scientific
methods, however, are the only valid means of acquiring knowledge is,
however, to elevate it to a religion, and a shaky one at that. For lack
of a better word, I will use scientism to refer to this forma of science.
Scientism appears to claim that only its methods produce valid knowledge.
In this case, we will have to jettison all of history, since historical
knowledge is not subject to any form of scientific verification. Attempts
to apply science to history must in fact consist of presupposing the
validity of current theory and then interpreting the evidence on that basis.
Obviously this means that we must reject the Buddha's revelation under the
Bo tree as being illusory and not valid.
Since it is easy to conceive that a deity exists that is too complex or
not structured to permit it to be understood in the terms of scientific
theory, scientism should advise us to be agnostics; I find it interesting
that in fact, scientism is profoundly antitheistic. I am also intrigued
by the constant emphasis on objective evidence. Objectivity in the
examination of evidence is not in fact and either/or thing. There are
differing levels of objectivity. On a subject such as miracles, where
the proponents of scientism have a stake in proving that there are none,
I would not for a moment consider them to be objective observers; somewhere
along the line, there is always a subjective evaluation of "good data" versus
"bad data', and those on Rich's side of the question always seem eager to
throw out reports of miracles.
Scientism can lay no claim to any sort of ethical or moral suasion. If you
throw out anything that is not material, you throw away moral authority.
The response to a statement of ethical responsibility should either be
"Oh, that's just your opinion"
or
"Oh, really?"
since it's all subjective anyway.
Well, that's about all for now. PLEASE do not mail me huge tracts of this
article back to me; extensive quoting hasn't prevented anyone from trying
to put words in my mouth.
Charley Wingate UUCP: {seismo,allegra,brl-bmd}!umcp-cs!mangoe
CSNet: mangoe@umcp-cs ARPA: mangoe@maryland
"My wings are like a shield of steel."rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (10/21/84)
> To claim that scientific methods, however, are the only valid means of > acquiring knowledge is, however, to elevate it to a religion, and a shaky one > at that. For lack of a better word, I will use scientism to refer to this > forma of science. [umcp-cs!mangoe - WINGATE] Scientific method is the only valid means to assure that you are acquiring the best possible, the most objective possible knowledge, given your tools of observation and analysis. The study and acquisition of knowledge through science is thus a rigorous process. Knowledge gained through other less reliable methods is thus less reliable knowledge. In some cases, where no attempt is made to be objective at all, what is acquired does not qualify as knowledge. > Scientism appears to claim that only its methods produce valid knowledge. > In this case, we will have to jettison all of history, since historical > knowledge is not subject to any form of scientific verification. Attempts > to apply science to history must in fact consist of presupposing the > validity of current theory and then interpreting the evidence on that basis. We have no need to "jettison" history at all. History may not scrutinize closely enough for scientific method standards, but reasonable students of history seek independent corroborative evidence. If an ancient document is uncovered which reads "My name is Woopy Franqueezi, and in 1236 B.C. I conquered the entire world", is not likely to accepted as historical fact unless it is corroborated elsewhere by independent, hopefully disinterested sources. In fact, what historians use in attempting to get an objective picture of history through corroboration approaches scientific method, given the limits of their tools of observation. > Since it is easy to conceive that a deity exists that is too complex or > not structured to permit it to be understood in the terms of scientific > theory, scientism should advise us to be agnostics; I find it interesting > that in fact, scientism is profoundly antitheistic. It is "antitheistic" in that it doesn't hold to YOUR conception of god. It is, in fact, quite agnostic, in that it chooses to hold your beliefs up to closer scrutiny then you would do. Not finding hard evidence, it returns to its neutral position. > I am also intrigued > by the constant emphasis on objective evidence. Objectivity in the > examination of evidence is not in fact and either/or thing. There are > differing levels of objectivity. On a subject such as miracles, where > the proponents of scientism have a stake in proving that there are none, > I would not for a moment consider them to be objective observers; somewhere > along the line, there is always a subjective evaluation of "good data" versus > "bad data", and those on Rich's side of the question always seem eager to > throw out reports of miracles. Perhaps that's the problem. You see rather clear cut and rational separation of "good data" from "bad data" (i.e., data which is known to be unreliable and not worthy of inclusion for objective analysis) as "subjective evaluation". Who has the stake in proving what??? It is always those who make the extraordinary claims who must provide the extraordinary evidence. Is analyzing a "miracle" closely to discover what really happened subjective? Since YOU believe a priori that they simply ARE miracles, you are not qualified to do a rational analysis of such an event to determine if it was one or not. If you could perform such an analysis objectively, that would be another story. But you can't; not if you presuppose a certain conclusion about the event. > Scientism can lay no claim to any sort of ethical or moral suasion. If you > throw out anything that is not material, you throw away moral authority. > The response to a statement of ethical responsibility should either be > "Oh, that's just your opinion" or "Oh, really?" > since it's all subjective anyway. Fact is, this is absolutely correct. Except for a few corrections to the wording. Absolute moral authority is not "thrown away"; in the absence of evidence for it, it cannot be shown to exist (outside of certain pre- conceptions about how the universe must be). Thus, the moral authority comes from human beings, through methods ranging from absolute tyranny ("I'm the king, and *I* decide the standards!") to religious autocracy ("These are the rules because god said them, and even though we can't prove that there is a god or that this god spoke to us, trust us, we're priests, and to us these rules sound good.") to minimalist rational morality ("The only rules state that you are free to do anything you so desire, so long as it doesn't cause harm to another human being."). Charlie sees having "no claim to any sort of ethical or moral suasion" as a negative; I see it as a positive, when dealing with a means of studying the way the universe is. As opposed to things like creation science (??) which takes a particular moral/ethical/preconceptive stance before looking at the world, interpreting evidence, not objectively, but based on its preconceptions. That's not science at all. And that's no way to study "the way things are". Unless, of course, you already "know" the answers... That's the difference between constructing a human society (hopefully in a way that will give the most benefit to the most people) and analyzing the existing universe. One sets up particular goals and purposes. The other simply tries to best examine what "is". It seems what Charlie is doing is setting goals for what he would like to see as a result of his analysis, interpreting evidence to support that goal, and using the results to go back and mold society. I prefer to have the two functions, investigating the world and constructing a society, distinct. -- "Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen." Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (10/26/84)
I neglected to mention some rather serious objections I had to Wingate's article in my rebuttal. Not to his points directly, but rather to the way he said certain things. > Scientism appears to claim that only its methods produce valid knowledge. I'm getting sick of having my ideas labelled with newly invented or re-used "-isms". The last time it happened someone else sought to arbitrarily distinguish between "rationality" (which he thought was "OK") and "rationalism", and I've been pegged with the label ever since (so much so that I've come to have to use it myself when I call myself a "rationalist"). Hopefully I won't be falling into this trap again. It's partially my own fault---it's sometimes either to offer a buzzword than to have to re-explain one's stance. Although I try to avoid this, I've used the term often as an adjective to describe some of my tenets. I'd rather deal with issues than offer adjectives as fodder for those who proclaim "you rational, my ass!" > you can't prove the religion of science that Rich Rosen espouses either > I would like to examine this religion of science which Rich Rosen and > others advocate. > "those on Rich's side of the question always seem eager to > throw out reports of miracles. I have explained several times that using and understanding scientific method has nothing to do with a religion. Use of scientific method implies a discipline involving careful objective examination of evidence in studying the universe. It has nothing to do with a religion or form of worship. No one prays to the scientific method. People use it because it gets the best objective results. It gets the best objective results because it takes into account the dnagers in accepting potentially faulty data as actual evidence. Other people FAIL to use it (in the course of what they claim is objective study). Why? Perhaps because they'd rather obtain some other set of results that the method would have shown to be faulty. Can anyone think of any other reason? By the way, why the emphasis on "Rich's side of the question" and "Rich's religion of science"? Are you simply trying to give counterarguments to religious belief a bad name by associating them with me? :-? It won't work. Not as long as there are others like Mike Huybensz who speak rather elqouently on the subject. -- "Good thing I didn't say anything about the dirty *knife*!" Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (11/05/84)
In article <223@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >I neglected to mention some rather serious objections I had to Wingate's >article in my rebuttal. Not to his points directly, but rather to the >way he said certain things. >> Scientism appears to claim that only its methods produce valid knowledge. >I'm getting sick of having my ideas labelled with newly invented or re-used >"-isms". O.K., Rich, YOU give it a name-- which is not "science", since what you advocate is not what I recognize as science. >> you can't prove the religion of science that Rich Rosen espouses either >> I would like to examine this religion of science which Rich Rosen and >> others advocate. >> "those on Rich's side of the question always seem eager to >> throw out reports of miracles. >I have explained several times that using and understanding scientific >method has nothing to do with a religion. Use of scientific method implies >a discipline involving careful objective examination of evidence in studying >the universe. It has nothing to do with a religion or form of worship. No >one prays to the scientific method. People use it because it gets the best >objective results. It gets the best objective results because it takes >into account the dnagers in accepting potentially faulty data as actual >evidence. Other people FAIL to use it (in the course of what they claim is >objective study). Why? Perhaps because they'd rather obtain some other >set of results that the method would have shown to be faulty. Can anyone >think of any other reason? Religion is not who you pray to; Taoism has no Gods, and neither does Rich's nameless religion. I do not contest science when it is applied to scientific studies; I do not accept its improper use as a bludgeon against religion. There simply cannot be objective data for an event which took place 2000 years ago and left no particular physical evidence; neither can their be evidence against it, other than the presupposition that it could not have happened. Therefore, by Rich's logic, we should draw no conclusion; instead, he chooses to reject the event. I cannot see this as objectivity; it is out and out subjective evaluation of the data. Science and religion are concerned with different things, and I am just as wary of those who wish to prove religion with science as I am of those who would try to disprove religion with science. I've studied too many existentialists to trust science as an arbiter of religion; if you want to use science as weapon, argue with Kierkegaard first. Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe
tim@cmu-cs-k.ARPA (Tim Maroney) (11/05/84)
Science and religion are NOT in any way opposed to each other! The scientific method can and should be applied to all religious activities, analyzing the results in as objective a fashion as possible. Most people seem willing to accept methodologies in their churches that they would never allow in their laboratories. -- Tim Maroney, Carnegie-Mellon University Computation Center ARPA: Tim.Maroney@CMU-CS-K uucp: Try sending through a gateway such as DECWRL, UCB-VAX, SEISMO, or HARVARD -- mailer conventions differ on syntax
mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) (11/05/84)
[Charley Wingate] > Religion is not who you pray to; Taoism has no Gods, and neither does Rich's > nameless religion. I do not contest science when it is applied to scientific > studies; I do not accept its improper use as a bludgeon against religion. Charlie, your first sentence only demonstrates that Rich may have a religion with no gods. It does not demonstrate that Rich has a religion. To do that, you will have to construct a definition of religion. If that definition includes science, then it is proper to use science in arguments against other religions. Your acceptance is besides the point. There are numerous religions which have tenets contradicted by science. What do you propose should be done about it? > There simply cannot be objective data for an event which took place 2000 > years ago and left no particular physical evidence; neither can their be > evidence against it, other than the presupposition that it could not have > happened. Therefore, by Rich's logic, we should draw no conclusion; > instead, he chooses to reject the event. I cannot see this as objectivity; > it is out and out subjective evaluation of the data. If you've really read Bertrand Russell lately, Charlie, you should remember that something can be rejected as unlikely, rather than on absolute logical proof. There are objective heuristics for guessing relative likelyhood such as Occam's Razor. > Science and religion are concerned with different things, and I am just as > wary of those who wish to prove religion with science as I am of those who > would try to disprove religion with science. I've studied too many > existentialists to trust science as an arbiter of religion; if you want to > use science as weapon, argue with Kierkegaard first. Science and religion have historically battled for their respective territories. Where they are concerned with different things it is only because one has been able to prevent the other from encroaching or has eliminated the other. One need only look at creationism and sociobiology for examples of recent and continuing conflicts. Science will not be the arbiter of religion, but it will continue to claim more territory as more is learned. -- Mike Huybensz ...mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (11/07/84)
In article <209@cybvax0.UUCP> mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) writes: > Charlie, your first sentence only demonstrates that Rich may have a > religion with no gods. It does not demonstrate that Rich has a religion. Fair enough. Let me attempt to distiguish between the use of science and the practice of science as a religion. Science assumes that the universe always follows the same pattern of action, whatever that may be, and attempts to MODEL that pattern. To say that there cannot be a God, outside of the universe, who intervenes and causes the pattern to be disrupted, is science as a religion. > If you've really read Bertrand Russell lately, Charlie, you should remember > that something can be rejected as unlikely, rather than on absolute logical > proof. There are objective heuristics for guessing relative likelyhood > such as Occam's Razor. Occam's Razor applies to theories; its purpose is to simplify science, not to make it more "true". It is a highly subjective weapon. If I am told by someone that their brother rose from the dead last night, is not the simplest theory that he did in fact do so? The evaluation that one would normally make would be that the event is "too unlikely"; but how unlikely IS too unlikely? One makes a highly subjective evaluation. I have a copy of _Why I am Not a Christian_, and I don't find it the least convincing. Most of his arguments are the same old discredited arguments we've all heard years before, and he doesn't seem to realize that if God sticks his hand into the universe and makes a change in the material universe, that the assumption that is the very foundation of science, that the universe always operates in the same fashion, is violated. > Science and religion have historically battled for their respective > territories. Where they are concerned with different things it is only > because one has been able to prevent the other from encroaching or has > eliminated the other. One need only look at creationism and sociobiology > for examples of recent and continuing conflicts. Science will not be the > arbiter of religion, but it will continue to claim more territory as more > is learned. I will save my complaints about the social sciences for another article. I don't think that creationism posses much of a problem, being bad religion as well as bad science. I do contest the use of "science" to make statements about God, either for or against; the data simply is not in the proper form. Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (11/07/84)
>>>Scientism appears to claim that only its methods produce valid knowledge. >>> [CHARLIE WINGATE] >>I'm getting sick of having my ideas labelled with newly invented or re-used >>"-isms". [RICH ROSEN] > O.K., Rich, YOU give it a name-- which is not "science", since what you > advocate is not what I recognize as science. [WINGATE] No, I won't give it a name! If you wish to pigeonhole and classify *yourself* with labels, adhering to the tenets of the label rather than to tenets you've developed and decided for yourself, then YOU do so. But don't pin such labels on me. Call yourself a "christian" if you like. I've learned the hard way that movements, philosophies, and the labels that go with them mean nothing in light of one's own evaluation independent of the labels. > Religion is not who you pray to; Taoism has no Gods, and neither does Rich's > nameless religion. I do not contest science when it is applied to scientific > studies; I do not accept its improper use as a bludgeon against religion. Improper? Why? Because it shows your religious beliefs for what they are? Thank you for defining the "proper" use of science: it's OK as long as it doesn't tear down something *YOU* believe in. How bogus can you get!!!! [Note that once again Mr. Wingate seeks to box my beliefs into a category he calls religion, when he has still failed to show any reason for doing so.] > There simply cannot be objective data for an event which took place 2000 > years ago and left no particular physical evidence; neither can their be > evidence against it, other than the presupposition that it could not have > happened. Therefore, by Rich's logic, we should draw no conclusion; > instead, he chooses to reject the event. I cannot see this as objectivity; > it is out and out subjective evaluation of the data. Thank you again. By logic like this, you have admitted that you have NO basis for your own religious beliefs. Which is the point I've been making all along. Those beliefs are rooted in preconception and assumption, nothing more. -- "If we took the bones out, it wouldn't be crunchy!" Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
emjej@uokvax.UUCP (11/08/84)
/***** uokvax:net.religion / umcp-cs!mangoe / 8:26 pm Nov 6, 1984 */ There simply cannot be objective data for an event which took place 2000 years ago and left no particular physical evidence; neither can there be evidence against it, other than the presupposition that it could not have happened. Therefore, by Rich's logic, we should draw no conclusion; instead, he chooses to reject the event. I cannot see this as objectivity; it is out and out subjective evaluation of the data. /* ---------- */ Pliny reported all sorts of marvelous creatures. Do you have the same position on their existence that you do on the veracity of the Bible? Similarly, Aristotle reported that women have fewer teeth than men. In the absence of reports to the contrary, should we give any credence to the possibility that women have come to have more teeth than they did in the time of Aristotle? Based on the lack of physical evidence, and the observed current and past tendencies of people to believe practically anything, I simply estimate the likelihood of the truth of Christianity as being on the same order as that of the validity of Uri Geller's claims, and hence not worth worrying about, save as it influences other people's behavior (and hence might get me burned at the stake :->), not to mention being the source of some very good art and music. (One can't say the latter about ESP proponents, admittedly.) This is not to say that the sort of discussion one finds in net.religion* isn't interesting at times. James Jones
mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) (11/08/84)
In article <770@umcp-cs.UUCP> mangoe@maryland.UUCP (Charley Wingate) writes: >[Mike Huybensz] >> If you've really read Bertrand Russell lately, Charlie, you should remember >> that something can be rejected as unlikely, rather than on absolute logical >> proof. There are objective heuristics for guessing relative likelyhood >> such as Occam's Razor. > >Occam's Razor applies to theories; its purpose is to simplify science, not to >make it more "true". It is a highly subjective weapon. If I am told by >someone that their brother rose from the dead last night, is not the >simplest theory that he did in fact do so? The evaluation that one would >normally make would be that the event is "too unlikely"; but how unlikely >IS too unlikely? One makes a highly subjective evaluation. If I am to invoke Occam's Razor to claim something is improbable, it is indeed subjective if I just say "Occam's Razor, so there!" However if I make a comparison of the assumptions required or destroyed by the alternatives, and then conclude with an invocation of the razor, then I have made an objective statement of my reasoning that is subject to confirmation or rebuttal. Selection of the assumptions analyzed by Occam's razor may be subjective, but the use of the razor itself need not be. -- Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (11/09/84)
The referenced article is, in Rich's best style, devoid of any counter arguments. Rich seems to think that my point is that my position is objective and that his is not. This is not so; my position is that his position is based subjective cosiderations and presuppositions, and is just as much a religious position as mine is. I lay no claims to objectivity; I admit freely that I am committed to my position as a christian. There is simply no objective way to evaluate the claims of Christianity, either for or against. Rich seems to think that I never question my beliefs, judging from his arguments. I would invite him to share a sleepless night worrying over my beliefs with me, but of course this is not a possibility. Rich, I often have doubts, and I have to deal with them, not having an infallible Bible or an infallible Occam's razor to console me. Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (11/11/84)
Occam's Razor only works because in science, we are not concerned with Truth; we are concerned with the "best" possible explanation. "Best" in this context means the explanation which has the most predictive power. It is important to note that, ignoring Occam's razor for the moment, two theories which predict exactly the same results are equivalent, regradless of their inner mechanics. Occam's Razor simply allows us two anoint one theory as "the" theory on the basis of a) simplicity and b) minimal unobservable attributes. It is irrelevant to science that the actual working of the universe may be according to the complicated theory with lots of unobservable attributes. Now God is a extreme example of a largely unobservable attribute which complicates any theory immensely, without really increasing its predictive power. Scientists therefore are reluctant to appeal to deities in their theories. The resurrection, as it is recorded, isn't remotely what any respectable scientist would consider as reliable experimental data. It is a one-time event, observed by perhaps a few hundred not especially unbiased observers. On the other hand, it is an absolutely one-time event, as claimed. Its alleged improbability is not relevant to whether or not it had in fact occured; if it did happen, of course it would have appeared very unlikely. The fact that something happens rarely (or especially only once) is not necessarily an argument that it doesn't happen at all. Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (11/12/84)
> In article <209@cybvax0.UUCP> mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) writes: > > Charlie, your first sentence only demonstrates that Rich may have a > > religion with no gods. It does not demonstrate that Rich has a religion. > > Fair enough. Let me attempt to distiguish between the use of science and > the practice of science as a religion. Science assumes that the universe > always follows the same pattern of action, whatever that may be, and attempts > to MODEL that pattern. To say that there cannot be a God, outside of the > universe, who intervenes and causes the pattern to be disrupted, is > science as a religion. It appears that you know little about cosmology and how scientists speculate and evaluate possibilities about the early moments of the universe. (I take that back: *I* know little about cosmology, so I guess you know even less than that.) To say that there simply IS a god, based solely on the assumption that you would like for there to be one, is a ridiculous position. As ridiculous (no, more so) than assuming that there isn't one. I say "more so" because it is arguably less ridiculous to take the more feasible possibility by Occam. > If I am told by > someone that their brother rose from the dead last night, is not the > simplest theory that he did in fact do so? The evaluation that one would > normally make would be that the event is "too unlikely"; but how unlikely > IS too unlikely? One makes a highly subjective evaluation. The "highly subjective evaluation" is the one that assumes the unlikely for no apparent reason. Simply because one assumes the conclusion, one accepts unreliable evidence as "proof", one "evaluates" by assuming what one wants to believe. And believing that THAT is a basis for making evaluative decisions about reality is preposterous. > I have a copy of _Why I am Not a Christian_, and I don't find it the least > convincing. Most of his arguments are the same old discredited arguments > we've all heard years before, and he doesn't seem to realize that if God > sticks his hand into the universe and makes a change in the material > universe, that the assumption that is the very foundation of science, that > the universe always operates in the same fashion, is violated. By "discredited", you apparently mean "ignored". -- WHAT IS YOUR NAME? Rich Rosen WHAT IS YOUR NET ADDRESS? pyuxd!rlr WHAT IS THE CAPITAL OF ASSYRIA? Nineveh (GOTCHA!) ALL RIGHT, OFF YOU GO...
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (11/13/84)
In article <8300063@uokvax.UUCP> emjej@uokvax.UUCP writes: >Pliny reported all sorts of marvelous creatures. Do you have the same >position on their existence that you do on the veracity of the Bible? >Similarly, Aristotle reported that women have fewer teeth than men. >In the absence of reports to the contrary, should we give any credence >to the possibility that women have come to have more teeth than they >did in the time of Aristotle? Pliny and Aristotle are making theoretical claims about the way the world functions; these are not claims of miracles. As malformed scientific theories, they are subject to contradiction by CURRENT observation. The ressurection makes little or no claim about the present observable behavior of the world. It says that precisely one man rose from the dead at a particular time in the past. It is an untestable statement from the point of view of science. >Based on the lack of physical evidence, and the observed current and >past tendencies of people to believe practically anything, I simply >estimate the likelihood of the truth of Christianity as being on the >same order as that of the validity of Uri Geller's claims, and hence >not worth worrying about, save as it influences other people's behavior >(and hence might get me burned at the stake :->), not to mention being >the source of some very good art and music. (One can't say the latter >about ESP proponents, admittedly.) This is not to say that the sort >of discussion one finds in net.religion* isn't interesting at times. Fine. My point throughout this discussion has been that such an evaluation is subjective, and in the same way as mine is. Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe
mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) (11/13/84)
In article <975@umcp-cs.UUCP> mangoe@maryland.UUCP (Charley Wingate) writes: >.... The resurrection, as it is recorded, isn't remotely what any respectable >scientist would consider as reliable experimental data. It is a one-time >event, observed by perhaps a few hundred not especially unbiased observers. >On the other hand, it is an absolutely one-time event, as claimed. Its >alleged improbability is not relevant to whether or not it had in fact >occured; if it did happen, of course it would have appeared very unlikely. >The fact that something happens rarely (or especially only once) is not >necessarily an argument that it doesn't happen at all. Besides the strong assumption that the resurrection occurred and was recorded (rather than faked or ficticiously reported), the above statement ignores the fact that Occam's Razor can be applied as a heuristic in history, as well as science. And why not theology as well? There is no debate that Occam's Razor is fallible. As any theologian would tell you, all humans and their devices are fallible. But as Charley said, it is thought to be the best way of choosing between alternative explanati?ns. Another problem with the above argument is the implication that there is a sample size of one for the resurrection, which leaves too little data for any useful analysis. This is not so. There are NUMEROUS other claims of resurrections (even in the Bible-- remember Lazarus?) in many other writings. There's the claim of reincarnation going on around us daily. I say that claims of miracles should be lumped together to be considered with the Razor. -- Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (11/15/84)
In article <235@cybvax0.UUCP> mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) writes: > Besides the strong assumption that the resurrection occurred and was > recorded (rather than faked or ficticiously reported), the above statement > ignores the fact that Occam's Razor can be applied as a heuristic in > history, as well as science. And why not theology as well? Occam's razor is only usable when you don't care that the explanation that it indicates is wrong, in the sense that the explanation produces the observations, but is not in fact what produced the original observations. In science this is not a problem, because we are only concerned with the predictive power of the explanation. You have to be able to re-test the explanation. I am hesitant to allow its use in history, because the explanation stands entirely in isolation and cannot be shown erroneous without introducing new data-- and there is not an infinite supply of new historical information. With regard to the claims of christianity, it is quite obvious that selecting the "wrong" explanation is quite devastating. While claims that the gospels are lies and claims that the resurrection actually happened as stated may explain the beginnings of christianity as it is recorded, the truth of one versus the other produces quite different implications. In this case, Occam's razor is less useful, because we do care whether or not the explanation is the same as the actuality, as well as caring that it explains the data. > Another problem with the above argument is the implication that there is a > sample size of one for the resurrection, which leaves too little data for > any useful analysis. This is not so. There are NUMEROUS other claims of > resurrections (even in the Bible-- remember Lazarus?) in many other > writings. There's the claim of reincarnation going on around us daily. > I say that claims of miracles should be lumped together to be considered > with the Razor. You can only lump together if you assume that they all have the same "cause", i.e., that they can all be explained through the same process. This is O.K. in science, because we can always disprove this assumption with new observations. We can't assume that with history because there's no way to go back and disprove the assumption without new data, which is decreasingly forthcoming. Lazarus is totally independent of Jesus. It is possible that definitive evidence will appear showing that Jesus rose from the dead and that Lazarus did not. Given the current evidence, however, there is no way to distinguish this from the other possibilities. I admit that the conclusion that Jesus rose from the dead makes the resurrection of Lazarus seem MUCH more likely. I should also point out that the gospel narrations in the two cases are quite different; the evidence indicates two different processes (or lies). Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (11/15/84)
It appears it is about time for me to bow out of this argument, judging from Rich Rosen's lastest missive: > It appears that you know little about cosmology and how scientists > speculate and evaluate possibilities about the early moments of the > universe. (I take that back: *I* know little about cosmology, so I > guess you know even less than that.) To say that there simply IS a god, > based solely on the assumption that you would like for there to be one, > is a ridiculous position. As ridiculous (no, more so) than assuming that > there isn't one. I say "more so" because it is arguably less ridiculous > to take the more feasible possibility by Occam. This statement is so full of incorrect assumptions about my position and motivations that it's hard to know where to start. First of all, one can obviously distiguish between scientific cosmology and the regualr flavor. Scientific cosmology has proceed under the limitation that using its techniques, we can never really know what started the universe. A very clever god could arrange everything so that we would never know he was there. That's O.K. in science because we don't care. In religion, we do. Secondly, since I have never explained how I justify my belief in christianity, where does Rich get his statement that I assume God's existence solely on the basis that I would like there to be one? How does he know? Sounds to me like he assumed that I would like God to exist, and decided that such a desire would irreparably prejudice me. Why don't we argue this as if we actually believed in our arguments? As for feasibility, Occam's razor isn't even remotely concerned with this. Occam's razor gives us simplicity; we get truth from other sources. Occam's razor only comes into play once we have a) agreed that both our explanations adequately explain the data, and b) agreed that we don't care which explanation is deemed correct. Once we have gotten to question (a), all our explanations are feasible. >> If I am told by >> someone that their brother rose from the dead last night, is not the >> simplest theory that he did in fact do so? The evaluation that one would >> normally make would be that the event is "too unlikely"; but how unlikely >> IS too unlikely? One makes a highly subjective evaluation. > >The "highly subjective evaluation" is the one that assumes the unlikely >for no apparent reason. Simply because one assumes the conclusion, one >accepts unreliable evidence as "proof", one "evaluates" by assuming what one >wants to believe. And believing that THAT is a basis for making evaluative >decisions about reality is preposterous. > >> I have a copy of _Why I am Not a Christian_, and I don't find it the least >> convincing. Most of his arguments are the same old discredited arguments >> we've all heard years before, and he doesn't seem to realize that if God >> sticks his hand into the universe and makes a change in the material >> universe, that the assumption that is the very foundation of science, that >> the universe always operates in the same fashion, is violated. > > By "discredited", you apparently mean "ignored". I can only understand by this statement that Rich Rosen is utterly ignorant of the history of christian theology. All the arguments he has brought up are very old; people were arguing about most of the in the middle ages. I can't see how he could seriously claim that these arguments have been ignored if he had ever actually read the traditional replies. I can't deny that a lot of the traditional responses are wrong; but those of us who actually read christian philosophical works are acutely aware that they haven't been ignored. Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe Ubi caritas et amor, deus ibi est.
mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) (11/19/84)
In article <1112@umcp-cs.UUCP> mangoe@maryland.UUCP (Charley Wingate) writes: >Occam's razor is only usable when you don't care that the explanation that >it indicates is wrong, in the sense that the explanation produces the >observations, but is not in fact what produced the original observations. >In science this is not a problem, because we are only concerned with the >predictive power of the explanation. You have to be able to re-test the >explanation. I am hesitant to allow its use in history, because the >explanation stands entirely in isolation and cannot be shown erroneous >without introducing new data-- and there is not an infinite supply of new >historical information. With regard to the claims of christianity, it >is quite obvious that selecting the "wrong" explanation is quite devastating. >While claims that the gospels are lies and claims that the resurrection >actually happened as stated may explain the beginnings of christianity as >it is recorded, the truth of one versus the other produces quite different >implications. In this case, Occam's razor is less useful, because we do >care whether or not the explanation is the same as the actuality, as well >as caring that it explains the data. If you don't know the "actuality" then how else will you decide what it most likely was? Appeal to vested interests seems to be your implication. >You can only lump together if you assume that they all have the same >"cause", i.e., that they can all be explained through the same process. >This is O.K. in science, because we can always disprove this assumption >with new observations. We can't assume that with history because there's >no way to go back and disprove the assumption without new data, which >is decreasingly forthcoming. Both history and theology recur in patterns. New religions are always being spawned, and history is always being made. Part of any hypothesis is how well it can classify (lump together) in predictive ways. Machievelli's The Prince for example. That no two hypotheses may classify alike doesn't disqualify any individual hypothesis. So you can classify Biblical miracles as uniquely true in your hypothesis, and I classify all miracles as probable lies. That's a perfectly appropriate part of hypothesizing. My ideas about religion may be analogous to Machiavelli's on princes. (Pardon the pomposity :-) ) On the other hand, I can think of times when Occam's Razor is not appropriate. It is not appropriate in cases of fraud, where because it is expected that Occam's Razor (or similar) will be used, the information made available is tailored to lead to a false conclusion. That's the route normally used by Christians (and other religions) to discredit logic of all sorts, by postulating a devil or other source of disinformation. Which leads us right to Tim Marony's (sp?) moral arguments against the god of that sort of religion. -- Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh